IN RE: the Involuntary Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of P.B. and R.B. (Minor Children) (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] R.B. (“Father”) and A.K. (“Mother”) (collectively, “Parents”) appeal the trial court's orders terminating their parental rights over their minor children, R.B. and P.B. (collectively, “the Children”). Parents raise one issue for our review, namely, whether the court clearly erred when it terminated their rights. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] R.B. was born on July 9, 2021, and P.B. was born on February 21, 2023. In 2016, prior to either child's birth, Mother became involved with the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) after her then ten-month-old child M.M. was unresponsive and being treated in a hospital. Mother's other child, A.R., was in the care of relatives because Mother was incarcerated on drug-related offenses. Both M.M. and A.R. were removed and adjudicated Children in Need of Services (“CHINS”). During the CHINS proceedings, Mother was released from incarceration but did not consistently participate in services or visit A.R. and M.M. The CHINS cases ended when guardianships were established for both of those children.

[3] In September 2019, A.R.’s guardian died, and custody of A.R. reverted back to Mother. DCS was able to confirm that Mother was using drugs, and Mother was again arrested. DCS removed A.R. and another sibling, Z.K., from Mother's care, and the court adjudicated them CHINS. Mother failed to stay sober, participate in services, or visit with her children. Z.K. was ultimately reunified with his father, and Mother's parental rights as to A.R. were terminated in May of 2021.

[4] When P.B. was born, he “experienced intense withdrawal symptoms” that required intervention and monitoring by a hospital. Appealed Order at 4.¹ DCS filed a petition alleging that P.B. was a CHINS, but the family successfully completed an informal adjustment, and the case was closed in September 2023.

[5] On February 2, 2024, DCS received a report that Mother was using methamphetamines and spice while caring for the Children. Mother refused to take an oral screen, which prompted DCS to get a court order. Prior to taking the court-ordered drug test, Mother admitted to having smoked marijuana and consumed alcohol. However, the drug test revealed that Mother had used methamphetamines. During this time, Father was at an inpatient facility to address his drug use. Following his release, he tested positive for “illegal substances” and was again arrested. Id. at 5.

[6] DCS removed the Children from Parents’ care on February 14 and filed petitions alleging the Children were CHINS. Following a fact-finding hearing in April, the court adjudicated them to be CHINS. Then, after a dispositional hearing, the court ordered Parents to participate in various services, including completing substance-abuse assessments and following recommendations, completing parenting assessments and following all recommendations; maintaining safe and suitable housing; and abstaining from illegal substances.

[7] Initially, DCS used oral screens to test for drugs. Father accused Mother of having used spice to manipulate the result of the oral drug tests. DCS then implemented urine-based drug tests in addition to oral tests for both Parents. Mother again “manipulated” the results of her tests by using “store-bought urine.” Id. at 6. DCS “struggled” to accurately monitor Mother's substance abuse. Id.

[8] Parents failed to show any “significant progress toward safe and sober parenting.” Id. at 7. As a result, on April 7, 2025, DCS filed petitions to terminate Parents’ parental rights over the Children. Following a fact-finding hearing, the trial court entered the following findings of fact and conclusions thereon:

23. On August 12, 2024, the Court held its first review hearing in this matter. During the preceding review period, both parents failed to show any significant progress towards safe and sober parenting. [Mother] had participated minimally in her ordered services throughout the review period. The home shared by both parents remained in hazardous and unsanitary condition with dirty dishes, dried food, and piles of trash observed by [Court-Appointed Special Advocate (“CASA”)] Ogle. [Father] stopped visiting the Children in June due to missed or positive drug screens.

24. In July, Father was admitted into another in-patient rehabilitation facility and completed a twenty-eight (28) day program. Upon his release from the facility, [Father] informed DCS that Mother was “cheating” on her screens by substituting fake urine at the time of collection. [Father] provided photographs showing what appeared to be fake urine samples. Despite his accusation, [Father] opted to return to the home with [Mother] following his release from treatment. Just two days after [Father] completed treatment and returned home, both he and [Mother] were arrested during a probation check at the residence that uncovered methamphetamines and paraphernalia. Just prior to the Six-Month Review Hearing, both parents were released from incarceration, with Father entering work release for the second time since the commencement of the CHINS cases.

25. The Court next held a three-month review hearing on November 18, 2024. Prior to that hearing, Mother's visits with the Children remained inconsistent due to positive drug screens, missed drug screens, or inconclusive and manipulated drug screens. Drug screening did reveal that Mother continued to abuse methamphetamines during the review period. Despite her ongoing substance abuse issues, [Mother] chose not to participate in any kind of mental health services or substance abuse treatment programs offered through DCS. By September, Father violated the conditions of his release and found himself incarcerated again. DCS continued to offer therapy to Father while he remained in jail; however, [Father's] therapist noted that Father made no significant progress in addressing the underlying reasons for his substance abuse and criminal recidivism.

26. The Court held a Permanency Review Hearing on February 10, 202[5]. During the preceding three-month period, Mother continued to struggle with her sobriety and stability. She missed multiple drug screens and continued to refuse any treatment offered through DCS. Her drug screens indicated that she continued to use methamphetamines. In January, Police arrested Mother at her residence, along with multiple individuals at the home, after they discovered illegal substances and an unresponsive female in the home. The woman passed away from a drug overdose. Prior to her incarceration, Mother missed the majority of her visits due to her ongoing instability and drug abuse.

27. During the same timeframe, Father was released from incarceration and into another in-patient rehabilitation program. He completed the program, but he declined to participate in a sober living program recommended to him following treatment. Instead, he moved back into the same home where Mother was just arrested. Promptly after his release from treatment, Father began missing drug screens. Father participated in one visit during the review period while still in the rehabilitation facility, but then he declined an in person visit with the children after his release, stating that he needed to help a cousin move instead. Shortly after the permanency review hearing in February, Father was arrested for Possession of Methamphetamines and Possession of Paraphernalia.

28. With little to no progress made towards reunification, DCS filed its Petitions seeking the involuntary termination of parental rights on April 7, 2025.

29. The Court held an initial hearing on the Petitions concurrently with a three-month review hearing on May 5, 2025. Following his most recent arrest, [Father] was released from incarceration in April and entered an in-patient rehabilitation program. He has since completed the program and re-engaged with visitation and services. [Father] was accepted into the Adult Drug Court Program on April 16, 2025. Through that program, [Father] is ordered to reside at the Work Release Facility. He estimates that, if he successfully follows the rules, he could be involved with the problem-solving court for up to eighteen (18) months.

30. [Mother] was released from incarceration in March. DCS encouraged Mother to participate in substance abuse treatment and to enter a sober shelter facility. Mother declined, and she began testing positive for methamphetamines on her drug screens again.

31. Throughout the entirety of these CHINS matters, and particularly within the past several months, the Children have struggled to process and understand the transitory and inconsistent presence of their parents in their lives. Following visitation, [P.B.] clings to his foster mother and becomes vocally distressed if she leaves the room he occupies. [R.B.], being the older of the two children, struggles even more with self-regulation following visit[s] with her parents. [R.B.] suffers nightmares, a regression in potty training, and even engages in self-harm. In one instance, [R.B.] kicked at her door until she broke off her toenails. She has banged her head against solid surfaces following visitation. And after a recent phone call with Father, she began soiling her pants rather than utilizing previously learned potty training. In both Children, these behaviors dissipate when the parents have been incarcerated or are otherwise unable to visit. The behaviors escalate as visitations resume.

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35. The Court finds that there is now a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the Children's removal and the reasons for their placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied. The parents find themselves today without having made any consistent and significant progress towards having the Children placed safely back in their care within the near future. [Mother] has never taken responsibility for the role that her own addictions and behaviors have played in the continuing removal of her Children from her care. During the entirety of these CHINS matters, as well as during her previous involvements with DCS, she has never attempted to seriously address and treat her addictions, her manipulative behaviors, or her mental health. Mother went to great lengths throughout these CHINS cases to hide her substance abuse and to produce manipulated screens so she could continue the very lifestyle that made placement of dependent children in her care untenable. Her efforts would have been better served working towards honesty, accountability, and mental wellness for her own sake as well as for the sake of her Children. Over the past ten (10) years, [Mother] has been arrested repeatedly for the same underlying causes: her chronic abuse of illegal substances. Her choices continue to lead to criminal sanctions, incarcerations, and the loss of contact and relationships with her biological children. Neither criminal sanctions nor the removal of multiple children have persuaded [Mother] to pursue consistent sobriety and stability in her life.

36. [Father] has, admirably, attempted on multiple occasions to attain sobriety through in-patient treatments. But his pursuits of drug rehabilitation follow what is now a predictable pattern. [Father] has been arrested multiple times in the life of these CHINS cases. Following his arrests, [Father] has typically sought treatment after his release from jail. Following treatment, [Father] fails to change his behaviors, patterns, and associations. The end result is that he is arrested following a relapse, and the cycle repeats itself.

37. These CHINS cases began with an assessment where Father was at a rehabilitation facility. By the time the assessments concluded with the removal of the Children, Father had been released from treatment and promptly arrested again for his substance abuse. In the brief interim between treatment and incarceration, Father returned to the same people, places, and things that encouraged him to abuse drugs in the first place. As the CHINS case progressed, Father repeated a version of this same pattern multiple times. He now wishes to have the Children wait for him to try again.

38. The Court finds by clear and convincing evidence that it is now reasonably probable that the continuation of the parent-child relationships poses a threat to the well-being, safety, physical health, and life of the Children. Neither parent has worked effectively to attain stability and independence from drugs. Their lifestyles today are as deleterious to their own health as they are to two young Children. They have not demonstrated with any consistency that they are now free of their previous cycles of criminality and substance abuse.

39. Most critically, the Children continue to suffer as their wardship drags further into its second year. The Children have demonstrated severe behaviors and regressions correlating to inconsistent exposure to their parents. In particular, [R.B.] is suffering as a result of her prolonged wardship. She has engaged in self-harm and suffers from severe nightmares when visitations resume. [Children] need to know that their family and their home is stable, safe, and permanent. The parents have failed to provide such a family or home for these Children.

40. The role of the stable and loving parent in the Children's lives has been assumed by their foster family, who have provided them with the love and care that the Children need while they continue growing and developing through their most formative years. To continue exposing the Children to the parents would be dangerous to their well-being and to the security that the foster home has offered to them. Though the parents have been able to engage in visitation and to interact with the Children sporadically throughout the CHINS cases, those interactions have come at a high cost to the Children's mental welfare and stability. The Court need not wait until a child is irreversibly harmed such that their physical, mental and social development is permanently impaired before terminating a parent-child relationship ․ [Children] should not be forced to endure any further uncertainty in their young lives.

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43. Neither [Mother] nor [Father] have demonstrated any consistency or stability for the sake of their Children. In the time since DCS became involved, neither Mother nor Father have demonstrated an ability to provide a stable, safe, clean, and nurturing home for the Children on a long-term basis that is free of both illegal substances and impaired, addicted caregivers.

Id. at 7-16. The court also concluded that termination of the parental rights was in the Children's best interests and that DCS has a satisfactory plan for the Children, that being adoption. Accordingly, the court terminated Parents’ parental rights as to the Children. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[9] Parents contend that the court clearly erred when it terminated their parental rights as to the Children. We begin our review of this issue by acknowledging that “[t]he traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.” Bailey v. Tippecanoe Cnty. Div. of Fam. & Child. (In re M.B.), 666 N.E.2d 73, 76 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), trans. denied. However, a trial court must subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the child when evaluating the circumstances surrounding a termination. Schultz v. Porter Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child. (In re K.S.), 750 N.E.2d 832, 837 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). Termination of a parent-child relationship is proper where a child's emotional and physical development is threatened. Id. Although the right to raise one's own child should not be terminated solely because there is a better home available for the child, parental rights may be terminated when a parent is unable or unwilling to meet his or her parental responsibilities. Id. at 836-37.

[10] When reviewing a termination of parental rights, we will not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. Peterson v. Marion Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child. (In re D.D.), 804 N.E.2d 258, 265 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. Instead, we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that are most favorable to the judgment. Id. Moreover, in deference to the trial court's unique position to assess the evidence, we will set aside the court's judgment terminating a parent-child relationship only if it is clearly erroneous. Judy S. v. Noble Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child. (In re L.S.), 717 N.E.2d 204, 208 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied.

[11] Before an involuntary termination of parental rights can occur in Indiana, DCS must file a petition to terminate the parent-child relationship. As the Indiana General Assembly has provided:

(c) A petition filed under subsection (a) must allege:

(1) the existence of one (1) or more of the circumstances described in subsection (d);

(2) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the child; and

(3) that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests.

(d) A petition filed under subsection (a) must allege the existence of one (1) or more of the following circumstances:

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(3) That there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(4) That there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the child.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4 (2024). If the court finds that the allegations in the petition are true, “the court shall terminate the parent-child relationship.” I.C. § 31-35-2-8(a). DCS's “burden of proof in termination of parental rights cases is one of ‘clear and convincing evidence.’ ” R.Y. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs. (In re G.Y.), 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1260-61 (Ind. 2009) (quoting I.C. § 31-37-14-2).

[12] Here, in terminating Parents’ parental rights, the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions thereon. When a trial court's judgment contains special findings and conclusions, we apply a two-tiered standard of review. Bester v. Lake Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005). First, we determine whether the evidence supports the findings and, second, we determine whether the findings support the judgment. Id. “Findings are clearly erroneous only when the record contains no facts to support them either directly or by inference.” Quillen v. Quillen, 671 N.E.2d 98, 102 (Ind. 1996). If the evidence and inferences support the trial court's decision, we must affirm. In re L.S., 717 N.E.2d at 208.

[13] Here, Parents do not challenge any of the court's findings of fact. Thus, we accept the findings as true. L.M. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs. (In re S.S.), 120 N.E.3d 605, 608 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). On appeal, Parents contend that the trial court erred when it concluded that the conditions that resulted in the Children's removal or placement outside of their care will not be remedied and that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the Children. However, because Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4(d) is written in the disjunctive, we need not address the threat argument. In addition, Mother alleges that the court erred when it concluded that the termination of her rights was in the Children's best interests. We address each argument in turn.

Remedy

[14] Parents first challenge the court's conclusion that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the Children's removal from their care or the reasons for the continued placement outside of their home will not be remedied. To make that determination, the trial court should judge Parents’ fitness to care for the Children at the time of the termination hearing, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions. See E.M. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs. (In re E.M.), 4 N.E.3d 636, 643 (Ind. 2014). However, the court must also “evaluate the parent's habitual patterns of conduct to determine the probability of future neglect or deprivation of the child[ren].” Moore v. Jasper Cnty. Dep't of Child Servs., 894 N.E.2d 218, 226 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (quotations and citations omitted). Pursuant to this rule, courts have properly considered evidence of a parent's prior criminal history, drug and alcohol abuse, history of neglect, failure to provide support, and lack of adequate housing and employment. Id. Moreover, DCS is not required to rule out all possibilities of change; rather, it need establish only that there is a reasonable probability the parent's behavior will not change. Id.

[15] On appeal, Mother argues that the court clearly erred when it determined that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions would not be remedied because she “took advantage of participating” in programs while incarcerated “to address her issues.” Mother's Br. at 17. She also contends that, by the time of the termination hearing, she “was providing clean drug screens, completing Suboxone treatment, attending NA classes, and seeking help” to address her mental health issues. Id. And Mother maintains that she “was no longer in a relationship with Father[.]” Id. at 18. Father contends that the court erred in this conclusion because he “was working through his substance abuse issues by participating in the Drug Court program” and he “had employment opportunities lined up once he was allowed to work.” Father's Br. at 11.

[16] However, as the undisputed findings demonstrate, both Parents have a history of substance abuse for which they have not successfully obtained treatment. Indeed, Mother's substance abuse issues date back to at least 2016, prior to the birth of either R.B. or P.B. At that time, DCS first became involved with Mother when her infant, M.M., was unresponsive and being treated in the hospital and her other child, A.R., was in the care of relatives because Mother was incarcerated on drug offenses. DCS again became involved with Mother in 2019 after A.R. was returned to her care and confirmed that Mother was using drugs again. As a result, A.R. and another child were removed from Mother's care, and Mother's rights as to A.R. were involuntarily terminated. Then, when P.B. was born, he experienced “extreme withdrawal symptoms,” which required hospital intervention. Five months later, Mother again used methamphetamines, and she tried to manipulate her drug screens. Indeed, Mother continued to use illegal substances throughout the underlying CHINS proceedings, did not make any meaningful progress toward sobriety, and was incarcerated several times as a result of her drug use.

[17] Similarly, Father has been in and out of jail for drug offenses during the underlying proceedings. And while he has made some efforts to attend rehabilitation programs, Father has historically relapsed after treatment and ended up back in jail. Despite ample time and opportunities to engage in services and work to remedy their substance abuse issues, Parents continue to use drugs. The unchallenged findings clearly support the court's conclusion that the conditions that resulted in the Children's removal or continued placement outside of their care will not be remedied.

Best Interests

[18] Mother also challenges the court's conclusion that termination of her parental rights is in the Children's best interests. In determining what is in a child's best interests, a court is required to look beyond the factors identified by DCS and consider the totality of the evidence. A.S. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs. (In re A.K.), 924 N.E.2d 212, 224 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). A parent's historical inability to provide “adequate housing, stability, and supervision,” in addition to the parent's current inability to do so, supports finding termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the child. Id.

[19] When making its decision, the court must subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the child. See Stewart v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs. (In re J.S.), 906 N.E.2d 226, 236 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). “The court need not wait until a child is irreversibly harmed before terminating the parent-child relationship.” Id. Moreover, this Court has previously held that recommendations of the family case manager (“FCM”) and CASA to terminate parental rights, coupled with evidence that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied, are sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child's best interests. Id.

[20] On appeal, Mother asserts that the court erred when it determined that the termination of her rights is in the Children's best interests because “she is changing things, including being in a different environment, being around different people, and being sober and clean.” Mother's Br. at 21. And she maintains that, while she “would not enter inpatient treatment,” she “began to provide more consistent drug screenings,” has “a plan to address her mental health,” and was “showing signs of sobriety[.]” Id.

[21] However, as outlined above, the court's unchallenged findings demonstrate that Mother is not capable of providing the Children with a stable home that is free from drug use. Despite the time and services that DCS has offered, Mother has not made any significant progress in addressing her drug use or mental health concerns.

[22] The Children need permanency. Both the Children's FCM and CASA testified that the termination of parental rights is in the Children's best interests. The evidence that the reasons for the Children's removal or placement outside of Mother's care are not likely to be remedied, coupled with the testimony from the FCM and CASA, supports the trial court's determination that the termination of Mother's parental rights is in the Children's best interests.

Conclusion

[23] The unchallenged findings support the trial court's conclusions that there is a reasonable probability that the reason for the Children's removal and continued placement outside of Parents’ home will not be remedied and that termination of Parents’ parental rights is in the Children's best interests. The court therefore did not clearly err when it terminated Parents’ parental rights. We affirm the trial court's order.

[24] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The court entered a separate order for each Parent; however, the orders are identical.

Bailey, Judge.

Tavitas, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.