IN RE: The Unsupervised ESTATE OF James Sidney HEERSMA: (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] James Sidney Heersma died intestate in 2022. Heersma's only heirs were his four adult nieces, including Cynthia Schrock and Frances Traisman. Frances was appointed personal representative of Heersma's estate (“the Estate”) and his heirs agreed that it should be administered under unsupervised administration. Administration of the Estate was prolonged because Frances encountered difficulty identifying all of the Estate's assets. Throughout the Estate's administration, Frances provided updates to the trial court of the Estate's status and submitted an interim accounting for the trial court's approval. At some point, Cynthia (1) moved to have Frances removed as personal representative of the Estate, (2) moved to have administration of the Estate converted to supervised, and (3) objected to the interim accounting. Apart from certain meal expenses, which the trial court ordered could not be charged to the Estate, the trial court approved the interim accounting and denied Cynthia's requests to remove Frances as the personal representative of the Estate and to convert administration of the Estate to supervised. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Heersma died intestate on March 14, 2022. At the time of his death, Heersma resided in Monroe County and had four heirs: Frances, Cynthia, Elizabeth Farry, and Abigail Schrock. None of Heersma's heirs lived in Indiana with Frances living in Seattle, Washington; Cynthia living in Queensbury, New York; Elizabeth living in Gansevoort, New York; and Abigail living in San Francisco, California.

[3] On April 27, 2022, Frances petitioned to be appointed personal representative of the Estate and for an unsupervised administration of the Estate. Frances's petition indicated that the other heirs had consented to her appointment and that administration of the Estate be unsupervised. Frances further indicated that, to the best of her knowledge, the Estate was “believed to be solvent and to consist of” real estate in Michigan, a vehicle, cash, a life-insurance policy, a retirement account, and an unknown amount of tangible personal property. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 12. The trial court appointed Frances as personal representative of the Estate and authorized its unsupervised administration on May 4, 2022.

[4] In her role as personal representative, Frances visited Indiana and Michigan in June of 2022, and Michigan in August of 2022. Abigail accompanied Frances on part of the June trip and Cynthia accompanied Frances on part of the August trip. During these trips, Abigail and Cynthia were given the opportunity to access Heersma's personal belongings and request any of these belongings that they wished to have. Cynthia requested family photographs, a book manuscript, a book titled “Your Story” that Cynthia had previously given to her grandparents, and a bell.¹

[5] Due to Frances's unfamiliarity with Heersma's assets, identification of the assets “took longer than anticipated[.]” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 28. Frances identified and administered the assets of the Estate, with each of the four heirs receiving a partial distribution of $100,000.00 on October 31, 2023. Frances provided status reports to the trial court in May of 2023 and May of 2024, and indicated that, with court approval, the remainder of the Estate would be distributed upon the closing of the Estate.

[6] On October 25, 2024, Cynthia sent a letter to the trial court requesting that Frances be removed from her role as personal representative of the Estate. Cynthia further indicated that she was revoking her consent to an unsupervised administration of the Estate and requested that administration of the Estate be converted to supervised. On November 21, 2024, Frances moved for approval of an interim accounting of the Estate's assets. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied Cynthia's requests to remove Frances from her role as personal representative of the Estate and to convert the administration of the Estate to supervised. The trial court also, apart from a few meals that had been charged to the Estate, approved the interim accounting.

Discussion and Decision

[7] Cynthia contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her request to remove Frances from her position of personal representative of the Estate. Cynthia also contends that the trial court erred in denying her request to convert the administration of the Estate from unsupervised to supervised and approving the interim accounting, with slight modifications. For her part, Frances argues that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Cynthia's request to remove her from her position of personal representative of the Estate or err in denying Cynthia's request to convert administration of the Estate to supervised or approving the interim accounting, with the slight modifications.

[8] As an initial matter, we note that Cynthia proceeds pro se.

A litigant is not given special consideration by virtue of his pro se status. Rather, it is well settled that pro se litigants are held to the same legal standards as licensed attorneys. This means that pro se litigants are bound to follow the established rules of procedure and must be prepared to accept the consequences of their failure to do so.

Kelley v. State, 166 N.E.3d 936, 937 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (internal brackets, citation, and quotation omitted). “These consequences include waiver for failure to present cogent argument on appeal [․] where the appellant's noncompliance with appellate rules is so substantial as to impede our consideration of the issues[.]” Basic v. Amouri, 58 N.E.3d 980, 984 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (internal citations omitted).² “We will not become an advocate for a party, or address arguments that are inappropriate or too poorly developed or expressed to be understood.” Id. (internal quotation omitted).

I. Removal of Frances as Personal Representative of the Estate

[9] Indiana Code section 29-1-10-6 gives trial courts the authority to remove a personal representative of an estate under certain circumstances.³ “It is well settled that a [trial] court has great latitude and wide discretion in matters concerning the appointment and removal of executors and administrators, and this Court will not attempt to control or interfere with the court's action unless it is clear that its discretion has been abused.” Est. of Jaworski v. Jaworski, 479 N.E.2d 89, 91 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985), trans. denied. “An abuse of discretion may occur if the trial court's decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court or if the trial court misinterpreted the law.” Tofany v. NBS Imaging Sys., Inc., 616 N.E.2d 1034, 1039 (Ind. 1993).

[10] Cynthia argues that Frances should have been removed from her position as personal representative of the Estate, claiming that Frances had failed to complete an inventory and to provide her with a copy of the inventory, as required by law. Cynthia also made allegations that Frances had breached her duty to the Estate and had engaged in self-dealing, conversion of the property, and mismanagement of the Estate's assets. The trial court considered Cynthia's arguments during the evidentiary hearing, ultimately concluding that Cynthia had failed to prove that Frances should be removed from her position of personal representative. Cynthia's arguments in this regard are, at times, hard to follow as she makes numerous unsubstantiated allegations against Frances. Frances, who had provided annual updates to the trial court, explained the difficulties in administering the Estate, given her (and apparently the other heirs’) unfamiliarity with Heersma's assets. Frances also provided a detailed interim accounting detailing the assets that she had discovered, and the costs associated with administration of the Estate.

[11] “[T]he factfinder, and not the appellate court, is obliged to determine not only whom to believe, but also what portions of conflicting testimony to believe, and is not required to believe a witness's testimony even when it is uncontradicted.” Shorter v. State, 144 N.E.3d 829, 839 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (internal quotation omitted), trans. denied. The trial court, acting as the trier-of-fact, apparently did not credit Cynthia's numerous allegations of wrongdoing by Frances but rather credited Frances's testimony and evidence outlining her work as personal representative. Cynthia's arguments on appeal amount to nothing more than a request that we reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. Estate of Kappel v. Kappel, 979 N.E.2d 642, 651 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012).

II. Conversion of Estate from Unsupervised to Supervised

[12] In denying Cynthia's request to convert the administration of the Estate from unsupervised to supervised, the trial court did not make any detailed factual findings. “In the absence of special findings, we review a trial court decision as a general judgment and, without reweighing evidence or considering witness credibility, affirm if sustainable upon any theory consistent with the evidence.” Perdue Farms, Inc. v. Pryor, 683 N.E.2d 239, 240 (Ind. 1997). “We will set aside the trial court's findings or judgment only if they are clearly erroneous.” Richardson v. Thieme, 76 N.E.3d 892, 897 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans. denied. “A finding is clearly erroneous only if there are no facts or inferences drawn therefrom to support it.” Id. (internal quotation omitted). “In reviewing a general judgment, we must presume that the trial court correctly followed the law.” Pryor, 683 N.E.2d at 240.

[13] The court may, on its own motion or the motion of an interested person, revoke an order of unsupervised administration and require an administration on terms and conditions which the court specifies if the court finds that such a revocation is in the best interests of the estate, creditors, taxing authorities, heirs, legatees, or devisees.

Ind. Code § 29-1-7.5-2(d). Cynthia's arguments relating to this contention are largely repetitive of the unsubstantiated allegations that she made with regard to Frances's position as personal representative of the Estate. As evidence of Frances's alleged mismanagement of the Estate, Cynthia points to the fact that Frances had failed to close the Estate “promptly.” Appellant's Br. p. 32.⁴ The evidence, which was apparently credited by the trial court, indicated that the delay in closing the Estate had been due to Frances's difficulties in uncovering all of Heersma's assets. Again, the trial court was in the best position to weigh the evidence and witness creditability. Shorter, 144 N.E.3d at 839. The evidence presented by Frances supports the inference that conversion of the administration of the Estate from unsupervised to supervised was not in the best interests of the Estate. Cynthia's argument to the contrary effectively amounts to a request to reweigh the evidence, which, again, we will not do. See Pryor, 683 N.E.2d at 240.

III. Approval of Interim Accounting

[14] Cynthia last contends that the trial court erred in approving the interim accounting. The trial court did not make specific findings in approving the interim accounting, beyond finding that meal expenses for persons other than Frances should not have been assessed to the Estate. Again, “[i]n the absence of special findings, we review a trial court decision as a general judgment and, without reweighing evidence or considering witness credibility, affirm if sustainable upon any theory consistent with the evidence.” Id. “We will set aside the trial court's findings or judgment only if they are clearly erroneous.” Thieme, 76 N.E.3d at 897.

[15] Cynthia makes the unsubstantiated allegation that Frances had “[u]sed the Estate [a]s [h]er [o]wn [p]ersonal [a]ccount.” Appellant's Br. p. 34 (bold omitted). Cynthia's arguments in support of this contention again include her unsubstantiated allegations of wrongdoing by Frances.

[16] With regard to unsupervised estates, Indiana law does not require that records be kept in any particular format or that the personal representative keep detailed receipts. See Thieme, 76 N.E.3d at 899. Frances provided the trial court with a detailed interim accounting of all of the Estate's assets and obligations. The trial court determined that the interim accounting was sufficient. The trial court determined that, apart from certain meal expenses, all of the expenses that Frances had charged against the Estate were appropriate. Given our review of the evidence, we cannot say that this determination is clearly erroneous. Furthermore, to the extent that Cynthia challenges the valuation of Heersma's personal property and certain expenses, such as burial fees for Heersma and attorney's fees related to administration of the Estate, which were charged against the Estate, Cynthia's challenge again amounts to nothing more than a request for this court to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See Pryor, 683 N.E.2d at 240.

[17] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Although distribution of the items was delayed due to the underlying court proceedings, the parties arranged for distribution of the photographs, the manuscript, and the book at the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing.

2.   We note that Frances asserts that Cynthia's appellate brief lacks cogent argument and contains arguments that are so poorly developed that we should find that Cynthia's appellate claims have been waived. While we agree that Cynthia's arguments are, at times, hard to follow, we will attempt to review the merits of her claims.

3.   These circumstances include when the personal representative has become incapacitated, disqualified, unsuitable, or incapable of discharging their duties; has mismanaged the estate; or has failed to perform any duty imposed by law or court order. Ind. Code § 29-1-10-6(b).

4.   We note that there appears to be an issue with the pdf pagination of Cynthia's brief. While this quote can be found on page 32 of the electronic pdf version of Cynthia's brief, the page number listed on the bottom of the quoted page says 19. When citing to Cynthia's appellate brief, we cite to the pdf page numbers as opposed to those listed in Cynthia's brief.

Bradford, Judge.

Weissmann, J., and DeBoer, J. concur.