R.B. (Mother), Appellant-Respondent v. Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellee-Petitioner (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] R.B. (“Mother”) appeals the termination of her parental rights to L.M. (“Child”). Mother argues the trial court's findings do not support its conclusion that the termination of her parental rights was in Child's best interests. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Mother ¹ and D.M. (“Father”)² (collectively, “Parents”) are the parents of Child, born December 2018. At the times relevant here, Child lived with Parents. In April 2021 and May 2021, the Department of Child Services (“DCS”) received reports of multiple domestic disturbances between Parents. The reports also alleged Father was using illegal substances and seemed to be impaired on one occasion. In late May 2021, DCS filed a petition to declare Child a Child in Need of Services (“CHINS”)³ based on the domestic violence and Father's drug use. The trial court dismissed the CHINS petition in July 2021 because Parents agreed to an Informal Adjustment that required them to complete substance abuse assessments and follow all recommendations; refrain from committing domestic violence; participate in homebased counseling; refrain from using alcohol and illegal substances; and submit to random drug and alcohol screenings. In addition, Mother agreed to be the only caregiver of Child and to be Child's “only disciplinarian[.]” (Ex. Vol. IV at 250.)

[3] On January 21, 2022, DCS filed a second CHINS petition alleging “that law enforcement was called to the home when [Father] was found having overdosed on methamphetamine, suboxone, and Xanax but was refusing medical care.” (Id. at 85.) Additionally, the petition indicated Parents were also not successful with the terms of the Informal Adjustment because domestic violence continued to occur, “[Father] was not sober around [Child], [and] [Mother] drinks heavily[.]” (Id.) DCS noted:

Service providers stated that sessions were unproductive and frustrating with no progress being made and that Mother had to be fully supervised during urine screens due to concerns that Mother was attempting to use [Child's] urine instead of her own and had attempted to falsify the documents for collecting the urine samples.

(Id.) At the initial hearing, Mother admitted Child was a CHINS.⁴ Child remained in Mother's care on the condition that Father have limited access to Child.

[4] In March 2022,⁵ the trial court entered a dispositional order requiring Mother to, among other things, successfully complete all recommended services, including a batterer's intervention program; refrain from using drugs or alcohol; submit to random drug screens; and refrain from engaging in domestic violence. In September 2022, Child was removed from Mother's care because her older sibling, D.B., was behaving violently; Mother had allowed Father to supervise Child, in violation of the trial court's order; Child had injuries following Mother's discipline; and a “social media video [circulated] of [Child] playing with one of [Sibling's] pills, like playing with the pill sorter [and] taking the pills out[.]” (Tr. Vol. II at 176-77.) Child was placed in foster care, where she has remained ever since.

[5] From December 2022 to January 2024, Mother participated in individual therapy designed to help her improve her parenting skills but did not “necessarily” complete the goals of therapy because she “really didn't take accountability even [as to] why the case is open” and there could not be “a lot of growth without accountability.” (Id. at 163.) Mother also participated in individual therapy designed to address her psychological issues. Dr. Bridget Roberts-Pittman diagnosed Mother with “Dependent Personality Disorder [and] Dysthymia” and behavior consistent with “Narcissistic Traits and Borderline Intellectual Functioning[.]” (Id. at 22.) Throughout therapy Mother “did not accept responsibility ․ for her actions” associated with Child's removal. (Id. at 27.) When asked if she would leave Father because of his continued violent behavior and substance abuse Mother “shook her head no.” (Id. at 25.)

[6] In late 2023, Mother completed a batterer's intervention program. Mother also regularly visited with Child but refused to use appropriate discipline as suggested by the service provider. During one family team meeting, Mother got into an argument with Family Case Manager Jennifer Cordell (“FCM Cordell”) and “sped off despite the fact that [Child] was not in a proper car seat.” (Id. at 141.)

[7] In February 2024, DCS filed a petition to terminate Mother's parental rights to Child because Mother was only partially compliant with services and DCS had “safety concerns” during Mother's visitations with Child. (Ex. Vol. IV at 127.) In April 2024, the State charged Mother with Class B misdemeanor public intoxication ⁶ and Class B misdemeanor disorderly conduct ⁷ following an incident in which Mother allegedly was “drunk and entering trailers without permission.”⁸ (Tr. Vol. III at 12.) The trial court held fact-finding hearings on the termination petition on April 16, 2024, October 8, 2024, December 3, 2024, December 8, 2024, March 14, 2025, and May 16, 2025.

[8] At the time of the May 16, 2025, fact-finding hearing, Mother was employed as a Certified Nursing Assistant (“CNA”). In addition, Mother had voluntarily participated in three services to address her alcohol addiction and her relationship with Father. Mother had a sponsor in an alcohol recovery group to assist her with her sobriety. However, while Mother testified that she was no longer in a relationship with Father at the time of the March 2025 fact-finding hearing, Father testified at the March and May 2025 fact-finding hearings that he was still living with Mother.

[9] Regarding Mother's continued relationship with Father, Dr. Roberts-Pittman outlined her interactions with Mother and expressed her concern that Mother would not leave Father, who posed a safety threat to Child. She also told the trial court that Mother refused to acknowledge her role in the removal of Child, blaming Father or other outside entities instead of taking responsibility for her own actions. In addition, FCM Cordell, who worked with the family from April 2022 until December 2024, testified that, at the time of the April 2024 fact-finding hearing,

it has been two (2) and a half, three (3) years that we've worked with [Parents] and it seems to just have reoccurring issues with [domestic violence], substances, and still being on supervised visits where multiple providers have worked with this family and nothing is ․ it still seems to be the same problem. Nothing is being able to be resolved.

(Tr. Vol. II at 218.) At the March 2025 fact-finding hearing, FCM Aubrey Deal (“FCM Deal”) echoed FCM Cordell's statement, noting that Mother, despite her participation in services, had failed to learn “the basic foundations of parenting.” (Id. at 241.) Both FCM Deal and FCM Cordell told the trial court that they felt termination of Mother's parental rights was in Child's best interests. The Court Appointed Special Advocate (“CASA”), Tiffany Clark, also told the trial court she felt that termination was in Child's best interests because she was concerned about Child's safety in Mother's care and

[Mother] does not believe that her lack of parenting skills are [a] lack of parenting skills. She does not believe that her children have behaviors despite being observed to have behaviors. She does not believe that ․ disciplinary tactic[s] [are] necessary because her children, according to her, do not have behaviors. She does not take accountability for the reason that the case opened. She does not take accountability for any domestic violence that has occurred within in [sic] her home or with any partners she's ever had. According to [Mother] she can and does no wrong.

(Tr. Vol. III at 16.)

[10] Regarding Mother's ability to parent Child, Ashaunte Miller, the visitation supervisor, testified that Mother still was not able to appropriately discipline Child, despite being counseled on several occasions that her discipline practices did not work. Child's foster mother testified that Mother's visitation with Child had decreased from two four-hour visits per week to one two-hour visit per week. Regarding Child's progress, Child's foster mother stated Child had “a lot of anxiety” because she did not know “where she's gonna live, where she's gonna grow up, where she's gonna go to school.” (Tr. Vol. II at 121.) Child's foster mother testified that when Child was placed with her, Child had anger issues and that at the time of the fact-finding hearings Child was employing techniques to effectively deal with her feelings in a constructive manner. Child's foster mother testified that she wished to adopt Child. On June 5, 2025, the trial court entered its order terminating Mother's parental rights.

Discussion and Decision

[11] Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to Child. “The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children.” In re A.L., 223 N.E.3d 1126, 1137 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), trans. denied. However, a juvenile court must subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the child when evaluating the circumstances surrounding a termination. Id. The termination of parental rights is appropriate when parents are “unable or unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities[.]” Id. (quoting Bester v. Lake Cnty. Ofc. of Fam. & Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005)). The termination of the parent-child relationship is “an ‘extreme measure’ and should only be utilized as a ‘last resort when all other reasonable efforts to protect the integrity of the natural relationship between parent and child have failed.’ ” K.E. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 39 N.E.3d 641, 646 (Ind. 2015) (quoting Rowlett v. Vanderburgh Cnty. Ofc. of Fam. & Child., 841 N.E.2d 615, 623 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied).

[12] To terminate a parent-child relationship, DCS must allege and prove “one (1) or more” of the circumstances listed in Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(d). Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c). As relevant here, Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(d) provides DCS can prove:

(3) That there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(4) That there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being, safety, physical health, or life of the child.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(d) (2024). In addition, DCS must prove that termination is in the children's best interests, Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c)(3) (2024), and that there exists a satisfactory plan for the children's care following termination. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c)(2) (2024). “DCS must provide clear and convincing proof of these allegations.” In re K.E., 162 N.E.3d 565, 569 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), trans. denied. “To determine whether a termination decision is clearly erroneous, we apply a two-tiered standard of review to the trial court's findings of facts and conclusions of law. First, we determine whether the evidence supports the findings; second, we determine whether the findings support the judgment.” In re E.P., 267 N.E.3d 531, 535 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (internal citations omitted).

[13] Mother argues the trial court's findings do not support its conclusion that termination of her parental rights was in Child's best interests.

[I]n determining whether termination of parental rights is in the best interests of a child, the court is required to look at the totality of the evidence. In doing so, the court must subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the children involved. The court need not wait until a child is irreversibly harmed before terminating the parent-child relationship. Moreover, the testimony of service providers may support a finding that termination is in the child's best interests.

Z.B. v. Indiana Dept. of Child Servs., 108 N.E.3d 895, 903 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (internal citations omitted), trans. denied. Mother contends she had a “profound and enduring bond” with Child and that Child “exhibited a deep attachment to Mother, crying when the visits ended and expressing a desire to see her even days after the visit ended.” (Mother's Br. at 11.) She also asserts that, while she did not make “significant progress during reunification services” she “made noticeable strides in addressing the underlying issues that led to DCS's involvement, including completing two domestic violence curriculums and maintaining sobriety.” (Id. at 12.) She notes that, at the time of the fact-finding hearing, she had “stable housing and gainful employment.” (Id.) She asks us to reverse the termination of her parental rights because her “demonstrated progress, stable employment, appropriate housing, and lengthy sobriety reveal that reunification was still a viable option with continued support.” (Id.)

[14] Regarding Child's best interests, the trial court found:

[B3.] The Court finds that [Father] and [Mother] are currently living together and are in a romantic relationship. The Court makes this finding by assessing the credibility of all witness testimony, including statements made by DCS personnel, service providers, and [Parents] themselves.

Additionally, the Court finds credible and persuasive the testimony of Dr. Roberts-Pittman and DCS Exhibit M [Dr. Roberts-Pittman's report]. That report notes multiple times that [Mother] is unwilling to end her relationship with [Father], and gives rise to the clear inference that [Mother] is emotionally dependent on [Father]. That statement still appears true today. The Court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that [Parents] will remain in a relationship absent a clear showing to the contrary; which was not provided.

[B4.] [Mother] has previous criminal history, including charges for public intoxication and disorderly conduct that occurred after the filing of the [termination] petition. Additionally, [Mother] has previously pled guilty to felony neglect of a dependent in a case involving [Siblings]. The court takes this as significant evidence that the parent-child relationship poses a threat to [Child], and that [Mother] will not be able to remedy the reasons that [Child] was removed from the home.

* * * * *

Additionally, as [Mother] and [Father] remain in a romantic relationship, as they have since the beginning of the case, and [Father] remains a threat to the safety of [Child], the Court is forced to find that [Mother] is also a threat to the safety of [Child] by her continued and intimate relationship with [Father].

[Mother] has made the choice to continue having [Father] in her life and in her home.

[B5.] The Court also finds that [Mother] has failed to make progress in services, despite attendance and completion of the same. The Court specifically finds persuasive and credible the testimony of FCM Aubrey Deal, CASA Tiffany Clark, former FCM Jennifer [Cordell], and former service provider Peggy Escobedo. This testimony is reinforced by the continued findings of the CHINS court that [Mother] has failed to make progress in services, or to learn the necessary skills from the services that she has completed.

Additionally, the completed psychological evaluation shows that [Mother] was not ever able to take responsibility for her actions. Progress cannot occur without self-reflection, and [Mother], through her testimony, showed that she demonstratively lacks self-reflection. The Court finds that it was clear throughout the proceeding that [Mother] was not able to understand her own role in [Child's] removal, and that when she encounters problems she is quick to blame others instead of accepting responsibility. Additionally, the psychological report notes that [Mother] repeatedly minimize[d] and denied her psychological symptom[s] and struggles. The Court finds this assessment persuasive and credible, and finds that this condition still persists at the time of trial.

The Court finds that this is clear and convincing evidence that [Mother] will not learn the necessary skills to be able to provide a safe home for [Child]. This is supported by the determination of Dr. Roberts-Pittman, who indicated in her report that “The Division of Family and Children have been involved with [Mother] for years with no marked gains on [Mother's] part. It is this lack of progress that prompted this evaluation referral. Based on the data gathered, it is most likely that this pattern will continue despite the efforts of providers and DCS. [Mother] is not willing to address the core issues.” The Court finds this statement persuasive, credible, and still applicable at the time of trial.

[B6.] This impression is further reinforced by [Parents’] continued struggles during visitation. The court relies upon the persuasive and credible testimony of the visit provider, Ashaunte Miller and [CASA] Tiffany Clark.

Ms. Miller noted a pattern of inability to provide structure and discipline at visits. This observation was also made by CASA Tiffany Clark. [Child] has been involved with [DCS] for approximately four years. That there are still issues that prevent visitation from progressing shows that the Parent-Child relationships between [Child] and [Parents] will continue to pose a threat to [Child]. [Parents] are not able to parent appropriately in the limited time they see [Child] each week. The Court can only infer that this issue would be worsened if [Child] was fully in [Parents’] care.

Additionally, waiting for [Parents] to make significant progress would endanger [Child's] mental health and long term well-being. [Child] needs permanency that [Parents] have so far been unable to provide.

[B7.] Additionally, there are still concerns of violent and belligerent behavior with [Parents]. The Court takes note of [Father's] criminal convictions, but also notes these same concerns for [Mother]. [Mother] also has [a] violent criminal history, and was noted to have aggressive behaviors during her psychological evaluation.

* * * * *

The Court finds that this behavior is another data point that strongly suggests that [Parents] will not remedy the reasons for removal and that maintaining the parent-child relationship will be a threat to [Child].

[B9.] The Court is persuaded that adoption is in the best interests of [Child].

* * * * *

Additionally, the court finds that [Child] is well bonded to her foster parents, and that those foster parents can provide her with a safe, stable, permanent home where she will be able to maintain family connections with [Siblings].

[B12.] DCS believes it is in the best interests of [Child] to be adopted due to the length of the case, [Parents’] lack of progress in remedying the reasons for removal, and [inability to] to provide a permanent and stable home for [Child].

(App. Vol. II at 144-46) (errors in original).

[15] The trial court found that for almost three years, Mother has participated in several types of reunification services without benefitting from them. The trial court stated Mother continued to deflect responsibility for her actions leading to Child's removal from her care and continued her abusive relationship with Father, whose behavior and substance abuse posed a danger to Child. Child needs stability, which the trial court found she received from her foster mother. She cannot be made to languish, waiting for permanency, until Mother demonstrates she can provide her with a safe, stable home. See Baker v. Marion Cnty. OFC, 810 N.E.2d 1035, 1040 n.4 (Ind. 2004) (limitations on trial court's ability to approve long-term foster care are designed to ensure a child does not “languish, forgotten, in custodial limbo for long periods of time without permanency”) (quoting In re Priser, No. 19861, 2004 WL 541124 at *6 (Ohio Ct. App. March 19, 2004)). Therefore, we conclude the trial court's findings support its conclusion that the termination of Mother's parental rights is in Child's best interest. See, e.g., In re N.G., 51 N.E.3d 1167, 1173 (Ind. 2016) (trial court's findings that mother had not benefitted from services and that the CASA and Guardian ad Litem testified termination was in children's best interests supported its conclusion that termination of mother's parental rights was in the child's best interests).

Conclusion

[16] We conclude the trial court's findings support its conclusion that the termination of Mother's parental rights to Child was in Child's best interests. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

[17] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Mother had two other children, D.B., born December 2011, and L.B., born September 2014. D.B. and L.B. (collectively, “Siblings”) split their time between Mother's house and their father's house. Mother's parental rights to Siblings were terminated in a separate action.

2.   The trial court also terminated Father's parental rights to Child, but Father does not participate in this appeal.

3.   Siblings were also found to be CHINS in separate cases.

4.   Father also admitted Child was a CHINS at his initial hearing.

5.   In March 2022, DCS closed Parents’ 2021 Informal Adjustment because Parents did not successfully complete its terms.

6.   Ind. Code § 7.1-5-1-3.

7.   Ind. Code § 35-45-1-3(a).

8.   In March 2025, Mother entered a pretrial diversion program for to these charges.

May, Judge.

Altice, C.J., and Foley, J., concur.