Joshua T. Karamalegos, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Joshua T. Karamalegos appeals his convictions of Level 4 felony possession of methamphetamine ¹ and Level 6 felony unlawful possession of a syringe ² and his eight-year sentence therefor. He raises three issues on appeal, which we revise and restate as:

1. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to prove Karamalegos constructively possessed the methamphetamine and syringes found in a car where Karamalegos was a passenger;

2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion at sentencing by not recognizing Karamalegos's substance abuse issues as a mitigating factor; and

3. Whether Karamalegos's sentence is inappropriate considering the nature of his offense and his character.

We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] During the early morning hours of January 13, 2021, Indiana State Police Trooper Benjamin Beers (“Trooper Beers”) was patrolling the Indiana Toll Road in LaPorte County, Indiana. He observed a black Volkswagen Passat swerve out from the right lane to the left lane without signaling, and then it moved back into the right lane. The Passat's license plate was obscured. Trooper Beers initiated a traffic stop.

[3] Abigail Van Winkle was driving the Passat, and Karamalegos was sitting in the front passenger seat. When Trooper Beers activated his police cruiser's emergency lights, Van Winkle started pulling the Passat over to the side of the road. Karamalegos became “very frantic” and was “grabbing different things, moving stuff around[.]” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 136.) One of the items Karamalegos grabbed was a cylindrical bleach wipe container that Van Winkle kept in her car. Karamalegos also opened the glove compartment and gave Van Winkle the vehicle registration paperwork.

[4] After the Passat pulled over to the side of the road, Trooper Beers approached the vehicle on the passenger side. As Trooper Beers approached the vehicle, he noticed an orange needle cap on the passenger side floorboard. Van Winkle “appeared extremely nervous. Her hands were shaking so bad that she could barely remove her driver's license.” (Id. at 59.) Trooper Beers also asked Karamalegos for identification. Karamalegos's hands were also shaking and Karamalegos would not look at him or speak to him. Trooper Beers then requested assistance from a K-9 handler so that a police dog could perform a drug sniff of the vehicle.

[5] When the K-9 handler arrived, Trooper Beers asked Van Winkle and Karamalegos to exit the vehicle, and the police dog sniffed the vehicle. The police dog alerted to the presence of drugs, and Trooper Beers and another trooper searched the vehicle. Trooper Beers found the wipes container on the center console of the vehicle, and inside the container, he discovered a clear plastic bag that contained what was later determined to be 27.91 grams of methamphetamine. The troopers also found syringes in the glove box.

[6] The troopers detained Van Winkle and Karamalegos and transported them to the LaPorte County Sheriff's Department. Indiana State Police Detective Michael Jones (“Detective Jones”) interviewed Van Winkle and Karamalegos. During the interview, Karamalegos “ramble[d] and talked very fast.” (Id. at 112.) He claimed he had sold the methamphetamine found in the car to Van Winkle for $420, and he estimated that he had sold thirty grams.

[7] On June 6, 2023, the State charged Karamalegos with Level 2 felony dealing in methamphetamine ³ and Level 6 felony unlawful possession of a syringe. The State later amended the charging information to add a charge of Level 4 felony possession of methamphetamine. The State also charged Van Winkle with possession of methamphetamine. Van Winkle pled guilty to that offense, and she received a sentence that was suspended to probation.

[8] The trial court held Karamalegos's jury trial on January 13-14, 2025. At trial, Karamalegos testified that prior to being pulled over by Trooper Beers, Karamalegos and Van Winkle had visited two casinos, and they had used meth throughout the evening. Karamalegos estimated they each had consumed about 3.5 grams of methamphetamine. When asked how long he had been awake prior to being pulled over on January 13, 2021, Karamalegos responded, “I'm going to say I'm comfortable with the answer of at least a week I had been up.” (Id. at 165.) He denied that the methamphetamine and syringes found in the car belonged to him. Karamalegos explained he told the police he sold the methamphetamine to Van Winkle because he was in a “fervent romantic relationship” with Van Winkle and he realized that “if something happened to” Van Winkle, then “something would happen” to Van Winkle's daughter. (Id. at 167-68.) The jury returned a verdict finding Karamalegos guilty of Level 4 felony possession of methamphetamine and Level 6 felony possession of a syringe. The jury could not reach a verdict with respect to the charge of Level 2 felony dealing in methamphetamine, and the State dismissed that charge.

[9] The trial court held Karamalegos's sentencing hearing on February 28, 2025. The State argued Karamalegos deserved “a sentence not at the top of the range but close to it.” (Tr. Vol. 3 at 22.) The State noted Karamalegos's criminal history consisted of five felony and twenty-one misdemeanor convictions and Karamalegos accumulated those convictions in three different states. The State also pointed to Karamalegos's history of “numerous violations of conditions of his release, conditions of probation, of work release, and community corrections.” (Id. at 24.) Karamalegos argued his criminal history indicates “he needs treatment.” (Id. at 25.)

[10] In a written order issued after the sentencing hearing, the trial court found Karamalegos's criminal history and his history of probation and prison disciplinary violations to be aggravating factors. The trial court also found it to be an aggravating factor that Karamalegos committed the offenses two months after being released on parole. In addition, the trial court noted Karamalegos “has been given several opportunities to comply with treatment and counseling and has failed.” (App. Vol. 2 at 160.) The trial court did not find mitigating factors. It sentenced Karamalegos to a term of eight years for his conviction of Level 4 felony possession of methamphetamine and two years for his conviction of Level 6 felony unlawful possession of a syringe. The trial court ordered Karamalegos to serve the terms concurrently, resulting in an aggregate sentence of eight years.

Discussion and Decision

1. Sufficiency of the Evidence

[11] Karamalegos challenges the sufficiency of the evidence the State presented to support his convictions. Our standard of review regarding sufficiency of the evidence claims is well-settled:

Sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims ․ warrant a deferential standard, in which we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility. Rather, we consider only the evidence supporting the judgment and any reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence. We will affirm a conviction if there is substantial evidence of probative value that would lead a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

Powell v. State, 151 N.E.3d 256, 262-63 (Ind. 2020) (internal citation omitted). Indiana Code section 35-48-4-6.1 outlaws the possession of methamphetamine, and the offense is a Level 4 felony if the amount of methamphetamine is greater than 10 grams but less than 28 grams. Ind. Code § 35-48-4-6.1(c)(1). Likewise, Indiana Code section 16-42-19-18 provides that it is a Level 6 felony for a person to possess a hypodermic syringe or needle with the intent to commit a controlled substance offense.

[12] Karamalegos argues the State presented insufficient evidence that he possessed the methamphetamine and syringes found in the Passat. The possession of contraband can be either actual or constructive. Williams v. State, 240 N.E.3d 1285, 1289 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024). “Actual possession of contraband occurs when a person has direct physical control over the item.” Id. Constructive possession of contraband occurs “when the person has both (1) the capability to maintain dominion and control over the item; and (2) the intent to maintain dominion and control over it.” Id. at 1290. “To fulfill the capability element of constructive possession, the State must demonstrate that the defendant was able to reduce the controlled substance to his personal possession. In order to satisfy the intent element, the State must demonstrate the defendant's knowledge of the presence of the contraband.” Griffin v. State, 945 N.E.2d 781, 783-84 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (internal citation omitted). “A defendant's knowledge may be inferred from either the exclusive dominion and control over the premises containing the contraband, or, if the control is non-exclusive, evidence of additional circumstances pointing to the defendant's knowledge of the presence of contraband.” Canfield v. State, 128 N.E.3d 563, 572 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). These additional circumstances include, but are not limited to,

(1) a defendant's incriminating statements; (2) a defendant's attempting to leave or making furtive gestures; (3) the location of contraband like drugs in settings suggesting manufacturing; (4) the item's proximity to the defendant; (5) the location of contraband within the defendant's plain view; and (6) the mingling of contraband with other items the defendant owns.

Gray v. State, 957 N.E.2d 171, 175 (Ind. 2011).

[13] Karamalegos maintains the methamphetamine and syringes belonged to Van Winkle. He notes Van Winkle “pled guilty and testified under oath at her plea entry hearing that she possessed the methamphetamine.” (Appellant's Br. at 19.) However, a defendant's possessory interest in contraband does not need to be exclusive to support a conviction for possession of the contraband. See Iddings v. State, 772 N.E.2d 1006, 1015 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (“Possession of contraband by the defendant need not be exclusive and it can be possessed jointly.”), trans. denied.

[14] Karamalegos was seated in the front passenger seat of the Passat, and both the methamphetamine and syringes were found near where he was sitting. Karamalegos was “very frantic” after Trooper Beers activated his emergency lights to initiate a traffic stop. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 136.) Karamalegos moved items around in the vehicle including the wipes container where the troopers found the methamphetamine. He also accessed the glove compartment where the syringes were found and an orange needle cap was found on the front passenger floorboard. Karamalegos's hands were shaking, and he refused to look at Trooper Beers during the traffic stop. In addition, Karamalegos acknowledged at trial that he had used methamphetamine at the two casinos he visited before the traffic stop. Karamalegos also provided a close estimation of the amount of methamphetamine found in the vehicle when he told Detective Jones that he had sold 30 grams of methamphetamine to Van Winkle. All these facts support the conclusion that Karamalegos had the capability and intent to maintain dominion and control over the methamphetamine and syringes found in the Passat. See, e.g., Pimentel v. State, 181 N.E.3d 474, 483-84 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (holding sufficient evidence supported conclusion that Pimentel possessed fentanyl and syringe found in vehicle he shared with another individual based on officer's observations of Pimental moving items around, location of a syringe near where Pimental was sitting, and intermingling of contraband with Pimental's possessions), trans. denied.

2. Sentencing Discretion

[15] Karamalegos next asserts the trial court abused its discretion at sentencing by not recognizing his history of substance abuse as a mitigating factor. We review a trial court's sentencing decision by applying a well-settled standard of review:

Sentencing decisions rest within the sound discretion of the trial court. So long as the sentence is within the statutory range, it is subject to review only for an abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion will be found where the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom. A trial court may abuse its discretion in a number of ways, including: (1) failing to enter a sentencing statement at all; (2) entering a sentencing statement that includes aggravating and mitigating factors that are unsupported by the record; (3) entering a sentencing statement that omits reasons that are clearly supported by the record; or (4) entering a sentencing statement that includes reasons that are improper as a matter of law.

Hudson v. State, 135 N.E.3d 973, 979 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (internal citations omitted). “The trial court is not obligated to accept the defendant's arguments as to what constitutes a mitigating factor, and the court is not required to give the same weight to proffered mitigating factors as the defendant does.” Rogers v. State, 878 N.E.2d 269, 272 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied. “An allegation that the trial court failed to identify or find a mitigating factor requires the defendant to establish that the mitigating evidence is both significant and clearly supported by the record.” Id. at 272-73.

[16] Karamalegos asserted at sentencing that his criminal behaviors were downstream of his substance abuse issues and that he needed treatment to address those underlying issues. However, substance abuse has been a longstanding issue for Karamalegos, and he has not taken advantage of the opportunities he has been afforded to address it. Karamalegos was thirty-six years old at the time of his sentencing hearing. He first tried methamphetamine when he was seventeen years old, and he began using it daily when he was twenty-four years old. He attended two treatment programs but continued to abuse drugs afterwards. In addition, while Karamalegos's prior sentences involved participation in community supervision programs, he refused to abide by the terms of those programs and continued to use illegal drugs. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to find Karamalegos's history of substance abuse as a mitigating factor. See, e.g., Rose v. State, 810 N.E.2d 361, 367 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (holding trial court did not abuse its discretion by not finding defendant's substance abuse issues to be a mitigating factor when the defendant failed to take advantage of prior opportunities to treat the problem).

3. Appropriateness of Sentence

[17] Finally, Karamalegos contends his sentence is inappropriate given the nature of his offenses and his character. We may revise a sentence when we find, “after due consideration of the trial court's decision ․ that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” Ind. App. R. 7(B). Because sentencing is a function of the trial court, its judgment “should receive ‘considerable deference.’ ” Oberhansley v. State, 208 N.E.3d 1261, 1267 (Ind. 2023) (quoting Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.3d 1219, 1222 (Ind. 2008)). This deference can only be “ ‘overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense’ and ‘the defendant's character.’ ” Lane v. State, 232 N.E.3d 119, 122 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Oberhansley, 208 N.E.3d at 1267). Appellate review of a sentence is “to leaven outliers, ․ but not to achieve the perceived ‘correct’ result in each case.” Nicholson v. State, 221 N.E.3d 680, 684 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (quoting Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1225), trans. denied. The burden of proving a sentence is inappropriate falls to the defendant. Littlefield v. State, 215 N.E.3d 1081, 1089 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), trans. denied.

[18] Our review is “holistic” and takes into consideration “the whole picture before us.” Lane, 232 N.E.3d at 127. Appellants need not prove their sentence is inappropriate for both their character and offense, but “to the extent the evidence on one prong militates against relief, a claim based on the other prong must be all the stronger to justify relief.” Id. Our determination “turns on our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given case.” Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1224.

[O]ur goal is to determine whether the appellant's sentence is inappropriate, not whether some other sentence would be more appropriate. We consider not only the aggravators and mitigators found by the trial court, but also any other factors appearing in the record.

George v. State, 141 N.E.3d 68, 73-74 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (internal citations omitted), trans. denied.

[19] “When we evaluate whether a sentence is inappropriate given the nature of the offense, we first look to the advisory sentence.” Zamilpa v. State, 229 N.E.3d 1079, 1089 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024). A Level 4 felony is punishable by a term of imprisonment of between two and twelve years, with six years being the advisory term. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-5.5. A Level 6 felony is punishable by a term of imprisonment of between six months and two and one-half years, with one year being the advisory term. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-7(b). The trial court imposed a cumulative eight-year sentence. Here, there is nothing about the nature of Karamalegos's offenses that renders his sentence inappropriate. Karamalegos possessed an amount of methamphetamine that was significantly above the minimum threshold and only slightly below the maximum threshold for his level of offense. See Ind. Code § 35-48-4-6.1(c)(1) (offense is a Level 4 felony if the amount of methamphetamine is at least ten grams but less than twenty-eight grams).

[20] “When considering the character of the offender, one relevant fact is the defendant's criminal history. The significance of criminal history varies based on the gravity, nature, and number of prior offenses in relation to the current offense.” Johnson v. State, 986 N.E.2d 852, 857 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (internal citation omitted). Karamalegos's criminal history is significant. It consists of five felony and twenty-one misdemeanor convictions and many of those convictions were for drug offenses. He also has a history of not abiding by the terms of community supervision, and despite being offered treatment, he has failed to adequately address his substance abuse issues. Therefore, we cannot say his sentence is inappropriate given his character.

Conclusion

[21] The State presented sufficient evidence to support the finding that Karamalegos constructively possessed the methamphetamine and syringes found in the Passat given his proximity to where the items were found, his behavior after Trooper Beers initiated the traffic stop, and his statements to law enforcement. In addition, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it did not find Karamalegos's history of substance abuse to be a mitigating factor, and his sentence is not inappropriate. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

[22] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-48-4-6.1(c).

2.   Ind. Code § 16-42-19-18.

3.   Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1.1(a)(2)(A) & (e)(1).

May, Judge.

Altice, C.J., and Foley, J., concur.