J.D. Spears, Appellant-Plaintiff v. Tony Codalata and Holly Codalata, Appellees-Defendants (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] J.D. Spears appeals the trial court's judgment ordering him to convey the deed to an Indianapolis home that the court found he sold to Tony and Holly Codalata (collectively, the Codalatas) under a rent-to-purchase agreement. Spears appears to contend that he only leased the property to the Codalatas. He claims that even if a rent-to-purchase agreement existed, the sale never occurred because the Codalatas defaulted. We affirm, finding Spears has waived his claims on appeal through substantial non-compliance with the Indiana Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Facts

[2] In 2014, Spears, through his agents, presented the Codalatas with a written agreement for the Codalatas to rent to purchase a home that Spears owned on Chase Street in Indianapolis. Under this agreement, the purchase price of $76,800 was to be paid by the Codalatas in installments of $800 monthly over 96 months, with $50 of each payment attributed to interest.

[3] The agreement also specified that the Codalatas would be responsible for all interior and exterior maintenance on the home. They also were obligated under the agreement to maintain insurance on the home and to pay the property taxes when due. Although the parties orally agreed to the terms of the written agreement, it was never signed by all parties.

[4] The Codalatas moved into the home, started making payments under the agreement, and made substantial improvements to the home. The couple paid the property taxes in 2014, but the tax bill in spring 2015 contained some penalties due to the lack of proper Homestead Credit documentation. That error was corrected months later. The parties agreed that Spears would pay the taxes in all following years and that the parties would “square up” on the taxes owed at the closing at the end of the agreement, when the deed would be conveyed to the Codalatas. Tr. Vol. IV, p. 35.

[5] Eight years later, after the Codalatas made the last monthly payment due under the agreement, Tony Codalata met with Spears to settle the property tax reimbursement. Spears stated that the Codalatas had defaulted under the agreement by failing to maintain home insurance before 2020 and by not paying property taxes after 2014. Spears refused to convey the deed to the property and maintained that the Codalatas were simply renting the property, although no lease had ever been agreed to or executed. By that time, the value of the property was listed as $166,000 on insurance documents.

[6] Spears thereafter presented the Codalatas with two written notices of termination of the agreement based on their alleged defaults. The Codalatas refused to vacate the home or acknowledge termination of the agreement. Spears then filed an eviction action in small claims court. The Codalatas counterclaimed for specific performance of the parties’ agreement and sought a declaratory judgment requiring Spears to convey the property to them by deed.

[7] The case was transferred to the Marion Superior Court. After a three-day bench trial, the court concluded that, “while the rent to own/purchase agreement was never executed[,] the equitable doctrine of promissory estoppel makes the oral agreement of the terms contained in the written document enforceable despite not complying with the Statute of Frauds.” App. Vol. III, p. 95. The court ordered Spears to convey the property by deed to the Codalatas. It also ordered the Codalatas to pay $7,807.16 to Spears in reimbursement for taxes paid by Spears since 2015 under their agreement. Spears appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[8] Spears contends the trial court erred in finding a valid rent-to-purchase agreement and by enforcing it without a written agreement. But his appellate filings are too deficient to allow appellate review.

[9] “It is well settled that pro se litigants are held to the same legal standards as licensed attorneys.” Basic v. Amouri, 58 N.E.3d 980, 983 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). These standards include following the Indiana Rules of Appellate Procedure and “accept[ing] the consequences of their failure to do so.” Id. at 983-84. Although we prefer to address issues on the merits, the alleged errors may be deemed waived when the appellant's noncompliance with our Appellate Rules is “so substantial as to impede our consideration of the issues.” Id. at 984.

[10] Spears's appellant's brief largely fails to comply with our Appellate Rules and appears more like an incomplete draft than a finished product. For instance, the caption on the brief refers to Spears as “J.D. Plaintiff” and to his opponents as “Tony Defendant” and “Holly Defendant.” Appellant's Br., p. 1; see generally App. R. 43(I) (specifying that “[t]he front page of the [brief] shall conform substantially to Form #App.R.43-1,” which requires the full name of the appellant and appellee, at least in non-confidential cases). The brief's table of authorities contains inaccurate page numbers for the three appellate decisions cited in the brief. See generally App. R. 46(A)(2) (“The table of authorities shall list each case, statute, rule, and other authority cited in the brief, with references to each page on which it is cited.”). And the few citations in the brief's statement of the case section are largely incomplete, appearing with a yellow highlight like this: “Appellant's App. Vol. 2, pp. __.” Appellant's Br., p. 6.

[11] The facts section of the brief begins with this disjointed sentence that refers to an appellee not involved in this case:

The primary issue before this Court is whether the Findings of Fact by the trial court is supported by the evidence and whether the findings support the judgment of the trial court, and judgment entered thereon, the Appellee Church makes reference to the record on appeal to or in support of the said findings and conclusions of law.

Id. (all errors in original). The remainder of the facts section consists solely of Spears's general reference to the trial court's findings of fact followed by his verbatim recitation of them. But Spears expressly challenges the court's findings, which are narrower than the facts that he alleges later in his argument. Thus, the statement of the facts in the brief violates Appellate Rule 46(A)(6), which requires that the section “describe the facts relevant to the issues presented for review.”

[12] The most troubling deficiency in the appellant's brief is the lack of cogent argument supported by citations to the record or authority. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a) specifies that “[t]he argument must contain the contentions of the appellant on the issues presented, supported by cogent reasoning” and “citations to the authorities, statutes, and the Appendix or parts of the Record on Appeal relied on ․” Spears does not adhere to this rule.

[13] Spears begins his argument by alleging that the evidence does not support the findings. But he never identifies which findings lack evidentiary support. Instead, he offers five pages of factual assertions, largely unsupported by citations to the record, without identifying the significance of these factual assertions. Aside from stating the standard of review, Spears cites to only one authority and waits until the end of his argument to do so:

This is not a case where The elements of this species of estoppel have been shown, namely: “(1) a promise by the promisor; (2) made with the expectation that the promisee will rely thereon; (3) which induces reasonable reliance by the promisee; (4) of a definite and substantial nature; and (5) injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise” as was the case in Gamble v. McQueary, 253 N.E.3d 477, 487 (Ind.Ct.App. 2025[)].

In this instance, the trial court basically structured a contract for the Defendants and against the plaintiff in the belief that its actions were approved by this Court.

Appellant's Br., pp. 18-19 (all errors in original).¹

[14] Spears never explains in the appellant's brief why the elements of estoppel were not established. He also does not elaborate on his claim that the trial court “structured a contract for” the Codalatas based on its view that “its actions were approved by this Court.” Id. These arguments lack cogency.

[15] “We demand cogent argument supported by adequate citation to authority because it promotes impartiality in the appellate tribunal.” Young v. Butts, 685 N.E.2d 147, 151 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997). “A court which must search the record and make up its own arguments because a party has not adequately presented them runs the risk of becoming an advocate rather than an adjudicator.” Id. We therefore do not address arguments “too poorly developed or expressed to be understood” and deem such arguments waived. Basic, 58 N.E.3d at 984; accord K.S. v. D.S., 64 N.E.3d 1209, 1212 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (quotation omitted) (“A party waives any issue for which it fails to develop a cogent argument or support with adequate citation to authority”).

[16] Although Spears's reply brief is more detailed than his appellant's brief, “[a]n argument raised for the first time in a reply brief is waived.” Kirchgessner v. Kirchgessner, 103 N.E.3d 676, 682 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (quoting U.S. Gypsum, Inc. v. Ind. Gas. Co., Inc., 735 N.E.2d 790, 797 n.5 (Ind. 2000)). After all, the appellee has no opportunity to respond to an argument first presented in a reply brief so if waiver does not apply, the appellate court hears only one side of the story.

[17] Given Spears's substantial non-compliance with our Appellate Rules, and particularly his failure to present cogent argument in the appellant's brief, we find Spears has waived his claims for appellate review. We therefore affirm the trial court's judgment.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The correct citation is Gamble v. McQueary, 255 N.E.3d 477, 487 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025).

Weissmann, Judge.

Pyle, J., and DeBoer, J., concur