Ashley Marie Peterson, Appellant-Plaintiff v. Donald Craig Peterson, Appellee-Defendant (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Nearly a decade after her guardianship ended, Ashley Peterson (Ashley) sued her former guardian—Donald Peterson (Donald), her adoptive father. Ashley alleged that he had mishandled her guardianship assets and later failed to pay three months of her rent as he allegedly promised. Following a bench trial, the trial court found Ashley did not meet her burden of proof. We affirm.

Facts

[2] In 2014, Donald was appointed guardian of Ashley, his adult daughter diagnosed with mental illness after experiencing significant childhood trauma before he adopted her. The guardianship was terminated in 2016 upon Ashley's request.

[3] Beginning five years later, Ashley filed a series of pro se motions in the closed guardianship case. Among other things, she sought an accounting of guardianship funds. Donald responded with a report detailing his and Ashley's financial history, including his expenditure of guardianship funds on Ashley's behalf. Ashley ultimately sought dismissal of her claims after informing the court that Donald had agreed to pay her rent for three months.

[4] Three years later, Ashley filed her pro se Notice of Claim and Debt in a different court than the one that presided over the guardianship case. She sought to set aside the accounting that Donald had filed. She also sought damages related to both his earlier handling of her guardianship funds and his supposed violation of their alleged agreement regarding rent. These alleged damages included Ashley's $650 rent payment from January 2025, an additional $100 per week in interest, and more than $25,000 in punitive damages.

[5] The trial court conducted a bench trial at which both parties appeared pro se. Ashley testified and presented documents and messages which she believed supported her legal claims over the disputed rent and prior guardianship. Donald denied that that he owed Ashley any money or that they specifically agreed to the rent payment. He also detailed his efforts to assist her as an adult during and after the guardianship. The trial court took judicial notice of the guardianship case, found that Ashley failed to prove her claims by a preponderance of the evidence, and entered judgment in favor of Donald. Ashley, again pro se, appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[6] We recognize that Ashley appears without counsel and that her filings reflect genuine frustration and belief in her claims. However, “[i]t is well settled that pro se litigants are held to the same legal standards as licensed attorneys.” Basic v. Amouri, 58 N.E.3d 980, 983 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). Thus, any issue not supported by cogent argument or citation to authority may be waived. See id. at 984 (ruling that where a litigant's noncompliance with our Appellate Rules is “so substantial as to impede our consideration of the issues, we may deem the alleged errors waived”).

[7] Ashley's appellant's brief, though extensive, does not present a clear or organized legal argument. Its 32 pages consist almost entirely of accusations rather than structured legal claims. For example, she writes that “the judgment was bias[ed], uneducated and erroneous in disregard to the blatant law violations as well as evidence of fact and law.” Appellant's Br. p. 6. Yet she does not identify any specific ruling that she challenges and does not cite authority to support these assertions, as required by the Indiana Rules of Appellate Procedure. See Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a) (requiring the appellant's brief to “contain the appellant's contentions [as to] why the trial court ․ committed reversible error” and that these contentions be “supported by cogent reasoning.”)

[8] Ashley also cites several irrelevant conflict-of-laws doctrines—“dépeçage,” “renvoi,” and “lex rei sitae”—without apparent understanding of the legal concepts. Appellant's Br., pp. 21, 29. Indiana has expressly declined to apply dépeçage, “the process of analyzing different issues within the same case separately under the laws of different states.” Simon v. United States, 805 N.E.2d 798, 801-02 (Ind. 2004).

[9] Moreover, this state has long rejected renvoi, which requires a court applying the law of another jurisdiction in resolving a dispute to “take into account the whole law of the other jurisdiction including not only the relevant substantive law ․ but also its rules as to conflict of laws.” Brill v. Regent Commc'ns, Inc., 12 N.E.3d 299, 308 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (quoting Maroon v. State, Dept. of Mental Health, 411 N.E.2d 404, 413 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980)). The ancient doctrine of lex rei sitae—the rule that real property is governed by the law of its situs—survives but does not advance Ashley's claim. See Mauzy v. Flint, 83 N.E. 757, 759 (1908). Her citations to these doctrines suggest a misunderstanding of these legal concepts and their relevance to this case.

[10] But we prefer to decide cases on the merits whenever possible. Basic, 58 N.E.3d at 984. We discern that Ashley's claims of judicial bias arise entirely from her disagreement with the court's credibility determinations and weighing of the evidence. Therefore, we construe her appeal as one challenging the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the judgment.

I. Standard of Review

[11] Because Donald has not filed an appellee's brief, we review this case for prima facie error—error apparent “at first sight, on first appearance, or on the face of it.” Hetty Inc. v. Weems, 237 N.E.3d 701, 704 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (quoting Jenkins v. Jenkins, 17 N.E.3d 350, 352 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014)). This less-stringent standard “does not relieve us of our obligation to correctly apply the law to the facts in the record ․ to determine whether reversal is required.” Wharton v. State, 42 N.E.3d 539, 541 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015).

[12] When reviewing a general judgment like this following a bench trial, we will not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility. GHPE Holdings, LLC v. Huxley, 69 N.E.3d 513, 521 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). “[W]e consider only the evidence most favorable to the prevailing party along with all reasonable inferences” and “affirm if there is substantial evidence or probative value supporting the judgment on any legal theory.” Id.

II. Ashley Has Not Shown Error

[13] At trial, Ashley testified that Donald orally agreed to pay three months’ rent for a Baltimore apartment she rented in late 2024 and that he failed to pay the final installment due in January 2025. She described the arrangement as a “family agreement” and presented handwritten notes and several printed text and Facebook Messenger exchanges that she believed showed Donald's promise to facilitate her move by paying the rent. Donald denied such an agreement. The trial court reviewed the documents that Ashley introduced but ultimately determined that she had failed to prove her claim by a preponderance of the evidence.

[14] Ashley also sought to revive allegations of financial improprieties from her long-closed guardianship, which she herself moved to terminate in 2016 and again voluntarily dismissed it in 2022 after reopening a second time. In response, Donald denied any wrongdoing and detailed his handling of the guardianship funds. The trial court took judicial notice of the guardianship case, which included orders relating to the current dispute. Based on the evidence before it, the court ultimately concluded that Ashley also had not met her burden of proof as to her claims of financial improprieties.

[15] The record supports that determination. The trial court was entitled to find that Ashley's evidence—consisting primarily of oral testimony, handwritten notes, and informal messages—did not establish a binding agreement or legally cognizable debt. The court also could reasonably credit Donald's testimony and the judicially noticed guardianship order over Ashley's conflicting accounts as to Donald's service as her guardian. Ashley is asking us to reweigh the evidence which we will not do. See GHPE Holdings, LLC, 69 N.E.3d at 521.

[16] Because Ashley has not met her burden to demonstrate that the trial court erred, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

Weissmann, Judge.

Bradford, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.