Michael Thomas, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] In April of 2022, some of Patrick White's neighbors realized that they had not seen him in a while and that Michael Thomas appeared to have moved into White's apartment. In May of 2022, Thomas began dating Patience Thomas and took her to the apartment, which she noticed was very cold and had a strong, unpleasant odor. A few days later, Thomas told Patience that he had shot a man named Patrick in the head and had concealed his body. In June of 2022, White's dead body was discovered in his apartment, with the cause of death being a gunshot to the head.

[2] The State charged Thomas with murder and alleged that he was a habitual offender. At Thomas's trial, Patience testified regarding his confession to her, and the prosecutor argued during closing that she was credible, with no objection. The jury found Thomas guilty as charged, he admitted to being a habitual offender, and the trial court sentenced him to seventy-five years of incarceration. Thomas contends that the prosecutor improperly vouched for Patience during his closing, which he claims resulted in fundamental error. Because we disagree, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] In early 2022, White lived alone in an apartment complex in Evansville. In April of 2022, several of White's neighbors realized that they had not seen him in some time. Also around this time, White's neighbor Justin Smith saw a person, later identified as Thomas, “comin’ and goin’ out the back door like six times.” Tr. Vol. II p. 34. A friend of White's named Gary went to visit White and also encountered Thomas, who told Gary that he was looking after the apartment.

[4] In May of 2022, maintenance supervisor Dimitri Hassell noticed that White's air conditioner was filled with ice and knocked on the door. Thomas opened the door, and, when Hassell entered, he noticed that it was very cold, with the thermostat “about as low as you can set it[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 49. In June of 2022, Smith and Hassell entered White's apartment in order to check on him. The apartment “stunk” and “had a lot of flies[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 32. Police were contacted, and a search of apartment uncovered White's corpse, wrapped and bound. White's cause of death was a non-contact gunshot wound to the head, with the bullet exiting the head and finally coming to rest in the “right chest cavity[.]” State's Ex. 51.

[5] Evansville Police Detective Kyle Thirty was assigned to the case, and, after speaking with White's neighbors, identified Thomas as a person of interest. By this time, Thomas was living in a trailer park with Patience. Police took Thomas and Patience into custody and interviewed them separately. In his interview, Thomas claimed that he and Patience had visited White's apartment and that he had emerged from the bathroom only to see White “trying to get on top of her.” Ex. 52 at 17:20–25. Thomas told the detectives that he had been attempting to wrestle White away from Patience when she had shot White.

[6] On November 1, 2024, the State charged Thomas with murder and filed a notice of intent to seek a habitual-offender enhancement Thomas's jury trial began on April 28, 2025. Patience testified while dressed in a jail uniform and indicated that she was serving a sentence for drug-related offenses. Patience testified that she had met Thomas in May of 2022 and that they had begun a romantic relationship. At some point between May 12 and 15, 2022, Thomas had taken Patience to what she had believed was his apartment. Patience had observed that the apartment “was really dirty and it was really cold in there and it stunk really bad.” Tr. Vol. II p. 191. Patience had asked Thomas why it smelled, “and he just laughed.” Tr. Vol. II p. 197. Thomas had packed a bag with items from the apartment to move into Patience's residence. The couple had left quickly because the smell and low temperature had made Patience uncomfortable.

[7] According to Patience, a few days after she and Thomas had visited the apartment, he had told her that “a man raped his daughter and so he shot him in the head.” Tr. Vol. II p. 194. Thomas had told Patience that the man's first name had been “Patrick” and that “he wrapped him up and put him in the closet.” Tr. Vol. II p. 194. Patience testified that, while she had not believed Thomas at first, she eventually “thought maybe he wasn't lying[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 195. Patience testified that she had remained in the relationship with Thomas because she had been “scared to go to the police or anything ‘cause [she] didn't know what he would do to [her].” Tr. Vol. II p. 195.

[8] Patience explained that during the time she was with Thomas, she had smoked heroin at least once an hour and that had obtained her money for drugs from her family and through prostitution. Portions of Patience's diary, which contained writings about how she “used to be a cutter” and had failed herself and her siblings were admitted as impeachment evidence by defense and published to the jury. Tr. Vol. II p. 217. On cross-examination, Patience stated that she was serving a sentence for three different cases, none of which was relevant to Thomas's case. Patience indicated that she was not “looking for leniency” or trying to get out of jail early because she had already signed her plea and had been sentenced. Tr. Vol. II p. 207. Thomas did not testify, but a video recording of his police interview was admitted as Exhibit 52. Thomas's overarching theory of the case during trial was that Patience had killed White.

[9] After the conclusion of evidence, the State made closing and rebuttal arguments, without objection. The prosecutor argued that Thomas's statement provided no proof of Patience's guilt because his account of events had not been corroborated. The prosecutor also discussed Patience's credibility, describing her as “compelling” and asking the jury, “So, are you going to believe Patience? Well, here's why I do and I think you should.” Tr. Vol. III p. 49. The prosecutor argued that Patience was testifying voluntarily, not because a plea agreement obligated her to, but, rather, because “in spite of her bad choices, in spite of the life she's lived, I think she feels bad.” Tr. Vol. III p. 50. The prosecutor argued that this evidence made Patience credible.

[10] The prosecutor finished his closing argument as follows:

So, make no mistake, this case is 100% Michael Logan Thomas. You know, in spite of his statement that somebody else did it, all the evidence points to him. There is no evidence that points anywhere else. And I know if I have to make a choice between believing Patience and believing Michael Thomas, I will and do believe Patience. Despite her faults, her life, her choices and addictions, a hundred times over would I believe her before Michael Thomas. And especially if other evidence corroborates her story and none corroborates his. So, for all the reasons that I've stated, I'm asking you for your verdict of guilty of murder for Michael Logan Thomas because he deserves it. He earned it. Thank you.

Tr. Vol. III p. 52. The jury found Thomas guilty as charged, Thomas admitted to being a habitual offender, and the trial court sentenced him to sixty years of incarceration, enhanced fifteen years by virtue of his habitual-offender status.

Discussion and Decision

[11] Thomas contends that the prosecutor committed misconduct amounting to fundamental error during final argument, specifically, that the prosecutor impermissibly vouched for Patience's credibility. When reviewing a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, we ordinarily consider whether the prosecutor engaged in misconduct and, if so, whether that misconduct, under the circumstances, placed the defendant in a position of grave danger or peril to which he would not have otherwise have been subjected. Coleman v. State, 750 N.E.2d 370, 374 (Ind. 2001). “The gravity of peril turns on the probable persuasive effect of the misconduct on the jury's decision, not on the degree of impropriety of the conduct.” Wisehart v. State, 693 N.E.2d 23, 57 (Ind. 1998) (citation and quotation marks omitted). To preserve a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, however, the defendant must object and ask the trial court to admonish the jury. Cooper v. State, 854 N.E.2d 831, 835 (Ind. 2006). In general, “failure to object at trial results in waiver of an issue for appeal.” Boatright v. State, 759 N.E.2d 1038, 1043 (Ind. 2001) (citation omitted). Thomas concedes that he has waived this claim for appellate review.

[12] In an attempt to avoid the effects of his waiver, Thomas claims that the alleged prosecutorial misconduct amounts to fundamental error. When a claim of prosecutorial misconduct has not been properly preserved for appeal, a defendant must establish not only the grounds for the misconduct, but also the additional grounds for fundamental error. See Cooper, 854 N.E.2d at 835. Fundamental error is an extremely narrow exception that allows a defendant to avoid waiver of an issue. Sobolewski v. State, 889 N.E.2d 849, 856 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied. When fundamental error must be established, we cannot reverse an instance of alleged prosecutorial misconduct unless we are convinced that the error made a fair trial impossible or constituted blatant violations of basic and elementary principles of due process. Booher v. State, 773 N.E.2d 814, 817 (Ind. 2002).

[13] Thomas's specific contention of misconduct is that the prosecutor improperly vouched for Patience's credibility.

It is inappropriate for a prosecutor to make an argument which takes the form of personally vouching for a witness. Lainhart v. State, 916 N.E.2d 924, 938 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (citing Schlomer v. State, 580 N.E.2d 950, 957 (Ind. 1991)). As set forth in the Rules of Professional Conduct:

A lawyer shall not ․ in trial, allude to any matter that the lawyer does not reasonably believe is relevant or that will not be supported by admissible evidence, assert personal knowledge of facts in issue except when testifying as a witness, or state a personal opinion as to the justness of a cause, the credibility of a witness, the culpability of a civil litigant or the guilt or innocence of the accused[.]

Ind. Professional Conduct Rule 3.4(e) (emphasis added). A prosecutor may comment on the credibility of the witnesses only if the assertions are based on reasons which arise from the evidence. Lainhart, 916 N.E.2d at 938 (citing [Cooper, 854 N.E. at 836]).

Gaby v. State, 949 N.E.2d 870, 880–81 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011).

[14] We conclude that the prosecutor did not improperly vouch for Patience in this case. While the prosecutor did indicate his belief in Patience's credibility, all of his statements to that effect were based on evidence in the record or reasonable inferences arising from that evidence. In response to Thomas's attack on Patience's credibility on cross-examination, in which he asked her if she was “looking for leniency” and whether she had been promised anything, the prosecutor argued that Patience did not have anything to gain by testifying because she had already been sentenced in another matter and would therefore receive no benefit for her cooperation in this case. Tr. Vol. II p. 207. The prosecutor's comments were based on Patience's testimony that she had not been promised anything in return for her testimony, had already been sentenced in her other case, and was not looking for leniency. See Brown v. State, 746 N.E.2d 63, 68 (Ind. 2001)) (“A prosecutor may respond to inferences raised by the defense, even if that response would otherwise be objectionable.”).

[15] The prosecutor also argued that Patience was credible because, in addition to having nothing to gain by testifying, she also had a lot to lose, pointing to the fact that she was appearing before the jury in her jail outfit, talking about her life of drug addiction, being “cross-examined about the mistakes she's made and the life she's lived[,]” and having portions of her personal diary read to the jury. Tr. Vol. III p. 50. The prosecutor argued that these factors lent credibility to her testimony because she would not have subjected herself to such humiliation only to lie, especially when there was no benefit to be had. These arguments, again, are based on evidence, specifically Patience's testimony that she had been a drug addict and convicted of crimes as “a result of [her] addiction[,]” her acknowledgment on the stand that she was dressed in a jail uniform, the diary entries used to cross-examine her, and the perfectly reasonable inference that airing all of this in open court was extremely unpleasant for her. Tr. Vol. II p. 190.

[16] Finally, the prosecutor's argument that Patience was credible was that her version of events was corroborated by other evidence in the record while Thomas's was not. Again, this is accurate. For example, Patience's description of White's apartment was the same as that of the other witnesses who had been to the apartment around the time that White had already been missing for some time, i.e., as being infested with flies, having a strong and unpleasant odor, and being extremely cold. Multiple witnesses placed Thomas—but not Patience—at White's apartment around and shortly after the time he had gone missing, and other evidence indicated that Thomas had begun living there. Patience's testimony that the first and only time she ever visited White's apartment was after he was already dead is corroborated by the evidence. In contrast, the only evidence that Patience had killed White was Thomas's self-serving statements from his police interview.

[17] Thomas draws our attention to the Indiana Supreme Court's decision in Schlomer and our decisions in Lainhart and Gaby. In Schlomer, the prosecutor's statement that “I believe Detective McGee when he tells us what happened” was conceded to be improper vouching. 580 N.E.2d at 957. In Lainhart, the prosecutor improperly

suggested during jury selection that “it would take an awful lot to get an officer [to lie]” and said that “there's no place for it in our society.” During closing argument he told jurors that “if any officer would even come close to not putting out exactly what happened telling the truth, they're out. I would never, ever, put them in front of a Jury, if I suspected anything.”

916 N.E.2d at 938 (brackets in original). In Gaby,

the prosecutor stated that she was “confident” that the jury would “come to the same conclusion” that she and the police detectives had come to. She also told the jury that “I cannot and would not bring charges that I believe were false.” She further told the jury that “I can tell you that with a guilty verdict on this case I will be able to sleep fine tonight. Just fine. In fact, better than fine. You will be able to also.”

949 N.E.2d at 880 (record citations omitted).

[18] All three cases are distinguishable, however, because, unlike here, there is no indication in any of them that the prosecutor's statements had been based on the evidence. See Schlomer, 580 N.E.2d at 957 (“It is improper for the prosecutor to make an argument which takes the form of personally vouching for the witness. The State concedes that the prosecutor's statements were improper.”) (citation omitted); Lainhart, 916 N.E.2d at 938 (“We agree [․] that the prosecutor's remarks constituted improper indoctrination, vouching, and commentary on the justness of the cause.”); Gaby, 949 N.E.2d at 881 (“[T]he prosecutor's response still crosses the line into improper vouching as her comments were not based solely on reasons which arose from the evidence, but rather, asserted a personal knowledge of the facts at issue.”). Here, because the prosecutor's statements regarding Patience's credibility were based on evidence and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, Thomas has failed to establish any prosecutorial misconduct. While we conclude in this case that the prosecutor's comments were sufficiently supported by the evidence to pass muster, when the prosecutor uses the word “I,” it pushes the envelope on expressing a personal opinion, which is not permitted. The better practice would be to phrase arguments of this type solely in terms of why the jury should believe a particular witness.

[19] Even if we were to conclude that any prosecutorial misconduct occurred, it could only be considered harmless under the circumstances. The evidence presented was more than sufficient to sustain Thomas's conviction without Patience's testimony. In summary, the record paints a picture of a guilty man attempting (however ineffectually) to cover up his crime. Thomas admitted to being in White's apartment when he died and seems to have moved in afterwards, with multiple witnesses seeing Thomas either inside White's apartment or “coming and going” in the weeks after White's death. Because Thomas was living in the apartment, it is reasonable to infer that he was the person who turned down the air conditioning to an uncomfortable level (in an apparent attempt to slow decomposition) and bound and concealed White's body. Thomas's active attempts to conceal White's death (when an innocent person almost certainly would have contacted the authorities) give rise to an inference that he was the person responsible for it. It is well-settled that “[a]ttempts to conceal evidence may be considered by the jury as revealing consciousness of guilt.” Stone v. State, 555 N.E.2d 475, 477 (Ind. 1990). Even without Patience's testimony, this is more than enough evidence to sustain Thomas's murder conviction.

[20] We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Bradford, Judge.

Weissmann, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.