LOTTIE v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Jesse Ricardo Lottie, Jr. (“Lottie”) appeals his conviction for Level 5 felony carrying a handgun without a license,¹ challenging the sufficiency of the evidence rebutting his defenses of self-defense and necessity. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On the evening of December 11, 2021, Lottie, Christian Tate (“Tate”), and Rickel Kinds (“Kinds”) drove to a Marathon gas station in St. Joseph County to purchase cigarettes. Noticing a crowd outside and sensing “it wasn't the right vibe,” they left without making a purchase. Tr. Vol. II pp. 179–80. As they left the Marathon and drove westbound, two vehicles—an SUV and a sedan—pulled out behind them. The two vehicles sped past Lottie's group, got in front of them, and turned into a movie theater parking lot. Lottie suggested they pull into a Family Express gas station near where the vehicles turned.

[3] Kinds, the driver, pulled up to the gas pumps. At that point, Kinds was already armed with a handgun. Before exiting the vehicle, Lottie and Tate also armed themselves, with Lottie retrieving a handgun from the vehicle console. The group exited the vehicle and fanned out, so they were each approximately ten feet apart. While looking to the east, they started walking toward the Family Express entrance. About fifty-five seconds later, the two vehicles approached an intersection near the Family Express and one of them rolled down a passenger window. Lottie and his acquaintances were still outside the Family Express. They watched the vehicles at the intersection, and when the vehicles began moving, the group started walking back toward the gas pumps, which was closer to the vehicles. The vehicles turned at the intersection, sped past the Family Express, and an occupant fired a rifle at them. Lottie, Tate, and Kinds returned fire as the two vehicles sped off. During the exchange, Tate was struck by a bullet and two bystanders were injured—a woman driving nearby was shot in the leg and a man was struck by a stray bullet while sleeping in his residence.

[4] In January 2022, law enforcement interviewed Lottie, who confirmed that he possessed and fired a handgun during the incident. At the time of the shooting, Lottie was prohibited from carrying a handgun in that he was convicted of Level 6 felony resisting law enforcement in 2020 and was still on probation.

[5] On October 27, 2022, the State charged Lottie with carrying a handgun without a license, seeking an elevated Level 5 felony conviction because Lottie had a prior felony conviction in the last fifteen years. An initial jury trial resulted in a mistrial. A second jury trial was held in February 2025. In closing arguments, Lottie's counsel stated: “[T]here's not a lot in contention here ․ Lottie was carrying a handgun at the time he was a convicted felon prohibited from carrying a handgun. We're not contesting that.” Tr. Vol. III p. 22. He instead asked the jury to consider two defenses—self-defense and necessity. The jury found Lottie guilty, and the trial court entered judgment of conviction. The trial court held the sentencing hearing on April 2, 2025, and sentenced Lottie to five years in the Indiana Department of Correction. Lottie now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[6] On appeal, Lottie focuses on the defenses of self-defense and necessity, claiming there was insufficient evidence to rebut them. We address each defense in turn.

I. Self-Defense

[7] Lottie claims that principles of self-defense justified retrieving the handgun from the vehicle console. “A defendant can raise self-defense as a justification for an otherwise criminal act.” Larkin v. State, 173 N.E.3d 662, 670 (Ind. 2021) (citing Indiana Code section 35-41-3-2). This includes claiming self-defense to justify the commission of a status offense. See Harmon v. State, 849 N.E.2d 726, 730–34 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (concluding the defendant could claim self-defense when charged with unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon).

[8] Our legislature adopted a self-defense statute, explaining that “it is the policy of this state that people have the right to defend themselves and third parties from physical harm and crime” and that the purpose of the statute “is to provide the citizens of this state with a lawful means of carrying out this policy.” Ind. Code § 35-41-3-2(a). In pertinent part, our self-defense statute provides as follows:

A person is justified in using reasonable force against any other person to protect the person or a third person from what the person reasonably believes to be the imminent use of unlawful force. However, a person:

(1) is justified in using deadly force; and

(2) does not have a duty to retreat;

if the person reasonably believes that that force is necessary to prevent serious bodily injury to the person or a third person or the commission of a forcible felony. No person, employer, or estate of a person in this state shall be placed in legal jeopardy of any kind whatsoever for protecting the person or a third person by reasonable means necessary.

I.C. § 35-41-3-2(c).

[9] Our Supreme Court recently interpreted and synthesized these three clauses, confirming that self-defense justifies the use of force “when ‘the defendant acted without fault, was in a place where he had a legal right to be, and was in real danger of death or great bodily harm or was in such apparent danger as caused him in good faith to fear death or bodily injury.’ ” Turner v. State, 253 N.E.3d 526, 537 (Ind. 2025) (quoting Spinks v. State, 437 N.E.2d 963, 965 (Ind. 1982)). The Court emphasized that there were “important limits” on self-defense, noting: “A person who provokes, instigates, or participates willingly in the violence does not act without fault for the purposes of self-defense.” Id. at 541 (quoting Richardson v. State, 79 N.E.3d 958, 964 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans. denied). The Court also explained that when a defendant “ ‘arms himself or herself with a weapon before an imminent threat exists in a premeditated strategy to retaliate for past violence (rather than to protect against the imminent use of unlawful force),’ self-defense does not justify using force.” Id. (quoting Henson v. State, 786 N.E.2d 274, 278 (Ind. 2003)).

[10] “Once the defendant invokes self-defense, the State has the burden to disprove beyond a reasonable doubt at least one element of the justification.” Id. at 534. The State may rebut the defense directly, “by affirmatively showing the defendant did not act in self-defense,” or the State may rely on the sufficiency of evidence in its case-in-chief. Hughs v. State, 153 N.E.3d 354, 361 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied. Where, as here, an appeal involves a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence rebutting a claim of self-defense, we apply the same standard of review as for any challenge to the sufficiency of evidence. Wilson v. State, 770 N.E.2d 799, 801 (Ind. 2002). That is, we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses. Id. Instead, we respect a fact-finder's exclusive province to weigh conflicting evidence and “consider only the probative evidence and the reasonable inferences that support the verdict.” Phipps v. State, 90 N.E.3d 1190, 1195 (Ind. 2018). We will reverse the defendant's conviction “ ‘only if no reasonable person could say that’ the defendant's self-defense claim ‘was negated by the State beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” Turner, 253 N.E.3d at 533 (quoting Wilson, 770 N.E.2d at 801).

[11] The essence of Lottie's self-defense claim is that arming himself was necessary to protect against serious bodily injury. We note, however, that “[a] person who provokes, instigates, or participates willingly in the violence does not act without fault for the purposes of self-defense.” Id. at 541 (quoting Richardson, 79 N.E.3d at 964). Here, the two vehicles sped past Lottie's group, pulled in front of them, and turned into a movie theater parking lot. When the vehicles turned, Lottie suggested that Kinds pull into the nearby Family Express gas station. Lottie then armed himself. His acquaintances were also armed. The group exited the vehicle and immediately fanned out, spacing themselves about ten feet apart. They continued to look east. Moreover, although they walked toward the entrance to the Family Express, they did not enter. After about fifty-five seconds, the two vehicles approached a nearby intersection, and one rolled a window down. Lottie and his acquaintances watched the two vehicles, and as the vehicles started moving, the group started walking in their direction.

[12] This was sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that Lottie was preparing to willingly participate in a violent confrontation. Further, because this case turns on the element of fault, as opposed to the reasonableness of believing force was necessary, we find the case distinguishable from Turner. See id. at 534 (explaining that “using defensive force based on an accurate belief [the force was necessary] is justified regardless of the belief's reasonableness”).

[13] In the end, based on Lottie's actions—including suggesting that Kinds pull into the Family Express near where the vehicles turned, arming himself thereafter, and later moving toward the vehicles—a reasonable juror could determine that Lottie chose to strategically arm himself, fan into position, and wait for the vehicles to return to confront the occupants. Under the circumstances, a jury could reasonably reject Lottie's contention that he acted without fault when he chose to arm himself, and therefore, he did not act in self-defense when committing the charged offense.² We therefore conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence rebutting Lottie's claim of self-defense.³

II. Necessity

[14] Lottie claims his possession of the handgun was justified by necessity. The State has the same burden of disproving at least one element of the defense beyond a reasonable doubt. Dozier v. State, 709 N.E.2d 27, 29 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999). Furthermore, we apply the same standard of review when assessing whether the State presented sufficient evidence to rebut the defense. Id. at 30.

[15] A necessity defense has six elements. Id. at 29. For this defense to apply, (1) “the act charged as criminal must have been done to prevent a significant evil,” (2) “there must have been no adequate alternative to the commission of the act,” (3) “the harm caused by the act must not be disproportionate to the harm avoided,” (4) “the accused must entertain a good faith belief that his act was necessary to prevent greater harm,” (5) “such belief must be objectively reasonable under all the circumstances,” and (6) “the accused must not have substantially contributed to the creation of the emergency.” Id.

[16] Here, a reasonable fact-finder could reject Lottie's contention that there was no reasonable alternative to arming himself in that, when he armed himself, the two vehicles that concerned him had driven away and turned into a movie theater parking lot. Instead of retrieving a handgun, Lottie could have directed Kinds to drive away from the area immediately. Alternatively, Lottie could have sought help, hurried into the Family Express, or taken any number of actions that would have been adequate alternatives to carrying a handgun.

[17] Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the judgment, we ultimately conclude there was sufficient evidence rebutting the defense of necessity.

Conclusion

[18] Having identified sufficient evidence rebutting the defenses of self-defense and necessity, we affirm the conviction.

[19] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-47-2-1(e)(2) (2017).

2.   Our analysis focuses on the moment Lottie armed himself, at which point he committed the offense.

3.   Having identified sufficient evidence rebutting the element that Lottie acted without fault in arming himself, we do not address whether the State rebutted other elements of self-defense.

Foley, Judge.

Altice, C.J. and May, J., concur.