Tavion Donte Cobb, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Tavion Cobb appeals his convictions and sentences for murder and neglect of a dependent. He contends that (1) his murder conviction is not supported by sufficient evidence; (2) his convictions for murder and neglect of a dependent violate double jeopardy; and (3) the trial court abused its discretion when it imposed consecutive sentences. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Cobb's then-girlfriend Germia Groves was the mother of eighteen-month-old N.G., her son from a previous relationship. One evening, Groves texted Cobb that she was having difficulty getting N.G. to go to bed. Cobb offered to pick up N.G. from Groves’ house and watch him for the rest of the night so she could get some sleep. Groves agreed and instructed Cobb to bring N.G. back to her early the next morning so she could get him ready for daycare.

[3] When Cobb did not return with N.G. the next morning, Groves sent him a text asking if they were awake. About an hour later, Cobb replied that N.G. was sick and would not be going to daycare. Groves then FaceTimed Cobb, who showed her N.G. sitting up in a chair with his eyes closed. N.G.’s face looked like it was covered in something, but Groves could not tell what it was. She asked Cobb, “[W]hat the hell happened to his face[?]” to which Cobb replied that N.G. had fallen off a tricycle. Transcript Vol. 2 at 203. Groves tried to talk to N.G., but he did not respond, so she demanded that Cobb take him to the emergency room.

[4] Instead of doing so, Cobb brought N.G. to Groves’ house. When he carried N.G. inside, the child was shirtless ¹ and cold to the touch, his lips were blue, and he was not breathing. Groves and Cobb each tried to perform CPR, and Cobb placed N.G. in front of a space heater. Because N.G. remained unresponsive, Groves repeated he needed to go to the hospital. This time, Cobb agreed to drive N.G. to the emergency room.

[5] When N.G. arrived at the hospital, he had no pulse, and his core body temperature was between seventy-one and seventy-two degrees. He also had second degree burns on his face and lower body. Upon first examining N.G., the doctor “immediately had concerns” that he had suffered “non-accidental trauma.” Id. at 40-41. The doctor was able to restart N.G.’s heart and stabilize him enough to be admitted to the ICU, where a CAT scan was performed. That scan showed N.G. had suffered an anoxic brain injury, meaning an injury resulting from a prolonged lack of oxygen to the brain. He died from his injuries the following day.

[6] The forensic pathologist who performed N.G.’s autopsy concluded that he had suffered blunt force trauma to his abdomen which caused significant internal bleeding. The resulting blood loss deprived N.G.’s brain of oxygen, which ultimately caused his death. The pathologist further concluded that “significant force” would have been required to cause N.G.’s injuries, and as such they were likely “non-accidental.” Id. at 167, 169.

[7] After N.G.’s death, Cobb gave various inconsistent and nonsensical explanations for N.G.’s injuries to medical staff, investigators, and others. For example, he told the treating physician that N.G. had been injured while playing at the park and, in that same conversation, said N.G. had fallen off a bike. The doctor did not believe that either explanation was a plausible cause for N.G.’s injuries. Later, Cobb told a family friend that N.G. had fallen into a bonfire, but N.G.’s injuries were not consistent with having fallen into a fire, because even though a large portion of his head had been burned, his hair was not singed. The forensic pathologist who performed the autopsy believed N.G.’s burns had been caused by scalding water.

[8] The State charged Cobb with one count of murder, a felony,² and two counts of Level 1 felony neglect of a dependent resulting in death.³ At trial, a jury found Cobb guilty as charged. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court convicted Cobb of murder and, citing “double jeopardy purposes[,]” sua sponte reduced one of the neglect counts to a Level 6 felony before entering a judgment of conviction on one count. Tr. Vol. 3 at 58. The court then declined to convict Cobb of the remaining neglect charge.

[9] The court found several mitigating circumstances, including Cobb's “lack of any significant prior criminal record and his relatively young age.” Id. at 59. It further found that these were outweighed by three aggravating circumstances: (1) “the age of the child[;]” (2) that Cobb had “care, custody, and control of the child at the time the offense was committed[;]” and (3) “the nature and circumstances of the offense.” Id. The court specifically noted that N.G.’s burns were “disturbing, chilling even to see that done to a young child.” Id. Cobb received consecutive sentences of sixty years for murder and two years for neglect, resulting in an aggregate sentence of sixty-two years executed in the Indiana Department of Correction. He now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

1. Sufficiency of the Evidence

[10] Cobb first argues there was insufficient evidence to support his murder conviction. When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we are mindful that it is the jury's role, not ours, “to assess witness credibility and weigh the evidence to determine whether it is sufficient to support a conviction.” Teising v. State, 226 N.E.3d 780, 783 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007)). Additionally, “[w]e consider only the evidence most favorable to” the conviction. Id. We will affirm a conviction unless no reasonable jury could have found “the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (quoting Jenkins v. State, 726 N.E.2d 268, 270 (Ind. 2000)).

[11] To convict Cobb of murder, the State was required to prove that he (1) knowingly or intentionally (2) killed N.G. Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1(1). On appeal, Cobb focuses on the first element, arguing “the State provided no evidence that [he] intended to kill N.G.” Appellant's Brief at 10. Specifically, Cobb contends that his inconsistent and nonsensical explanations for N.G.’s injuries, together with his efforts to hide N.G.’s soiled shirt, are probative of nothing more than “a guilty conscience[,]” but were not enough to show he knowingly or intentionally caused N.G.’s death. Id. at 12.

[12] Cobb's argument fails for two reasons. First, the circumstances of this case are strikingly like those in Franklin v. State, 715 N.E.2d 1237 (Ind. 1999). There, our Supreme Court found sufficient evidence to affirm Franklin's conviction for murdering his five-month-old baby because

the State presented evidence that [the baby] died as the result of severe injuries to the head and chest. These injuries were inflicted between the time that Franklin abducted the child from [the mother's] home and the point at which he placed the dead baby in [the step-grandfather's] home. Franklin, according to his own account of events, was with the baby throughout this period of time, and there is no suggestion that anyone else inflicted the injuries. Although Franklin offered a version of events that suggested the death was the result of an accidental fall and that the baby died the following day while Franklin slept, this account was at odds with the medical evidence in many respects.

Id. at 1241. Likewise, here, N.G. suffered significant injuries sometime between when Cobb picked him up from Groves’ home and when she called Cobb the following morning. Cobb was with N.G. that entire time and no evidence suggested that anyone else harmed N.G. Though Cobb said at various times that N.G. was injured while riding a tricycle, falling into a bonfire, or while playing at the park, the medical testimony showed that N.G.’s injuries could only have been caused by the intentional infliction of significant blunt force trauma. Under Franklin, this evidence was sufficient for the jury to conclude that Cobb knowingly or intentionally killed N.G.

[13] Second, Cobb is incorrect that the State was required to provide “evidence of the manner of the blows, use of a weapon, [or] a specific manner of attack.” Appellant's Br. at 12. According to Cobb, without such evidence showing his “goals or desires before or during the commission of the crime[,]” the State failed to prove that he “intended to hurt N.G.” Id. Critically, however, Cobb does not contest that there was sufficient evidence that he caused the “non-accidental injuries” that resulted in N.G.’s death. Id. As such, Cobb's argument fails under the principle that “[i]t is generally presumed that a person intends the natural, necessary, and probable consequences of his or her acts.” Konkle v. State, 253 N.E.3d 1068, 1092 (Ind. 2025) (affirming voluntary manslaughter conviction when the defendant punched victim's head, compressed his chest, and deprived him of oxygen). Here, N.G. suffered extensive injuries, including trauma inflicted with such force that twenty percent of his blood bled into his abdomen. Under Konkle, the jury could have reasonably inferred that Cobb could not have inflicted such forcible injuries without knowing “there was a high probability [N.G.] could die as a result.” Id. at 1092; see also I.C. § 35-41-22(b) (“A person engages in conduct ‘knowingly’ if, when he engages in the conduct, he is aware of a high probability that he is doing so.”).

[14] Indeed, Cobb's contention that circumstantial evidence is insufficient to prove knowledge or intent is contrary to well-settled law. Further, such a rule would discourage or even prevent the State from seeking a murder conviction when a child dies from significant injuries while in an individual's care, but there is no direct evidence of the specific mechanism of injury. See Merriweather v. State, 128 N.E.3d 503, 515 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (“Intent is a mental function and, absent a confession, usually must be proved by circumstantial evidence.”), trans. denied; McCaskill v. State, 3 N.E.3d 1047, 1050 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (“We will not reverse a conviction that rests in whole or in part on circumstantial evidence unless we can state as a matter of law that reasonable persons could not form inferences with regard to each material element of the offense[.]”). We reiterate that the brutal, forcible, and non-accidental nature of N.G.’s injuries supported a reasonable inference that Cobb intended to kill N.G. or had knowledge that N.G. could die from his injuries. See Pritcher v. State, 208 N.E.3d 656, 666-67 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (“In cases involving adults beating small children, the requisite intent to kill may be ‘inferred from repeated severe blows to a child where anyone with reasonable judgment would know that blows of such magnitude could fatally injure the child.’ ” (quoting Anderson v. State, 466 N.E.2d 27, 30 (Ind. 1984)).

[15] For these reasons, the State presented sufficient evidence to convict Cobb of N.G.’s murder.

2. Double Jeopardy

[16] Cobb next argues that “[d]ouble jeopardy principles prevent[ed] the [trial court] from entering convictions for murder and neglect of a dependent[.]” Appellant's Br. at 13. Whether convictions violate double jeopardy is a question of law that we review de novo. Wadle v. State, 151 N.E.3d 227, 237 (Ind. 2020).

[17] “[T]he prohibition against double jeopardy ․ embod[ies] a substantive bar to multiple convictions or punishments for the same offense in a single trial.” Id. at 235. Prior to its landmark opinions in Wadle and Powell v. State, 151 N.E.3d 256 (Ind. 2020), our Supreme Court had held that “where one conviction ‘is elevated [to a more serious felony] based on the same bodily injury that forms the basis of [another] conviction, the two cannot stand.’ ” Strong v. State, 870 N.E.2d 442, 443 (Ind. 2007) (quoting Pierce v. State, 761 N.E.2d 826, 830 (Ind. 2002)). Under this principle, the Strong Court found that a defendant's convictions violated double jeopardy because “the charge of neglect of a dependent [was] predicated ․ on the same bodily injury on which the murder charge [was] based.” Id. at 444. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded the matter back to the trial court with instructions to reduce the Class A neglect conviction to a Class D felony.⁴ Id.

[18] Here, the trial court appears to have followed Strong's lead by reducing Cobb's neglect conviction from a Level 1 to a Level 6 felony, and Cobb correctly notes that the double jeopardy principles Strong relied on were significantly altered by Wadle, Powell, and A.W. v. State, which “reiterat[ed] the Wadle test[.]” 229 N.E.3d 1060, 1062 (Ind. 2024). However, we disagree with Cobb's assertion that modern double jeopardy principles prohibited the court from convicting him of murder and Level 6 felony neglect.

[19] Where, as here, a single act or transaction results in multiple convictions under separate statutes, we apply Wadle's three-part test to determine whether a double jeopardy violation has occurred.⁵ A.W., 229 N.E.3d at 1062 (citing Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 248). First, we determine whether “the language of either statute clearly permits multiple punishment, either expressly or by unmistakable implication[.]” Id. at 1066 (quoting Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 248). If so, no double jeopardy violation has occurred. Id.

[20] Second, if the statutes do not permit multiple punishments, we “must then apply our included-offense statutes to determine statutory intent.” Id. (quoting Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 248) (emphasis in original). “If neither offense is an included offense of the other (either inherently or as charged), there is no violation of double jeopardy[.]” Id. at 1067 (quoting Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 248).

[21] Third, if one offense is included in the other, we “must then ․ ‘examine the facts underlying those offenses, as presented in the charging instrument and as adduced at trial.’ ” Id. at 1071 (quoting Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 249) (emphasis in original). If “a defendant's actions were ‘so compressed in terms of time, place, singleness of purpose, and continuity of action as to constitute a single transaction[,]’ ․ the prosecutor may charge the[ ] offenses only as alternative (rather than cumulative) sanctions.” Id. (quoting Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 249). But “[i]f the underlying facts reveal the two offenses are indeed ‘separate,’ there is no Wadle violation[.]” Id.

[22] Applying the Wadle test here, even if we were to assume, for the sake of argument, that Level 6 felony neglect of a dependent is inherently or factually included in murder,⁶ Cobb's double jeopardy argument fails at step three. Cobb contends that because the State did not “describe how [he] killed N.G., and the evidence d[id] not provide an explanation for how N.G. sustained his injuries[,]” he should be given the benefit of the doubt that his “actions constituted one single transaction[.]” Appellant's Br. at 16. But the evidence at trial proved that Cobb committed two separate crimes, i.e., (1) murder when he struck N.G. in the abdomen with enough force to cause catastrophic internal bleeding that ultimately resulted in N.G.’s death and (2) neglect when he placed N.G. in a situation that endangered his life or health in violation of Indiana Code section 35-46-1-4(a)(1) and resulted in him suffering horrific second degree burns. N.G.’s burns caused a large portion of the skin on his face and lower body to slough off but did not contribute to his death per the forensic pathologist's testimony. Moreover, the injury to his abdomen and his burns were caused by different mechanisms—the abdominal injury resulted from blunt force trauma while the burns were likely caused by scalding water. As such, Cobb's infliction of these injuries lacked a “continuity of action” that would render his murder and neglect convictions a double jeopardy violation. Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 249 (quoting Walker v. State, 932 N.E.2d 733, 735 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), reh'g denied). In other words, whether they were intentionally inflicted or resulted from mere neglect, these separate and distinct injuries constituted “separate and distinct crimes,” so Cobb's convictions for murder and Level 6 felony neglect did not violate double jeopardy. Id.

3. Consecutive Sentences

[23] Finally, Cobb argues that the trial court erred when it imposed consecutive sentences for murder and neglect of a dependent. Whether “to impose consecutive or concurrent sentences is within the trial court's sound discretion and is reviewed only for an abuse of discretion.” Gellenbeck v. State, 918 N.E.2d 706, 712 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). Moreover, “[a] single aggravating circumstance may support the imposition of consecutive sentences.” Id. Cobb contends the court abused its discretion in considering as aggravating circumstances N.G.’s age and that Cobb had care, custody, and control of the child because both factors were also material elements of Level 6 felony neglect. See I.C. § 35-46-1-4(a) (to commit neglect, a person must “hav[e] the care of a dependent”); I.C. § 35-46-1-1 (defining “[d]ependent” as “an unemancipated person who is under eighteen [ ] years of age”).

[24] While Cobb is correct that “[a] trial court may not use a material element of the offense as an aggravating factor, [ ] it may find the nature and particularized circumstances surrounding the offense to be an aggravating factor.” Gober v. State, 163 N.E.3d 347, 354 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), trans. denied. Here, the trial court did just that, finding the nature and extent of N.G.’s injuries, including the burns on his face and body and the suffering he likely endured, were aggravating circumstances. Because a single aggravating factor was enough to impose consecutive sentences, any error in the court's consideration of other factors was harmless, even if they were impermissible. See Hollen v. State, 740 N.E.2d 149, 161 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (“When the reviewing court is sufficiently persuaded that the original sentencing decision would have been the same had the trial court not relied on [ ] impermissible factor[s], the sentence should be affirmed.”), trans. granted, opinion adopted by 761 N.E.2d 398, 402 (Ind. 2002). The trial court described N.G.’s burns as “particularly [ ] disturbing, chilling even[,]” suggesting that it would have imposed consecutive sentences based on that factor alone. Tr. Vol. 3 at 59. From this, we are persuaded the court would have imposed consecutive sentences even had it not relied on the other two factors, so we affirm Cobb's consecutive sentences.

Conclusion

[25] For these reasons, we affirm Cobb's convictions and the trial court's imposition of consecutive sentences.

[26] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Groves later found N.G.’s crumpled and soiled shirt underneath the passenger seat of the car Cobb had been driving the night he watched N.G.

2.   Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1(1).

3.   The first neglect charge alleged that Cobb knowingly placed N.G. in a situation that endangered his life or health and resulted in his death in violation of Indiana Code section 35-46-1-4(a)(1), (b)(3). The second alleged that Cobb knowingly deprived N.G. of necessary support, which resulted in his death, in violation of section 35-46-1-4(a)(3), (b)(3).

4.   When Strong was decided, the neglect of a dependent statute made it a Class D felony to, among other things, “knowingly or intentionally[ ] ․ place[ ] [a] dependent in a situation that endanger[ed] the dependent's life or health[,]” and elevated the crime to a Class A felony if it was “committed ․ by a person at least eighteen [ ] years of age and result[ed] in the death of a dependent who is less than fourteen [ ] years of age[.]” I.C. § 35-46-1-4(a)(1), (b)(3) (2007). Similarly, the current statute classifies neglect as a Level 6 felony but elevates the crime to a Level 1 felony if it is committed by an adult and results in the death of a dependent less than fourteen years old. I.C. § 35-46-1-4(a)(1), (b)(3) (2025).

5.   In contrast, Powell controls where “a single criminal act or transaction violates a single statute but harms multiple victims.” A.W., 229 N.E.3d at 1073 n.1 (Goff, J., concurring) (quoting Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 247).

6.   The parties agree that “[n]either statute under which [Cobb] was convicted permits multiple punishments.” Appellant's Br. at 14; see also Appellee's Br. at 20 (“Neither the statute for murder nor the statute for neglect of a dependent ‘clearly permits’ multiple punishments.”).

DeBoer, Judge.

Bradford, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.