Elliott Cunningham, Appellant-Plaintiff v. PLS (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Elliott Cunningham appeals the small-claims court's judgment for PLS Financial Solutions on his claims of financial fraud and elder abuse. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On July 7, 2024, Cunningham went to PLS in East Chicago to cash a $2,500 money order. In accordance with its policy, PLS charged a $63.50 fee. Three days later, Cunningham, pro se, filed a small-claims notice of claim against PLS alleging “financial fraud” and “elderly abuse.” See Notice of Claim, Cause No. 45D12-2407-SC-3609 (July 10, 2024). Cunningham, who alleged that the PLS employee he interacted with on July 7 was named “Maria,” requested $8,500 in damages.

[3] A trial was scheduled for February 14, 2025. On January 16, the small-claims court ordered PLS to submit its witness list no later than January 24 and stated that if a witness wasn't on the list, they couldn't testify at trial. The next day, PLS filed its witness list naming one witness, PLS district manager Cornelius Rockett.

[4] On January 27, about two weeks before trial, Cunningham requested a 90-day continuance because he needed “time to contact” Maria, who wasn't on PLS's witness list, “to complete discovery.” See Motion for a 90 Day [C]ontinuance, Cause No. 45D12-2407-SC-3609 (Jan. 27, 2025); Plaintiff's [F]irst Interrogatories to Defendants PLS and PLS's Employees, Cause No. 45D12-2407-SC-3609 (Jan. 27, 2025). The small-claims court denied Cunningham's motion, finding that “[t]he testimony of any witnesses not disclosed by the Parties prior to January 24, 2025, with the exceptions of rebuttal witnesses if appropriate, is barred” and that “[a]ny further formal Discovery is hereby prohibited.” See Order on Discovery and Plaintiff's Motion for Continuance, Cause No. 45D12-2407-SC-3609 (Feb. 1, 2025).

[5] Right before trial started on February 14, Cunningham brought up discovery with the small-claims court, but the court told him that discovery had already closed. See Tr. pp. 4-10. Thereafter, the court issued a 7-page order finding that Cunningham had failed to prove financial fraud and elder abuse and entering judgment for PLS.

[6] Cunningham, still pro se, now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[7] Cunningham first contends that the small-claims court erred in denying his motion to continue the trial so that he could conduct additional discovery.¹ Although Cunningham doesn't cite it, Indiana Small Claims Rule 6 governs discovery in small-claims actions:

Discovery may be had in a manner generally pursuant to the rules governing any other civil action, but only upon the approval of the court and under such limitations as may be specified. The court should grant discovery only upon notice and good cause shown and should limit such action to the necessities of the case.

In addition, Small Claims Rule 9(A) provides that a party “may be granted a continuance for good cause shown.”

[8] Cunningham asserts that the small-claims court denied his motion “summarily” and “without explanation.” Appellant's Br. pp. 7-8. This is not correct. The court issued an order that it was denying Cunningham's motion to continue the trial to conduct additional discovery because discovery had closed and it was too late. On appeal, Cunningham has neither cited this order nor included it in his appendix. See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a) (providing each contention in the appellant's argument section “must be supported by citations to the authorities, statutes, and the Appendix or parts of the Record on Appeal relied on”). Cunningham has failed to show that the court erred in denying his motion to continue the trial to conduct additional discovery two weeks before trial.

[9] Cunningham next contends that the small-claims court engaged in “improper ex parte communications” and “private sidebars” with PLS's attorney in violation of the judicial canons. Appellant's Reply Br. p. 4. PLS responds that Cunningham has waived review of this issue because he did not object below. Indeed, Cunningham doesn't cite anything in the record to show that he raised this issue below or tried to develop a record on it. See Wilkes v. Celadon Grp., Inc., 177 N.E.3d 786, 794 (Ind. 2021) (explaining that an argument raised for the first time on appeal is waived).² Cunningham has therefore waived review of this issue.

[10] Finally, Cunningham contends that the small-claims court erred in entering judgment for PLS. Because Cunningham had the burden of proof at trial, he is appealing from a negative judgment and therefore must establish that the judgment is contrary to law. Williams v. Kirch, 268 N.E.3d 284, 286 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025). A judgment is contrary to law only when the evidence is without conflict and all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence lead to only one conclusion, yet the court reached a different conclusion. Id. at 287.

[11] Cunningham argues that he “provided unchallenged testimony regarding the events in question,” but PLS “did not rebut or deny [his] allegations.” Appellant's Br. p. 9. Cunningham, however, doesn't cite any portions of the transcript to support his claim. Indeed, he claims that the transcript is “irrelevant.” Appellant's Reply Br. p. 6. He has therefore waived review of this issue as well. See App. R. 46(A)(8)(a).³ Accordingly, we affirm the small-claims court's judgment.

[12] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Cunningham brings this as two separate issues: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to continue and (2) the trial court erred in denying his discovery requests. But Cunningham's motion to continue makes clear that he sought the continuance to conduct discovery. See Motion for a 90 Day [C]ontinuance, Cause No. 45D12-2407-SC-3609 (Jan. 27, 2025). We therefore treat this as one issue.

2.   Cunningham claims that his witness, Katie Ochoa, “witnessed the sidebar. (Appendix vol 2).” Appellant's Br. p. 8. Although Cunningham doesn't cite a page number in his appendix, we note that the page he numbered 25 is a “Witness Collaboration Statement” from Ochoa. This document, which contains the appellate docket number, is neither dated nor file stamped and is therefore not part of the record on appeal.

3.   Cunningham ends his brief by arguing that the “cumulative effect of the trial court's actions” violated his fundamental right to due process. Appellant's Br. p. 10. But as just explained, Cunningham hasn't established any error, so we need not address any cumulative effect.

Vaidik, Judge.

Mathias, J., and Pyle, J., concur.