Melissa L. Stevens, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Melissa L. Stevens appeals her conviction for Class C misdemeanor operating a vehicle with a Schedule I or II controlled substance or its metabolite, arguing the traffic stop that led to her arrest violated both the state and federal constitutions and thus the trial court committed fundamental error in allowing the admission of evidence resulting from that stop. Finding no error, let alone a fundamental error, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In the early morning hours of May 15, 2024, Stevens was driving a motorcycle down State Road 11 in Jackson County. Indiana State Police Trooper Tia Hunt pulled behind the motorcycle and observed it to be going 41 miles per hour in excess of the speed limit, which was “30 or 35 miles an hour.” Tr. Vol. II p. 25. Trooper Hunt initiated a traffic stop and spoke with Stevens, who stated her belief that “it was a 45 mile an hour zone” and “she didn't think she was going any faster [than that].” Id. at 9. Trooper Hunt requested Stevens’ driver's license, and noticed Stevens displayed “poor manual dexterity[,]” as well as “odd behavior[.]” Id. at 10, 27. Suspecting Stevens was impaired, Trooper Hunt requested Stevens submit to standardized-field-sobriety testing. Stevens did so but was unable to complete the tests because she “wasn't feeling well.” Id. at 13. She was transported via ambulance to a local hospital where a blood draw was performed. Later testing of her blood sample revealed the presence of methamphetamine and amphetamine.

[3] The State charged Stevens with Class C misdemeanor operating a vehicle with a Schedule I or II controlled substance or its metabolite.¹ A bench trial was held on November 21, 2025. Trooper Hunt testified she determined Stevens’ speed by “pacing” Stevens’ motorcycle, meaning she “pulled behind it” and “ke[pt] pace with the motorcycle” while observing the speedometer in her own vehicle. Id. at 7. Trooper Hunt explained that if her speedometer shows she is “exceeding the speed limit [then] the vehicle in front of [her] is as well.” Id. She also testified that her speedometer is accurate and calibrated.

[4] The court found Stevens guilty of the Class C misdemeanor and sentenced her to sixty days, with five days executed and fifty-five days suspended, as well as 365 days of probation. Stevens now appeals.²

Discussion and Decision

[5] Stevens contends the traffic stop was unconstitutional and thus any evidence resulting from the stop was inadmissible. Stevens acknowledges that she did not object on this basis at trial, but asserts the error is fundamental. “A claim that has been waived by a defendant's failure to raise a contemporaneous objection can be reviewed on appeal if the reviewing court determines that a fundamental error occurred.” Brown v. State, 929 N.E.2d 204, 207 (Ind. 2010). The fundamental-error exception is “extremely narrow, and applies only when the error constitutes a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the defendant fundamental due process.” Id. (quoting Mathews v. State, 849 N.E.2d 578, 587 (Ind. 2006)). “The error claimed must either ‘make a fair trial impossible’ or constitute ‘clearly blatant violations of basic and elementary principles of due process.’ ” Id. (quoting Clark v. State, 915 N.E.2d 126, 131 (Ind. 2009)). “This exception is available only in ‘egregious circumstances.’ ” Id. (quoting Brown v. State, 799 N.E.2d 1064, 1068 (Ind. 2003)).

[6] Traffic stops, even those for minor violations, fall within the protections of the federal and state constitutions. Marshall v. State, 117 N.E.3d 1254, 1258 (Ind. 2019). “When a law enforcement officer stops a vehicle for a suspected traffic infraction like speeding, that officer seizes the vehicle's occupants under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution; and that traffic stop must pass constitutional muster.” Id. Stevens argues that her traffic stop violated both the state and federal constitutions. Because each constitution requires a separate and independent analysis, we address each argument in turn.

I. Fourth Amendment

[7] “The Fourth Amendment safeguards our persons, our property, and our peace by requiring that law enforcement first have a warrant supported by probable Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 25A-CR-871 | December 12, 2025 Page 4 of 7 cause before executing searches or seizures.” Id. at 1258-59. One exception to the warrant requirement is a brief investigatory stop—often called a Terry stop—that allows police to seize a person if the officer has reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity may be afoot. Id. The reasonable-suspicion requirement “is satisfied where the facts known to the officer, together with the reasonable inferences arising from such facts, would cause an ordinarily prudent person to believe that criminal activity has occurred or is about to occur.” Crabtree v. State, 762 N.E.2d 241, 246 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). In applying the reasonable-suspicion standard to traffic stops, we have said an “officer's decision to stop a vehicle is valid so long as his on-the-spot evaluation reasonably suggests that lawbreaking occurred.” Meredith v. State, 906 N.E.2d 867, 870 (Ind. 2009).

[8] Stevens argues the traffic stop was not supported by reasonable suspicion. Specifically, she challenges Trooper Hunt's method of “pacing” of her motorcycle, offering various reasons the assessment of her speed may have been inaccurate. However, we have previously held this pacing method may be used to support an officer's belief that a driver has violated the speed limit. See Lashley v. State, 745 N.E.2d 254, 258 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied, abrogated on other grounds by Gaddie v. State, 10 N.E.3d 1249 (Ind. 2014). Here, Trooper Hunt traveled behind Stevens’ motorcycle and, based on her own speed, determined that Stevens was driving above the posted speed limit. This provides reasonable suspicion that Stevens was speeding and justifies the investigatory stop. See Marshall, 117 N.E.3d at 1261 (“For speeding violations in particular, it makes sense that either pacing or radar would naturally provide articulable, particularized objective facts to rouse reasonable suspicion.”). As such, the traffic stop did not amount to an unconstitutional seizure under the Fourth Amendment.

II. Article 1, Section 11

[9] We analyze claims under Article 1, Section 11 of our Indiana Constitution separately and independently from those under the Fourth Amendment. Robinson v. State, 5 N.E.3d 362, 368 (Ind. 2014). “When a defendant raises a Section 11 claim, the State must show the police conduct ‘was reasonable under the totality of the circumstances.’ ” Id. (quoting State v. Washington, 898 N.E.2d 1200, 1206 (Ind. 2008)). We consider three factors when evaluating reasonableness: “1) the degree of concern, suspicion, or knowledge that a violation has occurred, 2) the degree of intrusion the method of the search or seizure imposes on the citizen's ordinary activities, and 3) the extent of law enforcement needs.” Litchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 356, 361 (Ind. 2005).

[10] First, Trooper Hunt had a strong degree of knowledge that a violation had occurred, having paced Stevens’ motorcycle going in excess of the posted speed limit. Second, the traffic stop for speeding amounted to a “small intrusion” on Stevens’ ordinary activities. Marshall, 117 N.E.3d 1262. Trooper Hunt initiated a traffic stop, spoke with Stevens, and requested her driver's license–all routine procedures. The stop escalated to an operating-a-vehicle-while-intoxicated investigation only after Trooper Hunt observed Stevens’ poor manual dexterity and odd behavior. Finally, “law enforcement has at least a legitimate, if not a compelling, need to enforce traffic-safety laws, including speeding limits.” Id. In balancing these three factors, we hold Stevens’ stop for speeding did not violate Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution.

[11] Stevens has failed to establish that the traffic stop and the ensuing searches and seizures were unconstitutional. Thus, she has failed to establish any error, fundamental or otherwise, in the admission of the evidence introduced at trial. We affirm her conviction.

[12] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The State also charged Stevens with Class A misdemeanor operating while intoxicated but dismissed this count prior to trial.

2.   The court stayed Stevens’ sentence pending the outcome of this appeal.

Scheele, Judge.

Foley, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur