GOLDEN v. GLENBROOK CREDIT ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] Glenbrook Credit Acceptance Corporation (“Glenbrook”) sued Vanessa Golden to recover the unpaid balance Golden owed on her vehicle. After the trial court orally granted Glenbrook's motion for summary judgment, Golden filed a motion to compel arbitration. The trial court denied that motion. Golden now appeals and presents two issues for our review, which we revise and restate as follows:

1. Whether the trial court erred by denying Golden's motion to compel arbitration; and

2. Whether the trial judge demonstrated bias or prejudice against Golden during hearings in this case.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] In May 2022, Golden entered into a Retail Installment Contract and Security Agreement (the “Contract”) for the purchase of a vehicle. The Contract was assigned to Glenbrook, who, in October 2023, retook possession of the vehicle after Golden failed to make all required payments under the Contract. Golden did not redeem the vehicle, and Glenbrook sold it at an auction. Following the sale, Golden still owed Glenbrook more than $18,000 under the Contract.

[4] In February 2024, Glenbrook sued Golden for breach of contract to recover the amount owed plus prejudgment interest and the costs of collection. In response, Golden, pro se, filed several counterclaims. In May, Golden filed a motion for summary judgment on her counterclaims. The next month, Glenbrook filed a motion for summary judgment on all claims. On November 13, the trial court held a hearing on the parties’ motions, during which the trial court orally denied Golden's motion and orally granted Glenbrook's motion. The trial court indicated it would award Glenbrook prejudgment interest and attorneys’ fees, and it ordered Glenbrook to submit a proposed order. In the trial court's order entered the same day, the trial court reiterated that Golden's motion was denied, Glenbrook's motion was to be granted, and Glenbrook was to submit a proposed order by December 13.

[5] On November 14, Glenbrook filed its proposed order. Before the trial court adopted Glenbrook's order, Golden filed a motion to compel arbitration. Golden pointed to the Contract, which included an “Arbitration Provision,” providing that either Golden or Glenbrook “may elect to resolve any Claim by neutral, binding arbitration and not by a court action.” Appellee's App. Vol. III at 124. Based on that provision, Golden claimed the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to decide the case. After a hearing, the trial court denied Golden's motion, determining she had “intentionally and knowingly waived any right to seek arbitration.” Appellee's App. Vol. III at 138. Thereafter, the trial court issued an order granting Glenbrook's motion for summary judgment and entering judgment in its favor. The trial court also denied Golden's subsequent motion to correct error regarding the trial court's denial of her motion to compel arbitration. This appeal ensued.¹ ,²

Discussion and Decision

1. The Trial Court Did Not Err by Denying Golden's Motion to Compel Arbitration

[6] Golden contends the trial court erred by denying her motion to compel arbitration.³ We review de novo a trial court's decision on a motion to compel arbitration. Land v. IU Credit Union, 218 N.E.3d 1282, 1286 (Ind. 2023) (citing Doe v. Carmel Operator, LLC, 160 N.E.3d 518, 521 (Ind. 2021)), aff'd on reh'g, 226 N.E.3d 194 (Ind. 2024).

[7] Golden specifically argues that the trial court disregarded her “jurisdictional claim and addressed the merits.” Appellant's Am. Br. at 10. First, the Contract did not mandate arbitration but instead allowed either party to “elect” to proceed to arbitration. Appellee's App. Vol. III at 124. Second, long-standing Indiana precedent holds that “arbitration may be waived by the parties,” ISP.com LLC v. Theising, 805 N.E.2d 767, 776 (Ind. 2004), and such waiver will be presumed when a party chooses to “proceed before a nonarbitral tribunal” to resolve a contractual dispute, Prof'l Constr., Inc. v. Historic Walnut Square, LLC, 224 N.E.3d 352, 360 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (quoting Cabinetree of Wisconsin, Inc. v. Kraftmaid Cabinetry, Inc., 50 F.3d 388, 390 (7th Cir. 1995)). The party that elected to proceed before a nonarbitral tribunal may rebut this presumption by establishing facts indicating “that the invocation of the judicial process does not signify an intention to proceed in a court to the exclusion of arbitration.” Id. (citing Cabinetree, 50 F.3d at 391). That is, “[w]hether a party has waived the right to arbitration depends primarily upon whether that party has acted inconsistently with its right to arbitrate.” MPACT Const. Grp., LLC v. Superior Concrete Constructors, Inc., 802 N.E.2d 901, 910 (Ind. 2004) (collecting cases). To answer this question, we analyze the specific facts of the case, id. (collecting cases), including the following: (1) “whether the party attempting to invoke its right to arbitrate acted diligently in doing so, substantially delayed its request, filed dispositive motions, or participated in litigation or discovery”; (2) “the degree of prejudice that would be suffered by the other party”; and (3) “whether the litigant is unfairly manipulating the system by attempting to obtain a second bite at the apple,” Prof'l Constr., 224 N.E.3d at 360 (citing Cooper v. Asset Acceptance, LLC, 532 Fed. Appx. 639, 641 (7th Cir. 2013); Fin. Ctr. First Credit Union v. Rivera, 178 N.E.3d 1245, 1251 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021)).

[8] It is undisputed that for the first nine months of this case, Golden chose to proceed before the trial court rather than exercise her contractual right to compel arbitration on Glenbrook's claim. During those nine months, Golden filed an answer and counterclaims, participated in a case management conference and other hearings, filed and litigated her motion for summary judgment, and litigated Glenbrook's motion for summary judgment. It was not until after the trial court orally granted Glenbrook's motion for summary judgment, indicated it would award Glenbrook prejudgment interest and attorneys’ fees, and requested Glenbrook prepare a proposed order that Golden attempted to compel arbitration in this case. Under these circumstances, Golden's motion to compel arbitration was a clear attempt to bypass the trial court's decision to grant summary judgment in favor of Glenbrook and the impending judgment against her, and Golden waived her right to compel arbitration in this case. The trial court did not err by denying Golden's motion to compel arbitration.

2. The Trial Judge Did Not Exhibit Bias or Prejudice Against Golden

[9] Golden next asserts that we should reverse the trial court's orders regarding summary judgment and arbitration because the trial judge was biased against her. Indiana law presumes that a trial judge is unbiased and unprejudiced. Seabolt v. State, 240 N.E.3d 1249, 1258 (Ind. 2024) (citing Zavodnik v. Harper, 17 N.E.3d 259, 269 (Ind. 2014)). To overcome this presumption, the party alleging partiality “must establish that the judge has personal prejudice for or against a party.” L.G. v. S.L., 88 N.E.3d 1069, 1073 (Ind. 2018) (citing Carter v. Knox Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 761 N.E.2d 431, 435 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001)). “Such bias or prejudice exists only where there is an undisputed claim or the judge has expressed an opinion on the merits of the controversy before him.” Id. (citing Carter, 761 N.E.2d at 435). Importantly, “[a]dverse rulings and findings by a trial judge are not sufficient reason to believe the judge has a personal bias or prejudice.” L.G., 88 N.E.3d at 1073 (citing Thomas v. State, 486 N.E.2d 531, 533 (Ind. 1985)); see also State ex rel. Allen v. Carroll Cir. Ct., 226 N.E.3d 206, 217 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Zavodnik, 17 N.E.3d at 269).

[10] Golden contends the trial judge prejudged her summary judgment motion during the hearing thereon (1) by telling her that one of her counterclaims was not a defense to Glenbrook's breach of contract claim but was instead an argument about the amount of damages owed under the Contract, (2) cautioning her that citing to non-Indiana case law would not be allowed, and (3) advising her that she had provided the correct standard for summary judgment but was not following it and seemed to not understand summary judgment. Golden likewise maintains that the trial judge prejudged her motion to compel arbitration by telling her during the hearing thereon that her argument was “completely contrary to every case that has ever been heard on this issue in this state, but if that's your argument then that's your argument.” Feb. 2025 Tr. Vol. II at 8. None of the statements Golden now challenges demonstrate any prejudgment or bias.⁴ Instead, the trial judge's statements informed Golden of controlling precedent and of deficiencies in her arguments. Nothing about the challenged statements to which Golden cites shows that the trial judge had personal prejudice for or against either party in this case. Accordingly, Golden has not overcome the presumption that the trial judge was unbiased and unprejudiced.

Conclusion

[11] In sum, the trial court did not err by denying Golden's motion to compel arbitration, and it did not act impartially during the hearings concerning summary judgment and arbitration. We thus affirm the trial court on all issues raised.

[12] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Indiana Appellate Rule 28(A) and Items 11 and 13 of Appendix A to the Appellate Rules require a court reporter to consecutively number the volumes of the Transcript; prepare only one table of contents for the entire transcript, including when multiple hearings are transcribed; and to combine multiple hearings into a single transcript, although the hearings may be split between volumes if the court reporter so chooses. Here, three hearings were transcribed, and they occurred in April 2024, November 2024, and February 2025. The court reporter submitted three tables of contents and three sets of Transcript Volume II, one for each of the three hearings. To avoid confusion, we include the relevant month and year before each reference to the transcript.

2.   Both parties fail to support with record citations all statements of fact in their Statements of Case, as required by Appellate Rule 46(A)(5). We remind the parties that the purpose of our appellate rules—especially Appellate Rule 46 governing the content of briefs—“is to aid and expedite review and to relieve the appellate court of the burden of searching the record and briefing the case.” Miller v. Patel, 212 N.E.3d 639, 657 (Ind. 2023) (emphasis added) (quoting Dridi v. Cole Kline LLC, 172 N.E.3d 361, 364 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021)).

3.   The trial court denied Golden's motion to correct error without explanation. On appeal, both parties maintain that Golden is appealing the trial court's denial of her motion to correct error rather than her motion to compel arbitration. Because the trial court did not deny the motion to correct error on grounds other than those stated in its denial of the motion to compel arbitration, we treat Golden's claim as one regarding the merits of her motion to compel.

4.   Golden also alleges the trial judge tried to “discourag[e] argumentation” during the summary judgment hearing, Appellant's Am. Br. at 13, by asking her, “What else do you have?” Nov. 2024 Tr. Vol. II at 9, 11. In our view, the trial judge was attempting to encourage additional argument, not discourage it. Golden maintains that the trial judge's statements regarding her motion to compel arbitration “align[ed]” with Glenbrook's arguments such that the trial judge was “advocating” for Glenbrook. Appellant's Am. Br. at 18. A trial judge's accurate articulation of legal principles does not demonstrate bias merely because those principles favor the opposing party's position. See L.G. v. S.L., 88 N.E.3d 1069, 1073 (Ind. 2018) (citing Thomas v. State, 486 N.E.2d 531, 533 (Ind. 1985)); State ex rel. Allen v. Carroll Cir. Ct., 226 N.E.3d 206, 217 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Zavodnik v. Harper, 17 N.E.3d 259, 269 (Ind. 2014)).

Felix, Judge.

Brown, J., and Scheele, J., concur.