MITCHELL v. TUDOR PARK INC BY PAUL (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Kimberley Mitchell owns an apartment managed by Tudor Park, Inc. (Tudor Park) and failed to pay regular and special assessments as required of each apartment owner. Tudor Park, by its Receiver, recorded a lien against Mitchell's apartment for unpaid assessments and later brought suit to foreclose on the lien and obtain damages. Tudor Park moved for summary judgment, and the trial court granted the motion after finding Mitchell “failed to file any opposing affidavits[ ] or otherwise designate each material issue of fact and evidence relevant thereto[.]” Appellee's Appendix Vol 2 at 17.

[2] Mitchell filed a motion to correct error, which was denied, and a motion to stay enforcement of the ruling pending any appeal, which was granted. She now appeals, asserting multiple arguments including: (1) Tudor Park lacked standing and the capacity to sue her; (2) the suit was barred by the doctrine of res judicata; (3) she owed no debt; (4) Tudor Park misrepresented facts; and (5) the grant of summary judgment violated her due process rights. Finding no error, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Tudor Park is an administratively dissolved nonprofit corporation that manages apartments in Marion County. In 1994, Mitchell purchased one of those apartments. Under a declaration of horizontal property ownership (the Declaration) and the by-laws incorporated by reference therein,¹ Mitchell is required to pay regular assessments monthly and occasional special assessments. On February 1st each year, those assessments become a lien on the owner's apartment.

[4] In May 2018, a different entity connected to Tudor Park, called Tudor Park HOA (the HOA), filed suit in Marion County Small Claims Court to recover the unpaid assessments Mitchell had accumulated up to that point in time. The court entered judgment in favor of the HOA for $7,750 (the 2018 Judgment). Four years later, the HOA attempted to foreclose on the 2018 Judgment, but in September of 2022, it moved to voluntarily dismiss the case. Although the court granted that motion, its written order did not indicate whether the case was dismissed with or without prejudice. The chronological case summary indicated the dismissal was with prejudice.

[5] In January 2023, Mark Shane was appointed as the Receiver for Tudor Park.² In December, Tudor Park, by its Receiver, recorded a lien against Mitchell's apartment for unpaid assessments totaling $13,843.86 (the recorded lien). That lien was partially based on the 2018 Judgment. In March 2024, Shane resigned as Receiver, and the court appointed James M. Paul of Alps Property Management in his place.

[6] In July 2024, Tudor Park, by its Receiver, brought suit against Mitchell to foreclose on its lien and for damages related to her unpaid assessments. Tudor Park alleged that since May 30, 2018, Mitchell had “failed to make payments due to the Association in accordance with the terms of the Declaration.” Appellee's App. Vol. 2 at 27. Mitchell filed an answer admitting nine allegations in the complaint, denying six, and failing to respond to the rest.³ Mitchell filed a motion to remove the lien, and the trial court held a hearing regarding “the effect of the [September 2022] dismissal on the validity of [the recorded] lien and/or the amount of the lien.” Id. at 8. At the hearing, the parties clarified the circumstances surrounding the 2022 dismissal and presented arguments as to whether the 2018 Judgment could be included in Tudor Park's lien and foreclosure. Tudor Park also noted that the recorded lien included “[e]verything from the dismissal of the other foreclosure action forward.” Transcript at 15. Mitchell brought a few receipts to the hearing she claimed showed she had made some assessment payments. At the end of the hearing, the court found that the September 2022 dismissal was with prejudice and determined that any amounts included in the recorded lien prior to September 8, 2022 were void and could not be part of the foreclosure.

[7] The next day, Tudor Park filed a motion for summary judgment and designated the following evidence in support: (1) its complaint; (2) Mitchell's answer; (3) the Declaration; (4) the recorded lien; (5) an Affidavit of Debt by Paul encompassing only Mitchell's unpaid assessments after the September 2022 dismissal; and (6) their lawyer's affidavit in support of attorney's fees. Mitchell filed her response in objection to Tudor Park's motion, which was not under oath and did not designate any evidence in support. Neither party filed a motion for a hearing. The court granted Tudor Park's motion on April 29, 2025, finding Mitchell “failed to file any opposing affidavits[ ] or otherwise designate each material issue of fact and evidence relevant thereto[.]” Appellee's App. Vol. 2 at 17. It awarded Tudor Park $13,429.03 in damages, prejudgment interest, court costs, and attorney's fees.

[8] Also on April 29, Mitchell filed a motion asking the trial court to (1) take judicial notice of its ruling that lien amounts predating September 8, 2022, could not be foreclosed; (2) strike the entirety of Tudor Park's lien, including sums that had accrued after September 8, 2022; (3) schedule a hearing to determine an amount of damages to which she claimed to be entitled against Tudor Park; (4) and impose sanctions for Tudor Park's supposedly frivolous legal filings. The court did not rule on that motion. On May 8, she filed a motion to correct error asserting a plethora of arguments similar to those she previously made in her April 29th motion. The court denied her motion. She also filed a motion to stay the foreclosure, which the court granted, staying any sale of her apartment until thirty days after a ruling on her motion to correct error or for the duration of a timely filed appeal.⁴ Mitchell appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[9] Mitchell argues there are several reasons why the trial court's granting of Tudor Park's motion for summary judgment was erroneous. We first note that Mitchell proceeds in this matter pro se. “It is well settled that pro se litigants are held to the same legal standards as licensed attorneys.” Basic v. Amouri, 58 N.E.3d 980, 983 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), reh'g denied. Such litigants are required to adhere to our rules of appellate procedure “and must be prepared to accept the consequences of their failure to do so.” Flowers v. State, 250 N.E.3d 507, 509 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (quoting Basic, 58 N.E.3d at 983-84).

[10] Preliminarily, we find it important to address Mitchell's arguments regarding Tudor Park's standing and capacity to maintain this action. She claims that because Tudor Park is administratively dissolved, it ceased to exist and could not pursue an action against her. See Appellant's Brief at 13 (“Receiver and counsel used the defunct entity ․ to file the instant lawsuit[.]”). This argument is misplaced for several reasons. First, Tudor Park's administratively dissolved status does not per se render it incapable of bringing a legal action. See Ind. Code § 23-1-45-5(b)(5) (“Dissolution of a corporation does not[ ] ․ prevent commencement of a proceeding by or against the corporation in its corporate name[.]”).

[11] Second, in January 2023, another court appointed a Receiver for Tudor Park, and then in March 2024 it appointed Paul in substitution when the original Receiver resigned. Under Indiana Code section 32-30-5-7, “[a] receiver may, under the control of the court or the judge: [ ] bring and defend actions; [and] ․ collect debts[ ] ․ in the receiver's own name, and generally do other acts respecting the property as the court or judge may authorize.” Furthermore, in its January 19, 2023 Order, the receivership court specifically granted Tudor Park's Receiver the power “[t]o take possession and charge of, and to marshal all assets of [Tudor Park], and the Tudor Park community, and collect any and all assessments ․ on behalf of Tudor Park community pursuant to the Declaration and Indiana Code § 32-25-1-1 et seq.”⁵ Indiana Code sections 32-25-6-3(a) and (b)(2) specifically provide that “[a]ll sums assessed by the association of co-owners but unpaid ․ constitute a lien on the unit effective at the time of assessment” and such liens “may be filed and foreclosed by suit by” a court-appointed receiver. Upon Paul's appointment, the court granted him “all of the powers enumerated in [the] Court's January 19, 2023[ ] Order regarding the appointment of the initial[ ] predecessor Receiver.”⁶ Paul, as Tudor Park's current Receiver, was therefore statutorily and judicially authorized to institute this suit against Mitchell. As such, Mitchell's arguments that Tudor Park lacked standing or capacity to bring this suit against her are unavailing.

[12] Turning then to the matter of summary judgment, “[w]e review summary judgment decisions de novo, applying the same standard as the trial court.” Isgrig v. Trs. of Ind. Univ., 256 N.E.3d 1238, 1244 (Ind. 2025). Pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 56(C), the initial burden is on the moving party to make a “prima facie showing that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. (quoting Reed v. Reid, 980 N.E.2d 277, 285 (Ind. 2012)). If the moving party carries its initial burden, “the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to come forward with evidence establishing the existence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Id. Our review is limited “to the materials designated at the trial level.” Gunderson v. State, Ind. Dep't of Nat. Res., 90 N.E.3d 1171, 1175 (Ind. 2018), cert. denied. We construe any doubts as to any facts or reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party, and while the trial court's findings and conclusions “aid our review, [ ] they do not bind us.” Sandoval v. Willow Lake Ests. Home Owners Ass'n, Inc., 255 N.E.3d 1181, 1186 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025).

[13] Here, Tudor Park made a prima facie showing that there were no genuine issues of material fact and Mitchell failed to designate any evidence to the contrary. Thus, the trial court properly granted Tudor Park's motion for summary judgment.

[14] To meet its initial burden, Tudor Park was required to make a prima facie showing that a contract existed between it and Mitchell for the payment of assessments, Mitchell breached that contract, and Tudor Park suffered economic harm as a result of Mitchell's breach. Tudor Park designated evidence that Mitchell was obligated to pay assessments under the Declaration and that such assessments would become a lien on her apartment. In its complaint, Tudor Park alleged—and Mitchell admitted—that she owns an apartment in Tudor Park and the by-laws, incorporated by reference into the Declaration, require apartment owners to pay monthly regular assessments beginning each year in February and those assessments become a lien on the apartment when assessed on February 1.

[15] Moreover, Mitchell's failure to respond in her answer to paragraphs 9 and 11 of the complaint served as an admission to Tudor Park's allegations that as an apartment owner she was bound by the Declaration and the by-laws allowed the Board of Managers to make special assessments, which became liens on her apartment each February 1st. See Indiana Trial Rule 8(D) (“[a]verments in a pleading to which a responsive pleading is required ․ are admitted when not denied in the responsive pleading.”). Tudor Park's complaint and the Receiver's affidavit of debt showed Mitchell continuously failed to pay assessments after the September 2022 dismissal and after the December 2023 lien was recorded, culminating in almost $8,000 in overdue assessments. The recorded lien specifically states:

Tudor Park [was] also entitled to recovery and [ ] assert[ed] its lien rights to secure all unpaid assessments which may accrue subsequent to [December 22, 2023], interest on the outstanding balance of all amounts owed, interest beginning to accrue on the first day of default, and until all amounts are paid in full, at the rate of eight percent [ ] per annum, plus additional attorneys’ fees, recording fees and all other fees and expenses.

Appellee's App. Vol. 2 at 67.

[16] In her response to Tudor Park's motion, Mitchell designated no evidence whatsoever, let alone evidence showing the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. See id. at 155-158.⁷ Pursuant to Trial Rule 56(C), “[a] party opposing the [summary judgment] motion shall [ ] designate to the court each material issue of fact which that party asserts precludes entry of summary judgment and the evidence relevant thereto.” Mitchell's response was comprised of the following assertions: (1) Tudor Park could not collect on any amount reflected in the 2018 judgment because it had dismissed its previous collection efforts in 2022; (2) there had “been no hearing or adjudication on any alleged amount owed”; (3) she had unsuccessfully attempted to contact an entity called the Alps Group, which she suggested was Tudor Park's predecessor in interest regarding the collection of assessments; (4) the underlying lien was fraudulent; and (5) the Alps Group had only been incorporated as of April 2024, so according to Mitchell, she did not owe any sums that accrued prior to that date.⁸ Appellee's App. Vol. 2 at 156. But Mitchell failed to designate any evidence in support of those assertions or otherwise explain how they created a genuine issue of material fact in the case. See Hayden v. Franciscan All., Inc., 131 N.E.3d 685, 695 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (concluding summary judgment was proper where party “failed to designate any evidence creating a genuine of material fact”), trans. denied.

[17] On appeal, Mitchell makes a multitude of scattered and disjointed contentions that are not supported by cogent reasoning, case law, or the record as required by Appellate Rule 46(A). Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a) (“The argument [section of the brief] must contain the contentions of the appellant on the issues presented, supported by cogent reasoning [and] ․ citations to the authorities, statutes, and the ․ parts of the Record on appeal relied on[.]”). As a result, those arguments are waived for appellate review. See Wilkes v. Celadon Grp., Inc., 177 N.E.3d 786, 790 (Ind. 2021) (“To avoid waiver on appeal, a party must develop a cogent argument.”). To the extent we are able to interpret her remaining arguments, we address them below.⁹

[18] Mitchell contends that the September 2022 dismissal of Tudor Park's prior attempt to collect the 2018 Judgment bars the present matter under the doctrine of res judicata. The doctrine of res judicata is applicable “where there has been a final adjudication on the merits of the same issue between the same parties.” In re Eq.W., 124 N.E.3d 1201, 1208 (Ind. 2019) (quoting Ind. State Ethics Comm'n v. Sanchez, 18 N.E.3d 988, 993 (Ind. 2014)). While the 2018 case did involve a Tudor Park entity, Mitchell, and some of Mitchell's unpaid assessments, it did not involve her unpaid assessments after September 2022, which were the subject of the court-amended lien and Tudor Park's summary judgment motion. Thus, the prior case was not a final adjudication on the merits of the same issue and therefore, Tudor Park could maintain an action based on her post-September 2022 unpaid assessments and foreclose on the lien that attached to her apartment as a result. See Wedel v. Am. Elec. Power Serv. Corp., 681 N.E.2d 1122, 1131 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (“A claim for payments accruing subsequent to a previous judgment is considered a different cause of action.” (citing Booher v. Richmond Square, Inc., 310 N.E.2d 89, 92 (Ind. Ct. App. 1974)), reh'g denied, trans. denied.

[19] Mitchell also claims “there was no valid debt existing between any of the parties[,]” but she fails to point to the evidence she presented to the trial court in her summary judgment response supporting that claim. Appellant's Br. at 15. While she supposedly showed a receipt to the court at the hearing early in the case, she did not designate any evidence of such receipts in her response to the summary judgment motion. See Tr. at 21-22. Furthermore, Tudor Park's assessment calculation includes over $1,000 in credit for assessments Mitchell had paid, and Mitchell offers no evidence or argument that there are additional payments to be considered other than those already accounted for. See Appellee's App. Vol. 2 at 134.

[20] Mitchell also contends that Tudor Park “intentionally misrepresented facts” in its motion for summary judgment, but she does not clearly indicate what facts Tudor Park misrepresented. Appellant's Br. at 16. She instead points to Tudor Park's attorney's decision to check “No” on the summons document when prompted to select whether there were any cases related to this one. See id. at 19. According to Mitchell, this shows “a repeated intentional act to obtain judgment, and by any means necessary[.]” Id. However, an issue with the summons is unrelated to any misrepresentation made in the motion for summary judgment. Additionally, Mitchell failed to raise this concern to the trial court in either her answer or summary judgment response. See Hochstetler v. State, 215 N.E.3d 365, 376 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (“It is well-established that an appellant may not raise issues for the first time on appeal and that failure to raise an issue in the trial court results in waiver of an issue for our consideration.”), reh'g denied. Furthermore, on appeal she fails to indicate which cases she believes were related, present any evidence the attorney's mark was intended to deceive, or make any argument as to how that action, intentional or not, prejudiced her.

[21] Lastly, in a confusing mix of these contentions, Mitchell asserts the court's grant of the motion for summary judgment violated her due process rights. See id. at 15. However, given the failure of her other appellate arguments upon which it relies, her due process argument meets the same fate.

Conclusion

[22] In light of the evidence designated by Tudor Park in support of its motion for summary judgment and Mitchell's failure to designate any evidence in opposition or prevail on her other arguments, we conclude the trial court did not err in granting Tudor Park's motion for summary judgment, and we affirm.

[23] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The Declaration was filed pursuant to the Horizontal Property Act (the Act) codified in Indiana Code article 32-35. The Act provides that owners of certain housing units are subject “to declarations and bylaws of associations of co-owners adopted under” the Act. Ind. Code § 32-25-1-2(a).

2.   Pursuant to Indiana Evidence Rule 201, we take judicial notice of the court records in the receivership case under Cause No. 49D12-2212-PL-44382, in which Mark Shane, and later James M. Paul, was appointed as the Receiver for Tudor Park, Inc. Ind. Evidence Rule 201(b)(5) (“A court may judicially notice a law, which includes[ ] ․ records of a court of this state[.]”).

3.   There were 27 allegations in Tudor Park's complaint. Mitchell admitted to allegations 1-8 and 10; she denied allegations 13-16, 18, and 24; and she did not respond to the remaining allegations.

4.   Mitchell filed a slew of other motions including, inter alia, a motion to dismiss “for fraud upon the court,” a motion to vacate the judgment “and restore defendant[’]s home equity,” and a motion to vacate a void judgment for lack of standing, all of which were denied by the trial court. See Appellee's App. Vol. 2 at 13-15.

5.   Emergency Order Appointing Receiver at 4, Richard Trotman v. Tudor Park, Inc., Case No. 49D12-2212-PL-44382 (Marion Sup. Ct. Jan. 19, 2023).

6.   Order Appointing Substitute Receiver at 2-3, Richard Trotman v. Tudor Park, Inc., Case No. 49D12-2212-PL-44382 (Marion Sup. Ct. Mar. 15, 2024).

7.   Although Mitchell claims she included “designated materials that were in and of themselves a form of affidavits [because] they are true accounts[,]” there was no designation of evidence made in her response, there were no documents attached to or filed with her response, and the response itself was not under oath. Appellant's Br. at 11.

8.   We note that, in full consideration of the court's order voiding any portion of the 2023 recorded lien seeking unpaid assessments from the 2018 Judgment, Tudor Park's motion was limited to Mitchell's unpaid assessments after the 2018 Judgment. Furthermore, neither party requested that a hearing be held on the motion, and absent such a request, the court is not required to hold a hearing. See Trial Rule 56(C) (“The court may conduct a hearing on the motion. However, upon motion of any party made no later than ten [ ] days after the response was filed or was due, the court shall conduct a hearing on the motion[.]”) (emphasis added). And lastly, Mitchell did not explain how her attempts to contact the Alps Group or its date of incorporation were relevant to Tudor Park's ability to pursue her unpaid assessments.

9.   Intertwined throughout Mitchell's argument section is her belief that Tudor Park, as an administratively dissolved nonprofit, does not exist and therefore could not maintain an action against her. As addressed above, Tudor Park, Inc. continues to exist despite its administrative dissolution, and its Receiver was authorized by statute and by court order to pursue unpaid assessments and foreclose on liens.

DeBoer, Judge.

[24] Bradford, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.