WILLIAMS v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Aliesha Williams (“Williams”) appeals from the trial court's order revoking her probation. She raises one issue for our review: whether the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered her to serve 730 days of her previously suspended sentence. Because we find no abuse of discretion, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On April 6, 2022, Williams was arrested in a hotel room by undercover officers during a prostitution sting operation. During a search incident to Williams's arrest, the officers found in her possession a handgun, cocaine, marijuana, condoms, $280 in cash, and two cellphones. A subsequent search of the cellphones revealed text messages between Williams and a teenaged girl named N.F. The text messages indicated that Williams directed N.F. to engage in prostitution and received the proceeds from N.F. afterwards.

[3] In February 2024, Williams and the State entered into a plea agreement whereunder Williams would plead guilty to Level 5 felony promoting prostitution, Level 6 felony possession of cocaine, and Class A misdemeanor prostitution, and the State would dismiss numerous other charges. Williams would also receive an aggregate six-year suspended sentence with four years of that sentence served on probation. Williams pleaded guilty and, on April 5, 2024, was sentenced in accordance with the plea agreement that contained certain conditions of probation. As a condition of Williams's probation, the trial court ordered Williams to complete parenting classes, to not have any contact with N.F., and to consent to the installation of hardware or software to monitor her internet use on her personal computer or any device with internet capability. On June 11, 2024, the trial court clarified that Williams “may access the internet on her computer only for the purpose of online schooling” and noted that Williams “was well aware of the terms and limitations of the plea agreement taken two months ago.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 16.

[4] On September 30, 2024, the probation department filed a notice of probation violation, which alleged that Williams had failed to maintain a single, verifiable address and had failed to comply with parenting classes. On October 31, 2024, Williams admitted that she had violated a condition of her probation by not complying with her parenting classes. As a result of this admission to violating her probation, the trial court continued Williams on probation.

[5] Three months later, on January 29, 2025, the probation department filed a second notice of probation violation, alleging that Williams had violated her probation by accessing several social media accounts without authorization and testing positive for THC. The probation department attached to the notice of revocation thirty-eight screenshots from these various social media accounts associated with Williams. The probation revocation notice alleged that the photographs and videos from Williams's social media accounts dated back to April 2024, which was the same month that Williams was placed on probation, and “showed Ms. Williams dancing in an obscene manner.” Id. at 142. The notice also stated that Williams had “informed probation that she only used a flip phone and denied having any devices with internet capability,” making statements to this effect as recently as January 21, 2025. Id. In the “additional information” section of the notice, the probation department added that it had received an anonymous tip that alleged that Williams was in contact with N.F., had been working as an escort, and had been “forcefully escorting” N.F. Id. Based on the notice of probation revocation, the trial court issued a warrant for Williams's arrest on January 30, 2025. On February 19, 2025, the probation department filed an amended notice of probation violation and added an allegation that Williams had failed to report to the probation department as ordered on February 10, 2025. Williams was arrested on March 21, 2025.

[6] On April 10, 2025, the probation violation hearing was held, and Williams admitted to both of the allegations contained in the January 29, 2025 notice—using social media without authorization and testing positive for THC. After she admitted to violating the conditions of her probation, Williams offered mitigating evidence to the trial court. She testified that she has four children that she is solely responsible for, she is in counseling, she “potentially” had employment lined up prior to being arrested for her probation violations, and she and her children live with her mother. Tr. Vol. II pp. 31–33. When asked to explain her unauthorized use of the internet, Williams told the trial court, “Really it's my kids really because they use the Internet.” Id. at 34. She also stated that her social media activity primarily included family-related content, such as pictures and videos with her children. Williams also called Dr. Byron Alston (“Dr. Alston”), an acquaintance of her grandfather, to testify on her behalf. Dr. Alston stated that he would be willing to provide faith-based services to Williams and her children.

[7] When making its recommendation for Williams's sanction, the State referenced the anonymous tip included in the notice of probation violation. In response, Williams asked the trial court not to consider the anonymous tip, and the trial court stated it would not consider the tip. Following Williams's presentation of mitigating evidence and the recommendations from the parties, the trial court ordered that 730 days of Williams's suspended sentence would be revoked and Williams would execute that time in the Indiana Department of Correction (“the DOC”). The trial court ordered Williams to return to probation after she completed her executed time. The trial court provided the following explanation for its sanction decision:

Here's my problem, Ms. Williams, you were given a considerable break. I have read the probable cause in this matter. You groomed that young child and then sold her out while you had your children sitting in a hotel room. I've read it and I've read the pre-sentence investigation. Then the Court permitted you to have some access for your schooling to the Internet and really you're using it for social media purposes. I do not believe that you were doing this just to have – for your kids. I don't – I don't believe that at all and I am more concerned about your children and the influence you may have on them, just considering the circumstances in the probable cause affidavit and what you pled guilty to.

Id. at 45. Williams now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[8] Williams argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered her to serve 730 days of her previously suspended sentence executed in the DOC. “Probation is a matter of grace left to the trial court discretion, not a right to which a criminal defendant is entitled.” Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007). It is within the discretion of the trial court to determine probation conditions and to revoke probation if these conditions are violated. Id. Probation revocation is a two-step process, wherein the trial court first makes a factual determination as to whether the probationer violated the terms of his probation. Woods v. State, 892 N.E.2d 637, 640 (Ind. 2008). Then, if the trial court determines that a person has violated a term or condition of probation within the probationary period, the court may impose one or more of the following sanctions:

(1) Continue the person on probation, with or without modifying or enlarging the conditions.

(2) Extend the person's probationary period for not more than one (1) year beyond the original probationary period.

(3) Order execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing.

Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(h).

[9] We review a trial court's selection of a sanction for an abuse of discretion. Overstreet v. State, 136 N.E.3d 260, 263 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied. An abuse of discretion occurs when the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances. Id.

[10] When a probationer admits the allegations against her, she must still be given an opportunity to offer mitigating evidence suggesting that the violation does not warrant revocation. Killebrew v. State, 165 N.E.3d 578, 582 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021). However, in determining the appropriate sanction upon finding a probation violation, trial courts are not required to balance aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Id. Proof of a single violation is sufficient to permit a trial court to revoke probation. Beeler v. State, 959 N.E.2d 828, 830 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied. As long as the trial court follows the proper procedures in conducting a probation revocation hearing pursuant to Indiana Code Section 35-38-2-3, it may order execution of a suspended sentence upon finding of a violation by a preponderance of the evidence. Killebrew, 165 N.E.3d at 582.

[11] Williams contends that the trial court abused its discretion in its sanction because it relied on improper factors. Specifically, she asserts that the trial court improperly relied on a belief that Williams had received a break in her sentence under the plea agreement and that its decision was influenced by the anonymous tip regarding her continued work as an escort and contact with N.F. She also argues that the trial court ignored the mitigating evidence that she presented.

[12] The evidence presented to the trial court established that, in less than a year, Williams had two petitions to revoke probation filed against her. After admitting to the first violation, the trial court permitted her to continue on probation. Despite receiving this second chance, Williams again violated the conditions of her probation within just three months by utilizing and posting to multiple social media sites and testing positive to THC. Moreover, the time stamps on her social media posts reveal that Williams had been violating the conditions of her probation since at least May 2024, which was only a month after starting her period of probation. Both prior to and after her first probation violation, Williams accessed the internet and social media in violation of her probation order and lied to the probation department about her ability to access the internet. The trial court restricted Williams's use of and access to the internet and social media precisely because the crimes she committed involved the illicit use of the internet. Williams's deceit to the probation department about her use and access to the internet and social media suggested that she knew her actions were wrong and indicated that more severe sanctions were necessary. Williams had been given the grace of probation twice and squandered the opportunity twice by failing to comply with conditions of her probation. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in its sanction.

[13] Further, we do not find Williams's contrary arguments to be persuasive. Williams is correct that a trial court may not punish a defendant for the perceived leniency of the original plea agreement and may not rely on dismissed or uncharged allegations of misconduct at probation revocation, Puckett v. State, 956 N.E.2d 1182, 1186–88 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). However, the trial court did not do this. Although the trial court did state that Williams had been “given a considerable break,” when the trial court's statement is read in context with the rest of the pronouncement, it is clear that the trial court sanctioned Williams because Williams squandered the opportunities her suspended sentence provided by violating probation twice within a relatively short duration of time. Tr. Vol. II p. 45.

[14] Next, the trial court did not consider the anonymous tip when it determined her sanction. When Williams asked the trial court not to consider the evidence from the anonymous tip, the trial court stated that it would not do so, and in its determination of a sanction, the trial court did not mention the anonymous tip. Williams points to the trial court's statement, “I do not believe that you were doing [social media] just to have – for your kids. I don't ․ believe that at all and I am more concerned about your children and the influence you may have on them” as evidence that the trial court improperly considered the anonymous tip contrary to its assurance. Id. However, this statement was clearly a reference to Williams's earlier attempt to blame her children for her internet activity and indicated that the trial court did not believe Williams's attempt to shift the blame for her probation violation to her children.

[15] Further, although the trial court was required to give Williams the opportunity to present mitigating evidence, the trial court was “not required to balance aggravating and mitigating circumstances” before sanctioning her. See Killebrew, 165 N.E.3d at 582. Williams was given the opportunity to present her mitigating evidence during the sanctions hearing. However, given Williams's repeated probation violations and the nature of the violations, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering her to serve 730 days of her previously suspended sentence in the DOC.

[16] Affirmed.

Foley, Judge.

Altice, C.J. and May, J., concur.