Dallas Blake Spall, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Dallas Blake Spall appeals his conviction and sentence for Level 5 felony operating a motor vehicle after his driving privileges had been forfeited for life. Spall raises two issues for our review, which we restate as follows:

1. Whether an amendment to the statute underlying Spall's conviction should be applied retroactively.

2. Whether Spall's sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and his character.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On March 29, 2024, Indiana State Police Officer Nikolos Anderson observed Spall operate a vehicle in Kosciusko County. Because Officer Anderson knew Spall's driving privileges had been forfeited for life, he initiated a traffic stop and asked Spall if Spall had a court-provided exception to operate a motor vehicle. Spall said he thought he did but was unable to demonstrate what that exception might have been. Spall also provided Officer Anderson with an Indiana identification card, not a driver's license. Officer Anderson confirmed that Spall had had his driving privileges forfeited for life and had no existing exceptions, and he arrested Spall accordingly.

[4] The State charged Spall in relevant part with Level 5 felony operating a motor vehicle after his driving privileges had been forfeited for life as well as with being a habitual offender. A jury found him guilty of the Level 5 felony allegation, and Spall then stipulated to being a habitual offender. Thereafter, the trial court found Spall's criminal history to be an aggravating circumstance and ordered Spall to serve three years executed for his Level 5 felony conviction and an additional four years for being a habitual offender.

[5] This appeal ensued.

1. The 2025 amendment to Indiana Code section 9-30-10-17 is not retroactive.

[6] On appeal, Spall first argues that a 2025 amendment to Indiana Code section 9-30-10-17 should be retroactively applied to him. Whether to apply a statute retroactively is a question of statutory interpretation, which we review de novo. See Church v. State, 189 N.E.3d 580, 585 (Ind. 2022). We generally do not apply a statute retroactively “absent explicit language to the contrary.” Id. at 587.

[7] In March 2024, when Spall committed his offense, Indiana Code section 9-30-10-17 (2023) provided in relevant part that a person who operates a motor vehicle after the person's driving privileges are forfeited for life commits a Level 5 felony. However, thereafter, our General Assembly amended that statute with an effective date of July 1, 2025. See Pub. L. 36-2025 § 2 (eff. July 1, 2025). The 2025 version of the statute provides in relevant part that a person who operates a motor vehicle after the person's driving privileges are forfeited for life commits either (1) a Level 6 felony, if the forfeiture occurred before July 1, 2015; or (2) a Level 5 felony, if the forfeiture occurred after June 30, 2015. Ind. Code § 9-30-10-17 (2025).

[8] Because Spall's driving privileges were forfeited for life prior to July 1, 2015, he argues that the 2025 amendment should be applied retroactively, and his Level 5 felony conviction should be reduced to a Level 6 felony conviction. We reject his position. Nothing in the plain language of the amended statute directs the statute to be applied prior to its effective date.

[9] We acknowledge that the 2025 amendment is ameliorative on these facts. An ameliorative amendment to a statute reduces a prior criminal statute's maximum penalty. See Palmer v. State, 679 N.E.2d 887, 892 n.4 (Ind. 1997). For forfeitures that occurred prior to July 1, 2015, the 2025 version of Indiana Code section 9-30-10-17 reduces the maximum penalty available. However, “[w]hen a court sentences a defendant before the effective date of an ameliorative amendment, the new statute does not apply unless the legislature expressly designates that the new statute applies retroactively.” Id. at 892. Spall was sentenced prior to the effective date of the 2025 amendment, and, again, the amended statutory language does not designate that it applies retroactively. Spall is therefore not entitled to the ameliorative benefit of the 2025 amendment.

[10] Indeed, Spall's argument on appeal is that the 2025 amendment should be applied retroactively as a “remedial” statute. Remedial statutes “are statutes intended to cure a defect or mischief that existed in a prior statute.” Martin v. State, 774 N.E.2d 43, 44 (Ind. 2002). “When a remedial statute is involved, a court must construe it to effect the evident purpose for which it was enacted.” Id. (quotation marks and brackets omitted). However, “not all remedial statutes are automatically applied retroactively.” State v. Pelley, 828 N.E.2d 915, 919 (Ind. 2005). Rather, even if a statute is remedial, it “will normally be given prospective application” only “[u]nless there are strong and compelling reasons” to apply the statute retroactively. Id. at 920 (quotation marks omitted).

[11] We disagree with Spall's contention that the 2025 amendment to the statute is remedial, which is a broader basis for retroactivity than the amelioration doctrine. The 2025 amendment makes a new distinction between the level of an offense based on the age of the forfeiture. That “d[oes] not clear up any confusion” in the prior version of the statute, nor does it “address silence” in the prior version. See Lawrence v. State, 214 N.E.3d 361, 363 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023). Rather, the new language simply “signal[s] a ․ change” in policy, and a change in policy “is not remedial.” Id. Further, accepting Spall's argument that the 2025 amendment is remedial would swallow the amelioration doctrine, which we reject. Accordingly, we affirm Spall's Level 5 felony conviction.

2. Spall's sentence is not inappropriate.

[12] Spall also contends that his aggregate sentence of seven years in the Department of Correction is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and his character. Under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), we may modify a sentence that we find is “inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” Making this determination “turns on our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given case.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1224 (Ind. 2008).

[13] However, sentence modification under Rule 7(B) is reserved for “a rare and exceptional case.” Livingston v. State, 113 N.E.3d 611, 612 (Ind. 2018) (per curiam). Thus, when conducting this review, we will defer to the sentence imposed by the trial court unless the defendant demonstrates compelling evidence that portrays the nature of the offenses and his character in a positive light, such as showing a lack of brutality in the offenses or showing substantial virtuous character traits. Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015).

[14] The sentencing range for a Level 5 felony is one to six years, with an advisory term of three years. I.C. § 35-50-2-6(b). Spall's habitual-offender adjudication also required the court to sentence him to an additional and non-suspendible term between three and six years. I.C. § 35-50-2-8(i). The trial court found Spall's criminal history to be an aggravating circumstance and found no mitigating circumstances. The court then sentenced Spall to an advisory term of three years for his Level 5 felony conviction plus an additional four years for being a habitual offender.

[15] On appeal, Spall argues that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense because no one was harmed, no property was damaged, and ultimately his offense was akin to a “mundane traffic infraction.” Appellant's Br. at 15-16. Regarding his character, Spall asserts that, while he does have a criminal history, he only obtained one conviction in the last decade, for which he successfully completed probation. He also notes that he obtained his GED and had stable housing along with employment opportunities. Id. at 16.

[16] But we cannot say that Spall's advisory sentence for his Level 5 felony conviction and his below-the-midpoint enhancement for being a habitual offender is an outlier that justifies our revision of his sentence. Spall is forty-three years old and his adult criminal history goes back to 1999 and includes felony-level battery, resisting law enforcement, failure to return to lawful detention, and multiple alcohol-related offenses. The instant offense is part of a long pattern of behavior for Spall. We therefore affirm his sentence.

Conclusion

[17] For all of these reasons, we affirm Spall's conviction and sentence for Level 5 felony operating a motor vehicle after his driving privileges had been forfeited for life.

[18] Affirmed.

Mathias, Judge.

Vaidik, J., and Pyle, J., concur.