Clarissa Marie Culvahouse, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Clarissa M. Culvahouse appeals her conviction of Class A misdemeanor battery.¹ Culvahouse argues the evidence is insufficient to support her conviction. Because the testimony of the sole witness was not incredibly dubious and was sufficient to support her conviction, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In May of 2023, Aubrey Bookwalter was an employee at a KinderCare in Fishers. Bookwalter had been working at KinderCare for four months and regularly had been assigned to a classroom of two-year-old children. On May 2, 2023, Bookwalter was to train for a day “in the infant room,” where Culvahouse worked. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 39.) The children in the infant room were between the ages of three months and eleven months. One of the six children in Culvahouse's room was an eleven-month-old boy named J.W., whose mom Tina worked at KinderCare.

[3] After lunch, when it was time to start getting children down for naps, Bookwalter was in a rocking chair feeding a baby while Culvahouse sat in the other rocking chair “on her phone[.]” (Id. at 41.) J.W. was on the floor and had been playing, but he “ended up being sort of crabby, screaming, and crying.” (Id.) Culvahouse got “frustrated and said ‘Fuck’ then got up and got [J.W.]” (Id.) Culvahouse picked J.W. up by his biceps, carried him to his crib by his biceps, “laid him down on his stomach and then began patting him” more forcefully than is normal. (Id.) Bookwalter who still had a baby in her arms looked back to see what was happening, and Culvahouse was pushing J.W.’s head

down into the mattress, because he kept wanting to get back up. He didn't want to go to sleep; he's a baby trying to fight sleep. I could also hear he was kind of trying to grasp his breath again, kind of sounding like he was choking in a way. I remember seeing her keep putting his head down[.]

(Id. at 47-48.) Bookwalter believed Culvahouse was patting J.W. too hard and the situation “felt way too intense. Way more intense than it needed to be.” (Id. at 51.) Bookwalter put down the baby that she had been feeding, told Culvahouse to “go sit down,” and picked up J.W. to comfort him. (Id.) J.W. had “redness where he was grabbed along his bicep on both arms.” (Id. at 77.) It took J.W. about five minutes to calm down.

[4] When she took her lunch break, Bookwalter described the incident to a teacher that had trained her to work in the two-year-old room, and then they reported the incident to the acting director of KinderCare, Stephanie Tornes. Tornes informed J.W.’s mother, Tina, about the incident, and Tina went to check on J.W. Tina found J.W. had a mark near his elbow that looked like he had been squeezed too hard. Tornes contacted Child Protective Services, and Tina called the Fishers Police Department.

[5] On May 3, 2023, Bookwalter went to the Fishers Police Department for an interview, and on May 4, 2023, Bookwalter assisted police by reenacting the incident in the KinderCare classroom. (See State's Ex. 1) (videotaped reenactment). The mark on J.W.’s arm took a couple of days to go away, but doctors at Riley Hospital confirmed J.W. had no other injuries. After the incident, J.W.’s demeanor changed to be “more fussy and more clingy” with Tina. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 97.)

[6] On June 26, 2023, the State charged Culvahouse with Level 6 felony battery on a person less than fourteen years old. The information alleged Culvahouse “did knowingly or intentionally touch Juvenile Victim, a person under the age of fourteen (14), in a rude, insolent, or angry manner by grabbing and/or throwing Juvenile Victim[.]” (App. Vol. 2 at 17.) Culvahouse waived her right to a jury trial, and after hearing all the evidence, the trial court found Culvahouse guilty as charged.

[7] During the sentencing hearing, the trial court determined it would enter Culvahouse's conviction as a Class A misdemeanor pursuant to Indiana Code section 35-50-2-7. The trial court found mitigators in the circumstance being unlikely to recur and in Culvahouse's full-time employment and lack of prior criminal history. The court imposed a 365-day sentence, with 357 days suspended. Culvahouse had eight days of credit based on four days actually served, and the trial court ordered her to report to probation immediately after the sentencing hearing.

Discussion and Decision

[8] Culvahouse argues the State failed to present sufficient evidence to sustain her conviction. Our standard of review regarding sufficiency of the evidence claims is well-settled:

Sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims ․ warrant a deferential standard, in which we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility. Rather, we consider only the evidence supporting the judgment and any reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence. We will affirm a conviction if there is substantial evidence of probative value that would lead a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

Powell v. State, 151 N.E.3d 256, 262-63 (Ind. 2020) (internal citations omitted).

[9] The trial court found Culvahouse guilty of Level 6 felony battery of a person less than fourteen years of age. Battery, as alleged herein, occurs if a person “knowingly or intentionally ․ touches another person in a rude, insolent, or angry manner[.]” Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(c)(1) (defining Class B misdemeanor battery). As relevant herein, the crime becomes a Level 6 felony if “[t]he offense is committed against a person less than fourteen (14) years of age and is committed by a person at least eighteen (18) years of age.” Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(e)(3). The State specifically charged Culvahouse with battery based upon “grabbing and/or throwing” J.W. (App. Vol. 2 at 17.)

[10] Culvahouse testified she was twenty-three years old at trial, which made her twenty-one years old at the time of the incident, and J.W. was eleven months old at the time of the incident. As to the other elements, the trial court explained on the record:

[W]hen the Defendant threw out the F word suddenly in response to the child's cries and then put down her phone as well as aggressively patted the child on the butt and pushed the child's head into the mattress of his crib that was angry and it was certainly insolent. When Ms. Culvahouse denied using the F word, the only time she testified, she looked down at the ground when she said no to your question. The Court has to weigh credibility, and when doing so, the Court finds that the word was stated and assumes Ms. Bookwalter is correct, as she stated.

Additionally, the Court decision on grabbing is not the initial pick-up. I want to make that clear for the record. The Court's decision on grabbing is not the initial pick up from the child off the polka dot rug and putting him in the crib. The Court's decision on grabbing. [sic] That element was met when Ms. Culvahouse grasped the child's head, seized it, and pushed it into the mattress to the extent that his cries and screams were muffled because it was face-down in the mattress, and that's what caused Ms. Bookwalter to take action.

Court finds the State has met its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

(Tr. Vol. 2 at 181-82.)

[11] In the reenactment, Bookwalter explained Culvahouse was holding J.W.’s head down with “a good amount of pressure to where he was definitely muffled and you could barely hear any screaming. His face was definitely down in the mattress.” (State's Ex. 1 at 3:10-3:20.) At trial, Bookwalter described Culvahouse pushing J.W.’s head

down into the mattress, because he kept wanting to get back up. He didn't want to go to sleep; he's a baby trying to fight sleep. I could also hear he was kind of trying to grasp his breath again, kind of sounding like he was choking in a way. I remember seeing her keep putting his head down[.]

(Tr. Vol. 2 at 47-48.) These two pieces of evidence are sufficient to support the trial court's determination that Culvahouse “grasped the child's head, seized it, and pushed it into the mattress to the extent that his cries and screams were muffled.” (Id. at 181.) The trial court was present to observe Bookwalter as she testified, and “[i]t is the fact-finder's role, not that of appellate courts, to assess witness credibility and weigh the evidence to determine whether it is sufficient to support a conviction.” Teising v. State, 226 N.E.3d 780, 783 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007)).

[12] Culvahouse nevertheless asserts Bookwalter's testimony so lacked credibility that it should not be able to support her conviction.² We can invade the province of the fact-finder to assess credibility and weigh evidence if a witness's testimony is incredibly dubious. See McCallister v. State, 91 N.E.3d 554, 559 (Ind. 2018) (reviewing jury verdicts). Incredible dubiosity “is a difficult standard to meet,” Edwards v. State, 753 N.E.2d 618, 622 (Ind. 2001), and we will not interfere with the factfinder's role unless the testimony “runs counter to human experience.” Id. (quoting Campbell v. State, 732 N.E.2d 197, 207 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000)). There are three requirements for application of the incredible dubiosity rule: “1) a sole testifying witness; 2) testimony that is inherently contradictory, equivocal, or the result of coercion; and 3) a complete absence of circumstantial evidence.” Moore v. State, 27 N.E.3d 749, 756 (Ind. 2015).

[13] While Bookwalter's trial testimony about the event did not precisely match her earlier explanations, we are concerned instead with discrepancies within the testimony provided at trial. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 163 N.E.3d 925, 931 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (affirming conviction because testimony of sole witness was not incredibly dubious based on inconsistencies between pre-trial statements and trial testimony, given that child testified unequivocally at trial). Two years had passed between the incident and the trial, which makes it unsurprising that Bookwalter's memory of the event might have been altered slightly. Moreover, Culvahouse has not pointed to any manner in which Bookwalter's trial testimony was equivocal about whether Culvahouse was pushing J.W.’s face into the mattress, which muffled his cries. Bookwalter's testimony was not incredible dubious. See, e.g., Murray v. State, 761 N.E.2d 406, 409 (Ind. 2002) (declining to reverse based on incredible dubiosity rule because “[a]lthough [victim's] trial testimony was inconsistent in some respects with his pre-trial statement, it was not equivocal, and [victim] did not contradict himself on the witness stand”). We therefore cannot overturn Culvahouse's conviction.

Conclusion

[14] The testimony from Bookwalter was not incredibly dubious, and the evidence at trial was sufficient to support Culvahouse's conviction. We accordingly affirm the trial court's judgment.

[15] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(c)(1) & (e)(3).

2.   Culvahouse notes Acting Director Tornes testified Bookwalter told her immediately after the incident that J.W. “hit his head on the crib.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 112.) However, according to Culvahouse: “There is nothing in the record to indicate J.W. hit his head on the crib. And Ms. Bookwalter did not say this happened during the reenactment.” (Appellant's Br. at 9.) Culvahouse is simply incorrect. During the reenactment, Bookwalter explained that, when Culvahouse put J.W. in the crib, “I heard a thud, which made me assume that he had hit his head, and that was just right as he was put in the crib.” (State's Ex. 1 at 3:27-3:40.) Bookwalter then indicated J.W. may have hit his head on the wall slats at the end of the crib, because his head was very close to that end when she picked him up from the crib.Culvahouse also asserts “Bookwalter told J.W.’s mother that Ms. Culvahouse had grabbed J.W.by the elbow, thrown him in the crib, and hit his head.” (Appellant's Br. at 9.) In support, Culvahouse cites page ninety-five in the transcript, but on that page, J.W.’s mother testified that those facts were reported to her by Acting Director Tornes, not by Bookwalter.Given the two factual errors discussed in this footnote, we strongly encourage Appellant's Counsel to refrain from misstating the record because errors like these only undermine the credibility of counsel's arguments on behalf of his client. Culvahouse's appeal would not have been successful without these errors, but that may not always be the case.

May, Judge.

Altice, C.J., and Foley, J., concur.