Kamal Nour, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Kamal Nour was convicted of Class A misdemeanor distribution of an intimate image.¹ Nour presents several issues for review, which we consolidate and restate as: (1) Did the trial court abuse its discretion in the admission of evidence?; and (2) Was there sufficient evidence to support the conviction? We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Nour and B.C. began a relationship in 2009, and the two were later married under “Islamic law.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 34–35. During their relationship, the couple lived in different places, including Indiana and Sudan. Nour also traveled to Sudan alone while B.C. remained in the United States. At various points, Nour captured intimate images of B.C. When Nour was “traveling for long periods of time,” B.C. shared with him intimate images she took of herself “to help him fulfill those needs[.]” Id. at 36. She did not share the intimate images with anyone else.

[3] In 2020, B.C. resided in Johnson County, Indiana.² B.C. “had been seeing a counselor for quite some time and [the counselor] was working out a safety plan with [B.C.]” to end the relationship. Id. at 37. B.C. terminated the relationship during one of Nour's trips abroad. He did not handle the separation well. Nour incessantly tried to communicate with B.C., especially over email messages. He engaged in “a lot of pleading.” Id. at 38. But soon “the pleading turned to anger” and he threatened to “show up” at her house. Id. Nour reached out to B.C.’s son, telling the son he would buy him a car if he texted Nour B.C.’s daily whereabouts. B.C. sought and was granted an order of protection against Nour.³ As time passed, Nour's attempts to reach B.C. subsided, or at least B.C. believed they had.

[4] In 2021, B.C. married another man. In the fall of that year, B.C. and her husband posted family photos on social media. Shortly after, B.C.’s husband received a comment on his post telling him to check his instant messages. B.C. also received a “Facebook request from someone that had ․ an explicit photo of [B.C.] as a profile picture.” Id. at 40. B.C. had shared the photo with Nour some three years before. Months after the request, in spring and summer of 2022, B.C. and her husband uncovered a “spam section” on their social media accounts containing a slew of “message requests.” Id. at 41. The messages came from two accounts bearing names unfamiliar to B.C., at least one of which claimed to be the account of Nour's new fiancée. But because the messages contained intimate images B.C. had only shared with Nour, as well as confidential information related to B.C.’s past medical treatments she did not disclose to others, B.C. believed it was Nour who was behind the accounts.⁴

[5] Some messages contained disparaging language about B.C. while others included veiled or outright threats regarding intimate images B.C. sent Nour:

I have a looot of this by the way but don't be afraid i will not destroy you by sharing this trash[.]

Hahahah a real trash Who failed as a mom as a daughter and as wife soon[.]

Haha we gonna see if your familly has the same opinion when i share those pic and some many[.]

Ex. Vol. 3, at 10–13 (quoted as written).

[6] One missive in particular demanded B.C. draft an email to Nour, expressing in part:

To : kamal ․

Hey kamal !

I am sorry to not answear to your messages before i was mixed but now i want to explain everything to you[.] When i meet you i was with no work and no money i worth nothing i feel alone feel like no one love or even care about me ․

Id. at 10 (quoted as written). In addition to B.C.’s husband, other members of her family received similar communications, as well as attachments with intimate images of B.C.

[7] The State then charged Nour with distribution of an intimate image without B.C.’s consent. See Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 21. B.C. testified to the above events at Nour's bench trial. During B.C.’s direct examination, the State moved to admit Exhibits 1, 2, and 3, which depicted Nour's alleged messages and the distributed intimate images of B.C. Nour objected, arguing the exhibits constituted inadmissible hearsay. The trial court overruled the objections and admitted all three exhibits.

[8] Nour presented the testimony of his cousin, who claimed B.C. sent him an intimate image of herself years before. In addition, Nour admitted into evidence copies of his United States passport, which contained stamps from Ethiopian authorities suggesting he was in Ethiopia around the time the third-party accounts were created. When cross-examining B.C., Nour implied someone other than himself, perhaps his “subsequent lover,” was responsible for distributing the images. Tr. Vol. 2 at 53. During redirect, the State elicited testimony from B.C. regarding Nour's education in computer science, internet security, and prior instances when he allegedly forged electronic documents. Nour objected to the testimony as improper character evidence. See id. at 56, 57. The State countered Nour “cracked open the door ․ that [B.C.] has personal knowledge of things that he has done on the computer with his degrees.” Id. at 56. The trial court overruled Nour's objection, explaining it would permit B.C. to respond, “for the limited purpose that the State has explained.” Id. at 57.

[9] The trial court found Nour guilty.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in the admission of evidence.

[10] A challenge to the admission of evidence is typically reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Fansler v. State, 100 N.E.3d 250, 253 (Ind. 2018). “In those instances, we will reverse only where the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances.” Id.

Documentary evidence

[11] Nour maintains the trial court abused its discretion by admitting Exhibits 1, 2, and 3 because each exhibit contained inadmissible hearsay. See Appellant's Br. at 16–17. Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted therein. Evid. R. 801(c). “Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by law or by other court rules.” McGraw v. State, 243 N.E.3d 394, 399 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024), trans. denied. “However, a statement is not hearsay if it is a statement made by an opposing party that is offered into evidence against him.” Morris v. Crain, 71 N.E.3d 871, 878 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017); see also Evid. R. 801(d)(2)(A). “When deciding whether to admit evidence, the court must decide any question of fact by a preponderance of the evidence.” Evid. R. 103(f).

[12] In this case, Nour objected to the admission of State's Exhibits 1, 2, and 3—which depicted Nour's messages and intimate images of B.C.—on hearsay grounds. Nour recognized “the basis of the whole trial” turned on whether the exhibits came from him. Tr. Vol. 2 at 44. The trial court overruled the objections. Regarding Exhibit 1, the court found:

THE COURT: Well, right now the only evidence is that there are pictures attached to that email that only the witness and your client had, so overruled.

Id. at 44. Similarly, as to images in Exhibit 2, the trial court determined:

THE COURT: Okay. Same ruling. The only evidence the court has before it right now are [sic] that they came from your client, so overruled. State's 2 is admitted as well.

Id. at 46. Lastly, as to Exhibit 3, the court applied the “[s]ame ruling” and admitted the exhibit over Nour's hearsay objection. Id. at 47.

[13] Up until that point at trial, B.C testified to Nour's broader campaign of intimidation. The trial court heard about Nour's reaction to their separation. Nour's initial pleading soon turned to menacing messages in which he threatened to show up at her house. B.C. felt compelled to seek an order of protection against Nour. B.C. made it clear during her testimony she had shared intimate images only with Nour, particularly when he was traveling overseas. Despite Nour's claim the messages came from a third-party, the exhibits included confidential information about B.C.’s medical treatments known only by her, her husband, and Nour. And Exhibit 1 specifically contained an apology email B.C. was supposed to send to “Kamal.” Therefore, the trial court could find the preponderance of the evidence pointed to Nour as the person who created the accounts identified in the exhibits and the person who distributed the intimate images. See Evid. R. 103(f). And because statements made by an opposing party are not hearsay, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted Exhibits 1, 2, and 3. See Sincere v. State, 228 N.E.3d 439, 445–46 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (upholding trial court's decision admitting voicemail recording as statement of opposing party when the evidence established the defendant made the recording), trans. denied.

Testimonial evidence

[14] Next, Nour argues the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted B.C.’s testimony asserting Nour had previously manufactured documents for others because the testimony was offered to prove his bad character and no permitted use applied. See Appellant's Br. at 19–20.

[15] “Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a person's character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.” Evid. R. 404(b)(1). Yet such evidence “may be admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” Evid. R. 404(b)(2). “To decide whether character evidence is admissible under Rule 404(b), the trial court must: (1) determine whether the evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is relevant to a matter at issue other than the person's propensity to engage in a wrongful act; and (2) balance the probative value of the evidence against its prejudicial effect pursuant to [Indiana Evidence Rule 403].” Bassett v. State, 795 N.E.2d 1050, 1053 (Ind. 2003).

[16] Here, the State counters “Nour's knowledge of how to create passable, fake documents showed that Nour would know useful strategies in creating a passable, fake [social media] account.” Appellee's Br. at 19. We agree with the State. And we note under the judicial temperance presumption, we presume “that in a proceeding tried to the bench a court renders its decisions solely on the basis of relevant and probative evidence.” Konopasek v. State, 946 N.E.2d 23, 28 (Ind. 2011). “The presumption exists because ․ ‘risk of prejudice is quelled when the evidence is solely before the trial court.’ ” Terpstra v. State, 138 N.E.3d 278, 287 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (quoting Conley v. State, 972 N.E.2d 864, 873 (Ind. 2012)), trans. denied.

[17] First, the fact Nour previously forged documents for others was probative of his ability to create social media accounts which he then used to harass B.C. and her family, and to distribute B.C.’s intimate images. As the State points out, “that Nour had previously used his advanced computer training to create fraudulent documents was admissible for the limited purpose of showing that Nour had the knowledge of how to use computers to create fraudulent materials.” Appellee's Br. at 18–19; see also Schnitzmeyer v. State, 168 N.E.3d 1041, 1044 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (“Evidence is considered relevant if it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence and such fact must be of consequence in determining the action.”) (quotation and citation omitted).

[18] Second, Nour was not unfairly prejudiced. B.C. previously felt compelled to seek an order of protection against Nour. At trial, she provided ample testimony of Nour's campaign of intimidation. In messages sent to B.C., he threatened to distribute images she shared exclusively with him during their relationship. The messages to B.C. referenced confidential information about medical treatments known by a limited number of individuals. One missive specifically demanded an apology from B.C. addressed to “Kamal.” The trial court in turn was unpersuaded by Nour's cousin's “dubious” testimony, see Tr. Vol. 2 at 92, and was equally unconvinced by Nour's suggestion that a “subsequent lover” distributed the images, id. at 53. Although testimony about his past forgery gave credence to the State's theory that it was Nour who was behind the third-party accounts, the remaining evidence still pointed to Nour as the perpetrator. And the trial court admitted the testimony for the limited purpose of showing Nour's ability to forge electronic materials. See Evid. R. 403 (providing the court may exclude relevant evidence “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of ․ unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence”).⁵

Sufficient evidence supports the conviction.

[19] A sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim warrants a “deferential standard of review in which we ‘neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility[.]’ ” Hancz-Barron v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1237, 1244 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Brantley v. State, 91 N.E.3d 566, 570 (Ind. 2018), cert. denied). Instead, we respect the factfinder's exclusive province to weigh conflicting evidence, Phipps v. State, 90 N.E.3d 1190, 1195 (Ind. 2018), and consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences that support the judgment of the trier of fact, Hall v. State, 177 N.E.3d 1183, 1191 (Ind. 2021). We will affirm the conviction unless no reasonable factfinder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Teising v. State, 226 N.E.3d 780, 783 (Ind. 2024). It is “not necessary that the evidence ‘overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.’ ” Sallee v. State, 51 N.E.3d 130, 133 (Ind. 2016) (quoting Moore v. State, 652 N.E.2d 53, 55 (Ind. 1995)).

[20] Nour argues there was insufficient evidence “to prove the crime of distribution of an intimate image[.]” Appellant's Br. at 16. Under Indiana Code Section 35-45-4-8(d), a person who “(1) knows or reasonably should know that an individual depicted in an intimate image does not consent to the distribution of the intimate image; and (2) distributes the intimate image; commits distribution of an intimate image, a Class A misdemeanor.” The statute advances Indiana's “compelling interest in protecting individuals from the unique and significant harms from the nonconsensual distribution of their intimate images[.]” State v. Katz, 179 N.E.3d 431, 455–56 (Ind. 2022). Nour contends he “presented evidence that his subsequent jealous lover/fiancée or others could have sent” the intimate images. Appellant's Br. at 14.

[21] Here, the record indicates Nour did not handle his separation from B.C. well. Immediately after B.C. terminated the relationship, Nour relentlessly pursued communication with her. B.C. testified to Nour's campaign of intimidation. He pleaded that they get back together, and his pleadings quickly “turned to anger.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 38. Nour attempted to bribe B.C.’s son into keeping track of his mother for him. He threatened to “show up” at her house. Id. Nour's behavior pushed B.C. to seek an order of protection against him.

[22] Nour sent “hundreds” of messages attempting to contact B.C. Id. at 48. Using pseudonymous accounts, he threatened to distribute intimate images B.C. had exclusively shared with him during his travels abroad. The communications contained information regarding B.C.’s medical history—confidential information she “kept private” and shared only with her husband and Nour. Id. at 47. At least one of the messages demanded B.C. send an apology email addressed to Nour. An investigation revealed the accounts from which the communications were sent originated in Sudan.⁶ And because B.C. ended their relationship and obtained a protection order, Nour knew or reasonably should have known B.C. did not consent to distribution of the images.

[23] The trial court noted based on Nour's “training and experience” he could have sent the images from “someplace else,” not to mention Exhibit 1 “very obviously” contained a message pertaining to his relationship with B.C. Id. at 92. The court declined to “put any weight whatsoever on [Nour's] cousin's” “dubious” testimony claiming B.C. shared an intimate image with him years before. Id. A reasonable factfinder could find Nour distributed the images, and that he knew B.C. did not consent to their distribution. His argument on appeal would have this Court reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. Phipps, 90 N.E.3d at 1195.⁷

Conclusion

[24] The trial court did not abuse its discretion in the admission of evidence, and there is sufficient evidence to support the conviction.

[25] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-45-4-8(d) (2019).

2.   According to B.C., Nour also maintained a “legal address” in the county. Id. at 37.

3.   Due to uncertainty over Nour's physical location, B.C. served the order of protection over email, and Nour acknowledged receipt of the order. See id. at 37–38.

4.   A subsequent police investigation revealed the accounts originated in Sudan. Id. at 72, 77.

5.   We also agree with the State that Nour opened the door to evidence about his past forgery when he argued “someone else” could have created the accounts and that person was responsible for distributing intimate images of B.C. without her consent. See Tr. Vol. 2 at 55. “Evidence which opens the door must leave the trier of fact with a false or misleading impression of the facts related.” Garcia-Berrios v. State, 147 N.E.3d 339, 343 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied. “When that happens, the State may introduce otherwise inadmissible evidence if it is a fair response to evidence elicited by the defendant.” Id. To the extent Nour takes issue with admission of testimony specifying his educational attainments, see Appellant's Br. at 19, he does not explain how receipt of university degrees constitutes prohibited character evidence. Halliburton v. State, 1 N.E.3d 670, 681 (Ind. 2013) (noting Rule 404(b) aims to prevent the “forbidden inference that prior wrongful conduct suggests present guilt”) (quotation and citation omitted).

6.   Nour suggests his conviction raises a question about improper venue. See Appellant's Br. at 15, 20. We do not identify an issue regarding venue in Nour's conviction. In this case, B.C. resided in Johnson County when she received messages from the pseudonymous accounts and when her intimate images were distributed. According to B.C.’s testimony at trial, Nour maintained a “legal address” in Johnson County at the time of their separation. Tr. Vol. 2 at 37; see also I.C. § 35-32-2-1(k)(1)(A) (2005) (stating when an offense “is committed by use of ․ the Internet or another computer network[,]” the “trial may be held in the county where the victim resides at the time of the offense”).

7.   Additionally, Nour claims the trial court failed to exclude every reasonable theory of innocence given the circumstantial nature of the evidence presented against him during trial. See Appellant's Br. at 15 (citing McDonald v. State, 547 N.E.2d 294 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989)). In McDonald, a panel of this Court held a defendant is “entitled to an instruction on the exclusion of every hypothesis of innocence before being convicted upon circumstantial evidence.” 547 N.E.2d at 297. Although “a defendant may be entitled to a jury instruction to this effect, this standard is not applicable to appellate review for sufficiency of evidence.” Ogle v. State, 698 N.E.2d 1146, 1149 (Ind. 1998). Nour concedes as much, see Appellant's Reply Br. at 4–5, and given that his case was tried by the bench, we “presume the trial judge is aware of and knows the law[.]” Dumas v. State, 803 N.E.2d 1113, 1121 (Ind. 2004) (abrogated on other grounds).

Kenworthy, Judge.

Foley, J., and Scheele, J., concur.