Daniel Mathis, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Daniel Mathis appeals the trial court's imposition of an aggregate four-year sentence following his guilty plea to two counts of Level 6 felony voyeurism by means of a camera.¹ He raises two issues for appeal: (1) Did the trial court abuse its discretion by failing to find certain mitigating factors?; and (2) Was Mathis’ sentence inappropriate in light of the nature of his offense and character? We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On August 8, 2023, thirty-five-year-old Mathis used a cell phone camera to peep into a Hollister clothing store dressing room while thirteen-year-old M.H. was trying on clothes. On December 19, Mathis again used his cell phone camera to peep into a dressing room of the same store while twenty-one-year-old K.B. was undressing. In February 2024, the State charged Mathis with two counts of Level 6 felony voyeurism. In October, Mathis pleaded guilty as charged without the benefit of a plea agreement.

[3] In preparation for sentencing, the State moved to unseal the record of Mathis’ expunged 2019 conviction for public indecency. For that misdemeanor offense, Mathis was sentenced to 365 days, all suspended to community service.

[4] On the trial court's order, Mathis completed a pre-sentence interview with adult probation, in which he disclosed a history of mental health-related issues, alcohol and illegal substance use, and some treatment. The Indiana Risk Assessment System – Community Supervision Tool (“IRAS-CST”) score placed him in the “low risk” category to reoffend. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 57. But the report also noted that given the nature of his current offenses, he would be supervised as a high-risk offender.

[5] Mathis also submitted a sentencing memorandum, advancing eight mitigating circumstances for the trial court's consideration: (1) he did not intend to cause or threaten any serious harm to the victims; (2) the crime was the result of circumstances unlikely to recur; (3) he had no prior criminal history; (4) he was likely to respond affirmatively to probation or short term imprisonment; (5) his character and attitudes indicated an unlikelihood to commit another crime; (6) he would make restitution to K.B. for her cost of obtaining counseling; (7) prison would result in undue hardship to his three minor children; and (8) his diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) and mental health history. Mathis attached to the sentencing memorandum numerous letters of support from family and community members.

[6] The trial court held a sentencing hearing on December 20, 2024, at which it granted the State's motion to unseal the expunged records. The trial court sentenced Mathis, but because of certain inaccurate statements made at the hearing about the prior conviction, the trial court subsequently vacated its sentencing order and set a new hearing.

[7] The trial court held a second sentencing hearing on March 3, 2025.² M.H.’s mother testified she is now on “high alert” and worries about protecting her daughter's privacy in public. Tr. Vol. 2 at 24. K.B.’s father testified to the lasting effect on his daughter, stating “her privacy, dignity, and sense of safety and modesty were violated” and recounting how she fears being watched and calls him while walking home across her college campus. Id. at 28. The State read aloud K.B.’s victim impact statement, in which she described Mathis’ actions as “not just an invasion of [her] privacy” but of her “sense of self, [her] autonomy, and [her] peace of mind.” Id. at 31. She described feeling “stripped of [her] dignity” and “constantly on edge, as though I'm being watched even when I'm not.” Id. She sought counseling to “try and cope with the emotional and psychological damage[.]” Id.

[8] Mathis’ brother-in-law testified Mathis was working “very hard” to support his family, was a loving and involved father to his three young children, and had been supportive of his children's mother's efforts to go back to school part-time to secure a better paying job. Id. at 10. Dr. Stephen Ross, a forensic and clinical psychologist, recounted Mathis’ history of alcohol and marijuana use. According to Dr. Ross, Mathis’ PTSD diagnosis was related to childhood sexual abuse, being exposed to a “really disturbing” sexual act as a teenager, and being assaulted and robbed as a young adult. Id. at 17. Mathis’ sponsor in a twelve-step recovery program testified about Mathis’ abstinence from alcohol and marijuana since 2024 and his recovery process. In arguing Mathis would respond well to a sentence of probation, defense counsel recounted Mathis’ rehabilitation efforts, which included voluntary commitment to inpatient treatment after the offenses; subsequent voluntary engagement with recovery programs, therapy, and mental health treatment; and a recent move into a community corrections-eligible sober living house. Counsel also noted Mathis was employed and compliant with all pretrial release conditions. In addition to the mitigators advanced in the sentencing memorandum, defense counsel argued the trial court should consider as a significant mitigating factor the fact Mathis pleaded guilty and took responsibility for his crimes.

[9] At the end of the hearing, the trial court found as aggravators the nature and circumstances of the crime, particularly that “the [effects] still are going on with these young ladies to this day” and “they haven't gotten over this offense”; Mathis’ prior criminal history; and that Mathis’ prior efforts at rehabilitation had failed. Id. at 39. The trial court found the following mitigating factors: (1) Mathis paid restitution in full to K.B.; (2) Mathis’ PTSD diagnosis; (3) his substance use history; (4) his guilty plea and acceptance of responsibility; and (5) his limited criminal history. As to each of the mitigating factors Mathis advanced in his sentencing memorandum but the trial court did not find, the trial court addressed them on the record:

And I'll go through the Defendant's Memorandum that was filed that lists numerous mitigators. One, being that the crime neither caused nor threatened serious harm. I think I already addressed that pretty much in going over the nature and circumstances, the [effect] that that had on the young ladies. So, I don't find that as a mitigator. Two (2), was the crime was a result of circumstances unlikely to recur. I don't find that as a mitigator either. Here we have that offense in 2019 of public indecency, and not too many years later we're back with [this] voyeurism offense. Third listed mitigator was no history of delinquent or criminal activity. Obviously there is a history, as we noted the prior conviction of public indecency in 2019. Also, a requested mitigator was ․ the person is likely to respond affirmative[ly] to probation, or short term imprisonment. Well, I can't find that as a mitigator either. He's had the benefit of a suspended sentence, and he didn't respond well to that. Character and attitudes of the person indicate the person is unlikely to commit another crime; I think the 2019 conviction ․ goes against that as a mitigator ․ Seven (7), the imprisonment of the person will result in undue hardship of this person, or other dependents. Prison is tough on everybody, and the people that go there, and their families. I don't see this being anymore [sic] of a hardship for Mr. Mathis than anybody else.

Id. at 40–41. Finding the aggravators outweighed the mitigators, the trial court sentenced Mathis to two years on each count, with one year and 183 days of each executed and 182 days of each suspended to probation. Noting the two offenses took place on separate days with separate victims, the trial court ordered the sentences served consecutively.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to find certain mitigating factors Mathis advanced for consideration.

[10] Mathis first argues the trial court abused its discretion by failing to identify or find certain mitigating factors. We review a trial court's sentencing decisions for an abuse of discretion. Owen v. State, 210 N.E.3d 256, 269 (Ind. 2023). A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision is “clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom.” Id. (quoting Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007)). A trial court may abuse its sentencing discretion in a number of ways, including if it (1) fails to enter a sentencing statement; (2) relies on aggravating or mitigating factors unsupported by the record; (3) fails to find aggravating or mitigating factors that are supported by the record and advanced for consideration; or (4) relies on reasons that are improper as a matter of law. Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1223 (Ind. 2008). In reviewing a sentencing decision, we may consider both the trial court's written sentencing order and oral statements made at the sentencing hearing. Corbett v. State, 764 N.E.2d 622, 631 (Ind. 2002).

[11] “An allegation that the trial court failed to identify or find a mitigating factor requires the defendant to establish that the mitigating evidence is both significant and clearly supported by the record.” Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 493. If the trial court does not find the existence of a mitigating factor after it has been argued, however, the trial court need not explain why it has determined that factor does not exist. Id. And the trial court is “not obligated to accept the defendant's contentions as to what constitutes a mitigating circumstance.” Rascoe v. State, 736 N.E.2d 246, 249 (Ind. 2000).

[12] A Level 6 felony conviction carries a sentencing range of six months to two and one-half years, with an advisory sentence of one year. I.C. § 35-50-2-7(b) (2019). By sentencing Mathis to two years on each offense, the trial court therefore imposed an above-advisory sentence.

[13] Mathis contends the trial court overlooked his recovery efforts, pretrial release performance, and successful completion of the suspended sentence he received for his prior misdemeanor conviction. He also argues the trial court did not consider the undue hardship on his family.³ He contends that if the trial court had properly considered these factors, the trial court would have imposed an advisory sentence for each offense and ordered them to be served concurrently.

[14] In the sentencing memorandum and at the hearing, defense counsel argued Mathis’ voluntary recovery efforts, compliance with the conditions of pretrial release, and successful completion of a prior sentence were evidence supporting two statutory mitigating factors: the crimes resulted from circumstances unlikely to recur, and Mathis was likely to respond affirmatively to probation or short-term imprisonment. But the trial court expressly rejected those as mitigating factors because Mathis received a suspended sentence for a prior misdemeanor conviction for public indecency but then committed two counts of voyeurism against two victims. We read the trial court's sentencing statement to encompass consideration—and rejection—of these potential mitigating factors and the evidence Mathis put forth to support them. We commend Mathis on the steps he has taken to address his mental health and substance use disorders since his commission of these offenses. But the trial court was not obligated to accept Mathis’ contention that his recent efforts demonstrated a likelihood the crimes resulted from circumstances unlikely to recur or he would respond well to probation, especially considering his criminal history. See Rascoe, 736 N.E.2d at 249.

[15] As for the hardship to Mathis’ dependents, Mathis presented evidence he was working to support his family, was an involved and attentive father, and was helping care for his children while their mother pursued education to secure a more lucrative job. The trial court considered Mathis’ argument but concluded those circumstances did not mitigate his offenses. See Tr. Vol. 2 at 41 (trial court observing: “I don't see this being anymore of a hardship for Mr. Mathis than anybody else.”). “A sentencing court is not required to find a defendant's incarceration would result in undue hardship on his dependents.” Weaver v. State, 845 N.E.2d 1066, 1074 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied. We discern no abuse of the trial court's broad discretion in this area.

[16] The trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Mathis.

Mathis’ sentence is not inappropriate.

[17] Mathis next asks us to revise his sentence to no more than the advisory for each offense, to be run concurrently. The Indiana Constitution authorizes this Court to review and revise a trial court's sentencing decision as provided by rule. Ind. Const. art. 7, § 6. Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) provides we may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, “after due consideration of the trial court's decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” The principal role of appellate review is to leaven the outliers, not to achieve a perceived correct sentence in each case. Conley v. State, 183 N.E.3d 276, 288 (Ind. 2022). Therefore, “we reserve our 7(B) authority for exceptional cases.” Faith v. State, 131 N.E.3d 158, 160 (Ind. 2019) (per curiam).

[18] “[S]entencing is principally a discretionary function in which the trial court's judgment should receive considerable deference.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1222 (Ind. 2008). “Such deference should prevail unless overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense (such as accompanied by restraint, regard, and lack of brutality) and the defendant's character (such as substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character).” Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015). The two prongs of 7(B) review are “separate inquiries to ultimately be balanced in determining whether a sentence is inappropriate.” Lane v. State, 232 N.E.3d 119, 126 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Conner v. State, 58 N.E.3d 215, 218 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016)). “[T]o the extent the evidence on one prong militates against relief, a claim based on the other prong must be all the stronger to justify relief.” Id. at 127.

[19] The question “is not whether another sentence is more appropriate; rather, the question is whether the sentence imposed is inappropriate.” Helsley v. State, 43 N.E.3d 225, 228 (Ind. 2015) (quoting King v. State, 894 N.E.2d 265, 268 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008)) (emphasis omitted). Whether we regard a sentence as inappropriate “turns on our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given case.” Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1224. The defendant bears the burden of persuading us a revised sentence is warranted. Cramer v. State, 240 N.E.3d 693, 698 (Ind. 2024).

[20] As to the nature of the offense, Mathis argues there was no evidence “the nature of this present offense was more egregious than any other offense of its type” and “there was no harm beyond what [was] necessary to commit the crime.” Appellant's Br. at 20. Mathis, however, points us to no compelling evidence portraying the offenses in a positive light. His first victim, M.H., was a thirteen-year-old child. And as Mathis acknowledged at the sentencing hearing and on appeal, the harm he caused was not insubstantial. K.B., for example, described in detail the lasting impact of Mathis’ actions on her mental and physical health, including a fear of “being watched even when I'm not.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 31. She had to seek counseling to cope with the “overwhelming” mental toll it took on her. Id. The nature of the offenses does not militate toward revision.

[21] As to his character, Mathis points to his acceptance of responsibility, guilty plea without the benefit of a plea agreement, and voluntary rehabilitation efforts. He also notes his minimal criminal history, IRAS-CST score putting him in the “low risk” category to reoffend, history of gainful employment, and dependent children. He argues the sentence he received “should be reserved for individuals who lack the qualities [he] possesses.” Appellant's Br. at 20. Mathis essentially argues another sentence would be more appropriate, but that is not the focus of our review. See Helsley, 43 N.E.3d at 228 (“[T]he question is whether the sentence imposed is inappropriate.”). We acknowledge Mathis’ acceptance of responsibility and his efforts to address his mental health and substance use disorder since he committed these offenses. But Mathis has not shown such substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character to overcome the deference we give the trial court in these matters. This is not an outlier or exceptional case that warrants sentence revision.

Conclusion

[22] The trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Mathis, and his sentence was not inappropriate.

[23] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-45-4-5(b) & (c)(1) (2020).

2.   The transcript of the second hearing does not appear in the appellate record. The transcript was prepared, but despite some correspondence between the trial court and appellate clerks’ offices, the transcript was not transmitted to the appellate clerk. To complete our review, we have obtained the transcript from the trial court records through the Odyssey Case Management System. All transcript citations in this decision are to the March 3, 2025, sentencing hearing transcript.

3.   In the Summary of Argument section of his brief, Mathis briefly mentions the trial court did not acknowledge his remorse or employment but should have considered those as mitigating factors. Mathis does not develop an argument specific to these factors in the Argument section, and accordingly any argument on those factors is waived. See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8).

Kenworthy, Judge.

Foley, J., and Scheele, J., concur.