Charles Stidams, Appellant-Defendant v. Tasha Wilkerson, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Charles Stidams appeals the trial court's judgment for Tasha Wilkerson following a bench trial. Stidams raises one issue for our review, which we restate as the following two issues:

1. Whether the trial court's judgment that Stidams committed criminal conversion is clearly erroneous.

2. Whether the trial court's judgment that Stidams committed unjust enrichment is clearly erroneous.

[2] We affirm the trial court's judgment for Wilkerson for criminal conversion; reverse the trial court's judgment for her on an unpleaded theory of unjust enrichment; and remand with instructions for the trial court to enter a finding on Wilkerson's additional claim of conversion and to recalculate Wilkerson's damages.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] In spring 2018, Wilkerson and Stidams began dating. Near the end of 2018, they began to live together in a Pierceton residence. While living together, they had a “general agreement” to “pretty much split the bills down the middle.” Tr. Vol. 2, pp. 7-8. However, in 2020 and in 2022, Wilkerson purchased a washing machine, a dryer, two freezers, and a gas range for the residence, all of which she paid for herself.

[4] In early 2023, Wilkerson's car “broke down” and “was deemed unfixable.” Id. at 8. That same day, Wilkerson and Stidams went to purchase a new vehicle for her. Because Wilkerson had filed for bankruptcy in 2022, she was unable to obtain credit to purchase a replacement vehicle in her own name. Accordingly, she and Stidams “made an agreement that the vehicle would go in his name and [she] would make all payments,” and, “once the vehicle was paid off[,] he would transfer” the title to her. Id. Stidams then purchased a 2014 Buick Enclave through Huntington Bank, and Wilkerson paid Huntington Bank's installment payments directly.

[5] Around Labor Day of 2024, Stidams and Wilkerson's relationship came to an end. Wilkerson moved out of the shared residence and into her own place. At some point, Stidams took possession of the Buick by using a spare key to remove the vehicle from Wilkerson's driveway. Meanwhile, Wilkerson sought to remove the appliances she had purchased out of the previously shared residence, but Stidams did not allow Wilkerson to do so.

[6] In October 2024, Wilkerson filed her complaint against Stidams in which she alleged that Stidams had committed two counts of criminal conversion, one count pertaining to the Buick and one count pertaining to the appliances. After a bench trial, the court found that Stidams had converted the Buick, but the court did not enter any finding on Wilkerson's claim of conversion with respect to the appliances. However, the court nonetheless concluded that Stidams had been unjustly enriched by retaining possession over the appliances and ordered him to pay Wilkerson a depreciated value for them accordingly.

[7] This appeal ensued.

Standard of Review

[8] Stidams appeals the trial court's judgment for Wilkerson following a bench trial. The trial court's judgment is supported by findings of fact and conclusions thereon. We will set aside such a judgment only if it is clearly erroneous. Cooley v. Cooley, 229 N.E.3d 561, 564 (Ind. 2024). A judgment is clearly erroneous if the evidence does not support the findings or the findings do not support the judgment. See id. We consider only the evidence most favorable to the trial court's judgment and do not reweigh the evidence or reassess witness credibility. See id.

1. The trial court's judgment regarding the Buick is not clearly erroneous.

[9] On appeal, Stidams first contends that the trial court erred when it concluded that he converted the Buick. Wilkerson's specific claim here was that Stidam had committed criminal conversion under Indiana Code section 35-43-4-3(a) (2024), which provides that “[a] person who knowingly or intentionally exerts unauthorized control over property of another person commits criminal conversion ․”

[10] Stidams's argument on this issue is that he held the certificate of title to the Buick, and was the legal owner of it, and Wilkerson's right to that title was conditioned on her making all of the installment payments to Huntington Bank, which had not happened at the time he took possession of the car. But Stidams is incorrect. The holder of a title document is only entitled to an inference of legal title, which may be contradicted by other evidence. See, e.g., Brackin v. Brackin, 894 N.E.2d 206, 211-12 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). That is, a “[c]ertificate of title is not itself proof of ownership or legal title to the vehicle. A person may have legal title in a vehicle even though [s]he does not possess a certificate of title.” Id. at 212 (quotation marks omitted).

[11] Here, the evidence supports the trial court's finding that, the name on the certificate of title notwithstanding, the Buick belonged to Wilkerson. Wilkerson testified that Stidams had agreed to help her finance the purchase of the vehicle due to her prior bankruptcy, and the two had purchased the Buick the same day that Wilkerson's prior vehicle broke down. Thereafter, Wilkerson routinely used the vehicle and made the requisite payments to Huntington Bank. When the couple's relationship ended, Wilkerson took the vehicle with her to her new residence. A reasonable fact-finder could conclude from the evidence that Wilkerson was in fact the legal owner of the vehicle and that Stidams knowingly or intentionally exerted unauthorized control over it when he removed it from her driveway after the end of their relationship. We therefore affirm the trial court's judgment for Wilkerson on her claim relating to the Buick.

2. The trial court erred when it entered judgment for Wilkerson on an unpleaded theory of unjust enrichment.

[12] We next consider the trial court's judgment for Wilkerson on the appliances. As to that property, Wilkerson's complaint stated that Stidams had committed criminal conversion when he did not allow Wilkerson to remove the appliances from their previously shared residence or otherwise return the appliances to her. The trial court did not enter judgment for Wilkerson as to that claim; instead, the trial court, sua sponte, concluded that Wilkerson was entitled to recover the depreciated value of the appliances from Stidams under an unpleaded theory of unjust enrichment.

[13] Our consideration of this issue turns on Indiana Trial Rule 15(B). That rule states that, “[w]hen issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings.” “There are generally two factors to be considered when addressing whether a party has impliedly consented to a non-pleaded issue at trial.” Mercantile Nat. Bank v. First Builders of Ind., Inc., 774 N.E.2d 488, 492 (Ind. 2002). “The first is whether the opposing party had notice of the issue; the second, whether the opposing party objected to the issue being litigated at trial.” Id. “If the opposing party both had notice and failed to object at trial, then that party will have impliedly consented to the non-pleaded issue ․” Id. at 492-93.

[14] In support of the trial court's imposition of liability against Stidams under the unpleaded theory of unjust enrichment, Wilkerson asserts that Stidams “had ample notice of the issue through the presentation of evidence” regarding the appliances. Appellee's Br. at 16. Wilkerson further notes, and Stidams does not dispute, that he did not object to that evidence at trial.

[15] We agree with Stidams that the presentation of evidence regarding the appliances was insufficient to put him on notice that he might be liable to Wilkerson for the value of those appliances under an unpleaded theory of unjust enrichment. “Implied consent to trial of an unpleaded [claim] may not be deduced merely because evidence relevant to a properly pleaded [claim] inferentially suggests a [claim] not within the pleadings.” Elkhart Cnty. Farm Bureau Co-op. Ass'n v. Hochstetler, 418 N.E.2d 280, 284 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981). Rather, “[b]oth parties to the proceedings must litigate the new issue; ․ evidence to support the introduction of a new issue cannot be adduced under cover of asking questions about an already pleaded issue.” Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted). Similarly:

Trial Rule 15(B) does not require the opposing party to scrutinize every shred of evidence relevant to a pleaded issue to find allusions to unpleaded issues. Nor may T.R. 15(B) be used as a post-trial pleading mechanism whereby a party may review the record and raise any unpleaded [claim] that the evidence might suggest. Trial Rule 15(B) was intended to permit amendment to the pleadings only when evidence on an unpleaded issue is “unequivocally clear” to the opposing party but is nevertheless admitted without objection.

Id. at 285; see also Pardue v. Smith, 875 N.E.2d 285, 290 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (same).

[16] Here, the evidence presented at trial regarding the appliances was relevant to Wilkerson's pleaded claim of criminal conversion against Stidams. That the same evidence might have suggested a basis of recovery under another, unpleaded theory is insufficient as a matter of law to put Stidams on notice that that evidence was being used to litigate the unpleaded theory. Accordingly, the trial court's judgment for Wilkerson for unjust enrichment is reversed.

Conclusion

[17] For all of these reasons, we affirm the trial court's judgment for Wilkerson on her claim against Stidams for criminal conversion of the Buick; we reverse the trial court's judgment for Wilkerson on the theory that Stidams was unjustly enriched by his retention of the appliances; and we remand with instructions for the trial court to enter a finding on Wilkerson's claim of conversion with respect to the appliances ¹ and to recalculate Wilkerson's damages in accordance with this decision.

[18] Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions.

FOOTNOTES

1.   In accordance with Indiana Appellate Rules 66(C)(8) and (D), the trial court's finding on Wilkerson's claim of conversion with respect to the appliances shall be entered without a new trial being held.

Mathias, Judge.

Vaidik, J., and Pyle, J., concur.