IN RE: The Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of C.T. (Minor Child); (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] B.E. (“Mother”) appeals the termination of her parental relationship with her twenty-month-old daughter, C.T. (“C.T.”). Mother argues that the trial court's order terminating her parental relationship with C.T. is clearly erroneous. Concluding that the trial court's order is not clearly erroneous, we affirm the trial court's judgment.¹

[2] We affirm.

Issue

Whether the trial court's order terminating Mother's parental relationship with C.T. is clearly erroneous.

Facts

[3] In October 2022, twenty-eight-year-old Mother gave birth to her fifth child, D.T. (“D.T.”), who was born methamphetamine-exposed. The Department of Child Services (“DCS”) removed D.T. from Mother, who had a long history of involvement with DCS. None of Mother's children were in her care.

[4] Less than a year later, in September 2023, Mother gave birth to her sixth child, C.T., who also tested positive for methamphetamine. In addition, C.T. was born prematurely and showed signs of methamphetamine withdrawal, which necessitated her placement in a special nursery.

[5] DCS filed a petition alleging that C.T. was a CHINS in October 2023. In addition, DCS removed C.T. from Mother and placed the infant in foster care when she was discharged from the hospital. Mother admitted that C.T. was a CHINS, and in December 2024, the trial court issued a dispositional order that required Mother to: (1) participate in homebased case management services; (2) participate in individual therapy; (3) complete a parenting education program; (4) participate in an inpatient substance abuse program; (5) submit to random drug screens; and (6) participate in supervised visits with C.T.

[6] Mother was initially compliant with services, except submitting to random drug screens. Then, in April 2024, Mother stopped responding to the DCS family case manager (“the FCM”) and service providers. Mother “reappear[ed]” three months later, in July 2024, after giving birth to another methamphetamine-exposed baby. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 29). When a DCS case manager spoke to Mother at the hospital, Mother gave the case manager an alias. DCS then filed a CHINS petition using Mother's alias. However, in August 2024, after DCS had discovered Mother's duplicity, DCS filed an amended CHINS petition with Mother's correct name.

[7] Following this birth of her seventh child, Mother re-engaged in services. However, in October 2024, Mother tested positive for methamphetamine. In addition, in December 2024, the State charged Mother with Level 6 felony possession of methamphetamine, Level 6 felony possession of a narcotic drug (fentanyl), Level 6 felony unlawful possession of syringe, and Class B misdemeanor possession of marijuana for acts that occurred in October 2024.

[8] Also, in December 2024, DCS filed a petition to terminate Mother's parental relationship with C.T. In February 2025, Mother again stopped responding to the FCM and service providers.

[9] The trial court heard the facts as set forth above during a May 2025 termination hearing. In addition, the FCM testified that during the pendency of the CHINS proceedings, Mother had not regularly submitted to drug screens and that most of the drug screens to which she had submitted were positive for methamphetamine. Further, the FCM testified that Mother had been living with friends and in hotels and did not have stable housing. In addition, the FCM testified that Mother had not remedied the reason for C.T.’s removal. According to the FCM, C.T. was “thriving” in foster care, and the plan for C.T. was foster parent adoption. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 49). Lastly, the FCM testified that she was not in agreement with giving Mother more time to participate in services because C.T. needed “a stable home environment where she c[ould] grow and thrive and be free of DCS involvement.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 52).

[10] Mother testified and acknowledged that she needed help for her drug addiction. She asked the trial court for more time to address this issue. According to Mother, she “plan[ned] to get everything in order th[at] week” so that she could enter a drug treatment program. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 57). Mother further testified that she “want[ed] to learn how to be able to cope without having to try to get high.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 57).

[11] In May 2025, the trial court issued a detailed order terminating Mother's parental relationship with C.T. That order provides, in relevant part, as follows:

Mother testified that she still struggles with her substance abuse issues. Mother further testified that she does not have stable housing or employment. Mother indicated that she is now ready to participate in the reunification process. Mother's habitual pattern of conduct of non-compliance cannot be ignored. Mother has not addressed her substance abuse issues. Mother seems to have multiple excuses for her lack of participation, stability issues, and criminal issues and has not taken accountability. All of [M]other's issues stem from her substance abuse issues and [M]other has not addressed the main reason for all of [M]other's obstacles in her life.

(App. Vol. 2 at 36). Further, the trial court concluded that DCS had proved by clear and convincing evidence that there was a reasonable probability that: (1) the conditions that had resulted in C.T.’s removal from Mother's home would not be remedied; and (2) the continuation of the parent-child relationship posed a threat to C.T.’s well-being.

[12] Mother now appeals.

Decision

[13] At the outset, we note that DCS asks this Court to dismiss Mother's appeal because she failed to timely file her notice of appeal. Indiana Appellate Rule 9(A)(1) requires a party to initiate an appeal “by filing a Notice of Appeal ․ within thirty (30) days after the entry of a Final Judgment is noted in the Chronological Case Summary.” Here, the final judgment was noted in the Chronological Case Summary on May 20, 2025. Thus, Mother was required to file her notice of appeal no later than June 19, 2025. However, Mother did not file her notice of appeal until July 17, 2025. Generally, “[u]nless the Notice of Appeal is timely filed, the right to appeal shall be forfeited[.]” Ind. Appellate Rule 9(A)(5). However, our Indiana Supreme Court has recognized a limited exception to the forfeiture of an untimely appeal when “there are extraordinarily compelling reasons why this forfeited right should be restored.” In re O.R., 16 N.E.3d 965, 971 (Ind. 2014). We conclude that Mother's constitutional right to raise her child is an extraordinarily compelling reason why her forfeited right should be restored. Accordingly, we reject DCS’ request that we dismiss Mother's appeal and turn to Mother's argument that the trial court's order terminating her parental relationship with C.T. is clearly erroneous.

[14] The traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In re J.W., Jr., 27 N.E.3d 1185, 1187-88 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied. However, a trial court must subordinate the interests of the parent to those of the child when evaluating the circumstances surrounding a termination. Id. at 1188. Termination of the parent-child relationship is proper where a child's emotional and physical development is threatened. Id. Although the right to raise one's own child should not be terminated solely because there is a better home available for the child, parental rights may be terminated when a parent is unable or unwilling to meet his or her parental responsibilities. Id.

[15] Indiana Code § 31-35-2-4 provides, in relevant part, that DCS must allege in its termination petition as follows:

(c) A petition filed under subsection (a) must allege:

(1) the existence of one (1) or more of the circumstances described in subsection (d);

(2) that there is a satisfactory plan for care and treatment of the child; and

(3) that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests.

(d) A petition filed under subsection (a) must allege the existence of one (1) or more of the following circumstances:

* * * * *

(3) That there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(4) That there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being, safety, physical health, or life of the child.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4.² DCS must prove these alleged circumstances by clear and convincing evidence. K.T.K. v. Indiana Department of Child Services, Dearborn County Office, 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1230 (Ind. 2013).

[16] When reviewing a termination of parental rights, this Court will not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. In re Involuntary Termination of Parent-Child Relationship of R.S., 56 N.E.3d 625, 628 (Ind. 2016). We consider only the evidence and any reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom that support the judgment and give due regard to the trial court's opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses firsthand. K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1229.

[17] In addition, as a general rule, appellate courts grant latitude and deference to trial courts in family law matters. Matter of D.P., 72 N.E.3d 976, 980 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). “This deference recognizes a trial court's unique ability to see the witnesses, observe their demeanor, and scrutinize their testimony, as opposed to this court[ ] only being able to review a cold transcript of the record.” Id.

[18] Mother argues that the trial court's order terminating her parental relationship with C.T. is clearly erroneous. Specifically, her sole contention is that DCS failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions that had resulted in C.T.’s removal or the reasons for placement outside Mother's home would not be remedied. However, we note that the trial court also found that clear and convincing evidence established that the continuation of the parent-child relationship posed a threat to C.T.’s well-being. Indiana Code § 31-35-2-4(d) is written in the disjunctive. The trial court, therefore, needs only to find one of the requirements of this subsection by clear and convincing evidence. See L.S., 717 N.E.2d 204, 209 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (interpreting a previous version of the statute), reh'g denied. “Standing alone, the finding that the parent-child relationship posed a threat to the well-being of the child[ ] satisfies the requirement listed in subsection ([d]).” Id. (interpreting a previous version of the statute). In other words, we need not reach Mother's argument related to Indiana Code § 31-35-2-4(d)(3).

[19] Nevertheless, in light of Mother's constitutional right to raise her child, we choose to address her argument that the evidence is insufficient to show that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in C.T.’s removal or the reasons for placement outside Mother's home will not be remedied. In determining this statutory factor, we engage in a two-step analysis. In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 643 (Ind. 2014). We first identify the conditions that led to removal or placement outside the home and then determine whether there is a reasonable probability that those conditions will not be remedied. Id. The second step requires trial courts to judge a parent's fitness at the time of the termination proceeding, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions and balancing any recent improvements against habitual patterns of conduct to determine whether there is a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation. Id. Habitual conduct may include parents’ prior criminal history, drug and alcohol abuse, history of neglect, failure to provide support, and a lack of adequate housing and employment. A.D.S. v. Indiana Department of Child Services, 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1157 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. The trial court may also consider services offered to the parent by DCS and the parent's response to those services as evidence of whether conditions will be remedied. Id.

[20] Here, our review of the evidence reveals that C.T. was removed from Mother because of Mother's methamphetamine use. During the course of the CHINS proceedings, Mother continued to test positive for methamphetamine, gave birth to another methamphetamine-exposed infant, and was charged with, among other things, Level 6 felony possession of methamphetamine. Further, Mother has a long history with DCS and has had multiple opportunities to engage in services, including drug treatment, but has failed to do so. The totality of this evidence supports the trial court's conclusion that DCS proved by clear and convincing evidence that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions that had resulted in C.T.’s removal or the reasons for her placement outside Mother's home would not be remedied. Accordingly, the trial court's order is not clearly erroneous.

[21] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The trial court also terminated C.T.’s father's (“Father”) parental relationship with C.T. However, Father is not participating in this appeal.

2.   The General Assembly amended Indiana Code § 31-35-2-4 effective March 11, 2024. Because DCS filed the termination petition in this case in December 2024, the amended version of the statute applies here. Additionally, we note that the General Assembly further amended Indiana Code § 31-35-2-4 during the 2025 legislative session, and that amendment became effective July 1, 2025. The 2025 amendment does not apply to this case.

Pyle, Judge.

Vaidik, J., and Mathias, J., concur.