Megan Naville, Appellant-Respondent v. Zachary Naville, Appellee-Petitioner (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] Approximately three years after marrying Megan Naville (“Wife”), Zachary Naville (“Husband”) filed a petition to dissolve their marriage. A major sticking point in the divorce proceedings was the value of Husband's business. After an evidentiary hearing at which Husband and Wife presented dueling business valuation experts, the trial court assigned the business the value calculated by Husband's expert. The trial court also divided the marital estate equally; determined child support; and denied Wife's requests for maintenance, reimbursements, and attorney's fees. Wife now appeals and presents 12 issues for our review, which we revise and restate as the following 5 issues:

1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying Wife's motion to strike Husband's expert witness;

2. Whether the trial court clearly erred in dividing the marital estate;

3. Whether the trial court clearly erred in determining child support;

4. Whether the trial court clearly erred by denying Wife's request for spousal maintenance; and

5. Whether the trial court clearly erred by denying Wife's request for attorney's fees.

[2] We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand with instructions.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Husband and Wife married in 2019 and lived together in New Albany, Indiana. In 2021, N.N. (“Child”) was born. Husband is an insurance broker for Medicaid supplemental plans. Prior to the marriage, Husband started his own Medicaid supplemental insurance agency—Naville, LLC (the “Business”)—of which he is the sole employee. Wife is a registered nurse. In 2022, Husband filed a petition to dissolve the parties’ marriage. In October 2023, the trial court dissolved the marriage and ordered sole physical custody of Child to Wife with the parties having joint legal custody. The issues of child support and division of property were left to be decided later.

[4] A significant issue throughout the proceedings was the value of the Business. Wife hired Al Diamond as her expert witness to determine the value of the Business. Following the submission of Diamond's valuation report, Husband indicated that he would hire his own expert. Then, Husband disclosed his intent to call Missy DeArk as an expert witness to rebut Diamond's valuation and provide her own valuation. Prior to the evidentiary hearing, Wife filed a motion to strike DeArk's testimony, which the trial court denied. Both experts testified at the evidentiary hearing: Diamond valued the Business at $432,709, whereas DeArk valued the Business at $18,362.

[5] Following the three-day evidentiary hearing, the trial court entered findings and conclusions that divided the marital property and decided support for Child. The trial court found DeArk's valuation of the Business more credible and used this figure in dividing the marital estate. The trial court ordered an equal division of the marital estate and substantially adopted Husband's child support worksheet. Wife now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

1. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Denying Wife's Motion to Strike DeArk's Testimony

[6] Wife claims that the trial court erred by denying her request to strike DeArk's testimony. “A trial court has broad discretion in granting or denying a motion to strike.” Devereux v. Love, 30 N.E.3d 754, 766 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (citing Auto–Owners Ins. Co. v. Bill Gaddis Chrysler Dodge, Inc., 973 N.E.2d 1179, 1182 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012)). “The trial court's decision will not be reversed unless prejudicial error is clearly shown.” Id. (citing Coleman v. Charles Court, LLC, 797 N.E.2d 775, 786 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003)). Wife claims that the trial court should have granted her motion because Husband failed to comply with disclosures required by Trial Rule 16. We disagree.

[7] Indiana Trial Rule 16(A)(5) allows the court to order a hearing for the parties to consider “an exchange of names of witnesses to be called during the trial and the general nature of their expected testimony.” Further, “Trial Rule 16(J) provides trial courts the authority to ․ enter pre-trial orders controlling the course of proceedings ‘unless modified thereafter to prevent manifest injustice.’ ” Goston v. State, 200 N.E.3d 920, 921 (Ind. 2023) (quoting Ind. Trial Rule 16(J)). Wife claims that Husband violated a Trial Rule 16(J) order requiring him to disclose DeArk as a witness. We cannot agree.

[8] On February 8, 2024, the trial court scheduled an evidentiary hearing to be held on April 15, 2024. The evidentiary hearing was set to address the remaining issues, including child support and marital property distribution. On March 25, 2024, the parties met for a Trial Rule 16 conference at Husband's request. The purpose of the conference was to address Husband's motions to compel the deposition of Diamond and continue the April 15 evidentiary hearing. During the conference, Husband indicated that, once he was able to conduct Diamond's deposition, he would have a “consulting expert” look at Diamond's work. Tr. Vol. II at 8. At the close of the conference, the trial court set an April 8 deadline for exhibits and told Husband's counsel that “after the deposition ․ you guys can amend, if necessary.” Id. at 15. Importantly, there was no deadline set for witness lists, and the trial court did not enter a Trial Rule 16(J) order regarding witness lists. On April 5, prior to the only deadline set at the Rule 16 hearing, Husband provided notice of DeArk as a witness. Thus, we are unpersuaded by Wife's claim that the trial court should have granted her motion to strike DeArk's testimony for Rule 16 purposes. The trial court did not abuse its discretion.

2. The Trial Court Did Not Clearly Err in Dividing the Marital Estate

[9] Wife challenges several aspects of the trial court's order regarding division of the marital estate. Because the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law, we review the trial court's decisions for clear error. Cooley v. Cooley, 229 N.E.3d 561, 564 (Ind. 2024) (citing Ind. Trial Rule 52(A)). “Without reweighing the evidence or reassessing witness credibility, we determine whether the evidence supports the court's findings and, if so, whether those findings support its judgment.” Id. (citing S.D. v. G.D., 211 N.E.3d 494, 497 (Ind. 2023)). “Any issue not covered by the findings is reviewed under the general judgment standard, meaning a reviewing court should affirm based on any legal theory supported by the evidence.” Steele-Giri v. Steele, 51 N.E.3d 119, 123–24 (Ind. 2016) (citing In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d 1283, 1287 (Ind. 2014)). Further, we accept any unchallenged findings as proven. R.M. v. Ind. Dep't Child Servs., 203 N.E.3d 559, 564 (citing Madlem v. Arko, 592 N.E.2d 686, 687 (Ind. 1992)).

[10] “The division of marital property in Indiana involves a two-step process.” Roetter v. Roetter, 182 N.E.3d 221, 226 (Ind. 2022). “First, the trial court must identify the property to include in the marital estate.” Id. at 226–27 (citing O'Connell v. O'Connell, 889 N.E.2d 1, 10 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008)). Second, the court “must ․ distribute the property in a ‘just and reasonable’ manner.” Id. at 227 (citing O'Connell, 889 N.E.2d at 10–11; Ind. Code § 31-15-7-5).

[11] Wife contends the trial court erred in dividing the marital estate because (a) it did not properly value the Business, (b) it did not account for Husband's alleged dissipation of marital assets, and (c) it failed to award her a fair share of the marital assets.

a. Value of the Business

[12] Wife argues that the trial court erred in valuing the Business. Here, Diamond and DeArk provided competing valuations of the Business. Diamond valued the Business at $432,709, whereas DeArk valued the Business at $18,362. The trial court adopted DeArk's valuation of the Business. Wife claims the trial court erred by qualifying DeArk as an expert under Daubert and attacks the credibility of DeArk's valuation.

[13] Wife claims that DeArk's testimony did not qualify as expert testimony under Indiana Evidence Rule 702,¹ and relies on the Daubert factors for this proposition. The Daubert factors are “a non-exhaustive list of factors that may be relevant in assessing the reliability of scientific evidence” which include “whether the theory or technique can be and has been tested, whether the theory has been subjected to peer review and publication, whether there is a known or potential error rate, and whether the theory has been generally accepted within the relevant field of study.” Turner v. State, 953 N.E.2d 1039, 1048 (Ind. 2011) (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593–94 (1993); Kubsch v. State, 784 N.E.2d 905, 921 (Ind. 2003)). Although Daubert relates to Federal Rule of Evidence 702, our Supreme Court has noted that “[t]he concerns driving Daubert coincide with the express requirement of Indiana Rule of Evidence 702(b) that the trial court be satisfied of the reliability of the scientific principles involved.” Id. at 1050 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Malinski v. State, 794 N.E.2d 1071, 1084 (Ind. 2003)).

[14] While Evidence Rule 702(b) concerns expert scientific testimony, Evidence Rule 702(a) provides, “A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if the expert's ․ specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” “The ‘specialized knowledge’ mentioned in Evidence Rule 702(a) includes more than just scientific knowledge, and if knowledge is not ‘scientific,’ it need not be proven reliable by means of ‘scientific principles’ under Evidence Rule 702(b).” Helena Agri-Enters., LLC v. Jones, 149 N.E.3d 282, 296 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (quoting Taylor v. State, 101 N.E.3d 865, 871 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018)). Instead, “such evidence is governed only by the requirements of Rule 702(a), and any weaknesses or problems in the testimony go only to the weight of the testimony, not to its admissibility.” Id.

[15] The trial court's Business valuation findings are in relevant part as follows:

36. Both parties hired experts to evaluate the [Business].

37. Al Diamond had a lifetime of experience in the insurance industry and thus possesses an expertise in all things insurance related. His opinion is valued. Missy DeArk is a Certified Public Accountant, Certified Forensic Analyst and Certified Valuation Analyst, and as such, her opinion is likewise valued by the Court.

38. The Court finds Mr. Diamond did not speak directly to Husband and the worksheets he received to perform his valuation of the business were not only one-sided, but were incomplete. Although Mr. Diamond has vast experience in the insurance industry itself, he did not obtain intimate familiarity with Naville, LLC or the local area in which Naville, LLC operates. The Court finds Ms. DeArk's valuation methodology and basis of information more reliable and therefore adopts her valuation of Naville, LLC in the amount of $18,362. Husband is to pay Wife the amount of $9,181, or half the value of Naville, LLC at the date of filing.

Appellant's App. Vol. III at 131 (emphases added).

[16] In challenging the trial court's adoption of DeArk's valuation, Wife points to evidence supporting Diamond's methodology and expertise while seeking to discredit DeArk's valuation. Wife's arguments are merely requests for us to reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do. See Cooley, 229 N.E.3d at 564. Husband presented evidence that DeArk had thousands of hours of training, had valued hundreds of businesses, and had testified “about sixty-six” times as a valuation expert. Tr. Vol. II at 135. This evidence supports the trial court's finding regarding DeArk's knowledge, experience, and training, and this finding supports the trial court's conclusion that DeArk's testimony is “valued,” that is, helpful. Appellant's App. Vol. III at 131. The trial court did not err by allowing DeArk to testify as an expert.

[17] Wife next attacks the credibility of DeArk's valuation by pointing to DeArk's calculation of personal goodwill in the value of the Business. “[I]t is a factual issue to what extent, if any, the goodwill of a business is personal goodwill, which is not a marital asset, and to what extent it is enterprise goodwill, which is a divisible marital asset.” Weigel v. Weigel, 24 N.E.3d 1007, 1011 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (citing Yoon v. Yoon, 711 N.E.2d 1265, 1270 (Ind. 1999)). Here, DeArk determined that most of the value of the Business was personal goodwill due to “the unique and various abilities, skills, and other attributes that [Husband] contributes to the business, the nature of his business activities, and his personal reputation.” Ex. Vol. V at 52. To challenge this conclusion, Wife asks us to focus on Diamond's methods and conclusions; however, this is merely a request for us to reweigh the evidence which, again, we will not do, see Cooley, 229 N.E.3d at 564. “A valuation submitted by one of the parties is competent evidence of the value of property in a dissolution action and may alone support the trial court's determination in that regard.” Nix v. Nix, 205 N.E.3d 1010, 1012 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (quoting Alexander v. Alexander, 927 N.E.2d 926, 935 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010)). The trial court's valuation of the Business was within the range of values supported by the evidence, so the trial court did not clearly err in valuing the Business.

b. Dissipation of Marital Assets

[18] Wife argues that the trial court erred in finding that Husband did not dissipate marital assets “other than the two checks written for $14,999 each to his parents and $5,000 written to a friend's mother ․ that were returned to the marital pot to be split,” reducing the amount subject to division. Appellant's Br. at 25. “Indiana Code section 31-15-7-5 (the Division-of-Property Statute) calls for a presumptive equal division between the parties.” Roetter, 182 N.E.3d at 227. But a party “may rebut this presumption with ‘relevant evidence’ showing ‘that an equal division would not be just and reasonable.’ ” Id. Such relevant evidence may include evidence concerning “[t]he conduct of the parties during the marriage as related to the disposition or dissipation of their property.” Ind. Code § 31-15-7-5(4). “Dissipation generally involves the use or diminution of the marital estate for a purpose unrelated to the marriage and does not include the use of marital property to meet routine financial obligations.” Johnson v. Johnson, 181 N.E.3d 364, 376 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (quoting Balicki v. Balicki, 837 N.E.2d 532, 540 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied). Dissipation requires actual waste or misuse of marital assets, id. (quoting Balicki, 837 N.E.2d at 540), and it “includes the frivolous and unjustified spending of marital assets,” id. at 376–77 (quoting Grathwohl v. Garrity, 871 N.E.2d 297, 303 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007)). Wife claims that the trial court erred by (i) finding that the $35,000 in checks written to family members and a friend, returned to the marital pot should be split equally between Husband and Wife; and failing to find that Husband dissipated assets by (ii) obtaining an orthodontic procedure; and (iii) spending marital assets on alcohol and gambling. We disagree with Wife on each claim.

i. Checks

[19] Shortly before filing the petition for dissolution, Husband wrote three checks to family members and a friend's mother totaling approximately $35,000. At the evidentiary hearing, Wife argued that the $35,000 should be a marital asset subject to division. In its findings, the trial court agreed this $35,000 was a marital asset, included that amount in the marital estate, and divided the same equally between the parties. On appeal, Wife argues “the trial court erred in not giving [the $35,000] in [its] entirety to [Wife].” Appellant's Br. at 25. In doing so, however, Wife fails to make any argument as to why the trial court should have departed from the presumption of an equal division of this marital property. See Ind. Code § 31-15-7-5. “We will not step in the shoes of the advocate and fashion arguments on his behalf, ‘nor will we address arguments’ that are ‘too poorly developed or improperly expressed to be understood.’ ” Miller, 212 N.E.3d at 657 (quoting Dridi, 172 N.E.3d at 364). Thus, Wife's argument on appeal is waived. See Pierce v. State, 29 N.E.3d 1258, 1267 (Ind. 2015).

ii. Orthodontist

[20] Next, Wife claims that Husband dissipated marital assets by spending $1,323.04 on orthodontic treatment shortly after their separation. The trial court did not find that this spending was a dissipation of marital assets; in fact, the trial court did not include any findings related to the orthodontic services. Thus, we will affirm the decision based on any legal theory in the record. Steele-Giri, 51 N.E.3d at 123–24 (citing In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d at 1287).

[21] Husband testified that he spent $1,323.04 after his retainer broke, which necessitated getting Invisalign braces. On appeal, Wife claims that this was a dissipation because Husband never allowed Wife to get braces during the marriage. In contrast, Husband testified that he never prohibited Wife from getting braces and that she may have actually obtained the treatment herself. Because the trial court was in the best position to see the parties and weigh their conflicting testimony, we defer to its decision to apparently find Husband more credible in this instance. See Troyer v. Troyer, 987 N.E.2d 1130, 1145 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (citing Trost–Steffen v. Steffen, 772 N.E.2d 500, 509 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002)). Thus, we cannot say the trial court erred by declining Wife's request to find this orthodontist expense as a dissipation of marital assets.

iii. Alcohol and Gambling

[22] Wife also argues that Husband's spending on alcohol and gambling constituted a dissipation of marital assets. Wife presented evidence showing that Husband spent a significant amount of money on gambling and alcohol during both the marriage and the dissolution proceedings. Husband testified that he and Wife would often gamble together and that some of the alcohol purchases were for Wife and her family. The trial court found that “the spending habits of the Husband on alcohol and gambling were relatively consistent throughout the courtship and the marriage.” Appellant's App. Vol. III at 132. The evidence supports this finding; thus, we cannot say the trial court clearly erred in concluding there was no dissipation here.

c. Distribution of Marital Assets

[23] Wife also argues that the trial court (i) erred in dividing the marital personal property, and (ii) should have awarded her more than 50% of the final marital assets. We address each argument in turn.

i. Personal Property

[24] Wife argues that the trial court's division of the marital personal property constituted an unequal division of the marital estate in favor of Husband. At issue throughout these proceedings was Wife's personal property and property that the parties had borrowed that remained in the marital residence after Wife moved out. During the proceedings, Wife provided a list of all the personal items she wanted. Husband testified that Wife had already taken some of the listed items and that for some of the other items, he did not “know what [Wife] is talking about.” Tr. Vol. II at 94. Wife did not provide values for these items she sought, and the trial court noted that these items of personal property had a “total value of not a whole lot.” Id. at 95. In its order dividing the marital estate, the trial court found that it had “ordered on multiple occasions for the Husband to give Wife access to the residence for the purpose of retrieving her personal property. This has been accomplished to the exten[t] personal property of the Wife was located in the residence.” Appellant's App. Vol. III at 129. Petitioner's Exhibit 20 supports this finding. That exhibit contains Husband's notes indicating that he (1) had already provided certain personal property to Wife, (2) agreed to give Wife certain personal property, (3) did not know what certain personal property was or where it was located, or (4) did not agree to let Wife have certain personal property. Ex. Vol. IV at 199–212.

[25] Despite the trial court's finding, Wife subsequently filed a motion to stay execution of the dissolution decree, claiming that the trial court's order failed to address certain pieces of property that had not been provided to her. The trial court denied this motion, stating the following:

However, the Court does Order that [Husband] shall provide the vanity to [Wife]. The washer, dryer and refrigerator shall remain with and be sold with the marital residence. The parties still have disagreement as it relates to the chest of drawers, bedside tables, dresser and glass desk upon which [Husband] works. The Court does recommend to each party that they consider seriously how much he or she needs the listed item and whether the more cooperative resolution is to let the other simply have that/those item(s).

Appellant's App. Vol. III at 186.

[26] On appeal, Wife argues that the trial court provided her with “less than 5%” of the personal property in the marital estate. Appellant's Br. at 28. In making this claim, Wife points only to the exhaustive list of personal items that she submitted into evidence. Read in conjunction with Petitioner's Ex. 20 containing Husband's notes, we cannot discern which items have been returned or which items were actually in the now-sold marital residence. And, to the extent Wife is arguing that the trial court ordered unequal division of the marital personal property, we note that Wife did not present any evidence regarding the value of the items contained in her exhaustive list. Thus, we cannot say that the trial court effectuated an unequal division of the marital estate based on these items of personal property. See Campbell v. Campbell, 993 N.E.2d 205, 215 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (declining to address the unequal division argument because the husband failed to meet his burden of proving the value of the marital assets).

[27] Wife also claims that the trial court effectuated an unequal division of the marital estate because it did not award her the following appliances that remained in the marital residence: “the range/oven, washer, dryer, refrigerator, custom window treatments, and security system.” Appellant's Br. at 29. In its order denying Wife's motion to stay, the trial court ordered Husband to sell the marital residence with the appliances and distribute the proceeds consistently with the decree ordering an equal division. Thus, the trial court did not order an unequal division of marital property in relation to these items of personal property.

ii. Final Division of Property

[28] Wife makes similar arguments of alleged unfairness in the trial court's distribution of all remaining property. Wife argues that the trial court erred by not awarding her more than the presumed 50% split because Husband's annual income is more than hers and her home mortgage interest is more than his. The trial court specifically found that Wife's home was “purchased after the date of the filing and is not at issue in this dissolution.” Appellant's App. Vol III at 132. The trial court also recognized that Husband's 2022 income was $174,262.00, while Wife's was $70,340.00, and ordered an equal split of the marital estate. Although Husband's income is higher, this was a short, three-year marriage, and it was Wife's burden to demonstrate that an equal division of the marital estate was unjust or unreasonable. See Ind. Code § 31-15-7-5. She failed to do so. The trial court adhered to the presumptive equal split and did not clearly err in doing so.

3. The Trial Court Clearly Erred in its Child Support Order

[29] Wife next challenges the trial court's child support decision. We have previously set forth the standard of review for such a challenge as follows:

A trial court's calculation of child support is presumptively valid, and we will reverse a support order only for clear error. Bogner v. Bogner, 29 N.E.3d 733, 738 (Ind. 2015); Young v. Young, 891 N.E.2d 1045, 1047 (Ind. 2008). That is, reversal is proper only where the trial court's decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the trial court or is contrary to law. See Bogner, 29 N.E.3d at 738.

Wierks v. Mazellan, 171 N.E.3d 636, 640 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021). Wife claims that the trial court erred in its child support decision by (a) improperly imputing income; (b) miscalculating Childcare Costs and Insurance; and (c) allowing Husband to receive the child tax credit every other year. We address each claim in turn.

a. Imputing Income

[30] Wife claims the trial court erred in its calculation of child support because it improperly imputed income to Wife after finding that wife did not directly pay rent, “homeowner's insurance, property taxes, or utilities,” Appellant's App. Vol. III at 128, while living with her father from October 2021 until April 2024, Id. at 130. Along the same vein, Wife claims the trial court should have imputed more income to Husband, “consistent [with a] fulltime 40-hour work week.” Appellant's Br. at 20. We address each claim below.

i. Wife's Weekly Gross Income

[31] Wife argues the trial court erred by imputing $27,664.00 in income per year that she lived with her father, not paying rent. In making this argument, Wife claims that the trial court should have found she paid $900 per month in rent by paying for streaming services, her father's gas in his vehicle, and food.

[32] The Indiana Child Support Guidelines require trial courts to calculate each parent's weekly gross income to determine the amount of child support owed. Ind. Child Support Guideline 1. The Guidelines note that “in-kind payments received by a parent in the course of employment, self-employment, or operation of a business should be counted as income if they are significant and reduce personal living expenses. Such payments might include a company car, free housing, or reimbursed meals.” Id. 3(A)(2). The commentary to that section contemplates that in-kind payments from friends or family members can similarly count as income. Id. 3(A), cmt. 2(d).

[33] In Faulk v. Faulk, this court held that the mother, who was employed as a teacher and lived rent-free with her parents, had “unquestionably reduce[d] her living expenses and free[d] up money to support Child.” 166 N.E.3d 939, 945 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021). Similarly, in Glass v. Oeder, the Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the imputation of income to the father who was living alone and rent-free in his family's lake house. 716 N.E.2d 413 (Ind. 1999).

[34] Here, Wife is fully employed and earns an annual salary of approximately $70,000. Wife alleged that she left the marital residence to move in with her father due to safety concerns. Because safety was a concern, Wife packed only two duffle bags and left. After Wife left, Husband changed the locks so Wife could not return to the marital home. The trial court did not address Wife's alleged inability to return to the marital home or to secure an affordable rental given her advanced pregnancy and possession of only two duffle bags full of goods removed from the marital residence. Husband's mortgage payment for principal and interest in the marital home is $680 per month. Nevertheless, Husband sought to and the court did impute $2,000 in income per month to Wife due to her living with her father. This imputed income was not based on the value of Wife's father's home or the monthly mortgage payment on the home. Rather, the value was based on the highest cost to rent an apartment in Georgetown, Indiana.

[35] The trial court's reliance on Husband's income imputation amount was clear error because it was based on a speculative rental value where wife rented alone rather than on her actual living situation of living with her father. The trial court should have considered that Wife was not living alone and not imputed the full value of the monthly rent to her. The trial court should also have considered the actual value of the father's home or mortgage amount rather than the alleged cost to rent an unspecified apartment in the area. See Glass, 716 N.E.2d at 417 (upholding the imputation of income based on the approximate value of the home father lived in); see also Gilpin v. Gilpin, 664 N.E.2d 766, 767 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (the trial court should have considered evidence that the mother's new husband paid half of the monthly expenses in calculating her income for child support purposes).

ii. Husband's Weekly Gross Income

[36] Wife argues the trial court erred in calculating Husband's weekly gross income by “deducting $29,630, much more than the allotted amount for FICA tax deduction ․ and costs such as internet, phone lines, use of a vehicle, and data processing” because he received a tax deduction on those items already. Appellant's Br. at 18. Wife also argues Husband was underemployed and could have earned more money, despite earning $174,262 in 2022. In arguing the former, wife cites to her own motion and portions of Husband's and her own testimony. Neither the trial court's order nor the child support worksheet adopted by the court describe how the trial court arrived at Husband's weekly income amount; yet, without citations to the record, Wife claims the trial court erred in its computation. Without cogent argument, we cannot render a decision on the merits of Wife's claim the trial court erred in calculating Husband's weekly gross income. See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a) (requiring “cogent reasoning”); Miller v. Patel, 212 N.E.3d 639, 657 (Ind. 2023) (quoting Dridi v. Cole Kline LLC, 172 N.E.3d 361, 364 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021)) (“We will not step in the shoes of the advocate and fashion arguments on his behalf, ‘nor will we address arguments’ that are ‘too poorly developed or improperly expressed to be understood.’ ”). Consequently, we cannot say that the trial court erred.

[37] We now turn to Wife's argument that Husband was underemployed and “could earn significantly more if he sold other available products.” Appellant's Br. at 18. Wife argues that, even though Husband earned approximately $100,000 more than she did in a given year, the trial court erred in not imputing additional income to him that would be consistent with Husband having a 40-hour workweek. In making this claim, Wife relies on Indiana Child Support Guideline 3A(3), which states that “[i]f a court finds a parent is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed without just cause, child support shall be calculated based on a determination of potential income.” Here, the trial court made no such finding and instead concluded the opposite: “The Court finds each party is sufficiently employed.” Appellant's App. Vol. III at 133. This court has previously considered imputing income for child support purposes:

Trial courts may impute income to a parent for purposes of calculating child support upon determining that he or she is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed. Matter of Paternity of Buehler, 576 N.E.2d 1354, 1355–56 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991). The Child Support Guidelines permit imputation to discourage parents—both the payor-non-custodial parent and the recipient-custodial parent—from avoiding significant child support obligations by becoming unemployed or taking a lower paying job. See id. But the Guidelines do not require or encourage parents to make career decisions based strictly upon the size of potential paychecks, nor do the Guidelines require that parents work to their full economic potential. Id. “It is not our function ․ to approve or disapprove of the lifestyle of [parents] or their career choices and the means by which they choose to discharge their obligations in general.” Id. “To determine whether potential income should be imputed, the trial court should review the obligor's work history, occupational qualifications, prevailing job opportunities, and earning levels in the community.” Homsher v. Homsher, 678 N.E.2d 1159, 1164 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997).

Sandlin v. Sandlin, 972 N.E.2d 371, 375 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). Wife ignores the fact that Husband maintained the same work habits throughout the relationship that she attacks on dissolution, and fails to point to any evidence that Husband was underemployed for the purpose of avoiding child support obligations. We thus cannot say the trial court clearly erred by refusing to impute additional income to Husband.

b. Childcare Costs and Insurance

[38] Wife argues the trial court erred by (i) failing to “include the correct weekly insurance cost to provide coverage for [Child]” and (ii) excluding childcare costs from the “child support calculation adopted.” Appellant's Br. at 19. We address each argument in turn.

i. Insurance

[39] The child support worksheet adopted by the trial court lists $22.00 for the weekly cost of Child's health insurance premium. Appellant's Ex. Vol. V at 33. Wife argues the trial court should have found Child's portion was $31.37. Wife's calculation includes medical, dental, and vision insurance as well as additional coverage for accident, hospital indemnity, critical illness, child life and AD&D, and ID protection. See Appellant's Ex. Vol. VI at 140. Husband argues that the additional coverage is voluntary, and he should bear no obligation for the additional coverage. He does, however, concede the $22.00 listed on the child support worksheet is incorrect, and the correct amount of weekly health insurance for Child is $23.22.

[40] Wife cites to Child Support Guideline 3E(2) in arguing for the full $31.37 inclusion of insurance. That section merely states that “[t]he weekly cost of health insurance premiums for the child(ren) should be added to the basic obligation whenever either parent actually incurs the premium expense or a portion of such expense.” Ind. Child Support Guideline 3(E)(2). Considering the plain language of the guideline, we agree with Husband that only medical, dental, and vision coverage are included under the “health insurance premium” heading. See id; see also Thompson v. Thompson, 811 N.E.2d 888, 926 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (concluding “[a] child's dental needs are sufficiently related to their basic health needs so as to fall within Indiana Code section 31-16-6-4” (emphasis added)). We cannot say, as Wife argues, that the additional coverage is related to Child's “basic health needs,” so we find no error at its exclusion from the calculation. However, the trial court did err in determining the weekly cost of Child's health insurance premium was $22.00.

ii. Childcare Costs

[41] Wife argues the trial court erred by removing childcare costs from the basic child support obligation. Wife's one-paragraph argument cites only to her own testimony and to Child Support Guideline 3E(1) which states that “Child care costs incurred due to employment or job search of both parent(s) should be added to the basic obligation.” Here, the child support worksheet adopted by the trial court listed $0 in childcare expenses, so after considering Wife's testimony regarding the amount she spent on childcare, the trial court excised the childcare portion from the adopted worksheet and ordered Husband and Wife to split the costs of childcare: “60% to the Husband and 40% to the Wife from August 2023 through December 2023 [and, f]rom January 2024, those costs are to be split 67% to the Husband and 33% to Wife.” Appellant's App. Vol. III at 131. The Child Support Guidelines are “not immutable, black letter law, but provide room for flexibility.” Bogner, 29 N.E.3d at 739 (citing Child Supp. G. 1, cmt.; Garrod v. Garrod, 655 N.E.2d 336, 338 (Ind.1995)). Trial courts are permitted to create orders that address the party issues before them. The purpose of including childcare costs in the basic child support obligation is to apportion the cost between the parties according to their income share. The trial court here accomplished this with its order splitting the costs as described above, so we cannot say the trial court clearly erred.

c. Child Tax Credit

[42] Wife argues the trial court erred by allowing Husband to claim Child on his tax returns in odd numbered years. “A decision regarding the child tax credit falls within the trial court's ‘equitable discretion.’ ” Quinn v Threlkel, 858 N.E.2d 665, 674 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (quoting Lamon v. Lamon, 611 N.E.2d 154, 159 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993)). Wife's primary complaint regarding the credit is that the trial court did not expressly determine the statutory factors to justify permitting Husband to claim Child in alternating years. Indiana Code section 31-16-6-1.5 specifies that

(a) A court shall specify in a child support order which parent of a child may claim the child as a dependent for purposes of federal and state taxes.

(b) In determining which parent may claim the child as a dependent under subsection (a), the court shall consider the following:

(1) The value of claiming the child as a dependent at the marginal tax rate of each parent.

(2) The income of each parent.

(3) The age of the child or children and the number of years that the child or children could be claimed as a dependent or dependents.

(4) Each parent's percentage of the costs of supporting the child or children.

(5) If applicable, the financial aid benefit for postsecondary education for the child or children.

(6) If applicable, the financial burden each parent assumed under the property settlement in a dissolution proceeding.

(7) Any other relevant factors.

[43] Despite Wife's claim that the trial court failed to “determine or set forth that [Husband] could meet any of these statutory factors to justify an alternating year of the child tax credit to [Husband,]” Appellant's Br. at 27, the trial court made specific findings regarding the income of each parent, Child's birth date, and Husband's financial burden, vis-à-vis the equalization payment. Additionally, the trial court adopted Husband's child support worksheet, which provides each parent's percentage of costs for supporting Child. Thus, Wife's argument on appeal is unfounded, and we find no error.

4. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Denying Wife's Request for Spousal Maintenance

[44] Wife argues that the trial court erred by denying her request for spousal maintenance. The trial court entered written findings, so we review for clear error. Cooley v. Cooley, 229 N.E.3d 561, 564 (Ind. 2024) (citing Ind. Trial Rule 52(A)). “By statute, a maintenance award serves one of three purposes: to assist an incapacitated spouse, to assist a custodial spouse under certain circumstances, or to assist a spouse in need of educational or vocational rehabilitation.” Id. (citing Eads v. Eads, 114 N.E.3d 868, 878 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018); see also I.C. § 31-15-7-2(1)–(3). Wife argues that the trial court erred by not awarding her rehabilitative maintenance for education, claiming the trial court should have awarded maintenance to pay for her costs to obtain a higher degree to become a nurse practitioner. The trial court found that “Wife is gainfully employed and does not meet any of the requirements for the award of maintenance in Indiana.” Appellant's App. Vol III at 130. We agree with the trial court.

[45] Wife worked as a registered nurse throughout the proceedings and made approximately $70,000 per year. On appeal, Wife argues that she should have been awarded maintenance because her education was “put on hold” to help Husband start the Business. Appellant's Br. at 21. The evidence shows that Husband and Wife decided together to pause her education, and that Wife's involvement with the Business was minimal. Further, Wife was able to enroll in a nurse practitioner program during the dissolution proceedings. Thus, we are unpersuaded by Wife's claims that Husband halted her education. We conclude that the trial court did not clearly err by denying Wife's request for maintenance.

5. The Trial Court Did Not Clearly Err By Denying Wife's Request for Attorney's Fees and Reimbursement

[46] Lastly, we address Wife's claim that the trial court erred in denying her request for attorney's fees and reimbursement. The trial court entered written findings, so we review for clear error. Cooley v. Cooley, 229 N.E.3d 561, 564 (Ind. 2024) (citing Ind. Trial Rule 52(A)). Under Indiana Code section 31-15-10-1, a trial court “may order a party to pay a reasonable amount for the cost to the other party of maintaining or defending [dissolution proceedings] and for attorney's fees.”

[47] “In determining whether to order a party to pay some or all of the other party's attorney's fees, the trial court may consider ‘the parties’ resources, economic condition, ability to engage in gainful employment and earn income, and other factors bearing on the reasonableness of the award.’ ” Israel v. Israel, 189 N.E.3d 170, 179 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (quoting Ahls v. Ahls, 52 N.E.3d 797, 803 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016)). Wife argues the “disparity in the parties’ incomes and the many instances of wrongful conduct as to discovery, dissipation of assets, substance abuse and [Husband's] poor choices amply support an award of attorney fees.” Appellant's Br. at 26. However, Wife's arguments are requests that we reweigh the evidence and judge witness credibility, which we may not do. See Cooley, 229 N.E.3d at 564. The trial court's decision to deny Wife's request for attorney's fees and costs reimbursement, including for her own expert witness, was supported by evidence that both Husband and Wife were gainfully employed and “neither Husband nor Wife egregiously wasted the other's time with frivolous filings nor with willful disobedience of Court Orders.” Appellant's App. Vol III at 131. Thus, the trial court did not clearly err in deciding that Husband and Wife should bear responsibility for their own costs and attorney's fees.

Conclusion

[48] The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Wife's motion to strike Husband's expert witness and did not clearly err in dividing the marital estate or denying Wife's requests for spousal maintenance, costs, and attorney's fees. We affirm on these issues. The trial court did, however, clearly err in determining child support, specifically in its imputation of income to Wife and its calculation of Child's health insurance premium. We therefore remand this case to the trial court for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. Because we are remanding for the trial court to correct its determination of Wife's imputed income, we direct the trial court to make corresponding and necessary changes to its childcare costs calculation.

[49] Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Wife cites only Federal Rule of Evidence 702, but we apply our State's counterpart.

Felix, Judge.

Vaidik, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.