IN RE: W.C. (Minor Child) (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] C.C. (Father) appeals the trial court's determination that his child is a Child in Need of Services (CHINS), alleging one finding is clearly erroneous and the evidence is insufficient to support the adjudication. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Father and K.S. (Mother) are the biological parents of W.C. (Child), born in August 2024. Mother admitted Child is a CHINS and does not participate in this appeal.¹

[3] On November 19, 2024, the Indiana Department of Child Services (DCS) received a report alleging that Mother and Father were living together in New Castle and there was ongoing domestic violence around Child.² Specifically, the report source alleged Father pushed Mother into a portable crib either while Child was in it or while she was holding Child; Father threw a cat-litter box; and Father broke items including the television. Mother admitted to DCS that she was shoved and Father threw items generally; however, she denied that Child was near her when she was shoved and that Father threw items at her. Mother left Father's home that day “for her own safety.” Tr. Vol. II p. 8.

[4] On December 11, DCS received another report alleging a new incident and ongoing domestic violence. Family Case Manager (FCM) Katilyn Mahaffey assessed the report. Mother told FCM Mahaffey that she picked up Father in New Castle and they went to a gas station to get gas with Child in the car. On the way back from the gas station the pair got into an argument, and Father “pulled over on the side of the road, told [Mother] to get out with [Child] and walk home to Muncie.” Id. at 60. It was “approximately [thirty-one] degrees outside” that day, and Mother walked to a laundromat with Child where she waited for a ride. Id. at 9.

[5] Mother also told FCM Mahaffey that she did not tell the truth during the November assessment. Mother now said Father hit her the day she left their home in November and there was ongoing domestic violence. Mother also disclosed that when she was pregnant with Child, Father threw a steel-toed boot at her face causing her to bleed. And she disclosed an incident wherein Father hit her and punched the windshield while driving their car.³ When police pulled them over, Father “gave [Mother] a look and she knew that look meant not to say anything[;]” so, Mother lied to police and said nothing happened. Id. at 62.

[6] FCM Mahaffey also interviewed Father about the December report. Father confirmed Mother and Child were at his home in New Castle but denied they were driving or that he kicked Mother and Child out of a car. Instead, Father stated they got into an argument about visitation and Mother waited outside for a ride for over an hour with Child. Father also claimed Mother lied about domestic violence but reported that Mother “really pushes on him to the point where he gets angry[.]” Id. at 63.

[7] On December 16, DCS filed a “Preliminary Inquiry” detailing DCS's interactions with the family in November and December and a petition alleging Child to be a CHINS. App. Vol. II p. 14. Because of concerns for ongoing domestic violence and Child's safety, Child was removed and placed with M.C., who was the mother of another child with Father. A service provider supervised visits between Father and Child at M.C.’s home; M.C. did not observe any safety concerns between Father and Child during those visits. Mother was not present during the visits between Father and Child. Child was later placed in a relative foster's home.⁴

[8] On April 9, 2025, the court held a factfinding hearing to determine whether Child was a CHINS based on the allegations against Father. FCM Devyn Weidlich, who was assigned to the case after the assessment, testified that a protective-order proceeding between Mother and Father occurred during the instant CHINS case. With the agreement of the parties, the court took judicial notice of the protective-order pleadings. In those pleadings, Mother alleged several incidents of domestic violence before Child was born. She also alleged two incidents in November 2024: in the first, Mother alleged Father knocked over Child's crib and attempted to push it onto Mother while she was holding Child; in the second, Mother alleged Father yelled in her face, smacked her with an open hand, and pushed her causing her to fall onto the baby swing that held Child. A temporary protection order in favor of Mother was granted on December 17, 2024; however, a permanent protection order was denied on February 6, 2025 because Mother had not shown by her conduct that she was fearful of Father—namely that she maintained contact with him.

[9] FCM Weidlich also testified about an incident between Mother and Father that occurred the day before the factfinding hearing. Father told FCM Weidlich that he and Mother were “back together” and he was helping Mother fix her car. Tr. Vol. II p. 77. After Mother came to the house, “there was a verbal argument that resulted in police being called[,]” and Father had Mother trespassed from his property. Id. Father also told FCM Weidlich that Mother “called 911 stating that her boyfriend had hit her[,]” but he denied that he did so. Id.

[10] Robin Cruz, an abuse-intervention provider, also testified at the factfinding hearing. Following DCS's recommendation, Father completed a “batter[er]’s intervention assessment.” Id. at 39. During the assessment, Father discussed “some domestic violence allegations that were made” and that “there was just kind [of] with him and mom emotional, kind of yelling, name calling that they may do towards each other, but most definitely he reported no physical abuse.” Id. at 40. Cruz testified that name calling and yelling is concerning with a young, developing child in the home. Cruz elaborated that even with emotional violence alone, a child can have failure to thrive or attachment issues, behavioral outbursts, headaches, and/or stomach aches. Because of Father's disclosed name-calling, yelling, and screaming in the home, Cruz recommended an abuse-intervention program for Father; because Father disclosed he was a “hot head” and had “issues[,]” Cruz recommended Father participate in anger management. Id. at 47.

[11] Father refused to participate in those services and told FCM Weidlich it was because of “cultural reasons.” Id. at 72. More specifically, Father told FCM Weidlich that he adopted a culture growing up wherein he was “raised not to show emotions and that the wife did as the father said.” Id.

[12] On April 14, 2025, the trial court adjudicated Child a CHINS “as defined by [Ind. Code section] 31-34-1-1” and “due to domestic issues that have occurred between Mother and Father.” App. Vol. II pp. 96; 97. In support of its conclusion, the court found, among other things, that allowing a child to be exposed to emotional abuse “such as what Father disclosed” would be concerning and could lead to issues for Child, id. at 97; Father was not willing to participate in abuse-intervention services; “[a]t a minimum, ․ Father committed domestic violence by verbally yelling, screaming and name calling with Mother in the presence of the Child[,]” id.; “actions by Father ․ would seriously impair the Child's mental condition[,]” id.; and “[e]vidence of Father not participating in recommended services ․ are proof ․ that Father will not accept or participate in necessary services without the coercive intervention of the Court[,]” id. at 98. The court also found that “it is in the best interests of the Child to be removed from the home environment and remaining in the home would be contrary to the welfare of the Child because: of an inability, refusal or neglect to provide shelter, care, and/or supervision at the present time.” Id.

[13] The court issued its dispositional order on May 15. Among other things, Father was ordered to follow the recommendations of medical and psychiatric personnel, not commit any acts of domestic violence on anyone, report any instances of domestic violence to the FCM, and complete all recommendations from any domestic-violence assessments or programs. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[14] Father argues the evidence is insufficient to support the CHINS adjudication for several reasons. Specifically, Father contends 1) one finding is clearly erroneous because he did not indicate he engaged in emotional abuse; 2) the remaining findings do not support the conclusion that Father's actions seriously endangered Child's mental condition; 3) the CHINS court failed to make a finding that Child's needs were unmet; and 4) the evidence did not show Child's needs would go unmet without coercive intervention.

I. Standard of Review

[15] In reviewing a trial court's CHINS determination, “we do not reweigh evidence or judge witness credibility” but consider only the evidence supporting the trial court's judgment and the reasonable inferences therefrom. In re D.J., 68 N.E.3d 574, 577-78 (Ind. 2017). Where, as here, the court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law, we consider “first, whether the evidence supports the findings and, second, whether the findings support the judgment.” Id. at 578 (internal quotations and citation omitted). We reverse only if the CHINS determination was clearly erroneous, which occurs if “the record facts do not support the findings” or the wrong legal standard is applied. Id. “We accept unchallenged findings as true.” Matter of W.H., 254 N.E.3d 549, 554 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

[16] The trial court found Child to be a CHINS under Indiana Code section 31-34-1-1, which provides a child is a CHINS if that child is under eighteen and:

(1) the child's physical or mental condition is seriously impaired or seriously endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or neglect of the child's parent, guardian, or custodian to supply the child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education, or supervision:

(A) when the parent, guardian, or custodian is financially able to do so; or

(B) due to the failure, refusal, or inability of the parent, guardian, or custodian to seek financial or other reasonable means to do so; and

(2) the child needs care, treatment or rehabilitation that:

(A) the child is not receiving; and

(B) is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the court.

[17] DCS has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the child is a CHINS. Ind. Code § 31-34-12-3 (1997). In sum, a CHINS adjudication “requires three basic elements: that the parent's actions or inactions have seriously endangered the child, that the child's needs are unmet, and (perhaps most critically) that those needs are unlikely to be met without State coercion.” In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d 1283, 1287 (Ind. 2014), reh'g denied.

II. Finding 2

[18] Father argues the evidence is insufficient to support the court's finding that “[d]uring the Batterer's Intervention Assessment, Father disclosed that he engaged in name yelling, yelling, and emotional abuse with Mother and that that is just ‘what we do.’ Father also disclosed to Ms. Cruz that he is a ‘hot head.’ ” (Finding 2). App. Vol. II p. 96. Father asserts Finding 2 is inaccurate because he “never indicated that he engaged in ‘emotional abuse.’ ” Appellant's Br. p. 12. However, Father states that he “admitted only that he and Mother both yell and call each other names.” Id. at 13.

[19] Cruz testified that Father discussed “there was ․ with him and mom emotional, kind of yelling, name calling that they may do towards each other[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 40. It would be reasonable for the court to infer that Father disclosed emotional abuse to Cruz when he discussed “emotional, kind of yelling, name calling․” Id. But if that weren't sufficient to support Finding 2 alone, Cruz's testimony regarding her recommendations provides additional evidence. Cruz said that “[t]he domestic violence aspect comes in because [Father] met those criteria for emotional abuse, which is name calling ․ yelling and screaming within the home[.]” Id. at 47. Hence, the definition of emotional abuse is clear from the evidence. Because Father readily admitted to yelling and name calling, an inference that he thereby admitted to emotional abuse is reasonable and supported by the evidence. See D.J., 68 N.E.3d at 577-78 (we consider the evidence supporting the trial court's judgment and the reasonable inferences therefrom). Finding 2 is not clearly erroneous.

III. Seriously Impaired or Endangered

[20] Next, Father argues that the court's remaining findings do not support the conclusion that Father's actions seriously endangered Child's mental condition. Father contends the court found: “From the testimony of Robin Cruz, [Father's “verbally yelling, screaming and name calling with Mother] would seriously impair the Child's mental condition.” Appellant's Br. p. 14 (quoting App. Vol. II p. 97) (errors and brackets in original). He concludes that, in effect, “the court found that even though Child's mental condition was not seriously impaired at the time of the factfinding hearing, it would be seriously impaired if Parents continued to yell, scream, and call each other names.” Id. We disagree.

[21] Having determined that Finding 2 is not clearly erroneous and because no other findings are individually challenged, we accept the findings as true. W.H., 254 N.E.3d at 554 (we accept unchallenged findings as true). The collective findings support the judgment and defeat Father's argument. Among other things, the court found:

13. At a minimum, the Court finds that Father committed domestic violence by verbally yelling, screaming and name calling with Mother in the presence of the Child.

14. From the testimony of Robin Cruz, said actions by Father (and the actions by Mother and Father not removing the Child from Mother) would seriously impair the Child's mental condition.

App. Vol. II p. 97. A reasonable inference can be made from these findings that because Father's actions would seriously impair Child's mental condition if taken again, his actions seriously impaired Child's mental condition when taken before. In addition, Mother reported being yelled at and shoved or pushed by Father in the presence of Child multiple times. Together with Cruz's testimony that a child can have failure to thrive or attachment issues, behavioral outbursts, headaches, and/or stomach aches from witnessing emotional abuse, the court's conclusion that Child's mental condition was seriously impaired by Father's actions is sufficiently supported by the evidence. See D.J., 68 N.E.3d at 577-78 (we consider the evidence supporting the trial court's judgment and reasonable inferences therefrom).

IV. Unmet Needs

[22] Father also asserts that the CHINS court failed to make a finding as to the second CHINS element. The entirety of Father's argument is as follows: “Before a court can conclude that a child is in need of services, it must find that the child's needs of food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education, and supervision are unmet. See Ind. Code § 31-34-1-1. The court made no such finding in this case.” Appellant's Br. p. 15. Father's conclusion is incorrect.

[23] First, Father misquotes the statute as inclusive; rather, a court must find that a child is seriously impaired or endangered because of the parent's inability, refusal, or neglect “to supply the child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education, or supervision[.]” Ind. Code § 31-34-1-1(1) (2019) (emphasis added). Because this subsection is disjunctive, a finding that a parent is unable to provide one of these necessities would satisfy this element. See e.g., In re S.K., 124 N.E.3d 1225, 1233 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (because termination of parental rights statute subsection is written in the disjunctive, a trial court need only find one of the three requirements of that subsection). Second, the court explicitly found that Child was a CHINS “as defined by [Ind. Code section] 31-34-1-1” and “it is in the best interests of the Child to be removed from the home environment and remaining in the home would be contrary to the welfare of the Child because: of an inability, refusal or neglect to provide shelter, care, and/or supervision at the present time.” App. Vol. II pp. 96, 98. (emphasis added). The court therefore made findings as to the unmet needs element.

V. Coercive Intervention

[24] Finally, Father contends the evidence is insufficient to show that Child's needs were unlikely to be met without coercive intervention of the court. Father relies on a single finding to support his assertion: “Evidence of Father not participating in recommended services regarding Abuse Intervention Program, Individual Therapy and Anger Management are proof to the Court that Father will not accept or participate in necessary services without the coercive intervention of the Court.” Id. at 98. Father concludes the court “did not find that Child's needs were likely to be unmet without coercion but that Father would not comply with services unless there was State coercion” and “DCS failed to prove that Child's needs would be unmet without court intervention.” Appellant's Br. p. 16. We cannot agree.

[25] DCS's evidence demonstrated that Father and Mother engaged in at least emotional domestic violence in front of Child and such behavior seriously endangered Child's condition because it can cause failure to thrive or attachment issues, behavioral outbursts, headaches, and/or stomach aches. Father admitted to yelling and name calling with Mother and normalized the behavior by reporting it is “just what we do.” Tr. Vol. II p. 41. Father refused to participate in services to address the emotional abuse citing “cultural reasons.” Id. at 72. And even on the night before the factfinding hearing, Mother and Father continued to argue to the extent that law enforcement was contacted and Mother reported Father had hit her.

[26] In a CHINS case, the purpose of services for parents is to benefit the child by attempting to remedy a parent's neglect, refusal, or inability to meet the needs of the child. See Ind. Code § 31-34-20-3 (2022) (“If the juvenile court determines that a parent ․ should participate in a program of care, treatment or rehabilitation for the child, the court may order the parent” to participate in certain services) (emphasis added); I.C. § 31-34-1-1 (a child is in need of services if the child's needs are unmet due to a parent's inability, refusal, or neglect) (emphasis added). Father's refusal to participate in abuse-intervention services coupled with his ongoing contentious engagement with Mother demonstrated that the Child's needs—namely that Child be provided with violence-free shelter and supervision—were likely to go unmet without the court's coercive intervention and order that Father participate in said services.

[27] For all the foregoing reasons, the evidence sufficiently supports the CHINS adjudication. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

[28] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Mother was married to C.K., a man other than Father, at the time of W.C.’s birth. C.K. was an initial party to the instant case, but he was dismissed after the court received DNA results establishing Father's paternity of Child. In addition, Father's mother was an initial party to the instant case because she was granted guardianship of Child in October 2024. After learning that she never exercised her guardianship powers, the trial court terminated the guardianship and dismissed her from the instant case.

2.   The report also indicated concerns that Father was illegally using controlled substances; however, that allegation was not corroborated and was not a basis for the court's CHINS adjudication.

3.   FCM Mahaffey does not indicate when Mother said this incident occurred. However, pleadings from a protective-order case between Mother and Father (which the trial court took judicial notice of during the factfinding hearing in the instant case) seemingly reference this incident occurred in September 2023.

4.   The record does not reveal the relationship between Child and the relative foster placement.

Scheele, Judge.

Brown, J., and Felix, J., concur.