Chelsea J. Nicholson, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Pursuant to a guilty plea, Chelsea Nicholson was convicted of two counts of aggravated battery, Level 3 felonies. The trial court sentenced Nicholson to ten years for each conviction, to be served consecutively, for an aggregate sentence of twenty years in the Department of Correction (“DOC”). Nicholson appeals and argues: (1) the trial court abused its discretion in finding mitigating factors; and (2) the twenty-year aggregate sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm.

Issues

[2] Nicholson raises three issues, which we consolidate and restate as:

I. Whether the trial court abused its discretion sentencing Nicholson.

II. Whether Nicholson's twenty-year aggregate sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.

Facts

[3] On January 11, 2023, Glorene Ellis (a sixty-four-year-old) and her father-in-law, Robert Schlick (an eighty-seven-year-old), were at their home in Shelbyville taking down Christmas decorations. Ellis was working in the backyard while Schlick worked in the front. After finishing her work, Ellis went to check on Schlick because of his age. As they were preparing to take a break for coffee, Ellis noticed Nicholson standing on the street corner. Ellis looked at Nicholson, and Nicholson then came onto the porch.

[4] Without provocation, Nicholson attacked Ellis and knocked her into the front door. Nicholson then used two cement welcome plaques from the porch, each weighing approximately five pounds, to beat Ellis. Nicholson struck Ellis on the head “at least four or five” times with one of the plaques. Tr. Vol. II p. 8. While Nicholson was attacking Ellis, Schlick yelled, “[g]et help,” and tried to pull Nicholson off of Ellis. Id.

[5] When Ellis was able to get inside, Nicholson started beating Schlick with the other concrete plaque. Ellis called 911 and told dispatch that she thought Schlick might bleed to death. After the attack, Nicholson also called 911 herself and sat on the front porch waiting for law enforcement.

[6] Police found Schlick slumped on the ground with a substantial amount of blood pooling around his head, and bloody brick pavers and several pieces of broken concrete were lying nearby. Both victims had injuries to their heads and blood loss. Ellis and Schlick were transported to the hospital for medical treatment.

[7] On January 12, 2023, the State charged Nicholson with five counts: Count I—aggravated battery, a Level 3 felony; Count II—aggravated battery, a Level 3 felony; Count III—battery by means of a deadly weapon, a Level 5 felony; Count IV—battery by means of a deadly weapon, a Level 5 felony; and Count V—residential entry, a Level 6 felony. On September 12, 2024, Nicholson entered a guilty plea to Counts I and II, and the State agreed to dismiss Counts III, IV, and V.

[8] Nicholson's sentencing hearing was held on October 21, 2024. At the hearing, Ellis testified about the attack and its impact on her life. She testified that she was “dazed and confused” and “profusely bleeding” from her head but was not initially aware of it. Tr. Vol. II p. 9. Ellis believed that Nicholson “intend[ed] to kill” them both and thought she “[might] die” that day. Id. Ellis also testified that, since the attack, she finds it difficult to leave the house, has incurred “$1,3[00] or $1,400” in out-of-pocket medical expenses, and that neither she nor Schlick had ever seen Nicholson before. Id. at 7-10.

[9] Nicholson's mother, Cheryl Nicholson (“Cheryl”), also testified regarding thirty-one-year-old Nicholson's substance abuse and mental state on the day of the attack. Cheryl stated that Nicholson began using illegal substances at approximately “[fifteen] or [sixteen]” years old. Id. at 22-23. Cheryl testified that, on the day before Nicholson committed the offense, Nicholson was suffering from hallucinations and appeared to be under the influence of a substance because Nicholson was “talking to somebody that wasn't there.” Id. Cheryl later found a methamphetamine pipe in Nicholson's room. Cheryl also testified that she would be available as a resource to aid Nicholson in following court orders and receiving treatment.

[10] The trial court found three aggravating factors and assigned significant weight thereto: (1) Nicholson has two prior felony convictions and nine prior misdemeanor convictions; (2) one of the victims was over the age of sixty-five; and (3) Nicholson had previously violated probation and home detention. The trial court found one mitigating factor, which it assigned moderate weight—Nicholson entered a plea of guilty, thereby saving the State the time and expense of taking her to trial.

[11] The trial court found that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors and sentenced Nicholson to ten years for each of her two Level 3 felony convictions, to be served consecutively, for an aggregate sentence of twenty years in the DOC.  ¹ Nicholson now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

I. Abuse of Sentencing Discretion

[12] Nicholson argues that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to consider certain mitigators. Sentencing decisions rest within the sound discretion of the trial court and are reviewed on appeal only for an abuse of discretion. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007) (citing Smallwood v. State, 773 N.E.2d 259, 263 (Ind. 2002)), clarified on reh'g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007); Phipps v. State, 90 N.E.3d 1190, 1197 (Ind. 2018). “An abuse occurs only if the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom.” Schuler v. State, 132 N.E.3d 903, 904 (Ind. 2019) (citing Rice v. State, 6 N.E.3d 940, 943 (Ind. 2014)).

[13] A trial court may abuse its sentencing discretion in a number of ways, including:

(1) “failing to enter a sentencing statement at all”; (2) entering a sentencing statement in which the aggravating and mitigating factors are not supported by the record; (3) entering a sentencing statement that does not include reasons that are clearly supported by the record and advanced for consideration; or (4) entering a sentencing statement in which the reasons provided in the statement are “improper as a matter of law.”

Ackerman v. State, 51 N.E.3d 171, 193 (Ind. 2016) (quoting Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 490-91).

[14] “This Court presumes that a court that conducts a sentencing hearing renders its decision solely on the basis of relevant and probative evidence.” Schuler, 132 N.E.3d at 905. Even when an abuse of discretion occurs, “[w]e will not remand for resentencing if we can say with confidence the trial court would have imposed the same sentence had it not considered the purportedly erroneous aggravators.” Owen v. State, 210 N.E.3d 256, 269 (Ind. 2023). “A single aggravating circumstance may be sufficient to support an enhanced sentence.” Hayko v. State, 211 N.E.3d 483, 487 n.1 (Ind. 2023), cert. denied.

[15] Nicholson argues that the trial court abused its discretion by “not recogniz[ing] [her] substance abuse and/or mental health issues as a mitigating factor of some kind.” Appellant's Br. p. 8. We disagree. The trial court “ ‘is not obligated to accept the defendant's contentions as to what constitutes a mitigating circumstance or to give the proffered mitigating circumstances the same weight the defendant does.’ ” Weisheit v. State, 26 N.E.3d 3, 9 (Ind. 2015) (quoting Wilkes v. State, 917 N.E.2d 675, 690 (Ind. 2009)). “An allegation that the trial court failed to identify or find a mitigating factor requires the defendant to establish that the mitigating evidence is both significant and clearly supported by the record.” Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 493 (citing Carter v. State, 711 N.E.2d 835, 838 (Ind. 1999)).

[16] Nicholson's counsel repeatedly referenced her mental health condition and substance abuse history during the sentencing hearing. See Tr. Vol. II pp. 56-57, 60. The trial court was aware of Nicholson's mental health condition and history of substance abuse and discussed both in its sentencing statement. The trial court, however, did not consider either to be a mitigating factor. The trial court, instead, noted that Nicholson “had plenty of chances to get [her] behavior under control, to get treatment, to be a productive citizen, to be a good mother, and [she had] not taken advantage of that at all.” Id. at 61.

[17] We are not in a position to second-guess the trial court's decision regarding mitigating factors, particularly when nothing in the record and no argument supports Nicholson's claim that the decision was “clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court.” Schuler, 132 N.E.3d at 904. Our Supreme Court in Anglemyer expressly stated that “[i]t is apparent to us that rather than overlooking [Appellant's] mental illness, the trial court determined it was not significant and thus would not be a factor influencing the trial court's sentencing decision. This was the trial court's call. We find no error.” 868 N.E.2d at 493. The same analysis applies here, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that Nicholson's mental health and substance abuse were not mitigating factors.  ²

II. Inappropriate Sentence

[18] Next, Nicholson challenges her twenty-year sentence as inappropriate. The Indiana Constitution authorizes independent appellate review and revision of sentences imposed by a trial court. Lane v. State, 232 N.E.3d 119, 122 (Ind. 2024) (citing Ind. Const. art. 7, §§ 4, 6). This authority, as implemented through Appellate Rule 7(B), enables this Court to “revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court's decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” Deference to the trial court's sentence should prevail unless “overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense and the defendant's character.” Oberhansley v. State, 208 N.E.3d 1261, 1267 (Ind. 2023) (internal quotations omitted). A defendant, however, need not show that both the nature of the offense and his or her character warrant revision; however, “to the extent the evidence on one prong militates against relief, a claim based on the other prong must be all the stronger to justify relief.” Lane, 232 N.E.3d at 127 (citing Connor v. State, 58 N.E.3d 215, 220 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016)).

[19] Additionally, in determining whether a sentence is inappropriate, we are not limited to the aggravating and mitigating circumstances found by the trial court. Oberhansley, 208 N.E.3d at 1271. “Our role is primarily to leaven the outliers and identify guiding principles for sentencers, rather than to achieve the perceived correct result in each case.” Lane, 232 N.E.3d at 122 (internal quotations omitted). “Ultimately, we rely on our collective judgment as to the balance of all the relevant considerations involved, which include the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given case.” Id. (internal quotations omitted).

[20] “In considering the nature of the offense we recognize the advisory sentence is the starting point the Legislature selected as appropriate for the crime committed.” Kelly v. State, 257 N.E.3d 782, 805 (Ind. 2025). In the case at hand, Nicholson pleaded guilty to two Level 3 felonies. Indiana Code Section 35-50-2-5 provides “[a] person who commits a Level 3 felony ․ shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of between three (3) and sixteen (16) years, with the advisory sentence being nine (9) years.” The trial court here sentenced Nicholson to ten years for each Level 3 felony, to be served consecutively, resulting in an aggregate sentence of twenty years in the DOC.

A. Nature of the Offense

[21] Our analysis of the “nature of the offense” requires us to look at the extent, brutality, and heinousness of the offense. Pritcher v. State, 208 N.E.3d 656, 668 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (citing Brown v. State, 10 N.E.3d 1, 5 (Ind. 2014)). “And given that sentencing ‘is principally a discretionary function in which the trial court's judgment should receive considerable deference[,]’ a trial court's sentencing decision will generally prevail ‘unless overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense (such as [being] accompanied by restraint, regard and lack of brutality) and the defendant's character (such as substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character).’ ” Konkle v. State, 253 N.E.3d 1068, 1093 (Ind. 2025) (quoting Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015)).

[22] Nicholson attacked two elderly individuals—sixty-four-year-old Ellis and eighty-seven-year-old Schlick—without any provocation and despite never having seen them before. Nicholson used cement welcome plaques as weapons to strike the victims on the head, causing significant blood loss to both of them. In addition to striking them with the plaques, Nicholson also threw punches at the victims. This attack was entirely unprovoked; the victims were simply in their own yard taking down Christmas decorations. The assault has had lasting effects on the victims’ lives—Ellis testified that she believed she would die during the attack, and she now feels fear when it is dark outside. The victims also incurred significant out-of-pocket medical expenses. Nothing in the nature of the offense warrants a reduced sentence.

B. Character of the Offender

[23] Our analysis of the character of the offender involves a broad consideration of a defendant's qualities, including the defendant's age, criminal history, background, past rehabilitative efforts, and remorse. See Harris v. State, 165 N.E.3d 91, 100 (Ind. 2021); McCain v. State, 148 N.E.3d 977, 985 (Ind. 2020). The significance of a criminal history in assessing a defendant's character and an appropriate sentence vary based on the “gravity, nature and number of prior offenses as they relate to the current offense.” McElfresh v. State, 51 N.E.3d 103, 112 (Ind. 2016). “Even a minor criminal history is a poor reflection of a defendant's character.” Prince v. State, 148 N.E.3d 1171, 1174 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020).

[24] Nicholson was twenty-nine years old when she committed the instant crimes and had an extensive criminal record prior to this case. Nicholson began accumulating a criminal history as a juvenile at fifteen or sixteen years old. As an adult, she had fifteen criminal cases, resulting in two felony convictions and nine misdemeanor convictions. Nicholson also violated probation and home detention at least five times, including by testing positive for methamphetamine and alcohol, cutting off her GPS unit, failing to report, and failing to maintain employment. Even during her incarceration for the present case, Nicholson had “been written up and sanctioned for failing to follow rules” and effectively demonstrated no remorse for the harm she caused the victims. App. Vol. II p. 91. Nicholson's long-standing substance abuse has caused significant mental health problems; her diagnoses include “[a]mphetamine-induced psychosis” and severe “[m]ethamphetamine type substance use disorder.” Id. at 94; Tr. Vol. II p. 57. Nicholson, however, has never voluntarily sought treatment or stopped using illegal substances. Thus, we find no basis to conclude that her sentence is inappropriate.

Conclusion

[25] The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it sentenced Nicholson, and her sentence is not inappropriate. Accordingly, we affirm.

[26] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Nicholson argues that the trial court should have assigned “significant,” rather than “moderate,” weight to her guilty plea. Appellant's Br. p. 9. Our Supreme Court has held that “[b]ecause the trial court no longer has any obligation to ‘weigh’ aggravating and mitigating factors against each other when imposing a sentence, unlike the pre-Blakely statutory regime, a trial court cannot now be said to have abused its discretion in failing to ‘properly weigh’ such factors.” Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007). “The relative weight or value assignable to reasons properly found or those which should have been found is not subject to review for abuse.” Id. at 492. Accordingly, Nicholson's contention that her guilty plea should have been given greater weight is not available for appellate review.

2.   Nicholson also claims that her sentence was imposed “without the benefits of a plea agreement.” Appellant's Br. p. 9. (emphasis in original). We disagree. Rather, Nicholson received significant benefits from her guilty plea at sentencing. The State dismissed three of the five charges against her as part of the agreement. App. Vol. II p. 17. Further, Nicholson cites no authority and develops no argument to support this claim. We, thus, find the argument without merit.

Tavitas, Judge.

Bailey, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.