IN RE: the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of H.P. (Mother) and B.P. (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] H.P. (“Mother”) appeals the termination of her parental rights to two of her children. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Mother and B.P., Sr. (“Father”), have two children together: B.P., Jr., born in November 2015, and Ha.P., born in May 2018. Father does not participate in this appeal. The Department of Child Services (DCS) first became involved with the family shortly after Ha.P.’s birth. On May 24, 2018, DCS filed a petition alleging that the children were in need of services (CHINS) due to substance abuse by Mother and Father. DCS removed the children in June and placed them in foster care. Later that month, upon admissions by Mother and Father, the trial court adjudicated the children to be CHINS. The children moved to a different foster placement in November 2020. Around the same time, Mother was arrested and charged with multiple drug- and gun-related offenses. In July 2021, while Mother's criminal case was still pending, the children were returned to her care. The CHINS case was closed that October.

[3] In March 2022, Mother pled guilty to Level 5 felony possession of methamphetamine, Level 5 felony felon carrying a handgun, Class A misdemeanor carrying a handgun without a license, two counts of Class A misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance, Class B misdemeanor possession of marijuana, and Class C misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia. The trial court there sentenced Mother to a total of five years—two years executed on home detention and three years suspended to probation.

[4] From May to October 2022, Mother tested positive for methamphetamine four times, opiates, and THC. The Office of Home Detention informed DCS of Mother's drug use and that it would be filing a violation in her criminal case. At the time, Mother was the sole caregiver for the children, so DCS was concerned that Mother was using drugs “at a time when she is the only individual responsible for the children's safety and well-being.” Ex. 3 p. 2. Accordingly, on November 1, DCS filed another petition alleging that the children were CHINS. The next day, DCS removed the children and placed them in foster care. The children were originally in the same foster home, but Ha.P. was later placed with a teacher from her school, where she has since remained. B.P., Jr., on the other hand, had nine different foster placements throughout the CHINS proceedings due to his behavioral and mental-health issues.

[5] Mother tested positive for THC again in late November, and the Office of Home Detention filed an amended violation in her criminal case. In January 2023, the court there revoked Mother's home detention and ordered her to serve the balance of her executed sentence (337 days) on work release. But less than five months later, community corrections petitioned to terminate Mother's work release due to multiple positive drug screens. Upon admissions by Mother, the court revoked her work-release placement and 18 months of her suspended sentence and ordered her to serve 884 days in the Department of Correction (DOC).

[6] In the meantime, the children were adjudicated CHINS in June 2023.¹ In its dispositional order, the trial court required Mother to, among other things, maintain safe and suitable housing, notify the family case manager of any changes in housing or employment within five days, participate in any recommended services, and submit to random drug screens. While in the DOC, Mother participated in some services, including Recovery While Incarcerated, and had virtual visits with the children. After her release in June 2024, DCS referred Mother for home-based casework, a substance-abuse assessment, and individual therapy. Mother moved back into the house where she'd been living before her incarceration and secured employment. In July, she completed the substance-abuse assessment, but she also tested positive for methamphetamine and amphetamine. She tested positive for methamphetamine again in September.

[7] That same month, DCS petitioned to terminate Mother's and Father's parental rights to B.P., Jr., and Ha.P. Between July and September, B.P., Jr., had several “acute mental health stays” in the hospital. Tr. p. 86. In October, he was admitted to Damar for a diagnosis and evaluation. The evaluation was completed in November, but B.P., Jr., remained at Damar while DCS worked to find him a foster placement. Around the same time, Mother was evicted and moved in with a friend but didn't notify Family Case Manager (FCM) Cassandra Brown. In December, Mother was fired from her job. Once B.P., Jr., was living at Damar, Mother had joint visits with the children there. Throughout the CHINS and termination proceedings, Mother never progressed beyond supervised visitation.

[8] The fact-finding hearing began on December 16, 2024. By that time, Mother had 56 unforgiven missed drug tests and 167 missed calls to Cordant. FCM Brown recommended termination of Mother's parental rights due to Mother's lack of involvement in services and the children's need for permanency, which she didn't believe Mother could provide. She explained that B.P., Jr., was still at Damar, and DCS was searching for a pre-adoptive home for him. Marissa King-Ramirez, the children's court-appointed special advocate (CASA), also recommended termination because the children need permanency, and she didn't believe Mother was capable of meeting their needs. CASA King-Ramirez testified that Ha.P. was doing well in her placement, who wished to adopt her, but B.P., Jr., was “struggling” at Damar. Id. at 72. She explained that B.P., Jr., “needs a lot of services,” but Mother “denies that he needs them” and says his behavioral issues are “solely because he is away from her not because he has mental health need[s] and diagnosis.” Id. at 74.

[9] The fact-finding hearing continued on January 28, 2025. Between the two hearing dates, Mother refused to screen three times. Mother testified that she was participating in a relapse-prevention program through Aspire, which included random drug screens. She claimed that even though Cordant showed positive drug screens, her screens through Aspire were clean. Mother also testified that the friend she'd been living with since being evicted was “going through some medical things.” Id. at 169. She explained that she was working to obtain her own housing but was struggling because of her criminal history and past evictions. On rebuttal, FCM Brown testified that B.P., Jr., was still at Damar because the foster placement DCS had lined up withdrew.

[10] In May, the court terminated Mother's and Father's parental rights.

[11] Mother now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[12] Mother asks us to reverse the termination of her parental rights. When reviewing the termination of parental rights, we do not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility. In re K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1229 (Ind. 2013). Rather, we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences most favorable to the trial court's judgment. Id. When a trial court has entered findings of fact and conclusions of law, we will not set aside the findings or judgment unless clearly erroneous. Id. To determine whether a judgment terminating parental rights is clearly erroneous, we review whether the evidence supports the court's findings and whether the findings support the judgment. In re V.A., 51 N.E.3d 1140, 1143 (Ind. 2016). DCS must prove the allegations in a termination petition by clear and convincing evidence. See Ind. Code § 31-34-12-2.

I. The error in the trial court's findings of fact is not fatal to the judgment

[13] Mother challenges two of the trial court's findings of fact. A finding is clearly erroneous only when the record contains no evidence to support it, either directly or by inference. In re A.D.S., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1156 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied.

[14] Mother first contests the following portion of Finding 25: “Mother has failed to follow other orders of the CHINS Court, including those to notify the FCM of changes of address, household composition, employment or telephone number within five (5) days of said change ․” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 p. 14. She points to FCM Brown's testimony that Mother notified her within five days of changes to her employment and household composition. But FCM Brown also testified that Mother didn't inform her when she was evicted. See Tr. p. 47. This failure to notify FCM Brown of the change in her address supports the trial court's finding that Mother failed to abide by this requirement of the dispositional order. Finding 25 is not clearly erroneous.

[15] Mother also challenges Finding 38, which states, “CASA Marissa King-Ramirez has extensive experience in child welfare, including three years of study toward a B.A. in Social Work, and five (5) years of experience with the Youth Opportunity Center/True Harbor, which included serving as a Program Manager for much of that time.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 p. 15. As Mother points out (and DCS acknowledges), this is the education and employment history of FCM Brown, not CASA King-Ramirez. See Tr. pp. 58-59. But even an erroneous finding of fact is not fatal to the judgment, provided there are at least some valid findings to support the trial court's conclusions. In re A.F., 762 N.E.2d 1244, 1251 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied. As explained further below, because the rest of the trial court's findings of fact support its conclusions, the error in Finding 38 doesn't warrant reversal.

II. The trial court did not err in concluding that DCS satisfied the statutory requirements for termination

[16] Mother also contends there is insufficient evidence to support the termination of her parental rights. Here, DCS filed its termination petition under Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4. A petition under that section must allege:

(1) the existence of one (1) or more of the circumstances described in subsection (d);

(2) that there is a satisfactory plan for care and treatment of the child; and

(3) that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests.

I.C. § 31-35-2-4(c) (2024).² As to the first requirement, DCS alleged, and the trial court found, that the following circumstances in Section 31-35-2-4(d) exist:

(2) That:

(A) the child has been removed from the parent and has been under the supervision of a local office or probation department for at least fifteen (15) months of the most recent twenty-two (22) months ․ ; and

(B) despite the department's reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify the child's family ․, the parent has been unable to remedy the circumstances that resulted in the child being placed in care outside the parent's home.

(3) That there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

See Appellant's App. Vol. 2 pp. 18, 21. Mother doesn't frame her sufficiency argument as a specific challenge to any of the court's statutory conclusions. Rather, she argues more generally that termination “is not [s]upported by [the] [f]indings and [e]vidence.” Appellant's Br. p. 11. We address Mother's claims at the appropriate points in our analysis under the statute.

A. Conditions Remedied

[17] In determining whether there is a reasonable probability that the conditions resulting in a child's removal and continued placement outside the home will not be remedied, the trial court engages in a two-step analysis: first, the court identifies what conditions led to the child's placement and retention outside the home, and then it determines whether there is a reasonable probability those conditions will not be remedied. K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1231. This second step requires the court to judge a parent's fitness at the time of the termination proceeding, considering evidence of changed conditions and balancing any recent improvements against habitual patterns of conduct to determine whether there is a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation. In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 643 (Ind. 2014).

[18] In this case, the children were removed due to Mother's drug use while she was their sole caregiver. Between May and October 2022, while Mother was on home detention, she tested positive for methamphetamine four times, opiates, and THC. This resulted in her home detention being revoked, and she was placed on work release. But after several months, Mother's work release was also revoked because she continued testing positive for drugs. Mother then spent a year in the DOC. Although she reportedly participated in Recovery While Incarcerated and completed a substance-abuse assessment after her release, Mother's drug use continued—she tested positive for methamphetamine and amphetamine in July 2024 and for methamphetamine again that September. Additionally, she refused to screen between the two dates of the fact-finding hearing, which the trial court found “indicate[s] continued illicit drug use.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 p. 14. Mother claims there is no evidence that her drug use harmed the children, but given that her positive screens resulted in her spending a year in the DOC—delaying any chance at reunification by at least a year—we disagree. Mother also challenges the accuracy of the Cordant test results, but this is a request for us to reweigh the evidence, which we do not do. See K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1229.

[19] In addition to Mother's illegal drug use, the children remained outside her care due to her inability to maintain safe and stable housing. After her release from the DOC in June 2024, Mother moved back into the house where she'd been living before her incarceration. But in October, she was evicted and moved in with a friend, where she was still living at the time of the fact-finding hearing. Mother argues that living with a friend shouldn't be a basis for terminating parental rights, but it was the fact that her living situation wasn't stable, not merely the fact that she was living with a friend, that contributed to the trial court's determination. See Appellant's App. Vol. 2 p. 14 (“Such housing is not stable housing as it is subject to the goodwill of the homeowners and could change on any day ․”). Mother herself seemed to indicate that this living situation was temporary—she testified that the friend with whom she was living was “going through some medical things” and that she was looking for her own housing.

[20] The evidence supports the trial court's conclusion that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the children's removal and continued placement outside the home will not be remedied. Because Section 31-35-2-4(c)(1) requires the existence of only one circumstance in subsection (d), we need not address the court's other conclusion under this subsection. See In re J.W., 259 N.E.3d 1039, 1045 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025), trans. denied.

B. Satisfactory Plan

[21] Mother does not challenge the suitability of DCS's plan for Ha.P. but claims that “[t]he plans for [B.P., Jr.] are nonexistent.” Appellant's Br. p. 22. This is incorrect. The plan for both children is adoption, which we have previously held is a “satisfactory plan” for the care and treatment of a child under the termination statute. In re B.M., 913 N.E.2d 1283, 1287 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).

[22] Where DCS's plan is adoption, “there need not be a guarantee that a suitable adoption will take place, only that DCS will attempt to find a suitable adoptive parent.” In re A.S., 17 N.E.3d 994, 1007 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied. Although B.P., Jr., was still living at Damar at the time of the fact-finding hearing and didn't have a placement willing to adopt him then, FCM Brown testified that DCS was searching for a pre-adoptive home for him. The trial court did not err in determining that DCS's plan of adoption is satisfactory.

C. Best Interests

[23] Deciding whether termination is in a child's best interests requires the trial court to look at the totality of the evidence and, in doing so, subordinate the parents’ interests to those of the child. In re Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d 41, 49 (Ind. 2019), reh'g denied. Central among these interests is the child's need for permanency, as “children cannot wait indefinitely for their parents to work toward preservation or reunification.” Id. We have held that recommendations by both the case manager and child advocate, in addition to evidence that the conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied, is sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child's best interests. A.S., 17 N.E.3d at 1005.

[24] Here, FCM Brown and CASA King-Ramirez both recommended termination. And as explained above, Mother hasn't shown an ability to provide a stable, drug-free environment for the children. While this evidence alone is sufficient to support the trial court's conclusion, permanency is a central consideration in determining the children's best interests. B.P., Jr., now 10, and Ha.P., now 7, have been removed from Mother since November 2022. Additionally, they were removed for three years in the first CHINS case, so they've spent much of their lives outside of Mother's care. And during the second CHINS case, Mother never progressed beyond supervised visitation. Ha.P. has been in the same placement for three years. She is doing well there, and her placement wishes to adopt her. At the time of the fact-finding hearing, B.P., Jr., was at Damar while DCS worked to find him a pre-adoptive placement. CASA King-Ramirez testified that B.P., Jr., “needs a lot of services,” but Mother “denies that he needs them” and says his behavioral issues are “because he is away from her not because he has mental health need[s] and diagnosis.” Mother suggests that because DCS hadn't yet found a pre-adoptive placement for B.P., Jr., there would've been no harm in giving her more time to show she can properly care for the children. But as the trial court concluded, “the continuing and building harm of [the children] remaining ‘in the system’ sorely outweighs the possibility of a prompt and safe reunification with Mother ․” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 p. 16. The totality of the evidence supports the court's conclusion that termination is in the children's best interests.

[25] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The court also found T.A., Mother's child from another relationship, to be a CHINS. But DCS did not petition to terminate Mother's parental rights to T.A.

2.   Section 31-35-2-4 was amended effective July 1, 2025, about a month after the termination order was issued in this case. See Pub. L. No. 179-2025, § 25. Neither party argues that this amendment has any bearing on the proceedings.

Vaidik, Judge.

Mathias, J., and Pyle, J., concur