IN RE: J.G. (Minor Child) (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] A.H. (“Mother”) is the mother of J.G. (“Child”). Child was hospitalized for seizures, and Mother admitted she forgot about Child's follow-up appointment and that Child occasionally went days without her seizure medication. A child in need of services (“CHINS”) petition was filed, and after a hearing, the juvenile court granted that petition and adjudicated the Child a CHINS. Mother now appeals and raises one issue for our review, which we restate as follows: Whether the juvenile court clearly erred by adjudicating Child a CHINS.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Child, born in September 2017, is the biological child of Mother.¹ Child has a medical condition that causes seizures and is on two “preventative seizure medications,” which she is supposed to take “twice daily.” Tr. Vol. II at 16.

[4] In September 2024, the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) received a report that Child was not attending medical appointments; not being administered her medications; and as a result, Child was admitted to the hospital. A DCS representative spoke with Mother, who admitted that after Child was discharged from the hospital, a follow up appointment was scheduled, but Mother forgot about it. Mother also admitted that “there have been times where [Child] has not gotten her medication on several occasions” and that Child “typically” has a seizure when Child “goes two or more days without the medication.” Tr. Vol. II at 12. DCS thereafter filed a petition alleging that Child was a CHINS.

[5] In October 2024, DCS referred Mother to work with nurse case manager Rachel Konrad, with whom Mother met at least once weekly. Konrad's goals were to help Mother get to the point where she could, without assistance from DCS, keep track of Child's medical appointments, ensure Child's attendance at medical appointments, and ensure that Child was administered her medications as prescribed. Initially, Konrad took Child to Child's medical appointments because Mother had work obligations. Eventually, Mother began attending medical appointments with Konrad and Child, but Mother had not “gotten to the point where she's getting [Child] to the appointments by herself yet.” Tr. Vol. II at 17.

[6] Konrad provided Mother with a paper planner to track Child's medical appointments, but Mother “misplaced it and could not find it.” Tr. Vol. II at 17. When Konrad provided Mother with a new planner, Mother told Konrad “not to bother giving it [to] her” because Mother was “just going to use her phone” instead. Id. Konrad was concerned that Mother's use of her phone to track appointments was inadequate because Mother did not write down the “details” of upcoming appointments and would not be able to view upcoming appointments as easily as with a planner. Id. at 23.

[7] As for Mother's ability to manage Child's medications, in December 2024, Child's lab results showed that her “therapeutic levels” for her medications “were low.” Tr. Vol. II at 22. Konrad was unable to monitor Child's medications because the medications were in the form of “oral suspensions,” not pills, id. at 16; came in nontransparent bottles; and Mother provided the medication to Child from both old and new bottles. This made it difficult to track the “volume” of the medications administered to Child. Id. at 18. Konrad provided Mother with a “medication administration record” to ensure that Child was taking her medications as prescribed, but Mother did not “find that helpful” and did not use it. Id.

[8] Mother was also referred for family preservation services and home-based therapy. DCS considered unsuccessfully discharging Mother from the family preservation services due to her initial failure to participate, but Mother started to participate beginning around January 2025, and she was not discharged.

[9] The juvenile court held a factfinding hearing, at which Mother's family case manager Demecia Reed testified that without the court's intervention, Mother would not be able to ensure Child's attendance at medical appointments and “manage [Child's] medical needs.” Tr. Vol. II at 34. Konrad also testified as detailed above. The juvenile court took the matter under advisement.

[10] Following the factfinding hearing, DCS filed a petition to remove Child from Mother's care. DCS argued at the ensuing removal hearing that Mother was still inconsistently administering Child's medications and failing to manage Child's medical appointments. The juvenile court granted DCS's petition and ordered Child removed from the home.

[11] In May 2025, the juvenile court issued an order adjudicating Child a CHINS. At the dispositional hearing, DCS argued that although Child was “now in range of her levels,” that was because “[c]onsistent medication for one week can level out those results and those blood labs were drawn a week after [Child's] removal.” Tr. Vol. II at 60. The juvenile court issued a dispositional order continuing Child's removal. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

The Juvenile Court Did Not Clearly Err by Adjudicating Child a CHINS under Indiana Code section 31-34-1-1

[12] Mother challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the juvenile court's conclusion that Child is a CHINS under Indiana Code section 31-34-1-1. Indiana Code section 31-34-1-1 provides that in order to adjudicate a child a CHINS under that section, DCS must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that

(1) the child's physical or mental condition is seriously impaired or seriously endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or neglect of the child's parent, guardian, or custodian to supply the child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education, or supervision:

(A) when the parent, guardian, or custodian is financially able to do so; or

(B) due to the failure, refusal, or inability of the parent, guardian, or custodian to seek financial or other reasonable means to do so; and

(2) the child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that:

(A) the child is not receiving; and

(B) is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the court.

Ind. Code § 31-34-1-1. Although there is “a certain implication of parental fault in many CHINS adjudications, the truth of the matter is that a CHINS adjudication is simply that—a determination that a child is in need of services. Standing alone, a CHINS adjudication does not establish culpability on the part of a particular parent.” In re N.E., 919 N.E.2d 102, 105 (Ind. 2010).

[13] We will reverse a CHINS determination only if the juvenile court's decision was clearly erroneous. In re R.L., 144 N.E.3d 686, 689 (Ind. 2020) (citing In re D.J., 68 N.E.3d 574, 578 (Ind. 2017)). “A decision is clearly erroneous if the record facts do not support the findings or if [the juvenile court] applies the wrong legal standard to properly found facts.” Id. (quoting D.J., 68 N.E.3d at 578). “[W]e neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility.” Id. (citing D.J., 68 N.E.3d at 577–78).

[14] Mother challenges several of the trial court's factual findings and the trial court's ultimate CHINS adjudication. We address each argument in turn.

Factual Findings

[15] First, Mother challenges four of the trial court's factual findings. Finding 9 states that Mother “has not yet demonstrated she is able to keep track of [Child's] medical appointments, ensure [Child] gets to appointments, follow up on physician referrals and manage [Child's] medication administration.” Appellant's App. Vol. II at 104. Similarly, Finding 19 states that Mother “continues to struggle with ensuring [Child's] attendance at medical appointments and to follow her medication regimen, which increases [Child's] risk of seizures.” Id. at 106.

[16] Konrad testified that Mother often did not record the details of Child's medical appointments. Mother had also not progressed to the point where she could ensure Child's attendance at appointments without DCS assistance; Mother was still only attending appointments with Konrad present. Additionally, Mother had not shown the ability to consistently administer Child's medications, as Child's therapeutic levels were low when tested in December 2024. Mother thereafter refused to log Child's medications as recommended by Konrad. Mother points out that Konrad testified Child's therapeutic levels were “trending up” following the December 2024 labs, Tr. Vol. II at 46; however, the record does not show that Child's levels ever reflected consistent stabilization in an acceptable range before Child's removal.² We cannot say that the trial court's findings are unsupported by the record.

[17] Finding 10 states, “[Mother] misplaced the planner purchased for her and does not write down location and date information when scheduling appointments.” Appellant's App. Vol. II at 104. Mother does not contest that she misplaced the planner. As for writing down the details of appointments, Konrad testified that “when someone calls [Mother] to schedule something, [Mother] won't take the time to clarify like who is this person calling and what day and time are we scheduling for.” Tr. Vol. II at 22. The trial court was entitled to credit Konrad's testimony. The finding is not unsupported by the record.

[18] Lastly, Finding 14 states that Mother was “unsuccessfully discharged” from services but has since “reengaged.” Appellant's App. Vol. II at 105. DCS did consider discharging Mother due to her initial lack of participation in family preservations services; however, Mother began to engage approximately one month prior to the factfinding hearing and was not discharged. The trial court's finding regarding discharge is incorrect. Still, the error is harmless. The trial court correctly found that Mother had begun to engage in services, and moreover, the focus of the factfinding hearing was Mother's ability to care for Child's medical needs, not Mother's participation in services. See App. R. 66(A) (“No error or defect in any ruling or order or in anything done or omitted by the trial court ․ is ground for granting relief or reversal on appeal where its probable impact, in light of all the evidence in the case, is sufficiently minor so as not to affect the substantial rights of the parties.”)

[19] In sum, with the exception of a minor error in Finding 14, the trial court's findings are supported by the record. We accept as true the remaining findings, which Mother does not challenge on appeal. See R.M. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 203 N.E.3d 559, 564 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (citing Madlem v. Arko, 592 N.E.2d 686, 687 (Ind. 1992)).

CHINS Adjudication

[20] We next turn to Mother's argument that the CHINS adjudication was clearly erroneous. The trial court found that Child was “endangered” by Mother's “inability to provide needed medical care,” Mother “does not follow the recommendations of the providers working to improve her ability to meet [Child's] needs,” and the coercive intervention of the court was necessary to “compel [Mother] to take a different approach to [Child's] care.” Appellant's App. Vol. II at 106.

[21] Mother argues that she attended Child's appointments and her “prior failure to administer [Child's] medication had been remedied.” Appellant's Br. at 16. Mother contends that any further failure to administer Child's medications was mere “speculation” by Konrad, id., and Konrad's disagreement with Mother's methods for managing Child's medical needs does not alone support a CHINS finding.

[22] Mother analogizes her circumstances to those of the mother in In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d 1283 (Ind. 2014), but that case is distinguishable. In S.D., the child was hospitalized due to a severe medical event, and the mother relocated herself and her other children to be closer to the child's treatment. 2 N.E.3d at 1285. The mother faced complications attending to the child at the hospital while also caring for her other children, and she accepted varying degrees of assistance from DCS. Id. at 1285–86. The juvenile court adjudicated the child a CHINS because the hospital required the mother and a second caregiver to complete training before the child could be released, but by the time of the factfinding hearing, the mother had not completed the training. Id. at 1286. The Indiana Supreme Court reversed the CHINS adjudication, holding that the coercive intervention of the court was not required; the evidence showed that the mother “had difficulty completing the last step of medical training” given her situation but did not show that “she was unwilling or unable to do so without the court's compulsion.” Id. at 1290.

[23] Here, DCS became involved because Child was hospitalized due to seizures. Mother admitted that she forgot about Child's follow up appointment, Child occasionally did not receive her medications, and Child would “typically” have a seizure when she went two or more days without her medication. Tr. Vol. II at 12. This suggests that Mother neglected Child's medications on several occasions. Even after DCS became involved, Child's therapeutic levels for her medication were low in December 2024, which indicates Child was still not being given her medications consistently.

[24] DCS attempted to provide Mother with tools to better manage Child's medical needs, including a planner for Child's appointments and a log for Child's medications. Mother, however, refused to take advantage of these tools. Mother did not show the ability to record important details regarding Child's medical appointments, did not attend appointments without DCS assistance, and refused to track Child's medications.

[25] This is not a case where Mother and her service providers merely “might not have agreed” regarding Child's care, as Mother contends. Cf. In re A.T., 219 N.E.3d 90, 108 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), trans. not sought. On the contrary, Mother's methods for managing Child's medical needs were clearly inadequate, and Mother showed no inclination to improve them to better manage Child's medical needs. Unlike in S.D., the evidence shows that Mother was unwilling to do what was necessary for Child without the court's intervention. The juvenile court did not clearly err by adjudicating Child a CHINS.

[26] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Child's biological father does not participate in this appeal.

2.   We give little weight to DCS's observation at the dispositional hearing that Child was “now in range of her levels,” Tr. Vol. II at 60, because this testing occurred after Child had been removed from Mother.

Felix, Judge.

Brown, J., and Scheele, J., concur.