Caylin Monroe, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Caylin Monroe appeals her conviction and sentence for the murder of her three-month-old son. Monroe raises three issues for our review, which we restate as the following four issues:

1. Whether Monroe preserved her motion for mistrial for appellate review.

2. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support her conviction.

3. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it sentenced Monroe.

4. Whether Monroe's sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and her character.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On November 22, 2021, Monroe gave birth to her fourth child, S.S., a boy. S.S. weighed six pounds, 3.6 ounces at birth. Over the next eighty-five days in Monroe's care, S.S.’s weight dropped to four pounds, 9.8 ounces. Monroe did not take S.S. to any pediatrician appointments after Thanksgiving of 2021. Between then and mid-February 2022, multiple acquaintances told Monroe that S.S. did not look healthy. On February 15, 2022, S.S. died of malnutrition or starvation. His body measurements at the time of his death were “below the [first] percentile” for a three-month old. Tr. Vol. 6, p. 248.

[4] The State charged Monroe in relevant part with murder for having knowingly killed S.S.; the State did not allege that Monroe acted intentionally. Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 81. At Monroe's ensuing jury trial, the State called multiple witnesses who testified to having seen S.S. in an apparently malnourished state both before and after his death and while he had been in Monroe's care, including two acquaintances who had informed Monroe of their concerns during S.S.’s life. Another of those witnesses, Warrick County Sheriff's Deputy Jerry Ash, who responded to Monroe's 9-1-1 call reporting S.S.’s death, testified on direct examination that S.S.’s deceased body “looked like a ․ prop from a concentration camp” in a World War II movie. Tr. Vol. 5, p. 200. Monroe objected to Deputy Ash's testimony, which the trial court overruled. Monroe then cross-examined Deputy Ash. Upon the completion of that cross-examination, Monroe moved for a mistrial based on Deputy Ash's statement during his direct examination. The trial court denied the motion.

[5] The State presented substantial evidence that S.S. was “emaciated” at the time of his death. Tr. Vol. 7, p. 21. The State also presented evidence that Monroe had not brought S.S. to pediatric appointments after Thanksgiving of 2021. And the State presented evidence that Monroe had obtained public assistance in purchasing formula during S.S.’s life, which had required Monroe to report S.S.’s weight to administrating officials. In doing so, Monroe never reported any “concerns for [S.S.’s] growth.” Tr. Vol. 5, p. 31.

[6] Further, the State presented Monroe's own statements to the jury. Specifically, Monroe admitted that she had frequently missed S.S.’s feedings; that relatives had informed her that S.S. was “underweight” and “it looked like [Monroe] was not feeding him”; that she did not take S.S. to a pediatrician because “he was so small”; that she knew S.S. “wasn't growing right”; that, in the days leading up to his death, S.S. was sleeping more; and that, when she called 9-1-1 upon discovering S.S. deceased, she reported that his belly was “sunken in” and he was “really skinny.” Id. at 242; State's Ex. 9 at 00:49 to 00:51; State's Ex. 35 at 3:07 to 3:22; 8:14 to 8:31; 15:00 to 15:21.

[7] The jury found Monroe guilty of S.S.’s murder. At her ensuing sentencing hearing, Monroe exercised her right of allocution and stated that she was “sorry” for what had happened while placing blame for it on a failing marriage and an insufficient support system. Tr. Vol. 7, pp. 141-42. She also stated that S.S.’s death was “not intentional.” Id. Thereafter, the trial court stated that, having heard her statement, the court “finds there's a lack of remorse,” which the court found to be an aggravating circumstance. Id. at 150-51. The court also found S.S.’s age, Monroe's position of trust over S.S., and the harm S.S. suffered to be additional aggravating circumstances. The court found no mitigators. The court then sentenced Monroe to sixty-five years executed in the Department of Correction for the murder of S.S.

[8] This appeal ensued.

1. Monroe did not preserve her mistrial request for appellate review.

[9] On appeal, Monroe first argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied her motion for a mistrial based on Deputy Ash's testimony regarding his observation of S.S.’s deceased body upon arriving at Monroe's residence in response to her 9-1-1 call. Our Court has repeatedly recognized that the “[f]ailure ․ to move for a mistrial when improper argument or statements are alleged to have occurred results in waiver of that issue.” Fleener v. State, 648 N.E.2d 652, 661 (Ind. Ct. App.) (emphasis added), summarily aff'd in relevant part, 656 N.E.2d 1140, 1142 (Ind. 1995). And we have specifically recognized that a mistrial request that comes only after the examination of a witness has been completed is untimely. Hale v. State, 875 N.E.2d 438, 444 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied.

[10] Monroe did not preserve her motion for a mistrial for our review. Deputy Ash made his statement during his direct examination, and Monroe's request for a mistrial did not come until after she had completed her cross-examination of him. Accordingly, we agree with the State that Monroe's mistrial argument is not properly before us, and we do not consider it.

2. The State presented sufficient evidence to support Monroe's conviction.

[11] We next consider Monroe's argument that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support her murder conviction. For challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, we consider only the probative evidence and the reasonable inferences therefrom that support the judgment of the trier of fact. Hall v. State, 177 N.E.3d 1183, 1191 (Ind. 2021). We will neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility. Id. We will affirm a conviction unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

[12] To prove that Monroe committed murder, the State was required to show that she knowingly killed S.S. Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1(1) (2021). Monroe only argues that the State failed to prove that she acted “knowingly.” Appellant's Br. at 14-15. A person engages in conduct “knowingly” if, when she engages in the conduct, she is “aware of a high probability” that she is doing so. I.C. § 35-41-2-2(b). In the context of murder, “[a] person knowingly kills when [she is] aware of a high probability that [her] actions may kill.” Pritcher v. State, 208 N.E.3d 656, 665 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (quotation marks omitted).

[13] As we have summarized:

“Knowledge and intent are both mental states and, absent an admission by the defendant, the jury must resort to the reasonable inferences from both the direct and circumstantial evidence to determine whether the defendant has the requisite knowledge or intent to commit the offense in question.” Stubbers v. State, 190 N.E.3d 424, 432 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), trans. denied; see also Leonard[ v. State], 80 N.E.3d [882,] 883 [(Ind. 2017)] (“Because knowledge is the mental state of the actor, the trier of fact must resort to reasonable inferences of its existence.”). “In deciding whether a defendant was aware of the high probability that his actions would result in the death of a victim, the jury may consider the duration and brutality of a defendant's actions, and the relative strengths and sizes of a defendant and victim.” Williams v. State, 749 N.E.2d 1139, 1141 (Ind. 2001) (citing Childers v. State, 719 N.E.2d 1227, 1229 (Ind. 1999)).

Id. at 665-66.

[14] The State presented ample evidence to show that Monroe was aware of a high probability that her actions vis-à-vis S.S. could have killed him. S.S. was Monroe's fourth child, and she acknowledges that she was “well-educated on how to care for a newborn ․” Appellant's Br. at 15. That education notwithstanding, S.S., while in her care, starved to death over the course of his first and only three months of life. Monroe admitted that she had frequently failed to feed S.S. She admitted that multiple people had told her, during S.S.’s life, that S.S. did not appear to be healthy in that he appeared to be underweight specifically. She admitted that she had failed to take S.S. to pediatrician appointments at least in part because he had become so diminutive. She admitted that she had known that S.S. was not growing as he should have. The State's evidence also made clear that Monroe did not report concerns about S.S.’s weight to administrators of the public assistance program in which she was a participant. And the State's evidence further made clear that, at the time of his death, S.S. was emaciated.

[15] The jurors reasonably concluded from the State's evidence that Monroe acted knowingly, and Monroe's argument to the contrary simply seeks to have our Court reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. We affirm her conviction.

3. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it sentenced Monroe.

[16] We next address Monroe's argument that the trial court abused its discretion when it sentenced her. As relevant here, “[w]e review a sentencing court's decision about whether to find a mitigating factor for an abuse of discretion.” Russell v. State, 234 N.E.3d 829, 847 (Ind. 2024). Sentencing courts are “under no duty to deem mitigating every factor advanced simply because it was supported by some evidence in the record.” Id. (quotation marks and brackets omitted). Further, “the sentencing court is not obligated to credit or weigh the defendant's evidence of mitigating circumstances the same way the defendant does.” Id. at 848 (quotation marks and brackets omitted).

[17] Monroe argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it found her “lack of remorse” to be an aggravating circumstance. Tr. Vol. 7, pp. 150-51. In particular, Monroe asserts that her statement in allocution was her maintaining her innocence, which the trial court then used against her. We disagree. Monroe stated that she did not act “intentionally” in killing S.S., but the State only charged her for having murdered S.S. “knowingly,” not “intentionally.” Id. at 141-42; Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 81. Thus, her comment at sentencing about not having acted intentionally was not a protestation of her innocence. Further, the trial court's finding that Monroe lacked remorse was within its discretion in its assessment of her credibility, which we will not reconsider. The court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Monroe.

4. Monroe's sixty-five year sentence is not inappropriate.

[18] Monroe's final argument on appeal is that her sixty-five year sentence is inappropriate. Under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), we may modify a sentence that we find is “inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” Making this determination “turns on our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given case.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1224 (Ind. 2008).

[19] However, sentence modification under Rule 7(B) is reserved for “a rare and exceptional case.” Livingston v. State, 113 N.E.3d 611, 612 (Ind. 2018) (per curiam). Thus, when conducting this review, we will defer to the sentence imposed by the trial court unless the defendant demonstrates compelling evidence that portrays the nature of the offenses and her character in a positive light, such as showing a lack of brutality in the offenses or showing substantial virtuous character traits. Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015).

[20] A person convicted of murder shall be sentenced to forty-five to sixty-five years, with an advisory term of fifty-five years. I.C. § 35-50-2-3. In sentencing Monroe, the trial court found four aggravating circumstances: (1) Monroe's position of trust over S.S.; (2) S.S.’s age; (3) the harm S.S. suffered; and (4) Monroe's lack of remorse. The trial court found no mitigating circumstances. The court then ordered Monroe to serve the maximum term of sixty-five years in the Department of Correction.

[21] On appeal, Monroe argues that her sentence is inappropriate because she was twenty-three years old when S.S. died; because she was struggling with poverty; because she “suffered from untreated mental health issues, including postpartum depression and anxiety”; because she admitted at sentencing to having failed S.S.; because she cooperated in the investigation into S.S.’s death; and because of her lack of criminal history. Appellant's Br. at 18-19.

[22] But Monroe's argument simply seeks to have our Court disregard the trial court's sentencing discretion, which we will not do. Regarding the nature of the offense and her character, Monroe starved her newborn son to death over the course of his first three months of life. We affirm her sentence.

Conclusion

[23] For all of these reasons, we affirm Monroe's conviction and sentence for murder.

[24] Affirmed.

Mathias, Judge.

Vaidik, J., and Pyle, J., concur.