Jean Fagnide, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Following a jury trial, Jean Fagnide appeals his convictions for Level 6 felony resisting law enforcement ¹ and Class A misdemeanor battery resulting in bodily injury.² He presents two issues for review: (1) Did the trial court fundamentally err by refusing to instruct the jury on self-defense?; and (2) Does sufficient evidence support Fagnide's conviction for resisting law enforcement? We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In the afternoon of July 24, 2024, Fagnide was standing on a bus station platform in the 3800 block of Shelby Street in Indianapolis when he and another man, William Crist, got into a verbal altercation that turned physical. Video (without audio) captured by the station's overhead security cameras show Fagnide standing at one end of the platform when Crist disembarked from a bus. Crist stood about halfway down the platform, some distance from Fagnide. Other passengers were milling around waiting for the next bus. After a few minutes, the men began exchanging words and gesturing angrily at each other. Fagnide then approached Crist. As Fagnide removed his backpack, Crist quickly moved closer to Fagnide and removed his own. The men exchanged more words while standing face to face. Fagnide then pushed Crist backwards, sending him toppling over a bystander's bicycle. As Crist was sprawled face-up atop the bike, Fagnide leaned over and began punching and kicking Crist in the face and body. After about thirty seconds, Fagnide briefly let up, and Crist crawled up off the bike. The scuffle and arguing continued for another minute or so, during which Fagnide drop-kicked Crist to the ground, kicked his body, and struck him with his hand. About two minutes after the fight began, the men returned to their original spots on the platform but continued to yell and periodically approach each other. Fagnide at one point grabbed an iron bar from his possessions and approached Crist with it in hand. Crist sustained cuts or abrasions on his right wrist, elbow, nose, neck, and left leg. His face was swollen from being hit.

[3] During the fight, a bystander called 9-1-1. Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Officer Patrick Tieken was dispatched to respond to the scene of a “disturbance or fight” involving two men at the bus stop. Tr. Vol. 2 at 175. The dispatcher gave a brief description of the men. When the officer pulled up to the scene about a minute after being dispatched, he saw the “male that was described,” meaning Fagnide, standing at the end of the platform. Id. at 176. Officer Tieken got out of his patrol car, walked toward the station, and asked what was going on. As Fagnide responded, the officer saw Crist “bleeding from the face” and “pointing at [Fagnide].” Id. at 179. Crist shouted at the officer that Fagnide “attacked me.” Ex. Vol. 1, page 4 at 00:50 (Officer Tieken's body camera footage). A woman approached, also pointing at Fagnide and saying he was involved. Officer Tieken described the situation as “kind of a chaotic disturbance going on” with “[a] lot of moving parts.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 176. But the two identifications led Officer Tieken to believe Fagnide “might be my suspect in a crime that occurred” and “maybe that's who I should focus my attention on.” Id. at 180, 181.

[4] At that point, “with the nature of a violent act that had occurred, to try to keep the peace and keep more violence from happening,” the officer “decided to place [Fagnide] into handcuffs.” Id. at 181. Officer Tieken reached for and grasped Fagnide's arm while telling Fagnide to put his hands behind his back. Fagnide tensed up and began resisting the officer's efforts to restrain him. Fagnide then “dropped his center of gravity” and reached around Officer Tieken's waist. Id. at 182. In response, Officer Tieken twice struck Fagnide in the face to create distance between them. As they continued to struggle, another officer arrived and helped take Fagnide to the ground. Because Officer Tieken was not responding over his radio, dispatch sent additional officers to the scene. Fagnide held his hands beneath his body and refused to release them as more officers arrived. Eventually, five officers working together pulled Fagnide's hands from under his body and placed him in handcuffs. During the altercation, Officer Tieken sustained injuries to his wrist and knees.

[5] The State charged Fagnide with resisting law enforcement and battery resulting in bodily injury. The case proceeded to a jury trial at which Fagnide represented himself and testified in his defense. In his opening statement, Fagnide claimed Crist insulted him and approached him aggressively, and he pushed Crist because Crist “was already aggressing me.” Id. at 143. During his direct testimony, Fagnide stated he was on his phone when Crist accused him of speaking too loudly and verbally attacked and insulted him. According to Fagnide, Crist “was the one threatening me.” Id. at 243. Fagnide further explained:

[H]e's the one who aggressed. He aggressor [sic]. And I felt very, very, very, very hurt. Because when somebody now [sic] acknowledging me as an American citizen and he telling me, go back to your country ․ And he treated me like I'm not part of one of you. That's offensive.

Id. at 245. The State asked, “So I just wanted to clarify. So what you're saying is ․ he hurt your feelings. Is that what I'm hearing?” Id. at 246. Fagnide responded, “Yeah, my feeling.” Id. Fagnide conceded he pushed Crist first. And when asked why he continued attacking Crist once Crist was on the ground, Fagnide explained he was “disciplining” Crist. Id. at 243.

[6] At the close of evidence, the State suggested the trial court include a self-defense instruction in the final instructions because “I think he's come up against kind of claiming self-defense[.]” Id. at 247. The trial court rejected the State's suggestion, because Fagnide “said his feelings were hurt” and “I don't think that's appropriate to give a self-defense instruction.” Id. at 247. Fagnide himself did not object and he did not request or tender such an instruction.

[7] As to the resisting law enforcement charge, Fagnide testified he resisted when Officer Tieken grabbed his arm because the officer “didn't listen to [his] side of the story” and was arresting or detaining him “without listening [and] questioning around.” Id. at 237, 236.

[8] The jury found Fagnide guilty of both charges. The trial court sentenced him to concurrent sentences of two years on resisting law enforcement and 180 days on battery, all executed in the Indiana Department of Correction.

1. The trial court did not fundamentally err in refusing to give a self-defense instruction.

[9] Fagnide first argues the trial court fundamentally erred by refusing to give a self-defense instruction. We review a trial court's decision to give or refuse a jury instruction for abuse of discretion. Hernandez v. State, 45 N.E.3d 373, 376 (Ind. 2015). We consider whether the instruction correctly states the law, is supported by the evidence, and is covered in substance by the other jury instructions. McCowan v. State, 27 N.E.3d 760, 763–64 (Ind. 2015). We reverse only if the appellant shows the instructional error prejudiced his substantial rights. Hernandez, 45 N.E.3d at 376.

[10] A defendant who fails to object to an instruction at trial waives any challenge to that instruction on appeal. Baker v. State, 948 N.E.2d 1169, 1178 (Ind. 2011); see also Ind. Trial Rule 51(C) (requiring a party to object to any deficiency in jury instructions and to state “distinctly the matter to which he objects and the grounds of his objection” to preserve the issue for appeal). Likewise, a defendant's failure to tender an instruction results in waiver of the issue for review. Baker, 948 N.E.2d at 1178.

[11] Here, it was the State—not Fagnide—that suggested a self-defense instruction could be appropriate considering Fagnide's argument and testimony. Although the State placed the issue before the trial court, Fagnide made no argument he was entitled to a self-defense instruction, and he did not tender a proposed instruction. Fagnide has waived any claim of error in the trial court's decision.

[12] Fagnide acknowledges he waived the issue and therefore frames his appellate argument as one of fundamental error. A party can raise an otherwise waived issue through a showing of fundamental error. See Mathews v. State, 849 N.E.2d 578, 587 (Ind. 2006). The “fundamental error” exception to waiver is “extremely narrow, and applies only when the error constitutes a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the defendant fundamental due process.” Id. This “formidable standard ․ applies only where the error is so flagrant that the trial judge should have corrected the error on [their] own, without prompting by defense counsel.” Tate v. State, 161 N.E.3d 1225, 1229 (Ind. 2021).

[13] But the fundamental error doctrine is inapplicable here, where the trial court had an opportunity to consider the issue and exercised its discretion in refusing to give the instruction. See id. Regardless, Fagnide's fundamental error argument would not succeed. Decades ago, the Indiana Supreme Court held a “trial court's failure to give sua sponte an instruction on self-defense even though there was some evidence which might support a self-defense claim, does not constitute fundamental error.” Harris v. State, 377 N.E.2d 632, 634 (Ind. 1978). This is because the “trial rules require that a party specifically object to deficiencies in jury instructions in order to preserve that issue on appeal” and the “burden to request [a self-defense] instruction is clearly upon the defendant.” Id. (citing former Indiana Criminal Rule 8). Cf. Helton v. State, 402 N.E.2d 1263, 1266 (1980) (holding the “entitlement to included offenses instructions, in an appropriate case, is not a fundamental right but rather is one that must be claimed and the claim preserved, in accordance with established rules of trial and appellate procedure”).

[14] Fagnide failed to object to the jury instructions or request a self-defense instruction and has therefore waived that issue on appeal.

2. Sufficient evidence supports Fagnide's resisting law enforcement conviction.

[15] Fagnide next argues there was insufficient evidence to support his resisting law enforcement conviction. A sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim warrants a “deferential standard of review in which we ‘neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility[.]’ ” Hancz-Barron v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1237, 1244 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Brantley v. State, 91 N.E.3d 566, 570 (Ind. 2018), cert. denied). Instead, we respect the fact-finder's exclusive province to weigh conflicting evidence, Phipps v. State, 90 N.E.3d 1190, 1195 (Ind. 2018), and consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences that support the judgment of the trier of fact, Hall v. State, 177 N.E.3d 1183, 1191 (Ind. 2021). We will affirm the conviction unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Teising v. State, 226 N.E.3d 780, 783 (Ind. 2024). It is “not necessary that the evidence ‘overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.’ ” Sallee v. State, 51 N.E.3d 130, 133 (Ind. 2016) (quoting Moore v. State, 652 N.E.2d 53, 55 (Ind. 1995)).

[16] To convict Fagnide of resisting law enforcement as charged, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt Fagnide knowingly or intentionally forcibly resisted Officer Tieken while the officer was lawfully engaged in the execution of his duties, and in committing said act, inflicted bodily injury on or otherwise caused bodily injury to Officer Tieken by causing pain to his wrist and/or knee. I.C. § 35-44.1-3-1(a)(1) & (c)(1)(B)(ii); Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 16.

[17] Fagnide does not argue there was insufficient evidence he forcibly resisted or caused Officer Tieken bodily injury. Instead, Fagnide contends the State failed to establish Officer Tieken was lawfully engaged in the execution of his duties at the time he resisted because the officer had no legal justification for arresting him under the Fourth Amendment. And although Fagnide acknowledges Officer Tieken may have had reasonable suspicion to justify an investigatory stop, Fagnide argues the officer had no reason to handcuff him because there was no indication he “was armed or that handcuffing him was necessary for officer safety.” Appellant's Br. at 16–17.

[18] A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support a resisting law enforcement conviction may implicate the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Gaddie v. State, 10 N.E.3d 1249, 1255–56 (Ind. 2014) (construing statute defining the offense of resisting law enforcement by fleeing after being ordered to stop to require that a law enforcement officer's order to stop be lawful, that is, based on reasonable suspicion or probable cause). The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides in part: “The right of people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated[.]” This protection against unreasonable seizures includes seizure of the person. California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 624–26 (1991). We review de novo the constitutionality of a search or seizure. Belvedere v. State, 889 N.E.2d 286, 287 (Ind. 2008).

[19] An “arrest” is “the taking of a person into custody, that he may be held to answer for a crime.” I.C. § 35-33-1-5 (1983). “A full-blown arrest or a detention that lasts for more than a short period of time must be justified by probable cause.” Finger v. State, 799 N.E.2d 528, 532 (Ind. 2003). “Probable cause exists when, at the time of the arrest, the arresting officer has knowledge of facts and circumstances that would warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that the suspect had committed a criminal act.” Henderson v. State, 769 N.E.2d 172, 176 (Ind. 2002).

[20] Even if an officer lacks probable cause to make an arrest, an officer may stop and briefly detain an individual for investigatory purposes if, based upon specific and articulable facts, the officer has a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Armfield v. State, 918 N.E.2d 316, 319 (Ind. 2009) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)). “Reasonable suspicion is satisfied where the facts known to the officer at the moment of the stop, together with the reasonable inferences arising from such facts, would cause an ordinarily prudent person to believe that criminal activity has occurred or is about to occur.” Reinhart v. State, 930 N.E.2d 42, 45 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). Reasonable suspicion requires “more than mere hunches or unparticularized suspicions.” Finger, 799 N.E.2d at 534. “An officer must be able to point to specific facts giving rise to reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.” Id. “The reasonable suspicion inquiry is highly fact-sensitive.” Id. at 533.

[21] An investigatory stop may be converted to an arrest if the officer interrupts the accused's freedom or restricts his liberty of movement to a degree associated with a formal arrest. See Reinhart, 930 N.E.2d at 46 (“While a Terry investigatory stop also interrupts a suspect's freedom and restricts his liberty of movement, such interruption is presumably much less intrusive and for a shorter duration than an arrest.”). Placing a person in handcuffs is one situation that may restrain a defendant's liberty of movement to a degree sufficient to convert an investigatory stop into an arrest. Id; see also Payne v. State, 854 N.E.2d 1199, 1204–05 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (comparing cases in which Indiana courts determined the use of handcuffs constituted an arrest with cases holding the contrary), trans. denied. There are limited circumstances in which handcuffs are appropriate without converting an investigative stop into a full arrest. Smith v. State, 121 N.E.3d 669, 675 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (citing U.S. v. Vaccaro, 915 F.3d 431, 436 (2019)), trans. denied.

Chief among them is officer safety and the possibility of the presence of a weapon. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 697 F.3d 625, 631–32 (7th Cir. 2012) (explaining that a suspected bank robber was left with one agent while others chased accomplices); United States v. Bullock, 632 F.3d 1004, 1016 (7th Cir. 2011) (noting that extra caution was warranted because of probable presence of drugs and possibility of violent behavior); United States v. Shoals, 478 F.3d 850, 853 (7th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (approving use of drawn weapons and handcuffs where suspect matched description of late-night 911 report of individual engaging in gun fire, was wearing a coat indoors, and attempted to hide from police); United States v. Stewart, 388 F.3d 1079, 1085 (7th Cir. 2004) (approving use of handcuffs where defendant matched description of armed perpetrator of recent bank robbery and behaved suspiciously).

Howell v. Smith, 853 F.3d 892, 898 (7th Cir. 2017). Whether an officer's placement of a person in handcuffs converts an investigatory stop into an arrest depends on the totality of the circumstances. Reinhart, 930 N.E.2d at 46.

[22] In this case, Officer Tieken was dispatched to a disturbance or fight at the bus stop involving two men, and the dispatcher provided descriptions of those involved. A report of a disturbance, without more, is generally an insufficient basis to conduct an investigatory stop. Gaddie, 10 N.E.3d at 1255. But reasonable suspicion may exist if the defendant flees, engages in furtive activity, and is uncooperative, or if the officer has a description of the suspect corroborated on seeing the defendant. Id. (citing State v. Atkins, 834 N.E.2d 1028, 1033–34 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied). As the officer approached the platform, he first encountered Fagnide, who matched one of the descriptions given by dispatch. Crist was standing in the background, agitated and visibly bloodied, wearing clothes also matching the description of a person involved. Crist identified Fagnide as the person who injured him. A disinterested bystander also approached the officer and pointed to Fagnide. At that point, Officer Tieken had at least reasonable suspicion Fagnide was involved in criminal activity, that is, a battery resulting in bodily injury.³

[23] Moreover, Officer Tieken was the only officer on scene at a busy bus stop responding to a call of a disturbance or fight. When he arrived, he encountered “kind of a chaotic disturbance going on” with “[a] lot of moving parts.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 176. There was evidence of recent violence. Under these conditions, it was reasonable for the officer to briefly detain Fagnide in handcuffs to ensure officer and bystander safety, at least until additional officers arrived to help control the scene and investigate. Fagnide immediately resisted Officer Tieken's detention and commands to put his hands behind his back, and so we cannot evaluate the duration of the stop. But based on the totality of the circumstances, a brief detention would not have converted the stop into an arrest. See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 710 N.E.2d 925, 928 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (holding it did not violate the Fourth Amendment during investigative stop to handcuff defendant who matched the description of a fleeing suspect reported to have fired shots just minutes before the defendant was spotted and detained by the officer).

[24] Officer Tieken was not without legal justification to conduct an investigative stop and use handcuffs to briefly detain Fagnide. Because Officer Tieken was lawfully engaged in the execution of his duties when Fagnide forcibly resisted law enforcement, there was sufficient evidence to sustain Fagnide's conviction

Conclusion

[25] The trial court did not fundamentally err in refusing to instruct the jury on self-defense. Sufficient evidence supports Fagnide's resisting law enforcement conviction.

[26] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3-1(a)(1) & (c)(1)(B)(ii) (2024).

2.   I.C. § 35-42-2-1(c)(1) & (d)(1).

3.   Officer Tieken also testified Fagnide was “getting very defensive” and “moving around.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 180. According to the officer, generally “[w]hen someone's looking around and not wanting to look at [him], that shows ․ someone is looking for an avenue of escape.” Id. at 181. On appeal, Fagnide fairly characterizes this testimony as implying he was making furtive movements or attempting to flee but argues the video footage of the incident “show[s] otherwise.” See Appellant's Br. at 16. He urges us to recognize the video provides a more accurate record than Officer Tieken's testimony. Id. (citing Love v. State, 73 N.E.3d 693, 699 (Ind. 2017)). We have reviewed the bus station surveillance video and Officer Tieken's body cam footage. But we have no need to decide whether the video contradicts Officer Tieken's testimony because even without evidence of furtive movements or an attempt to flee, the totality of the circumstances establishes the officer had reasonable suspicion to justify conducting an investigative stop.

Kenworthy, Judge.

Foley, J., and Scheele, J., concur.