William Langford, Jr., Appellant-Respondent, v. Diethric Langford, Appellee-Petitioner. (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case 1

[1] After the trial court entered its order dissolving the marriage of William Langford and Diethric Langford and dividing the marital estate, William and Diethric ² each filed a motion to correct error. William appeals from the dissolution order and the court's order granting in part his motion to correct error as to the valuation of marital assets. Concluding that the trial court did not err in its valuation and division of the marital estate, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] William and Diethric were married on October 27, 1990. They were separated when Diethric filed her petition for dissolution of marriage on November 15, 2021. In her petition, Diethric also sought “an equitable division of property owned by the parties ․” Appellant's App. Vol. II, p. 20.

[3] There were many delays, for the most part attributable to William's requests for continuances, before the court held its final hearing on May 3, 2024. At that time, the parties presented their proposed division of the marital assets.

[4] Diethric and William testified about the division of financial responsibilities during the marriage. Diethric paid for food, her car payment and insurance, repairs and gas for her car, her cell phone, her credit card balances, and other out-of-pocket expenses. She also paid for clothing, musical instruments, and sports equipment for their son while he lived at home. William paid the mortgage and utilities related to the marital home, his vehicle maintenance, and his vehicle insurance among other things. Diethric collected the documentation for the preparation of taxes, but William was responsible for submitting the documents. William made many payments online and kept and maintained financial information as to the online accounts. Diethric did not have access to passwords or other information for those accounts. And she was unaware of investments he made during the marriage.

[5] The Langfords owned three properties: (1) the marital residence; (2) property in Tennessee; and (3) a timeshare. The parties stipulated to the admission of a certified appraisal for the marital residence, which reflected a value of $350,000.00 as of September 14, 2022. Ex. Vol. I, pp. 5-34 (Exhibit 1, Appraisal). However, Diethric also presented her marital estate summary, Exhibit 13, which was admitted by stipulation. Tr. Vol. II, p. 25; Ex. Vol. II, pp. 57-60; see also Ex. Vol. III, p. 147 (Pet. Ex. 100, Revised Marital Estate Summary). In that exhibit, Diethric adopted a Zillow estimate of $398,000.00 for the marital residence. The Tennessee property's appraised value was $56,000.00. And the timeshare was a $13,000.00 liability.

[6] Prior to and during the marriage, William worked for General Motors, retiring in June of 2021. Through his employment there, William made contributions to a GM Pension Plan. He chose to cash out his GM pension and roll it over into his GM Retirement Savings Plan (GM RSP) in 2021, at a loss. William submitted evidence of the value of the pension portion of his GM RSP. He urged the trial court to apply the coverture fraction formula to this asset. Evidence was presented that he withdrew $80,000.00 from his GM RSP two days after Diethric filed her petition and that at some point he had purchased a truck. However, other evidence established the valuation of William's GM RSP as of November 15, 2021, the date of filing. He also asked that the social security benefit portion of his pension plan be excluded as a marital asset from the pension valuation. In addition, William invested in a TD Ameritrade account. And he had a universal life insurance policy, referred to as the Group Variable Universal Life Insurance (GVUL) investment account.

[7] Diethric worked for Indianapolis Public Schools (IPS) and continues to do so. She delayed her retirement due to the length of the dissolution proceedings and her lack of access to marital funds. Diethric submitted paystubs as evidence of her earnings and the amounts deducted for her retirement account through INPRS, Indiana Public Retirement System. Diethric lives in a rental home and testified that the rent had recently increased to $1,350.00 per month during the pendency of the proceedings. She was placed on short term disability in 2023 for a right knee replacement, which kept her off work for around four months. Since the date of filing, she received one $10,000.00 distribution payment and one payment to reimburse her for medical expenses from marital estate funds.

[8] When their son was preparing for college, William and Diethric discussed their financial resources to help pay for their son's tuition. William informed Diethric that he did not have any funds to contribute and suggested that they take out Parent Plus Loans. They each took out a Parent Plus Loan for their son's tuition based on William's representations and Dietrich's lack of access to marital financial information. Diethric testified that, in her opinion, based on financial disclosures received during the dissolution proceedings, those loans were unnecessary.

[9] The court issued its order dissolving the marriage and dividing the marital assets. William and Diethric each filed a motion to correct error. William appeals from the court's order granting his motion to correct error in part.

Discussion and Decision

[10] William appeals the trial court's division of marital property. We apply a strict standard of review to a court's division of property upon dissolution. Smith v. Smith, 854 N.E.2d 1, 5 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). “The division of marital assets is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court.” Id. “The party challenging the trial court's property division bears the burden of proof.” Id. That party must overcome a strong presumption that the dissolution court correctly followed the law and made all the proper considerations when dividing the property. Id. at 5-6. Thus, we will reverse a trial court's property distribution only if there is no rational basis for the award. Id. at 6.

[11] It is well settled that in a dissolution action, all marital property goes into the marital pot for division, whether it was owned by either spouse before the marriage, acquired by either spouse after the marriage and before final separation of the parties, or acquired by their joint efforts. Beard v. Beard, 758 N.E.2d 1019, 1025 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied.; Ind. Code § 31-15-7-4(a) (1997). For purposes of dissolution, property means “all the assets of either party or both parties[.]” Ind. Code § 31-9-2-98 (b) (1997) (emphasis added). “The requirement that all marital assets be placed in the marital pot is meant to insure that the trial court first determines that value before endeavoring to divide property.” Montgomery v. Faust, 910 N.E.2d 234, 238 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). “Indiana's ‘one pot’ theory prohibits the exclusion of any asset in which a party has a vested interest from the scope of the trial court's power to divide and award.” Wanner v. Hutchcroft, 888 N.E.2d 260, 263 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). While the trial court may decide to award a particular asset solely to one spouse as part of its just and reasonable property division, it must first include the asset in its consideration of the marital estate to be divided. Hill v. Hill, 863 N.E.2d 456, 460 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). The systematic exclusion of any marital asset from the marital pot is erroneous. Wilson v. Wilson, 409 N.E.2d 1169, 1173 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980).

[12] William specifically asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in dividing the marital estate equally and in concluding that he failed to rebut the presumption of an equal division of the marital property. The division of marital property is a two-step process in Indiana. Estudillo v. Estudillo, 956 N.E.2d 1084, 1090 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). First, the trial court determines what property must be included in the marital estate. Id. After deciding what constitutes marital property, the trial court must then divide the marital property under the presumption that an equal split is just and reasonable. Ind. Code § 31-15-7-5 (1997). This presumption may be rebutted by a party who presents relevant evidence, including evidence of the following factors, that an equal division would not be just and reasonable:

(1) The contribution of each spouse to the acquisition of the property, regardless of whether the contribution was income producing.

(2) The extent to which the property was acquired by each spouse:

(A) before the marriage; or

(B) through inheritance or gift.

(3) The economic circumstances of each spouse at the time the disposition of the property is to become effective, including the desirability of awarding the family residence or the right to dwell in the family residence for such periods as the court considers just to the spouse having custody of any children.

(4) The conduct of the parties during the marriage as related to the disposition or dissipation of their property.

(5) The earnings or earning ability of the parties as related to:

(A) a final division of property; and

(B) a final determination of the property rights of the parties.

Estudillo, 956 N.E.2d at 1090 (quoting I.C. § 31-15-7-5). In dividing marital property, the trial court must consider all these factors, but it is not required to explicitly address all the factors in every case. Eye v. Eye, 849 N.E.2d 698, 701-02 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). To the contrary, we presume that the trial court considered these factors. Hatten v. Hatten, 825 N.E.2d 791, 794 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied. This is one of the strongest presumptions applicable to our consideration on appeal. Id.

[13] We further emphasize our longstanding rule that the trial court's disposition of marital assets is to be considered as a whole, not item by item. Simpson v. Simpson, 650 N.E.2d 333, 335 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995). In crafting a just and reasonable property distribution, a trial court is required to balance several different considerations in arriving at an ultimate disposition. Fobar v. Vonderahe, 771 N.E.2d 57, 60 (Ind. 2002). “The court may allocate some items of property or debt to one spouse because of its disposition of other items.” Id. “Similarly, the factors identified by the statute as permitting an unequal division in favor of one party or the other may cut in different directions.” Id. “As a result, if the appellate court views any one of these in isolation and apart from the total mix, it may upset the balance ultimately struck by the trial court.” Id.

[14] With these concepts in mind, we turn to the issues in this case; namely, the court's determination of what to include in the marital estate, the valuation of the marital estate, and whether William rebutted the presumption of an equal division. More specifically, William challenges the court's valuation of the TD Ameritrade, GVUL Insurance, and GM RSP accounts. And he contends that the court abused its discretion and misapplied the law by refusing to apply the coverture fraction formula to the pension portion of his GM RSP. He further claims that the court misapplied the law by excluding Diethric's defined contribution portion of her retirement account. Additionally, he contends the court erred by using a Zillow estimate to value the marital residence.

A. Valuation of the TD Ameritrade, GVUL Insurance, and GM RSP

[15] William challenges the trial court's valuation of the TD Ameritrade account, the GM RSP, and GVUL accounts, claiming the trial court's conclusions are unsupported by the evidence. In particular, he says that the court's $60,000.00 valuation of the TD Ameritrade account was erroneous because he offered a value of $26,955.15 as of November 30, 2021, and no other evidence was provided. Appellant's Br. p. 22. He further speculates that the court improperly used the account's value as of a date predating the parties’ legal separation. Id. However, Diethric's marital estate summary, which was admitted in evidence by stipulation, reflected a value of $60,000.00 for that account. Ex. Vol. II, p. 57 (Exhibit 13, Marital Estate Summary). And William's responses to interrogatories filed March 30, 2022, reflected that the account was open and that the highest balance in the last twenty-four months was $53,000.00. Id. at 10, 12. The parties did not offer a balance as of the date of separation.

[16] “We review a trial court's decision in ascertaining the value of property in a dissolution action for an abuse of discretion.” Balicki v. Balicki, 837 N.E.2d 532, 536 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied. Generally, there is no abuse of discretion if a trial court's chosen valuation is within the range of values supported by the evidence. Id. “ ‘A valuation submitted by one of the parties is competent evidence of the value of property in a dissolution action and may alone support the trial court's determination in that regard.’ ” Alexander v. Alexander, 927 N.E.2d 926, 935 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (quoting Houchens v. Boschert, 758 N.E.2d 585, 590 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied), trans. denied. In reviewing a trial court's valuation of property in a dissolution, we will neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses. Bass v. Bass, 779 N.E.2d 582, 590 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied.

[17] We conclude that the trial court's valuation of the TD Ameritrade account was within the range of the evidence presented to the trial court. Therefore, we find no abuse of discretion.

[18] Similarly, William challenges the trial court's $25,155.53 valuation of his GVUL insurance account. He contends that the cash surrender value of the GVUL is $533.33 due to a loan against the asset for $24,222.52. He argues that the only value provided during the pendency of the action was the $533.33 cash surrender value and claims this amount is uncontroverted. Again, Diethric's marital estate summary reflected a $25,155.53 valuation. To the extent William argued that there was a loan taken against that account, Diethric testified that she was unaware of the loan and, thus, had not consented to it. The trial court's valuation of this account is within the range of evidence presented. Therefore, we find no abuse of discretion.

[19] As for the GM RSP portion, William attacks it saying that it is a liability, not an asset, and that the court erred by finding a $24,220.15 valuation of the account. Appellant's Br. p. 21. We first note that William's marital estate summary does not show the GM RSP in the liability column, when it clearly shows the timeshare, home foundation repair, and their son's vehicle as liabilities of the marital estate. Exhibit Vol. III, pp. 122-124 (Respondent's Exhibit Y, Marital Estate Summary). Diethric's marital estate summary reflects a $24,220.15 valuation of the GM RSP account. We conclude that the trial court's valuation is within the range of evidence presented at trial. Therefore, we find no abuse of discretion.

B. Coverture Fraction Formula

[20] William's next attack on the court's order involves the court's decision not to apply the coverture fraction formula to the pension plan portion of the GM RSP. He argues that the trial court's order on his motion to correct error demonstrates an abuse of discretion. In declining to apply the coverture fraction formula, the court noted “the length of pendency of the dissolution” and cited Diethric's evidence supporting the “conclusion that the RSP should not be limited to a 75% percentage for sake of calculation[.]” Appellant's App. Vol. II, p. 73.

[21] This Court has explained,

The “coverture fraction” formula is one method a trial court may use to distribute pension or retirement plan benefits to the earning and non-earning spouses. Under this methodology, the value of the retirement plan is multiplied by a fraction, the numerator of which is the period of time during which the marriage existed (while pension rights were accruing) and the denominator is the total period of time during which pension rights accrued.

In re Marriage of Fisher, 24 N.E.3d 429, 433 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (quoting Hardin v. Hardin, 964 N.E.2d 247, 250 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (citation omitted) (emphasis omitted)). In other words, the coverture fraction formula is a discretionary mechanism that the trial court may use for allocating benefits to the parties.

[22] “Section 31-15-7-4 says in no uncertain terms that ‘the court shall divide the property of the parties, whether ․ owned by either spouse before the marriage [or] acquired by either spouse in his or her own right’ after the marriage and before final separation.” Gatton v. Gatton, 249 N.E.3d 626, 636-37 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024). “As mandated by statute, all assets must be included in the marital pot.” Id. at 637. “If one of the assets is a retirement asset, then the coverture fraction formula is a useful means of determining which portion of the asset accrued prior to the marriage and which portion accrued after the marriage.” Id. (footnote omitted). “But it is unhelpful to view the premarital portion of the asset as not being subject to division.” Id. “It is instead more helpful to view the entire retirement asset as being subject to division and the coverture fraction as a tool in helping a trial court determine how to distribute the assets.” Id. “If the trial court uses the coverture fraction formula to award a greater share of the estate to a party, it should find the presumption of an equal distribution rebutted.” Id.

[23] William suggested to the trial court that “only the marital portion of his RSP be included.” Appellant's App. Vol. II, p. 42. Specifically, he argued that only 77.5 percent of that account was marital property. However, the trial court correctly included the entire retirement asset in the marital pot to determine how it should be distributed. Here, William argued against an equal division, citing his employment by GM prior to the marriage. But Diethric argued that she had no knowledge of the investments and had no access to information about the accounts during the marriage. And William had exclusive control of the bulk of the marital assets over the course of the thirty-year marriage plus the three years in which the dissolution proceeding pended. The court's decision not to apply the coverture fraction formula to that asset was not a punishment to William for causing delays in the proceedings inasmuch as it implicitly concluded he had not rebutted the presumption of an equal distribution. And rebutting the presumption of an equal distribution was necessary before the court could determine in its discretion whether to apply the coverture fraction formula. We find no error here.

C. Valuation of Diethric's INPRS Account

[24] Diethric's INPRS account consisted of two parts: (1) the defined contribution account; and (2) the High-Five Defined Benefit Pension Benefit. William claims the trial court erred by excluding the defined contribution portion of Diethric's INPRS account from the marital pot. Appellant's Br. p. 18. The court used the $230,000.00 value from Diethric's marital estate summary when dividing the assets and awarded Diethric's INPRS account to her. Appellant's App. Vol. II, pp. 25 (decree); 27 (marital estate summary).

[25] Diethric introduced Exhibit 4, which reflected that her defined contribution account had a value of $31,244.31 as of April 30, 2022. Ex. Vol. I, p. 138 (Exhibit 4). Diethric's High-Five Defined Benefit Pension Benefit was valued at $78,948.44 as of the same date. Id. And neither party had a formal valuation conducted for the INPRS account. However, Exhibit P, a 2021 Teacher's Retirement Fund Annual Member Statement, reflected that Diethric's fully vested INPRS account is worth approximately the same as a $230,000.00 annuity. Ex. Vol. II, p. 203. Diethric used the higher number, $230,000.00, which combined both components as represented by an annuity, as opposed to $110,194.75, the valuation of the sum of the two separate components as of April 30, 2022. We conclude that the trial court's valuation did not constitute an abuse of discretion as it was supported by ample evidence.

D. Zillow Estimate

[26] William further challenges the court's use of the Zillow estimate to support its valuation of the marital residence. He claims that the Zillow estimate “is not probative evidence of a more accurate assessed value for real property.” Appellant's Br. p. 19. He contends that the $350,000.00 appraisal dated September 14, 2022, is more appropriate.

[27] However, at the hearing, William stipulated to the admission of Diethric's marital estate summary which included the Zillow estimate of $398,000.00 as the valuation of the marital residence. And Diethric stipulated to the admission of William's marital estate summary, Exhibit Y, which included the September 14, 2022 appraised value of $350,000.00. A party may express their opinion as to the valuation of a marital asset and may adopt and present that valuation to the trial court for consideration. Here, the trial court used Diethric's valuation of the marital residence when dividing the marital assets. That value is within the range of the evidence presented. We find no abuse of discretion here.

Conclusion

[28] In light of the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion or otherwise err when assigning values to and dividing William and Diethric's marital assets. Therefore, we affirm.

[29] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

2.   Diethric's motion addressed the trial court's scrivener's error, citing October 27, 2024, an incorrect date for the parties’ marriage, when they were married on October 27, 1990. And the motion draws the trial court's attention to its award of her reasonable attorney fees and conflicting notations about the same in its dissolution decree. The trial court granted Diethric's motion in full and directed William to submit the cash equalization payment and payment for Diethric's attorney fees to the office of her attorney in the amount of $120,743.79 within thirty days of the order. Appellant's App. Vol. II, p. 101. Diethric does not appeal from this order.

Crone, Senior Judge.

Tavitas, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.