Jennifer Bikneris, Appellant-Petitioner, v. David Bikneris, Appellee-Respondent. (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Jennifer Bikneris petitioned to dissolve her marriage to David Bikneris. The parties’ dispute focused on marital assets. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court issued an order dividing their property. Jennifer appeals, claiming the trial court erred in applying the coverture fraction formula to David's retirement assets. She also claims the trial court's findings justifying an unequal split of the estate lack evidentiary support. Concluding that the trial court did not commit reversible error, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] The parties married in 2008 and had one child. Jennifer did not work outside the home during the marriage. David worked as a mechanic. He has a vested pension, along with two retirement accounts. His interest in his pension vested before the marriage. In addition, David had several investment accounts before the marriage. Those accounts were funded with money that David received as part of a wrongful death settlement after his mother died in a car accident.

[3] Before the marriage, David's father told David that he was giving him David's childhood home. David's father did not execute a deed until after the marriage, and he named Jennifer and David on the deed. Jennifer and David remodeled the house over the course of the marriage, with David paying “most” of the costs, “a lot more than what [Jennifer] gave.” Tr. Vol. 2, p. 166. In addition, David purchased a storage facility before the marriage.

[4] In 2022, Jennifer petitioned to dissolve the parties’ marriage. She moved in with her parents, and David continued to live in the marital home with the parties’ child, who was still a minor. They negotiated a partial settlement agreement addressing all child-related issues. The trial court accepted the agreement and issued a decree of dissolution, leaving the division of marital assets and liabilities to be addressed later.

[5] The trial court held an evidentiary hearing and issued an order dividing the marital estate. The court concluded that the estate should be divided sixty-five percent to thirty-five percent, with David receiving the larger share. Regarding David's pension and retirement accounts, the court calculated the values of those assets using the date of the evidentiary hearing (for the pension) or the date that the parties separated (for the two accounts) and then identified the value of each asset that accrued during the marriage. The court included only the accrued values in the marital estate and assigned them to David. Among other assets, the court awarded the marital home, the storage facility, and several investment accounts to David. But the court ordered David to pay Jennifer $229,788.99 as an equalization payment. This appeal followed.

Issues

[6] Jennifer raises two issues, which we restate as:

I. Whether the trial court committed reversible error in excluding part of David's retirement assets from the marital estate.

II. Whether the evidence supports the trial court's findings of fact.

Discussion and Decision

[7] The trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions sua sponte. We review the findings and conclusions to determine whether the evidence supports the findings, and whether the findings support the judgment. Helm v. Helm, 873 N.E.2d 83, 87 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). “We will set aside the trial court's findings and conclusions only if they are clearly erroneous.” Id. “A judgment is clearly erroneous when a review of the record leaves us with a firm conviction that a mistake was made.” Id. We neither reweigh the evidence nor assess the witnesses’ credibility, and we consider only the evidence most favorable to the judgment. Id.

[8] Jennifer challenges the trial court's findings supporting an unequal division of the marital estate. The trial court has broad discretion in dividing the marital estate, and we will reverse only for an abuse of discretion. Goodman v. Goodman, 94 N.E.3d 733, 742 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied. “An abuse of discretion occurs if the court's decision is against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court or if the court has misinterpreted the law.” Herber v. Bunting, 194 N.E.3d 1142, 1145 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022). A party challenging the trial court's division of marital property must overcome a strong presumption that the court considered and complied with the applicable statute, and that presumption is one of the strongest presumptions applicable to our consideration on appeal. DeSalle v. Gentry, 818 N.E.2d 40, 44 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004).

I. Retirement Accounts, the Coverture Fraction Formula, and the Marital Pot

[9] Jennifer argues that the trial court erroneously excluded part of the value of David's pension and retirement accounts from the marital estate. The General Assembly has stated how a trial court should identify marital property:

(a) In an action for dissolution of marriage under IC 31-15-2-2, the court shall divide the property of the parties, whether:

(1) owned by either spouse before the marriage;

(2) acquired by either spouse in his or her own right:

(A) after the marriage; and

(B) before final separation of the parties; or

(3) acquired by their joint efforts.

Ind. Code Ann. § 31-15-7-4(a) (1997).

[10] In Indiana, courts follow the “ ‘one pot’ theory[ ]” when identifying marital property under the statute. Ahls v. Ahls, 52 N.E.3d 797, 801 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). That is, “all marital property is included in the marital pot for division[.]” Id. “Including all marital assets in the marital pot ensures that the trial court will first determine the value of each asset before endeavoring to divide the property.” Id.

[11] Once the marital assets and liabilities are identified, the trial court divides them as follows:

The court shall presume that an equal division of the marital property between the parties is just and reasonable. However, this presumption may be rebutted by a party who presents relevant evidence, including evidence concerning the following factors, that an equal division would not be just and reasonable:

(1) The contribution of each spouse to the acquisition of the property, regardless of whether the contribution was income producing.

(2) The extent to which the property was acquired by each spouse:

(A) before the marriage; or

(B) through inheritance or gift.

(3) The economic circumstances of each spouse at the time the disposition of the property is to become effective, including the desirability of awarding the family residence or the right to dwell in the family residence for such periods as the court considers just to the spouse having custody of any children.

(4) The conduct of the parties during the marriage as related to the disposition or dissipation of their property.

(5) The earnings or earning ability of the parties as related to:

(A) a final division of property; and

(B) a final determination of the property rights of the parties.

Ind. Code Ann. § 31-15-7-5 (1997).

[12] “A coverture fraction is a mathematical formula that can be used to help trial courts determine how to divide an asset during divorce proceedings based on the portion of the asset that accrued during the marriage.” Kinder v. Kinder, 265 N.E.3d 550, 557 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025). “We apply the coverture fraction formula to determine what portion of a retirement asset is subject to division.” Ahls, 52 N.E.3d at 801.

[13] Here, the trial court included in the marital estate the value of David's pension and retirement accounts that accrued during the marriage and then assigned those amounts to David. Jennifer argues that the trial court erroneously excluded the full value of David's retirement assets from the marital estate. We agree that the correct practice is to include the full values of those assets in the marital estate and then divide them. See Gatton v. Gatton, 249 N.E.3d 626, 636 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (trial court erred by including only coverture fraction of retirement assets in pot; should have included full value), on reh'g, 251 N.E.3d 1104 (2025).

[14] Even so, the error does not require reversal. The trial court identified the full value of the pension and the two retirement accounts in its decision and considered that value in dividing the estate. The court also noted that David's pension had vested before the parties had married, and he brought the pension and both retirement accounts to the marriage. Further, David continued to work and contribute to the retirement accounts throughout the marriage, while Jennifer remained “voluntarily unemployed[.]” Appellant's App. Vol. II, p. 27. As a result, the court granted the coverture value of the pension and retirement accounts to David after considering the full value of his retirement assets. See Gatton, 249 N.E.3d at 637 (trial court's failure to include full value of retirement accounts in marital estate was not reversible error; court considered full value while identifying marital assets). We cannot conclude the trial court committed reversible error in assigning those assets to David. See Roetter v. Roetter, 182 N.E.3d 221, 229 (Ind. 2022) (trial court's failure to include all assets in marital estate before division was not grounds for reversal; court considered all assets and liabilities, and failure to follow “rigid, technical formula” did not require correction).

II. Division of Marital Assets and Findings of Fact

[15] Jennifer challenges several of the trial court's findings that support the decision to divide the marital estate unequally. First, she challenges the trial court's finding ten: “Testimony revealed that Respondent's father gave the marital residence to Respondent approximately two years before the parties’ date of marriage. However, the marital residence was conveyed after the parties’ marriage and subsequently deeded into both parties’ names.” Appellant's App. Vol II, p. 22 (emphasis in original). There is sufficient evidentiary support for this finding: David testified that his father gave the house to him two years before the marriage but did not execute a formal deed until after the marriage. And the deed named both parties as the recipients.

[16] Jennifer argues that David's father's verbal gift of the house was irrelevant as a matter of law because gift transfers of land must be made by written deed. But David was testifying informally, and the trial court's finding is supported by his testimony. To the extent that Jennifer is in substance arguing that she is entitled to a larger share of the house because the transfer occurred as a matter of law after the marriage, the evidence and the finding support the trial court's split as to that marital asset. David lived in the house from childhood, and as discussed below, he contributed more funds to the house's renovation. Further, he continued to live in the house with the parties’ child after Jennifer and David separated.

[17] Jennifer also challenges finding twelve: “The marital residence was renovated through the parties’ joint efforts during the course of the marriage and Petitioner contributed funds toward the renovation. The amount of funds Petitioner contributed was in dispute but both parties testified it was under $50,000.” Id. Jennifer testified that she paid over $50,000, so this finding is incorrect. But when the court split the value of the house as a marital asset, the court was not obligated to believe her testimony about her contributions to the renovations. David testified that he contributed far more money than Jennifer. The trial court's error does not compel reversal.

[18] She also claims findings thirteen and fourteen are deficient:

13. Evidence at the hearing revealed that Petitioner is a well educated and skilled person in the dental field.

14. Petitioner and Respondent testified, however, that Petitioner voluntarily left her employment within months of the parties’ marriage in 2008 and never attained full time employment throughout the duration of the marriage.

Id.

[19] Jennifer argues that the evidence shows that she did not leave her employment voluntarily. David testified that she “lost” her job within the first week of the marriage. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 139. As a result, we conclude that a portion of finding fourteen is incorrect, but Jennifer does not dispute the key portion of the finding, that she did not obtain full-time employment outside the home at any point during the marriage.

[20] Next, Jennifer claims that the trial court erred in finding fifteen: “Petitioner testified that Respondent asked Petitioner many times to obtain outside-of-the-home employment during the marriage and no evidence was submitted that Petitioner was prevented from working outside the home once the parties’ child entered full time schooling.” Appellant's App. Vol. II, p. 22. Jennifer testified that David asked her to seek employment outside the home “twice.” Tr. Vol. 2, p. 195. While “twice” may not be the same as “many,” the main portion of the finding—that Jennifer chose not to work outside the home even after their child entered school—has ample evidentiary support.

[21] Jennifer also challenges finding sixteen: “Petitioner, at the hearing, testified that she has remained unemployed and has no disability that would prevent her from obtaining employment. Petitioner lives with her parents now and has done so since separation from Respondent.” Appellant's App. Vol. II, p. 23. Jennifer testified that she spends much of her time caring for her elderly, infirm parents. But that testimony does not undermine the correctness of the trial court's finding, based on the evidence presented during the hearing.

[22] Jennifer challenges finding of fact twenty-four: “Petitioner testified to doing very little, if anything at all, as to the maintenance, management or care of the storage facility during the marriage. Nonetheless, it is included in the marital pot.” Id. The evidence presented at trial supports this finding. Jennifer testified that she helped David sort through belongings that renters left behind. She also testified that she had performed a variety of other tasks at the facility, but only before the birth of the parties’ child, which occurred early in the marriage. The trial court could reasonably conclude that David was responsible for a majority of the upkeep and management of the storage facility.

[23] Jennifer also claims the trial court wrongly introduced fault into the proceedings and improperly justified an unequal division of the estate by blaming her for failing to work outside the home. “Fault may not be used as a basis to support an unequal division of the marital estate.” Thompson v. Thompson, 811 N.E.2d 888, 921 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. We disagree with Jennifer's claim. The trial court found, with evidentiary support, that Jennifer had chosen not to work outside the home, even after David asked her to seek employment and the parties’ child began attending school. The trial court was free to decide that David's contributions to the family by working outside the home and managing the storage business, along with the fact that he brought most of the marital assets to the marriage, justified granting him a larger share of the estate. And the trial court ordered David to pay Jennifer an equalization payment of $229,788.59. The trial court did not find fault with her conduct. See id. at 911 (trial court did not reduce Husband's share of estate based on fault; court instead noted Wife had poorer economic condition and future earnings ability).

Conclusion

[24] For the reasons stated above, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

[25] Affirmed.

Crone, Senior Judge.

Brown, J., and Felix, J., concur.