Jeffrey W. Fuqua, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] Jeffrey W. Fuqua (“Fuqua”) appeals the sanction imposed following the revocation of his probation. Fuqua argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered him to serve his previously suspended sentence. Concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

[2] We affirm.

Issue

Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered Fuqua to serve his previously suspended sentence.

Facts

[3] In November 2020, the State ultimately charged Fuqua with Level 3 felony resisting law enforcement, Level 4 felony operating while intoxicated causing catastrophic injury,¹ Level 5 felony criminal recklessness, Level 5 felony operating a vehicle with a Schedule I or II drug causing serious bodily injury, Level 5 felony resisting law enforcement, Level 6 felony resisting law enforcement, Level 6 felony identity deception, Class A misdemeanor theft, and Class C misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia. Fuqua had an active warrant for a probation violation at the time of this offense. In April 2021, Fuqua entered into a plea agreement, wherein he agreed to plead guilty to Level 4 felony operating while intoxicated causing catastrophic injury, and the State agreed to dismiss the remaining charges. The plea agreement further provided that the State would recommend that Fuqua serve a twelve (12) year sentence, with five (5) years executed and seven (7) years suspended to probation. Additionally, the plea agreement provided that Fuqua would obey the terms and conditions of probation. Attached to the plea agreement, the parties included a document containing the terms and conditions of probation. The document provided that, among other terms, Fuqua: (1) “shall make an appointment to meet with the Probation Department ․ within five (5) days after release from incarceration[;]” and (2) “must not commit another criminal offense.” (App. Vol. 2 at 109). Fuqua signed the terms of probation. At an April 2021 change of plea hearing, Fuqua pleaded guilty pursuant to the plea agreement, and the trial court took the plea agreement under advisement.

[4] At Fuqua's May 2021 sentencing hearing, the trial court accepted the plea agreement. The trial court told Fuqua that, as a condition of his probation, he had to “make an appointment to meet with the Probation Department of this Court within five days after release [from] incarceration and thereafter report to the Department ․ [as] directed.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 20). Additionally, the trial court told Fuqua that, as another term of his probation, he “must not commit another criminal offense.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 20). After reading Fuqua all of the terms of his probation, the trial court asked Fuqua if he understood the terms of his probation, and Fuqua answered in the affirmative. Thereafter, the trial court sentenced Fuqua pursuant to the plea agreement. Specifically, the trial court ordered Fuqua to serve a twelve (12) year sentence, with five (5) years executed at the Indiana Department of Correction (“the DOC”) and seven (7) years suspended to probation.

[5] In July 2024, the probation department filed a petition to revoke Fuqua's probation, which alleged that Fuqua had failed to report to the probation department after having been released from incarceration. Specifically, the probation department alleged that Fuqua had been released from incarceration in August 2023, had not reported to the probation department within five days of that date, and that Fuqua's current whereabouts were unknown. In October 2024, the probation department filed an amended petition to revoke Fuqua's probation and alleged that Fuqua had committed a new offense in Kentucky. Specifically, the probation department alleged that, in July 2024, Fuqua had been charged with shoplifting in Louisville.

[6] In December 2024, the trial court held a factfinding hearing. During the hearing, Fuqua admitted to violating the terms of his probation as alleged. The trial court found that Fuqua had violated the terms of his probation and set a dispositional hearing.

[7] At an April 2025 dispositional hearing, Fuqua testified that he had been accepted into a residential treatment center. Fuqua asked the trial court to allow him to be released to the treatment center, continue probation, or, if incarcerated, participate in the Recovery While Incarcerated program. Fuqua testified that nobody had told him to report to probation when he had been released from incarceration. The probation officer testified that Fuqua was not “a good candidate for probation because he avoided reporting.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 61).

[8] The trial court noted that Fuqua had an extensive criminal history, including four felony convictions and two probation violations. The trial court further noted that Fuqua had “basically ignored the Court's orders” when Fuqua had failed to report to probation after having been released from incarceration and had committed a new offense. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 64). Further, the trial court noted that Fuqua was “not accepting responsibility[,]” “making excuses, [and] blaming ․ anyone but himself[.]” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 64). The trial court told Fuqua that it had “heard nothing today to indicate any level of remorse or any level of acceptance or responsibility.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 65). At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court revoked Fuqua's probation and ordered him to serve the remainder of his previously suspended sentence at the DOC. Additionally, the trial court ordered Fuqua to participate in the Recovery While Incarcerated program, and, if Fuqua was successful, the trial court would consider modifying his sentence.

[9] Fuqua now appeals.

Decision

[10] Fuqua argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered him to serve his previously suspended sentence. We disagree.

[11] “[A] trial court's sentencing decisions for probation violations are reviewable using the abuse of discretion standard.” Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007) (citing Sanders v. State, 825 N.E.2d 952, 956 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied). An abuse of discretion occurs where the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances. Id. “Once a trial court has exercised its grace by ordering probation rather than incarceration, the judge should have considerable leeway in deciding how to proceed.” Prewitt, 878 N.E.2d at 188. “If this discretion were not afforded to trial courts and sentences were scrutinized too severely on appeal, trial judges might be less inclined to order probation to future defendants.” Id. Upon determining that a probationer has violated a condition of probation, the trial court may “[o]rder execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing.” IND. CODE § 35-38-2-3(h)(3).

[12] Our review of the record reveals that the trial court had a sufficient basis for its decision to order Fuqua to serve all of his previously suspended sentence. Fuqua admitted to every allegation in the probation department's petitions to revoke his probation. Specifically, Fuqua admitted to failing to report to the probation department after he had been released from incarceration and to committing a new shoplifting offense. Further, the trial court noted that Fuqua had multiple previous probation violations, multiple felony convictions, and that Fuqua had shown no evidence of remorse or acceptance of responsibility. Further, Fuqua had an active arrest warrant in another county for a probation violation when he had committed these offenses. Additionally, the probation officer testified that Fuqua was not a good candidate for probation. Considering the record before us, the sanction imposed was well within the trial court's discretion. See I.C. § 35-38-2-3(h)(3). Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

[13] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Fuqua caused a catastrophic injury to the passenger in his car.

Pyle, Judge.

Vaidik, J., and Mathias, J., concur.