JJ v. Terrence Fields, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] After First Wok JJ Inc. (“First Wok”) failed to timely respond to a lawsuit filed against it by Terrence Fields, the trial court entered default judgment against First Wok. First Wok moved to set aside the default judgment, which motion the trial court denied. First Wok contends that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to set aside the default judgment. Because we disagree, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On September 19, 2024, Fields filed a complaint alleging that he had discovered water, sewage, and fecal matter in the basement of his Merrillville home; his basement had been damaged by these materials; the damage had been caused by a clogged sewer line, which had caused the backup into Field's basement; he had sustained damages in the amount of $48,129.83; and the clog had been caused by First Wok, a known grease producer. Fields claimed that First Wok was a nuisance to neighboring properties, had been negligent in its grease discharge, and had trespassed upon Fields's property by causing the sewage blockage. Also on September 19, 2024, Fields served First Wok with the summons and complaint via both certified and regular mail. The summons and complaint were sent to Wei Jiang, the registered agent of First Wok, at the restaurant's business location. The certified-mail card was signed and returned to Fields's counsel, indicating receipt of the summons and complaint.

[3] On October 21, 2024, Fields moved for default judgment, claiming that First Wok had “failed to appear and respond to [Fields's] complaint within twenty-three (23) days from September 19, 2024, the date [Fields] served [his] complaint on” First Wok. Appellee's App. Vol. II p. 2. On October 22, 2024, the trial court entered default judgment against First Wok in the amount of $48,129.83.

[4] On January 21, 2025, First Wok moved to set aside the default judgment, claiming that it had not received the summons and complaint. First Wok also claimed that the signature on the card indicating acceptance of the certified mail did not clearly match the signature of Jiang and that it had a meritorious defense. On May 14, 2025, the trial court denied First Wok's request to set aside the default judgment.

Discussion and Decision

[5] We give substantial deference to a trial court's denial of a motion to set aside a default judgment and reverse only for abuse of discretion. Swiggett Lumber Const. Co. v. Quandt, 806 N.E.2d 334, 336 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). An abuse of discretion “occurs when the trial court's judgment is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and inferences supporting the judgment for relief.” Id. (internal quotation omitted). “We may not reweigh the evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the trial court.” Id. (internal quotation omitted). The movant bears the burden to prove sufficient grounds for relief under Indiana Trial Rule 60(B). Id. In relevant part, Indiana Trial Rule 60(B) provides that a trial court may relieve a party from a judgment for (1) mistake, surprise or excusable neglect; (2) when a party was served only by publication and was without actual knowledge of the action and judgment, order, or proceedings; or (3) any other reason justifying relief from the judgment.

[6] With regard to service, Trial Rule 4.6(A) provides, in relevant part, that service should be made on an organization's registered agent. Jiang was the registered agent for First Wok, and it is undisputed that the summons and complaint were sent to her attention at First Wok. In denying First Wok's request to set aside the default judgment, the trial court found that

First Wok argues that it never received the Summons and Complaint and that, whomever signed the green card, was not authorized to do so.․

The Summons was directed to ․ Jiang, at First Wok's business address. Although First Wok questions whether or not the signature on the green card was actually that of [Jiang], someone signed the green card at First Wok's place of business acknowledging service of process. This establishes jurisdiction over First Wok pursuant to Trial Rule 4.6. The Summons and method of service was reasonably calculated to inform First Wok that an action was instituted against it pursuant to Trial Rule 4.15(F).

Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 7. Based on the record before us, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in determining that First Wok was appropriately served with notice of the complaint and summons.

[7] In addition, as it relates to Trial Rule 60(B)(8), we have previously stated the following:

The trial court's residual powers under subsection (8) may only be invoked upon a showing of exceptional circumstances justifying extraordinary relief. Indiana Ins. Co. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 734 N.E.2d 276 [(Ind. Ct. App. 2000)]. Among other things, exceptional circumstances do not include mistake, surprise, or excusable neglect, which are set out in T.R. 60(B)(1). In this respect, we have explained:

“T.R. 60(B)(8) is an omnibus provision which gives broad equitable power to the trial court in the exercise of its discretion and imposes a time limit based only on reasonableness. Nevertheless, under T.R. 60(B)(8), the party seeking relief from the judgment must show that its failure to act was not merely due to an omission involving the mistake, surprise or excusable neglect. Rather some extraordinary circumstances must be demonstrated affirmatively. This circumstance must be other than those circumstances enumerated in the preceding subsections of T.R. 60(B).”

Indiana Ins. Co. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 734 N.E.2d at 279–80 (quoting Blichert v. Brososky, 436 N.E.2d [1165, 1167 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982)]).

Brimhall v. Brewster, 864 N.E.2d 1148, 1153 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied.

[8] The trial court found that while First Wok had put forth what it claimed was a meritorious defense,

the fact that First Wok argued a plausible theory that the source of the sewage that fouled Fields's basement could have come from other sources (or, as First Wok argues, must have), may be evidence, perhaps even extraordinary evidence, it is certainly not evidence of extraordinary circumstances.

Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 7. We cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in making this determination.

[9] First Wok cites to Smith v. Patel, 560 N.E.2d 1260 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990), in support of its claim that the trial court abused its discretion in denying its request to set aside the default judgment. The issue presented in that case, however, is distinguishable from the instant matter in that it interprets the small-claims court rules as they relate to a default judgment, and does not interpret the Indiana Trial Rules, which apply here.

[10] Furthermore, to the extent that First Wok argues that Fields failed to prove his case, we remind First Wok that default judgment was entered at the pleading stage in the litigation after First Wok failed to timely appear, not following a trial on the merits. The adoption of Indiana Trial Rule 8 “changed the traditional pleading practice in Indiana from ‘theory pleading’ to ‘notice pleading.’ ” Palacios v. Kline, 566 N.E.2d 573, 576 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991). “[N]otice pleading merely requires pleading the operative facts so as to place the defendant on notice as to the evidence to be presented at trial.” Id. Pursuant to Trial Rule 8,

A party commencing a civil action is required to include in his complaint only a short and plain statement of his claim and demand for relief. The complaint need not disclose the general theory upon which plaintiff will proceed, but rather only the operative facts involved in the litigation. A complaint need only state the operative facts involved in a cause of action and does not need to state all the elements of a cause of action.

Id. (internal citations and quotation omitted). Fields's complaint satisfied the requirements of Trial Rule 8 in that it contained a plain statement of Fields's claim and demand for relief. First Wok has failed to meet its burden of proving that the trial court abused its discretion in denying its motion to set aside the default judgment.¹

[11] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   To the extent that First Wok argues that it could not be sued because it had been administratively dissolved, we note that Indiana Code section 23-1-45-5(b)(5) explicitly states that “[d]issolution of a corporation does not ․ prevent commencement of a proceeding by or against the corporation in its corporate name[.]”

Bradford, Judge.

Weissmann, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.