S.R., Appellant-Respondent v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] S.R. appeals the trial court's award of wardship over him to the Indiana Department of Correction (“DOC”) after he admitted to having committed theft, as a Class A misdemeanor if committed by an adult. S.R. raises one issue for our review, namely, whether the court abused its discretion when it placed him with the DOC. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] S.R. has been involved with the Jasper County Probation Department “for the past few years.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 6. The probation department had received referrals for S.R. due to “incorrigible issues in the home” and “disobedience.” Id. The probation department placed him on an informal adjustment. The department also had S.R. “go through a substance abuse education virtual class” and did another informal adjustment. Id. In February 2024, the State filed its first petition alleging that S.R. was a delinquent for having possessed paraphernalia, but that petition was subsequently dismissed.

[3] In April 2024, the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) placed S.R. in foster care. In September, S.R. committed a “new substance offense,” which resulted in the State filing another petition alleging that he was a delinquent. Id. at 7. “Due to the continued substance issues,” S.R. was placed at Josiah White's Residential Center (“White's”). Id. While there, in January 2025, S.R. “slapp[ed] a peer,” took a “nicotine vape” and a “Delta 8 vape” from a staff member's bag and tested positive for marijuana, and “assaulted a peer during recreation time.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 96.

[4] On February 7, S.R. and another juvenile escaped from White's, stole a vehicle, and drove to Marion, Indiana. While there, they stole alcohol and other items from various stores and consumed the alcohol. The stores reported the thefts, and officers were ultimately able to locate S.R. and the other juvenile. Officers detained them and transported them to the Youth Opportunity Center.

[5] The State filed a petition alleging that S.R. was a delinquent for having committed resisting law enforcement, as a Class A misdemeanor if committed by an adult; theft, as a Class A misdemeanor if committed by an adult; and illegal possession or consumption of alcohol by a minor. At a hearing, S.R. admitted to having committed theft, and the court adjudicated him a delinquent.

[6] The court then held a dispositional hearing on July 2. During the hearing, S.R.’s probation officer testified that S.R. had been provided a “number of interventions ․ to change his behavior,” including Valley Oaks, Changes Sycamore program, services through DCS, Family Focus, foster care, and Paddock View shelter care, and that “[he] was given an additional opportunity while in Josiah White's in the treatment facility.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 10. She further testified that, because S.R. “struggled” in the “highly structured environment,” she had “concerns of if he's going to be able to manage under less supervision[.]” Id.

[7] S.R.’s DCS Family Case Manager (“FCM”) testified that S.R.’s mother was living with her friend Katherine Brown in Lafayette but that Brown's home had not been approved for S.R.’s mother when she had been on home detention, so it would likely not be approved for S.R. if he were placed on home detention. S.R.’s mother testified that she wanted S.R. to live with her at Brown's house, but that she had not confirmed whether the local probation office would supervise S.R. Brown did not testify.

[8] At the conclusion of the hearing, the court found that Brown was not present to “confirm” whether she was willing to supervise S.R. but that, even if she was willing to, “there's no contractual obligation for her to allow [S.R.] to stay,” and that, as a result, Brown's house was “not stable housing.” Id. at 34. The court also found that Brown's house was not “a good enough foundation to help [S.R.] develop the things that [he] need[s.]” Id. Rather, the court found that S.R. “needs” to go someplace that can “best serve [him] as far as services.” Id. The court therefore ordered S.R. to be committed to the DOC. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[9] S.R. contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered him to be committed to the DOC rather than a less restrictive setting. As the Indiana Supreme Court has explained:

The specific disposition of a delinquent is within the juvenile court's discretion, to be guided by the following considerations: the safety of the community, the best interests of the child, the least restrictive alternative, family autonomy and life, freedom of the child, and the freedom and participation of the parent, guardian, or custodian. We reverse only for an abuse of discretion, namely a decision that is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom.

K.S. v. State, 849 N.E.2d 538, 544 (Ind. 2006) (citations and quotation marks omitted).

[10] On appeal, S.R. contends that the court abused its discretion when it placed him under the wardship of the DOC because he had not “been given the opportunity to serve a suspended sentence,” all of his previous cases “had been resolved by way of dismissal,” and he had the option of a “less restrictive placement” at Brown's house. Appellant's Br. at 10-11. As such, S.R. contends that the court's order “purports to punish [him] rather than provide opportunities for him to work toward becoming a productive member of society.” Id. at 12.

[11] However, the record demonstrates that, at only fourteen years old, S.R. has already been involved with the juvenile probation system for “a few years[.]” Tr. Vol. 2 at 6. Indeed, his involvement began with incorrigible issues in the home and disobedience and progressed to drug-related acts of delinquency. Probation attempted several informal adjustments and other services, and DCS got involved and provided services to S.R. But S.R. continued to commit acts related to illegal substances and was ultimately placed at White's. However, while at White's, S.R. hit another child, stole vapes from an employee, tested positive for marijuana, and battered another child. S.R. then escaped from White's and stole items from several stores.

[12] In other words, while we acknowledge that S.R. has not been previously placed on electronic monitoring or served a suspended sentence, the record demonstrates that both the probation department and DCS have given S.R. multiple opportunities to improve his behavior and ultimately placed him in a residential facility. But despite those prior efforts, S.R. absconded from the facility and committed an additional act of delinquency.

[13] Further, while S.R. asserts that a less-restrictive placement exists at Brown's, we first note that Brown did not appear at the hearing to confirm whether she was willing to take S.R. in. Further, the court found that, even if Brown were willing, her house was “not stable housing” because there was no obligation for her to house S.R. “for any period of time.” Id. at 34. The court also found that Brown's house was not “a good enough foundation” for S.R. to develop the skills he needed. Id. As such, the court specifically determined that a less-restrictive placement did not exist at Brown's.

[14] Because S.R. continues to commit delinquent acts despite prior services and because a less restrictive option does not exist at Brown's house, the court did not abuse its discretion when it awarded wardship of S.R. to the DOC. We therefore affirm the trial court.

[15] Affirmed.

Bailey, Judge.

Tavitas, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.