KREILEIN v. REAGLE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Alan Kreilein, pro se, appeals the trial court's order dismissing his petition seeking to enjoin the Indiana Department of Correction (“DOC”) from labeling him a sexually violent predator (“SVP”). We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On May 16, 2004, Kreilein committed Class A felony criminal deviate conduct.¹ In October 2004, Kreilein pled guilty to the offense pursuant to a plea agreement and received a thirty-year sentence.

[3] Indiana Code section 35-38-1-7.5 (2002) was in effect at the time of Kreilein's offense and conviction, and it provided that a person convicted of a sex offense was a SVP if the trial court found the person was a SVP after consulting with at least two board certified psychologists or psychiatrists with expertise in criminal behavior disorders. In 2007, the General Assembly amended the SVP statute to provide that an offender who committed one of several sex offenses, including Class A felony criminal deviate conduct, “is a [SVP] by operation of law if ․ the person was released from incarceration, secure detention, or probation for the offense after June 30, 1994.” Ind. Code § 35-38-1-7.5 (2007).

[4] Following enactment of the 2007 Amendment, Kreilein learned he will be required to register as a SVP upon his release from prison. In the years following this revelation, Kreilein filed a plethora of unsuccessful actions seeking to avoid his designation as a SVP. (See Appellee's Br. at 8-9 (summarizing prior actions).) (See, e.g., State v. Kreilein, 82D02-0405-FB-416 (motion to correct erroneous sentence, motion for writ of habeas corpus, motion to withdraw guilty plea); Kreilein v. State, 82D03-2104-PC-001765 (petition for post-conviction relief); Kreilein v. State, 82D03-2309-PC-004686 (successive petition for post-conviction relief)).

[5] On May 30, 2024, Kreilein filed his complaint in the instant case, and he amended his complaint on September 13, 2024. Kreilein's amended complaint asked the trial court to issue an order enjoining the DOC from requiring him to register as a SVP. The State responded to Kreilein's complaint with a motion for summary disposition. In that motion, the State advanced several arguments including that Kreilein's complaint should be dismissed pursuant to Trial Rule 12(B)(6) because labeling him a SVP did not violate his constitutional rights. On January 16, 2025, the trial court issued an order summarily granting the State's motion and dismissing Kreilein's complaint.

Discussion and Decision

[6] Initially, we note Kreilein proceeds pro se. “It is well settled that pro se litigants are held to the same legal standards as licensed attorneys. Thus, pro se litigants are bound to follow the established rules of procedure and must be prepared to accept the consequences of their failure to do so.” Parker v. Ind. State Prison, 266 N.E.3d 775, 779 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (internal citation omitted).

[7] Kreilein asserts the trial court erred by dismissing his complaint.² We review a trial court's ruling on a Trial Rule 12(B)(6) motion de novo. Safeco Ins. Co. of Ind. v. Blue Sky Innovation Grp., Inc., 230 N.E.3d 898, 901 (Ind. 2024), reh'g denied. “A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(B)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint: that is, whether the allegations in the complaint establish any set of circumstances under which a plaintiff would be entitled to relief.” Trail v. Boys & Girls Clubs of Nw. Ind., 845 N.E.2d 130, 134 (Ind. 2006).

[8] Kreilein argues the SVP designation violates his right under the Indiana Constitution to be free of ex post facto laws.³ However, in Lemmon v. Harris, 949 N.E.2d 803 (Ind. 2011), our Indiana Supreme Court expressly rejected that argument. Harris pled guilty to Class B felony child molesting in 1999, and he was released from incarceration in 2008. Id. at 804. Harris filed a declaratory judgment action asking the trial court to order that he be subjected to only a ten-year reporting obligation and that he not be labeled a SVP. Id. at 805. The trial court ruled in Harris's favor. Id. We affirmed, but our Indiana Supreme Court granted transfer. Id. The Court held retroactive application of the SVP-by-operation-of-law statute to Harris was not a violation of the Indiana Constitution's prohibition against ex-post facto laws because the amended statute was non-punitive. Id. at 813. The Court explained the 2007 Amendment was non-punitive as applied to Harris because “many of the [SVP] Act's registration and disclosure requirements were in place and applied to Harris at the time he committed his offense and at the time he pled guilty to child molesting, well before the 2007 Amendment.” Id. at 812. In addition, the Court noted the amended act allowed the offender to petition the trial court to have his SVP status removed after registering for ten years, and the Court concluded that “the 2007 Amendment advances the Act's legitimate regulatory purpose of public safety—by its terms, only those people who present a future threat are required to register for their lifetimes.” Id. at 813. For the same reasons our Indiana Supreme Court rejected Harris's argument that the 2007 Amendment violated his constitutional rights, application of the 2007 Amendment to Kreilein does not violate his constitutional right to be free of ex post facto laws. Therefore, we affirm the trial court because Kreilein's complaint fails as a matter of law.

Conclusion

[9] As a matter of law, the application of the 2007 Amendment to the SVP statute to Kreilein does not violate his right under the Indiana Constitution to be free of ex post facto laws. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's dismissal of his complaint.

[10] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-42-4-2(b) (1998).

2.   Kreilein's briefs fail to comply with our Appellate Rules in several respects. Most notably, Appellate Rule 43(C) requires appellate briefs to “be produced in a neat and legible manner using black type.” In addition, Appellate Rule 43(D) requires the font used in an appellate brief to be “12-point or larger[.]” While we recognize an inmate may need to submit a handwritten brief out of necessity, this Rule still requires such handwritten briefs be easily legible. Kreilein's poor and exceedingly small handwriting renders large portions of his briefs unnecessarily difficult to read. The failure to follow our Appellate Rules may result in waiver of arguments on appeal, but given our preference to decide cases on the merits when possible, we nonetheless proceed with deciding Kreilein's appeal. See, e.g., Foley v. Mannor, 844 N.E.2d 494, 496 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (deciding appeal on the merits despite appellant's failure to comply with numerous provisions of the Indiana Appellate Rules).

3.   “No ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts, shall ever be passed.” Ind. Const. Art. 1, § 24.

May, Judge.

Altice, C.J., and Foley, J., concur.