A.W., Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] In these juvenile delinquency proceedings, A.W. appeals the juvenile court's modification of its dispositional decree. He contends that (1) his fundamental rights were violated by the State's supposed failure to present any evidence supporting modification and (2) the court abused its discretion when it placed him at the Indiana Department of Correction (the DOC). We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In March 2023, A.W., who was then fifteen years old, was arrested after getting into a physical fight with several other teenagers and attempting to flee the scene when officers arrived. A few days later, the State filed a delinquency petition alleging that A.W. had committed acts that, if they had been committed by an adult, would constitute resisting law enforcement, battery, and disorderly conduct. In April, A.W. admitted he had committed battery and the State dismissed the remaining allegations. The juvenile court issued a dispositional decree placing A.W. on probation for a period of six months, releasing him to his father's custody, and ordering him to participate in counseling and a day reporting program.

[3] In August, the probation department filed a motion to modify A.W.’s dispositional decree. That petition alleged that A.W. had been discharged from two different day reporting programs “for being too disruptive” and “refus[ing] to comply with services[.]” Appellant's Appendix Vol. 2 at 45. The petition further alleged that A.W. had repeatedly left home—sometimes overnight—without telling his father where he was going and had “not been attending school despite his [father's] efforts to encourage him to go.” Id.

[4] At an initial hearing on the motion to modify, A.W. agreed to be placed on in-house detention pending further hearing and submit to a psychological evaluation. In October, A.W. admitted the allegations made in the motion to modify and was again placed on probation. He was further ordered to participate in services through Circle Around Families and complete a psychiatric evaluation.

[5] In January 2024, the probation department filed a second motion to modify disposition, this time alleging that A.W. had failed to participate in court-ordered services, including submitting to drug screens, completing a psychiatric evaluation, and informing the probation department and service providers where he was living.

[6] In May, before the juvenile court ruled on the second motion to modify, A.W. was arrested after a car he was riding in was pulled over for speeding. When A.W. saw the car was being stopped by the police, he attempted to hide a loaded revolver behind a car seat occupied by a three-year-old child. When the police questioned A.W., he admitted that he was also carrying a loaded 9mm pistol. It was later determined that pistol had been reported stolen. Thereafter, the State filed a second delinquency petition alleging that A.W. had committed one count of theft of a firearm and two counts of dangerous possession of a firearm, if committed by an adult.

[7] At a combined hearing on the second motion to modify and the second delinquency petition, A.W. admitted to the allegations in the motion to modify and to dangerous possession of a firearm, and the State agreed to dismiss the theft of a firearm allegation. The juvenile court placed A.W. on probation for another term of six months, released him to the custody of a residential treatment center, and ordered him to continue participating in services.

[8] In October, A.W. became upset with the staff at the residential treatment center and, among other acts of insubordination, knocked over a bookshelf and made threatening statements to staff members. He also picked up a chair a staff member was sitting on, carried her around the facility, and refused to put her down. Police were called to the facility and detained A.W. in juvenile confinement. The State then filed a third motion for modification alleging that A.W. had been removed from the treatment facility.

[9] While in juvenile detention, A.W. completed a psychological evaluation. That evaluation noted that A.W. had been diagnosed with ADHD and a conduct disorder, meaning he had displayed “a repetitive and persistent pattern of behavior in which the basic rights of others and major ․ societal norms/rules [were] violated.” Exhibits at 24.¹ These behaviors included “intimidating and bullying others, initiating physical fights, stealing items of nontrivial value, and deceiving/manipulating others to obtain favor/avoid obligations.” Id. The evaluator further noted:

[A.W.] reported that the [prior] facility is unwilling to accept him back into their program. His probation officer has reportedly had difficulty identifying another residential facility that is willing to accept him currently. In addition to the failed residential placement, the records indicated that [A.W.] has received a myriad of services in the community prior to his placement in residential treatment ․ which have reportedly failed․ [A.W.’s] father, with whom he previously resided, became incarcerated while [he] was in residential placement. His paternal grandmother was reportedly contacted by the probation department and expressed that placement in her home is not an option[.]

Id. at 25.

[10] The probation department filed a predisposition report with the juvenile court in January 2025. The report recommended that A.W. be placed in the DOC because he

has had numerous services through [the juvenile] court, including Official Probation, Detention at [two juvenile detention centers], House Arrest, in-home wrap around services through Circle Around Families, which included individual, family and substance abuse therapy along with a mentor, tutor, and drug screener, and residential placement[.] ․ [A.W.] was in residential placement, when he was arrested and charged with Intimidation[.] ․ While detained pending court, [A.W.] has had 4 major incidents, including him punching a peer causing that peer to have seizures then proceeding to punch another peer in the back of the head 3 times.

At this point, [A.W.] does not appear to be amenable to therapeutic treatment and would best benefit from rehabilitative services that can be offered at the [DOC]. [A.W.] shows no remorse and takes no accountability for his actions.

Appellee's App. Vol. 2 at 24.

[11] The probation department supplemented its report in May 2025. That supplemental report indicated that A.W. had engaged in several more violent and combative behaviors:

[In January 2025], [A.W.] reportedly grabbed detention staff and refused to let him go. [Later that month], [A.W.] was reportedly combative with staff and had a shank, made out of a toothbrush, in his waistband. [In February], [A.W.] reportedly refused staff directives. [In March], [A.W.] reportedly attacked a peer by striking him 4 times in the back. [On another occasion], [A.W.] was refusing to follow staff directives, he became verbally aggressive and was making veiled threats towards staff․ Probation has been advised by detention staff that [A.W.] often instigates and antagonizes peers, has cursed at the Detention Therapist, and consistently displays non-compliant behaviors which are not always documented for Probation to review.

Id. at 28-29. Probation again recommended that A.W. would benefit from services available at the DOC, including a high school credit program and an “Inside-Out Dad” program that would attempt to teach A.W. “pro-fathering attitudes, knowledge, and skills” that would be beneficial since he believed he had fathered a child. Id. at 30.

[12] In May 2025, the juvenile court held a hearing on the third motion to modify. At the hearing, a probation officer gave a brief account of the circumstances surrounding A.W.’s removal from the residential facility and subsequent detention. The State then requested that the court take judicial notice of the third motion to modify and indicated that it had no further evidence to present. After taking judicial notice of the motion without objection from A.W., the court asked his counsel if she had “any evidence on behalf of [A.W.] regarding the petition for modification[.]” Transcript at 10. A.W.’s counsel indicated that she did not, and the court then granted the motion to modify and heard argument and further testimony from probation, the State, and A.W. as to the “disposition on modification.” Id. at 11. Before questioning the probation officer regarding disposition, the court noted that it had received “a pre[ ]dispositional report filed by the probation department and ․ a supplemental ․ report” and, without objection, made both documents “a part of the Record for the purposes of [ ] disposition.” Id. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court took the matter under advisement.

[13] Later that month, the juvenile court entered an order placing A.W. in the DOC. The court reasoned, in part, that A.W.

has several identified needs that require further intervention and rehabilitation, including substance abuse, educational planning, psychiatric care, therapeutic and anger management services, and parenting skills. There is little to no likelihood of [A.W.] receiving such services without being required to do so in a structured environment. With all lesser restrictive alternatives having been exhausted and no realistic alternative[ ] being identified by [A.W.], the [DOC] is the only dispositional option which is capable of providing both the environment and services ․ necessary to support [A.W.]

Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 98. A.W. now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

1. The State's Presentation of Evidence

[14] On appeal, A.W. argues that the State “presented no evidence” at the May 2025 modification hearing and thus violated his “right to have the State prove the allegations against him.” Appellant's Second Amended Brief at 12. This contention finds no support in the record.

[15] As an initial matter, A.W. concedes that he failed to raise this issue before the juvenile court and, consequently, asks us to review it for fundamental error. See M.H. v. State, No. 24A-JV-2510, at *3, 2025 WL 883960 (Ind. Ct. App. March 21, 2025) (mem.) (reviewing claim that juvenile court failed to hold evidentiary hearing for fundamental error when juvenile did not raise the issue below), trans. denied. Though an issue not raised below is generally waived for appellate review, fundamental error is an “extremely narrow” exception that permits a party to raise an issue for the first time on appeal “when the record reveals a clearly blatant violation of basic and elementary principles, where the harm or potential for harm cannot be denied, and which violation [was] so prejudicial to the rights of the [appellant] as to make a fair trial impossible.” Jewell v. State, 887 N.E.2d 939, 942 (Ind. 2008).

[16] Before a juvenile court can modify a dispositional decree, “it must hold an evidentiary hearing at which the State produces ‘some evidence of the wrongdoing on which the modification is premised.’ ” M.H. v. State, 265 N.E.3d 525, 525 (Ind. 2025) (mem.) (Rush, C.J., dissenting from the denial of transfer) (quoting In re M.T., 928 N.E.2d 266, 271 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied) (emphasis added). Modifying a dispositional decree without holding an evidentiary hearing violates a juvenile's due process rights. Id.; see also M.T., 928 N.E.2d at 269 (holding that “basic due process principles instruct[ ] us an evidentiary hearing is required”).

[17] Here, the juvenile court undeniably held an evidentiary hearing, and A.W.’s assertion that the State presented no evidence of his wrongdoing warranting modification is blatantly contradicted by the record. The transcript of the May 2025 hearing indicates that at the outset, “[t]he [p]arties and [w]itnesses [were] [s]worn[.]”² Tr. at 9. The court then asked the probation officer for “any evidence/testimony that Probation wanted to offer[,]” to which the officer replied that the probation department had filed for modification “based off of a removal request from [the residential facility.]” Id. Without objection from A.W., the court then took judicial notice of the modification petition, attached to which was an incident report from the residential facility that provided details of A.W.’s misbehavior, arrest, and removal. Moreover, the court—again without objection from A.W.—made the probation officer's predispositional report and the supplement thereto “a part of the Record[.]” Id. at 11. The report and supplement provided further details of the misconduct and acts of violence A.W. committed while in residential treatment and juvenile detention, which led the probation officer to conclude that A.W. was not “amenable to therapeutic treatment and would best benefit from rehabilitative services that can be offered at the [DOC].” Appellee's App. Vol. 2 at 24. Considering all this, A.W. is simply wrong in asserting “that no evidence was presented in this matter[.]” Appellant's 2d Amend. Br. at 13.

[18] Given that evidence was presented in support of modifying A.W.’s dispositional decree, his reliance on Chief Justice Rush's dissent from the denial of transfer in M.H. is unpersuasive. There, the juvenile court held a four-minute hearing on a motion to modify where “no evidence was presented.” M.H., 656 N.E.3d at 525 (Rush, C.J., dissenting). On appeal, the juvenile argued that the court “violated his ‘Right to Due Process’ ” by failing to hold an evidentiary hearing. M.H., No. 24A-JV-2510 at *3. In a memorandum decision, a panel of this Court disagreed, holding that his counsel had made remarks to the court constituting “an intentional act of waiver as to the issue of [the] violation of the terms of [the juvenile's] placement ․ and the necessity for modification[.]” Id. at *4. Chief Justice Rush dissented from our Supreme Court's denial of transfer, reasoning the juvenile had not waived the issue and that “committing a child to the DOC without a hearing at which the State produces evidence supporting its basis for modification not only violates basic principles of due process, but also thwarts the child's prospects of rehabilitation[.]” M.H., 265 N.E.3d at 527 (Rush, C.J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).

[19] A.W. asserts that “[t]he situation presented in [M.H.] is almost the same situation contained here.” Appellant's 2d Amend. Br. at 12. But, as noted above, the State did present testimony and other evidence that A.W. violated the terms of his placement at the residential facility and continued to commit acts of misconduct and violence while in juvenile detention. Thus, A.W. has failed to establish that any error occurred at the May 2025 evidentiary hearing, let alone fundamental error.

2. Placement at the Department of Correction

[20] A.W. next contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion by placing him at the DOC because he “ha[d] other placements with relatives that could potentially be viable.” Id. It is well-settled that “[t]he disposition of a juvenile adjudicated a delinquent is a matter committed to the juvenile court's discretion, subject to statutory considerations of the child's welfare, community safety, and the policy favoring the least harsh disposition.” A.F. v. State, 247 N.E.3d 841, 843 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (quoting Q.H. v. State, 216 N.E.3d 1197, 1200 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023)). We will reverse only if the juvenile court abused its discretion, meaning “its decision [was] clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it or the reasonable inferences that may be drawn from them.” Q.H., 216 N.E.3d at 1200. In reviewing the court's decision, “we neither reweigh evidence nor judge witness credibility.” Id. (quoting J.S. v. State, 110 N.E.3d 1173, 1175 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied).

[21] A juvenile court is statutorily required to issue a dispositional decree “[i]f consistent with the safety of the community and the best interest of the child[.]” Ind. Code § 31-37-18-6. In doing so, the court must balance several factors so that the juvenile's placement

(1) is:

(A) in the least restrictive (most family like) and most appropriate setting available; and

(B) close to the parents’ home, consistent with the best interest and special needs of the child;

(2) least interferes with family autonomy;

(3) is least disruptive of family life;

(4) imposes the least restraint on the freedom of the child and the child's parent, guardian, or custodian; and

(5) provides a reasonable opportunity for participation by the child's parent, guardian, or custodian.

Id.

[22] A.W. focuses his argument on factor 1(A), asserting “placement at the DOC was not the least restrictive placement ․ as he had several viable relatives who indicated that they would take placement of him[.]” Appellant's 2d Amend. Br. at 17. However, section 31-37-18-6(1)(A) did not require the juvenile court to impose any less restrictive disposition, but rather “the least restrictive disposition that [was] ‘consistent with the safety of the community and the best interest of the child.’ ” J.T. v. State, 111 N.E.3d 1019, 1026 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (quoting D.S. v. State, 829 N.E.2d 1081, 1085 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005)), trans. denied.

[23] The juvenile in J.T. was initially placed on home detention with electronic monitoring after he committed a series of offenses. Id. at 1020. He was later placed in a residential facility after violating several terms of his probation. Id. While in the residential facility, the juvenile had numerous behavioral issues, including incidents of violence. Id. Eventually, the juvenile court ordered him to be placed in the DOC. Id. On appeal, a panel of this Court found that the court had not abused its discretion “given the nature of [the juvenile's] acts of delinquency and the failure of less-restrictive alternatives” Id. at 1026. The panel reasoned that

over the course of approximately one-and-one-half years, [the juvenile] was found delinquent four times and was offered many more less-restrictive options than commitment to the DOC, to no avail. [He] [ ] consistently failed to take advantage of the leniency shown him, including placement on home detention, problem-solving court, and [residential treatment] and the provision of services such as counseling and therapy. Despite all of these opportunities, the record indicate[d] that [the juvenile] never went more than a few weeks without violating the conditions of these less-restrictive options.

Id. at 1027.

[24] Like in J.T., the juvenile court here did not abuse its discretion by concluding that A.W. had exhausted all alternatives less restrictive than the DOC given his continued acts of misconduct and failure to comply with the terms of numerous court-ordered placements. A.W. was initially placed on probation, released to his father's custody, and ordered to participate in counseling and other services. Less than four months later, he had already been discharged from two day reporting programs for non-compliance and was refusing to go to school. He was given another chance to engage in services while on probation but refused to participate or to tell the probation department where he was living. He committed additional offenses during that time, including two counts of dangerous possession of a firearm. He was then placed in a residential facility but was removed due to his violent and disruptive behavior. He continued to engage in violent and defiant behavior while in juvenile detention, leading the probation department to conclude that A.W. required rehabilitative services in the highly structured environment offered by the DOC.

[25] In sum, given A.W.’s history, need for immediate rehabilitative services to curb his violent oppositional behavior, and the failure of all previously ordered less-restrictive placements, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in placing him at the DOC.

Conclusion

[26] For these reasons, we affirm the judgment of the juvenile court.

[27] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The psychological evaluation was admitted into evidence “by agreement of the parties” at an omnibus hearing on the third motion to modify in December 2024. Transcript at 5.

2.   Accordingly, A.W.’s contention that “[n]o witnesses were sworn in at the start of the hearing [ ] so the statements of the probation officer cannot be considered testimony” is a plain mischaracterization of the record. Appellant's 2d Amend. Br. at 13.

DeBoer, Judge.

Bradford, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.