Jacob Murphy, Appellant v. ARC RRINSIN001 LLC ARC CFMEZZ001 LLC INC (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Jacob Murphy appeals the trial court's entry of summary judgment in favor of the City of Indianapolis (the “City”) and Rolls-Royce Corporation (“Rolls-Royce”) on his negligence claim. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On May 7, 2022, thirty-three-year-old Murphy, a resident of Arkansas, was operating an electric two-wheel foot scooter on a sidewalk near the intersection of Illinois Street and West Henry Street just south of downtown Indianapolis when the scooter “hit a depression in the concrete that was not visible as marked.” Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 166. This caused Murphy “to be thrown from the scooter fracturing [his] left knee cap which required surgery.” Id. According to Murphy, on the date he was injured, the “street access was blocked due to a race or marathon that had occurred or been set up for earlier that day.” Id.

[3] Meanwhile, by agreement dated August 25, 2021, titled “Fifth Amendment to Sublease Agreement” (the “Sublease”), Rolls-Royce leased the premises located at 450 and 546 South Meridian Street in Indianapolis from ARC RRINSIN001, LLC (“ARC”). The Sublease included, as part of the leased premises, a nine-level parking garage (the “Parking Garage”). Murphy's alleged scooter accident occurred on the public sidewalk that abuts the Parking Garage.

[4] The Sublease included a section titled “Premises Downsizing” that provided in relevant part:

(a) ․ not earlier than seven months following [August 25, 2021] but not later than the Expiration Date (the “Give Back Date”), [Rolls-Royce] shall give back and surrender to [ARC] all of the Existing Leased Premises EXCEPT FOR the Faris II Building, also referenced as the North Building, and the area described in subsection (t) hereof (collectively, the Give Back Premises, such notice to include the Give Back Date (the “Give Back Notice”). For the avoidance of doubt, the Give Back Premises being surrendered by [Rolls-Royce] shall include, without limitation, the Faris I Building, also referred to as the South Building, the Cafeteria/Conference Building, the Parking Garage and the North Parking Lot/Surface Lot B. For the avoidance of doubt, from and after the Give Back Date, each of the Parking Garage and the North Parking Lot/Surface Lot B shall be Common Areas for purposes of the Lease․

* * * * *

(c) Upon and after the Give Back Date, the Parking Garage and the North Parking Lot/Surface Lot B shall not be part of the Leased Premises․

Id. at 83-84. On January 28, 2022, Rolls-Royce provided the written “Give Back Notice” to ARC. Id. at 103. The notice provided that, effective May 1, 2022, Rolls-Royce was surrendering the “Give Back Premises,” which included the Parking Garage. Id. The notice further provided that ARC “will take control of the [P]arking [G[arage after giving back.” Id. at 109.

[5] On April 1, 2024, Murphy filed a complaint for negligence against the City and Rolls-Royce.¹ Murphy alleged that the City is “a municipality responsible for maintaining sidewalks, roadways and pedestrian paths on or around the sidewalk” where he was injured, and that Rolls-Royce “owned, operated and maintained a parking garage at or around” the site of the accident, and that his injury “was proximately caused by and/or resulted from the negligence and/or fault of” the City and Rolls-Royce. Id. at 16.

[6] On January 1, 2025, Rolls-Royce filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, designation of evidence, and memorandum. Specifically, Rolls-Royce argued that it did not owe a duty to Murphy because, on the day of the accident, it did not “own the public sidewalk” and further that it did not “own, occupy, or possess any adjacent private property to where [Murphy] fell.” Id. at 23. Rolls-Royce emphasized that at the time of the accident, on May 7, 2022, “Rolls-Royce no longer occupied” the “parking garage next to where [Murphy] fell” but had “surrendered possession of it to its Landlord, co-Defendant [ARC].” Id. On February 5, 2025, the City filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and memorandum. In its motion, the City argued that, at the time of the accident, Murphy was operating a motorized vehicle on a sidewalk in violation of the Revised Code of Indianapolis § 441-320.1(a) (the “Scooter Ordinance”). The City argued that the unexcused violation of the Scooter Ordinance constituted negligence per se, thereby barring Murphy's claim against the City.

[7] On March 4, 2025, Murphy filed his response in opposition to Rolls-Royce's Motion for Summary Judgment. On that same date, Murphy filed his response in opposition to the City's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. In his response to the City, Murphy requested the trial court take judicial notice that the “2022 OneAmerica 500 Festival Mini-Marathon and 5k races occurred on May 7, 2022[,] from 7:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m.” Id. at 152. On March 18, 2025, the City filed its reply in support of its Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. On March 19, 2025, Rolls-Royce filed its reply in support of its Motion for Summary Judgment.

[8] On May 27, 2025, the trial court entered its order granting Rolls-Royce's Motion for Summary Judgment. On May 30, 2025, the trial court converted the City's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings to a Motion for Summary Judgment and entered an order granting the motion. Specifically, the court found that the designated evidence demonstrated that “at the time of the incident in which he claims he was injured, Murphy was operating a motorized vehicle on a sidewalk.” Id. at 13. The court found that the Scooter Ordinance provides that “It shall be unlawful for any person to operate an electric foot scooter on: (1) A sidewalk, (2) A greenway, or (3) Any pedestrian or multimodal path that is paved or unpaved in the city.” Id. (citing Revised City Code § 441-320.1(a)). The court found that “Murphy's violation of the ordinance was not justified or excused” and that such “violation of the ordinance constitutes negligence per se.” Id. at 14. The court found that “Murphy's negligence per se was a proximate cause of his injury” and thus “his claims are barred against the City as any contributory fault bars his claims against a municipality.” Id. (citing Brown v. City of Indianapolis, 113 N.E.3d 244, 252 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018)). Regarding both orders, finding no just reason for delay, the court entered final appealable judgments and Murphy filed a consolidated notice of appeal.

Discussion and Decision

[9] Murphy challenges the trial court's entry of summary judgment in favor of the City and Rolls-Royce. Our standard of review is well settled. Summary judgment is appropriate only where there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Ind. Trial Rule 56(C); Mangold ex rel. Mangold v. Ind. Dep't of Natural Res., 756 N.E.2d 970, 973 (Ind. 2001). The party moving for summary judgment has the burden of making a prima facie showing there is no genuine issue of material fact. Goodwin v. Yeakle's Sports Bar & Grill, Inc., 62 N.E.3d 384, 386 (Ind. 2016). Once met, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to show the existence of a genuine issue by setting forth specifically designated facts. Id. Our review is de novo, drawing all reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of the nonmovant. Ind. Dep't of Ins. v. Doe, 247 N.E.3d 1204, 1210 (Ind. 2024) (citing Hughley v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1000, 1003 (Ind. 2014)). In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion for summary judgment, we may affirm on any grounds supported by the Indiana Trial Rule 56 designated materials. Catt v. Bd. of Commr's of Knox Cnty., 779 N.E.2d 1, 3 (Ind. 2002). On appeal, the trial court's order granting or denying a motion for summary judgment is cloaked with a presumption of validity. Ellis v. City of Martinsville, 940 N.E.2d 1197, 1201 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). The party appealing the trial court's summary judgment determination bears the burden of persuading the appellate court the ruling was erroneous. Ryan v. TCI Architects/Eng'rs/Contractors, Inc., 72 N.E.3d 908, 913 (Ind. 2017). As the court here entered separate orders addressing each appellee's motion, we will address the appealed orders in turn.

A. Rolls-Royce

[10] We first address the trial court's entry of summary judgment in favor of Rolls-Royce. Murphy contends that “genuine issues of fact remain as to whether Rolls-Royce owed a duty to repair and maintain the sidewalk at issue.” Appellant's Brief at 15 (emphasis omitted). We disagree.

[11] “[T]o prevail on a claim of negligence the plaintiff must show: (1) duty owed to plaintiff by defendant; (2) breach of duty by allowing conduct to fall below the applicable standard of care; and (3) compensable injury proximately caused by defendant's breach of duty.” Goodwin, 62 N.E.3d at 386-387 (citations omitted). “Absent a duty there can be no negligence or liability based upon the breach.” Id. Whether a duty exists is a question of law for the court to decide. Id. However, “a judicial determination of the existence of a duty is unnecessary where the element of duty has ‘already been declared or otherwise articulated.’ ” Rogers v. Martin, 63 N.E.3d 316, 321 (Ind. 2016) (quoting N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Sharp, 790 N.E.2d 462, 465 (Ind. 2003)).

[12] Murphy concedes that he was operating the scooter on a “[C]ity-sidewalk.” Appellant's Brief at 11. It is well-settled that “[a] municipality has a common[-] law duty to exercise reasonable care and diligence to keep its streets and sidewalks in a reasonably safe condition for travel.” Denison Parking, Inc. v. Davis, 861 N.E.2d 1276, 1280 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied. It is also well-settled that “there is no similar corresponding duty for owners of property abutting a public sidewalk.” Id. (collecting cases). Rather, “[p]ersons are held to have assumed a duty to pedestrians on public sidewalks only when they create artificial conditions that increase risk and proximately cause injury to persons using those sidewalks.” Id. (emphasis omitted).

[13] Here, there is neither allegation nor designated evidence that Rolls-Royce created artificial conditions that increased the risk to persons using the sidewalk adjacent to the Parking Garage. Indeed, Murphy alleged that he was injured due to “a depression” in the concrete sidewalk. Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 166. There is no allegation or suggestion in the designated materials that Rolls-Royce created or caused the depression in the sidewalk. Under the circumstances, we cannot say that Rolls-Royce assumed a common-law duty to Murphy, based upon a condition that it did not create. Thus, Rolls-Royce did not assume a common-law duty to maintain the public sidewalk upon which Murphy was injured.²

[14] To the extent Murphy asserts that summary judgment was improper because Rolls-Royce may be liable under a premises liability theory because it “had recently leased, controlled, or occupied the [P]arking [G]arage and surrounding area where [he] fell,” Appellant's Brief at 17, we observe that the undisputed designated evidence demonstrates that Rolls-Royce's tenancy of the Parking Garage ended on May 1, 2022. On that date, Rolls-Royce surrendered both its possession and control over the Giveback Premises, which included the Parking Garage, to ARC. Murphy's scooter accident occurred on May 7, 2022. Accordingly, Rolls-Royce was not in control of the Parking Garage and surrounding area when the accident occurred.

[15] The Indiana Supreme Court recently observed:

“[I]n premises liability cases, whether a duty is owed depends primarily upon whether the defendant was in control of the premises when the accident occurred.” Daisy v. Roach, 811 N.E.2d 862, 867 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (citation omitted). “The rationale is to subject to liability the person who could have known of any dangers on the land and therefore could have acted to prevent any foreseeable harm.” Rhodes v. Wright, 805 N.E.2d 382, 385 (Ind. 2004). Only the party who controls the land has the right to prevent others from coming onto it and can remedy the hazardous conditions which exist upon it. The party that is in control of the land has the exclusive ability to prevent injury from occurring. Harris v. Traini, 759 N.E.2d 215, 225 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (internal citations omitted). Therefore, “[l]iability for injury ordinarily depends upon the power to prevent injury.” Cox v. Stoughton Trailers, Inc., 837 N.E.2d 1075, 1081 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (quoting Mishler v. State, 730 N.E.2d 229, 231 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000)).

Isgrig v. Trs. of Indiana Univ., 256 N.E.3d 1238, 1245 (Ind. 2025) (emphasis added). We cannot say that the trial court erred in granting Rolls-Royce's Motion for Summary Judgment.

B. The City

[16] We next address the trial court's entry of summary judgment in favor of the City. The court found that “Murphy's violation of the [Scooter] [O]rdinance was not justified or excused,” that such “violation of the ordinance constitutes negligence per se,” and therefore, “his claims are barred against the City as any contributory fault bars his claims against a municipality.” Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 14. We find our recent opinion in Areche v. Indianapolis Dep't of Public Works, 264 N.E.3d 84 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025), trans. denied, instructive.³ In Areche, Eliezer Areche was riding an electric foot scooter on a sidewalk in Indianapolis when he hit a hole, fell, and was injured. Areche, 264 N.E.3d at 86. He brought a negligence action against several defendants, including the City. Id. The City moved for summary judgment arguing that “Areche could not recover because he was negligent per se for violating a city ordinance that prohibited electric foot scooters from being operated on sidewalks and was, therefore, contributorily negligent.” Id. The trial court agreed and granted the City's motion for summary judgment. Id.

[17] On appeal, this Court reviewed and considered the interplay between general negligence, the common-law defense of contributory negligence, and negligence per se. We observed that the common-law defense of contributory negligence survived the adoption of the Comparative Fault Act for tort claims against governmental entities and thus, “for claims against governmental entities, any amount of negligence by the plaintiff still acts as a complete bar to recovery under the theory of contributory negligence.” Id. at 89-90 (citing McSwane v. Bloomington Hosp. & Healthcare Sys., 916 N.E.2d 906, 911 (Ind. 2009)). We next observed that negligence per se consists of the “unexcused violation of a statute or ordinance” if the statute or ordinance “(1) protects the class of persons in which the plaintiff is included and (2) protects against the type of harm [that] has occurred as a result of the violation.” Id. at 90 (quoting Stachowski v. Est. of Radman, 95 N.E.3d 542, 544 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (some quotation marks and citation omitted)). A “finding of negligence per se ․ represents a judicial acceptance of the legislative judgment that acts in violation of the statute constitute unreasonable conduct.” Id.

[18] In Areche, the City claimed that, by violating the Scooter Ordinance, Areche was negligent per se and was, therefore, barred from recovery against the City based upon the defense of contributory negligence. Id. Areche admitted that he violated the Scooter Ordinance but claimed that the negligence per se doctrine did not apply because the Scooter Ordinance does not protect the class of person in which he was included (scooter operators) and does not protect the type of harm that resulted (a single scooter accident). Id. The majority disagreed with Areche and concluded that the Scooter Ordinance protects “anyone on the sidewalk, including electric scooter operators—and protects against the type of harm that Areche suffered as a result of his violation of the Scooter Ordinance—injuries caused by riding electric scooters on sidewalks.”⁴ Id. at 93. Accordingly, the majority concluded that Areche's admitted violation of the Scooter Ordinance constituted negligence per se, and thus his claim against the City was barred by the common-law defense of contributory negligence and summary judgment in favor of the City was appropriate. Id.

[19] Murphy maintains that Areche is not dispositive here because the plaintiff in that case did not claim “that his violation [of the Scooter Ordinance] was excused.” Appellant's Reply Brief 13. Murphy points to his designated answers to Rolls-Royce's interrogatories in which he claimed that, on the date of his accident, the “street access was blocked due to a race or marathon,” Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 71, and asserts that a genuine issue of material fact remains regarding whether his violation of the Scooter Ordinance was excusable and thus, whether negligence per se/contributory negligence applies thereby barring his claim against the City.

[20] We note that while contributory negligence is generally a question of fact and is not an appropriate matter for summary judgment “if there are conflicting factual inferences,” Funston v. Sch. Town of Munster, 849 N.E.2d 595, 599 (Ind. 2006), contributory negligence becomes a question of law when “the facts are undisputed and only a single inference can reasonably be drawn therefrom.” Indianapolis Pub. Transportation Corp. v. Bush, 266 N.E.3d 719, 725 (Ind. 2025).

[21] This Court has held that proof of the violation of a safety regulation creates a rebuttable presumption of negligence. Brown v. City of Indianapolis, 113 N.E.3d 244, 251 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (citing Witham v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 561 N.E.2d 484, 485 (Ind. 1990)). The presumption may be rebutted by evidence that the person violating the statute did what might reasonably be expected of a person of ordinary prudence, acting under similar circumstances, who desired to comply with the law. Id. More specifically, the Indiana Supreme Court has indicated that, in order to rebut the presumption, the person must come forth with evidence that discloses that statutory or ordinance “compliance was impossible or non-compliance was excusable because of circumstances resulting from causes or things beyond [the person's] control, and in no way produced by his own negligence[.]” See Larkins v. Kohlmeyer, 229 Ind. 391, 400, 98 N.E.2d 896, 900 (1951) (discussing evidence necessary to justify noncompliance with provisions of a safety statute regarding operation of an automobile on a public highway).

[22] Here, Murphy's admitted violation of the Scooter Ordinance creates a presumption of his negligence per se. Based upon our review of the designated evidence, he failed to rebut that presumption. In his response to the City's motion for judgment on the pleadings/summary judgment based upon Murphy's violation of the Scooter Ordinance, Murphy baldly asserted that “[d]ue to road closures, compliance with [the Scooter Ordinance] would have been impossible in the area where Murphy was injured.” Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 152. In reply, the City requested the court take judicial notice of “the official 2022 Indianapolis 500 Mini-Marathon and 5k races Participant Guide” which provided that “the race course did not include Illinois Street or West Henry Street, nor did it pass by the Rolls-Royce parking garage or anywhere near that location.” Appellant's Appendix Volume III at 80. We agree with the City that this designation appears to establish that Murphy's allegation that pertinent street access was blocked “is demonstrably inaccurate.” Id.

[23] Significantly, even assuming a question of fact exists regarding whether or not pertinent street access was blocked, Murphy has provided no evidence from which a reasonable inference could be made that he simply had no other choice but to operate the electric scooter on that particular sidewalk at that particular time. As observed by the City, Murphy designated no evidence as to “where he began operating the electric scooter ․ [h]e has not explained where he was going” and he “has not provided any information from which a juror could reasonably infer that [he] could not have used a different route.” City's Brief at 19. We cannot say that Murphy came forth with evidence showing compliance with the Scooter Ordinance was impossible or non-compliance was excusable because of circumstances resulting from causes or things beyond Murphy's control, and in no way produced by his own negligence. We agree with the trial court that Murphy's claim against the City is barred by the common-law defense of contributory negligence.

[24] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court's entry of summary judgment in favor of the City and Rolls-Royce.

[25] Affirmed.

[26] I concur in all respects with the majority's analysis regarding Rolls Royce. For the reason noted below, I also concur in the result affirming summary judgment in favor of the City of Indianapolis. I write separately solely to address the majority's apt reference to my dissent in Areche, 264 N.E.3d 84 (Scheele, J., dissenting), and its application to the instant case. See supra fn. 4.

[27] In Areche, I did not believe the plaintiff's injury was explicitly among the types of harm contemplated by the City of Indianapolis when it enacted the Scooter Ordinance. Therefore, I would have held a factual issue existed that should be decided by a jury. Here, Murphy was injured when his scooter “hit a depression in the concrete that was not visible as marked.” Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 166. As in Areche, I doubt whether the type of harm suffered by Murphy was contemplated by the ordinance and would hold that a question of fact remains. Indeed, it is well-established that “we resolve any doubt as to any facts or inferences to be drawn therefrom ․ in favor of the non-moving party.” Burton v. Benner, 140 N.E.3d 848, 851 (Ind. 2020) (citation and brackets omitted, emphasis added).

[28] The denial of Areche's Petition to Transfer does not mean, on its own, that the Scooter Ordinance intends to protect from the type of harm suffered by Areche or Murphy. See Indiana Appellate Rule 58(B) (Denial of a Petition to Transfer has “no legal effect other than to terminate the litigation between the parties in the Supreme Court.”). I remain convinced that it is unclear from the Scooter Ordinance that the City intended to protect scooterists from the type of harm suffered by Areche and Murphy, and, therefore, that a factual issue exists for a jury to decide. However, in light of Murphy's apparent abandonment of his argument regarding types of harm the ordinance seeks to prevent, I concur in result based on Murphy's remaining arguments.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Murphy also named ARC, the “owner and/or property manager of the Rolls-Royce parking garage,” as a defendant. Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 15-16. Murphy's negligence claim against ARC is not a subject of this appeal.

2.   Murphy concedes that he “is not claiming Rolls-Royce owed him a duty of care based upon a statutorily imposed duty.” Appellant's Reply Brief at 10.

3.   The City notes that this Court “issued its decision in Areche on June 6, 2025,” that Murphy “is represented by the same counsel, and filed his opening brief nearly six weeks later, on July 16, 2025,” but that “he makes no mention of Areche in his opening brief.” City's Brief at 25. Murphy responds that “at the time [he] filed his Appellant's Brief, Areche was still pending final disposition from the Indiana Supreme Court,” with transfer being denied on September 25, 2025. Appellant's Reply Brief at 13.

4.   Judge Scheele dissented regarding the majority's conclusion that the Scooter Ordinance protected against the type of harm Areche suffered, hitting a large hole with gravel on the sidewalk, believing that the majority applied the Scooter Ordinance too broadly. Areche, 264 N.E.3d at 93-94 (Scheele, J., dissenting). However, in light of the Indiana Supreme Court's denial of transfer in Areche, Murphy explicitly states that he abandons any “further argument with regard to the class of persons the Scooter Ordinance aims to protect or the harm the ordinance seeks to prevent.” Appellant's Reply Brief at 15.

Brown, Judge.

Judge Felix concurs. Judge Scheele concurs in result with separate opinion. Felix, J., concurs. Scheele, J., concurs in result with separate opinion.