Anthony M. Mason, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Anthony Mason asks us to exercise our authority under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) to revise his four year-aggregate sentence for strangulation and domestic battery. Because Mason has failed to prove his sentence is inappropriate, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In December 2023, Mason and his girlfriend, Pamela Johnson, were at her house with their twenty-month-old toddler and six-month-old baby. Mason, who was drunk and high on cocaine, got into a heated argument with Johnson. He grabbed Johnson by the neck while she was holding their baby, pushed her onto a couch, and got on top of her. As their toddler watched, he strangled Johnson until she was unconscious and urinated on herself. When Johnson regained consciousness, Mason, who still had his hands around her neck, said, “I'll kill you.” Appellant's Appendix Vol. 2 at 37. She managed to free herself from his grip, ran out of the house, and called 911.

[3] When the police questioned Mason at the scene, he admitted he “put [his] hands on her.” Id. He also said, “I'm not gone [sic] lie, I have about zero point five grams of cocaine in the room that I use for personal use.” Id. A plate with cocaine on it was found in the room where Mason had strangled Johnson.

[4] The State charged Johnson with Count I: Criminal Confinement, as a Level 3 felony;¹ Count II: Strangulation, as a Level 6 felony;² Count III: Intimidation, as a Level 6 felony;³ Count IV: Domestic Battery in the Presence of a Child, a Level 6 felony;⁴ and Count V: Domestic Battery, as a Class A misdemeanor.⁵ Mason pled guilty to Counts II and IV and the State dismissed the remaining charges. Under the plea agreement, “[t]he Parties agree[d] to fully argue their respective positions as to the sentences to be imposed[.]” Id. at 18.

[5] At the sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed consecutive sentences of two years on each count, for an aggregate sentence of four years. Mason was ordered to serve two years in the Department of Correction and one year in community corrections, with the final year suspended to probation. He now appeals his sentence.

Discussion and Decision

[6] Mason argues his sentence is inappropriate and asks us to revise it under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) “to one year on each count to be served concurrently[.]” Appellant's Brief at 6. Rule 7(B) permits us to revise a sentence if it “is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” McCain v. State, 148 N.E.3d 977, 985 (Ind. 2020) (quoting Ind. Appellate Rule 7(B)). We give the trial court “considerable deference” when reviewing a sentence under Rule 7(B). Oberhansley v. State, 208 N.E.3d 1261, 1267 (Ind. 2023) (quoting Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1222 (Ind. 2008)). We will not revise a sentencing decision absent “compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense (such as accompanied by restraint, regard[,] and lack of brutality) and the defendant's character (such as substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character).” Konkle v. State, 253 N.E.3d 1068, 1093 (Ind. 2025) (quoting Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015)). The burden is on the defendant to persuade us that his sentence is inappropriate. Id. at 1092.

1. Nature of the Offense

[7] Mason first contends that his “offenses are not such that they warrant a four-year sentence.” Appellant's Br. at 9. When evaluating the nature of an offense, we “look at the extent, brutality, and heinousness of the offense.” Borroel v. State, 241 N.E.3d 8, 18 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024), trans. denied. We begin with the advisory sentence as “the starting point the Legislature has selected as an appropriate sentence for the crime committed.” Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 494 (Ind. 2007), as clarified on reh'g by 875 N.E.2d 218 (2007).

[8] Mason was convicted of two Level 6 felonies. Indiana Code section 35-50-2-7(b) provides that “[a] person who commits a Level 6 felony ․ shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of between six [ ] months and two and one-half [ ] years, with the advisory sentence being one [ ] year.” In determining whether Mason's two-year consecutive sentences are appropriate, we consider “whether there is anything more or less egregious about the offense committed by the defendant that makes it different from the ‘typical’ offense accounted for by the legislature when it set the advisory sentence.” T.A.D.W. v. State, 51 N.E.3d 1205, 1211 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (quoting Holloway v. State, 950 N.E.2d 803, 806-07 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011)). We also consider whether the offenses were “accompanied by restraint, regard, and lack of brutality[.]” Stephenson, 29 N.E.3d at 122.

[9] According to Mason, the nature of his crimes did not warrant more than the advisory sentence because “the significance of [his] child's presence [was] reflected in the legislature's sentencing guidelines.” Appellant's Br. at 9; see Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1.3(b)(2) (elevating domestic battery to a Level 6 felony if committed “in the physical presence of a child less than sixteen [ ] years of age”). However, Mason did more than simply batter Johnson in front of a child. He got drunk and high in front of two of his young children. Then he attacked Johnson while she was holding their six-month-old baby, who could have, as the trial court noted at the sentencing hearing, “fallen, ․ hit its head, [or] ․ died.” Transcript at 29. Furthermore, Mason left a plate of cocaine within the reach of his twenty-month-old toddler, who also could have been seriously injured. Finally, Mason not only strangled Johnson to the point of unconsciousness but he also threatened to kill her—going beyond the elements necessary to convict him of strangulation or domestic battery and thus distinguishing his crimes from the “typical” offenses contemplated by the advisory sentence.

[10] Given these facts, Mason carried a heavy burden to provide “compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of [his] offense[s.]” Konkle, 253 N.E.3d at 1093 (quoting Stephenson, 29 N.E.2d at 122). His two-paragraph argument regarding the nature of his offenses, which merely recites the elements of the crimes for which he was convicted, falls far short of satisfying that burden. Accordingly, he has failed to show that his aggregate four-year sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of his offenses.

2. Character of the Offender

[11] Given the nature of his crimes, Mason was required to make a strong showing that his sentence was inappropriate because of his good character. Lane v. State, 232 N.E.3d 119, 127 (Ind. 2024) (“[T]o the extent the evidence on one prong militates against relief, a claim based on the other prong must be all the stronger[.]”). In considering Mason's character, “we engage in a broad consideration of [his] qualities[.]” Burkhart v. State, 259 N.E.3d 347, 355 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (quoting T.A.D.W., 51 N.E.3d at 1211), trans. denied. This includes “whether [he] has ‘substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character[.]’ ” Id. (quoting Stephenson, 29 N.E.3d at 122).

[12] To support his argument, Mason contends that he has a good relationship with his three children, has worked several jobs, took courses on anger management and substance abuse while awaiting sentencing, and accepted responsibility for his crimes by pleading guilty. He also claims that because he “has no prior felony or misdemeanor convictions[,]” his history of criminal behavior “should not adversely impact the consideration of his character.” Appellant's Br. at 8.

[13] Starting with Mason's criminal history, Mason's claim that he had not been convicted of any offense prior to attacking Johnson is contradicted by the record. His presentence investigation report indicates that in 2018, he was charged in Illinois with numerous counts of identity theft and forgery and was found guilty of one count of felony “theft deception[.]” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 25. In any event, our Supreme Court has held that a defendant's lack of criminal convictions may be offset by actual criminal behavior. Conley v. State, 972 N.E.2d 864, 874 (Ind. 2012), reh'g denied. Mason has a long history of illegal drug use, including marijuana, cocaine, ecstasy, and psilocybin mushrooms. He has also had extensive involvement in the criminal justice system and continued to commit criminal offenses despite having been shown leniency in the past. For his financial crimes in Illinois, he participated in a second chance probation program that resulted in the dismissal of six counts. In 2022, he was charged with resisting law enforcement and disorderly conduct in Indiana, but those charges were dismissed as part of a deferred prosecution. It reflects poorly on Mason's character that his participation in both second chance probation and a deferred prosecution did not deter him from committing additional criminal offenses.

[14] Nor does it reflect well on Mason that when he committed the offenses against Johnson, he was facing pending charges for three counts of operating a vehicle Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 25A-CR-1298 | December 10, 2025 Page 7 of 10 while intoxicated in a separate case. Moreover, while on pre-trial release in this case, he was charged with felony possession of a controlled substance, misdemeanor driving under the influence, and misdemeanor domestic battery in Illinois. Notably, the Illinois domestic battery charge arose out of a drunken argument Mason had with his brother that turned violent, just like his drunken argument with Johnson had. Mason's repeated acts of criminal behavior, including repeated acts of drunken domestic violence against his family members, demonstrate neither “virtuous traits [n]or persistent examples of good character[.]” Stephenson, 29 N.E.3d at 122. Mason may have tried to “improve himself” while awaiting sentencing by taking advantage of anger management and substance abuse courses, but his history of repeated criminal behavior overshadows these remedial efforts. Appellant's Br. at 8.

[15] Furthermore, while Mason touts his work history as exemplifying his good character, his presentence investigation report indicates that his criminal behavior and failure to pass background checks disrupted his employment on at least two occasions. Additionally, Mason's claim of having “a good relationship” with three of his children is unpersuasive given that his present offenses were not only committed against the mother of two of his children and in their presence, but also directly threatened their safety. Id.

[16] Finally, while Mason argues he accepted responsibility for his actions by pleading guilty, generally “[a] guilty plea is not necessarily a mitigating factor where the defendant receives substantial benefit from the plea or where evidence against the defendant is so strong that the decision to plead guilty is merely pragmatic.” Amalfitano v. State, 956 N.E.2d 208, 212 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied. Mason received a substantial benefit from his guilty plea, in that the State agreed to dismiss three charges, including a Level 3 felony, for which he was facing as much as sixteen years, I.C. § 35-50-2-5(b); another Level 6 felony, which carried a maximum sentence of two and a half years, I.C. § 35-50-2-7(b); and a Class A misdemeanor, for which he could have been sentenced to as much as one year, I.C. § 35-50-3-2. His four-year aggregate sentence—half of which will be served on community corrections and probation—is well below what he could have received if he had been found guilty of all five counts originally charged. See Davidson v. State, 926 N.E.2d 1023, 1025 (Ind. 2010) (permitting appellate courts to consider “whether a portion of the sentence is ordered suspended or otherwise crafted using any of the variety of sentencing tools available to the trial judge” when conducting Rule 7(B) reviews). Pleading guilty under these circumstances was a pragmatic decision, not one that demonstrates Mason's willingness to accept responsibility for his actions.

[17] For these reasons, Mason has failed to demonstrate that his sentence is inappropriate in light of his character.

Conclusion

[18] Because Mason failed to show his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of his offenses or his character, we affirm.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-42-3-3(a), (b)(3)(B).

2.   I.C. § 35-42-2-9(c).

3.   I.C. § 35-45-2-1(a)(1), (b)(1)(A).

4.   I.C. § 35-42-2-1.3(a)(1), (b)(2).

5.   I.C. § 35-42-2-1.3(a)(1).

DeBoer, Judge.

Bradford, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.