Terry L. Harris, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Two police officers lawfully stopped a vehicle in which Terry Harris was a front seat passenger. One took Harris's identification card and used it to search for outstanding warrants while writing the vehicle's driver a traffic citation. Before this officer returned Harris's identification, Harris handed the second officer his backpack and admitted that he possessed cocaine. The officers then searched Harris's backpack and found cocaine, methamphetamine, and fentanyl.

[2] Harris was convicted of three drug dealing felonies and sentenced to a total of 20 years in the Indiana Department of Correction (DOC). Harris now appeals his convictions, arguing that the evidence of drug dealing was inadmissible because it was obtained in violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Harris also argues that State failed to prove Allen County was the proper venue for his trial. Additionally, he appeals his sentence as inappropriate under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B). We affirm.

Facts

[3] On August 1, 2024, Officers Evan Rhoades and Hau Thang of the Fort Wayne Police Department were surveilling a residence located at 1202 High Street, Fort Wayne, Indiana. Officer Rhoades knew the residence to be a common nuisance for drug activity, and he could see someone sitting in the driver's seat of a silver Kia Soul that was parked in the driveway. From a prior traffic stop, Officer Rhoades recognized this vehicle as belonging to Angelina Tulk. And by reviewing Tulk's driving record, Officer Rhoades learned that Tulk did not have a valid driver's license.

[4] A second person, later identified as Harris, soon exited the residence carrying a brown leather backpack. Harris got into the passenger seat of the Kia, which then drove away from the residence. As it did, Officer Rhoades saw that Tulk was the person behind the wheel—driving without a license. Officers Rhoades and Thang therefore followed Tulk in their patrol car and soon initiated a traffic stop. Officer Rhoades also called for a canine officer to join them at the scene.

[5] During the traffic stop, Tulk and Harris both provided Officer Rhoades with identification cards when asked. Officer Rhoades took these cards back to his patrol car and used them to search for outstanding warrants. The search revealed that Harris had an outstanding warrant in Georgia, but it was not extraditable from Indiana. Officer Rhoades next wrote Tulk a traffic citation for driving without a license. Because Harris, too, did not have a driver's license, Officer Rhoades also called for a truck to tow Tulk's vehicle.

[6] Officer Rhoades was in his patrol car for 10 to 12 minutes, during which Fort Wayne Police Officers Nolan Hoffman and Shay Beaver arrived at the scene, the latter with his canine partner. While Officer Rhoades finished writing Tulk a citation, Officer Beaver began preparing for his canine to perform a “free air sniff” of Tulk's vehicle. Tr. Vol. II, p. 40. Officer Hoffman assisted Officer Beaver by asking Tulk to step out of the vehicle, and Officer Thang did the same with Harris.

[7] When Officer Thang asked Harris to step out of the vehicle for the canine sniff, Harris muttered something about “cocaine” before quickly passing his brown leather backpack through his open car window. Tr. Vol. II, p. 61. Officer Thang received the backpack on the other side as Harris stated, “[J]ust take it.” Id. Harris then exited the vehicle and began removing items from his pockets, including a small foil packet that he admitted contained cocaine. Harris also claimed responsibility for any contraband found in Tulk's vehicle.

[8] Officer Thang promptly arrested Harris and informed Officer Rhoades of his incriminating statements. Officer Rhoades then searched Harris's backpack and found 11.63 grams of cocaine, 24.8 grams of methamphetamine, and 6.77 grams of fentanyl along with marijuana and a scale with a light powdery substance on it. Harris later admitted during a police interview that he had been dealing the drugs, selling to 20 or 30 people per day.

[9] The State charged Harris with Level 2 felony dealing in cocaine, Level 2 felony dealing in methamphetamine, and Level 3 felony dealing in a narcotic drug. Prior to his bench trial, Harris moved to suppress the evidence of his drug dealing, arguing that it was obtained in violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment. The trial court denied Harris's motion, and the case proceeded to trial. Over defense counsel's objections, the court admitted evidence of Harris's drug dealing, including testimony about and photographs of the drugs found in his backpack.

[10] The court found Harris guilty as charged and later sentenced him as follows:

• Level 2 felony dealing in cocaine – 20 years in DOC with 2 years suspended to probation;

• Level 2 felony dealing in methamphetamine – 20 years in DOC with 2 years suspended to probation; and

• Level 3 felony dealing in a narcotic drug – 10 years in DOC with 1 year suspended to probation.

The court further ordered that Harris serve his sentences concurrently, yielding a total sentence of 20 years in DOC with 2 years suspended to probation.

Discussion and Decision

[11] Harris appeals his convictions, arguing that the trial court erred by admitting the evidence of his drug dealing and that the State failed to prove Allen County was the proper venue for his trial. He also appeals his sentence as inappropriate under Appellate Rule 7(B). We affirm.

I. Admissibility of Evidence

[12] Harris argues that the evidence of his drug dealing was inadmissible because it was obtained in violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment. We typically review a trial court's ruling on the admissibility of evidence for an abuse of discretion and reverse only if the decision is “clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances.” Thomas v. State, 81 N.E.3d 621, 624 (Ind. 2017). But “when a challenge to such a ruling is predicated on the constitutionality of the search or seizure of evidence, it raises a question of law that we review de novo.” Id. “Generally speaking, evidence obtained pursuant to an unlawful seizure must be excluded under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine.” Clark v. State, 994 N.E.2d 252, 266 (Ind. 2013).

[13] The Fourth Amendment guarantees “the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. When a police officer stops a vehicle to investigate a suspected traffic violation, the officer seizes everyone in the vehicle for Fourth Amendment purposes—the driver as well as any passengers. Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 255 (2007). This seizure “ordinarily continues, and remains reasonable, for the duration of the stop.” Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 333 (2009). But “a police stop exceeding the time needed to handle the matter for which the stop was made violates the Constitution's shield against unreasonable seizures.” Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 350 (2015).

[14] Harris concedes that the traffic stop of Tulk's vehicle was valid, and he does not challenge the constitutionality of his seizure as a passenger during that stop. Instead, Harris claims he was unreasonably seized when Officer Rhoades retained his identification card for roughly 10 minutes after determining he did not have any extraditable warrants. See generally Finger v. State, 799 N.E.2d 528, 533 (Ind. 2003) (ruling that a police officer seizes an individual under the Fourth Amendment by retaining their driver's license). According to Harris: “Once [Officer] Rhoades ran Harris’[s] information and found that there was no basis to hold him any longer, Harris’[s] identification should have been immediately returned to him[,] and he should have been allowed to leave the scene and go about his day.” Id. at 13.

[15] But when Officer Rhoades allegedly seized Harris by retaining his identification card, Harris had already been lawfully seized for purposes of the traffic stop. That initial seizure was ongoing and continued even after Officer Rhoades determined that Harris did not have any extraditable warrants. Though Harris does not challenge the constitutionality of that seizure, our review of the record reveals that it was not unreasonably extended by Officer Rhoades's brief search for outstanding arrest warrants or anything that occurred during the 10 minutes that followed. Police bodycam footage shows that, after checking for arrest warrants, Officer Rhoades immediately began writing Tulk a traffic citation. And he was still in the process of writing that citation when Harris voluntarily handed Officer Thang his backpack full of drugs and spontaneously admitted to possessing cocaine.

[16] Because Harris was lawfully seized, the evidence of his drug dealing was not obtained in violation of his Fouth Amendment rights. The trial court therefore did not err by admitting that evidence at trial.

II. Sufficiency of Evidence

[17] Harris next argues that the State failed to prove Allen County was the proper venue for his trial. A criminal defendant has a constitutional and statutory right to be tried in the county where an offense was committed. Baugh v. State, 801 N.E.2d 629, 631 (Ind. 2004); see Ind. Const. art. I, § 13 (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to a public trial, by an impartial jury, in the county in which the offense shall have been committed ․”); Ind. Code § 35-32-2-1(a) (“Criminal actions shall be tried in the county where the offense was committed, except as otherwise provided by law.”).

[18] “Venue is not an element of the offense.” Baugh, 801 N.E.2d at 631. Thus, “although the State is required to prove venue, it may be established by a preponderance of the evidence and need not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. We review sufficiency challenges to venue in the same manner as other claims of insufficient evidence. Eberle v. State, 942 N.E.2d 848, 855 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). We do not weigh the evidence nor resolve questions of credibility but, instead, look to the evidence and reasonable inferences that support the conclusion that venue was proper. Id.

[19] At trial, Officer Beaver testified that he was working his assigned shift in the southeast quadrant of Fort Wayne, Allen County, when he was called to assist with a traffic stop. According to Harris, this testimony does not reveal where the traffic stop took place; it reveals only where Officer Beaver was located when he received the call to assist. But Officer Beaver's testimony is not the only evidence relevant to the issue of where the traffic stop occurred.¹

[20] At trial, Officer Rhoades testified that he was working his assigned shift in the northwest quadrant of Fort Wayne when he initiated the traffic stop of Tulk's vehicle. From this testimony, it can reasonably be inferred that the traffic stop took place in Fort Wayne. See Evans v. State, 571 N.E.2d 1231, 1233 (Ind. 1991) (“[C]ircumstantial evidence may be sufficient to establish proper venue.”). The record also contains no evidence that the stop occurred anywhere else.

[21] Because a preponderance of the evidence shows that Harris committed his offenses in Fort Wayne, the State sufficiently proved that Allen County was the proper venue for his trial.

III. Appropriateness of Sentence

[22] Finally, Harris challenges his 20-year sentence as inappropriate under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B). That rule which permits an appellate court to revise a sentence if, “after due consideration of the trial court's decision, the sentence is found to be inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” Ind. Appellate Rule 7(B). In reviewing the appropriateness of a sentence, our principal role is to attempt to leaven the outliers, not to achieve a perceived “correct” sentence. Knapp v. State, 9 N.E.3d 1274, 1292 (Ind. 2014). Accordingly, we give “substantial deference” to the trial court's sentencing decision. Id. The trial court's judgment should prevail unless it is “overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense ․ and the defendant's character.” Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 112 (Ind. 2015).

[23] In assessing the appropriateness of a sentence in light of the nature of the offense, we first look to the statutory range established for that class of offense. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 494 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh'g, 875 N.E.2d 218. Harris was convicted of two Level 2 felonies and one Level 3 felony. A Level 2 felony has a sentencing range of 10 to 30 years and an advisory sentence of 171/212 years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-4.5. A Level 3 felony has a sentencing range of 3 to 16 years and an advisory sentence of 9 years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-5. Thus, Harris faced a combined sentencing range of 23 to 76 years and a combined advisory sentence of 44 years.

[24] Harris was sentenced to 20 years in DOC for each of his Level 2 felonies and to 10 years in DOC for his Level 3 felony. Each of these sentences is slightly above the advisory sentence for its respective felony level. But the trial court ordered all three sentences to be served concurrently, yielding a total executed sentence of 20 years. The court also suspended 2 years of Harris's total executed sentence to probation, meaning he was ordered to serve only 18 years in prison. Nothing about the nature of Harris's three drug dealing offenses renders this sentence inappropriate.

[25] As to Harris's character, we observe that he has 9 prior felony and 9 prior misdemeanor convictions. “Even a minor criminal history” reflects poorly on a defendant. Moss v. State, 13 N.E.3d 440, 448 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). But Harris's includes convictions for burglary, theft, forgery, carrying a concealed weapon, driving while intoxicated, possession of cocaine, possession of marijuana, and possession of methamphetamine. At the time of sentencing, Harris also had multiple drug possession charges pending in the state of Georgia. See generally Tunstill v. State, 568 N.E.2d 539, 545 (Ind. 1991) (“Pending charges ․ are relevant and may be considered by a sentencing court as being reflective of the defendant's character ․”).

[26] Harris asserts that his drug dealing “was entirely the product of years of dependency on illegal substances.” Appellant's Br., p. 16. However, statements he made during his police interview contradict this assertion. According to Harris, he successfully completed a court-ordered recovery program not long before his arrest in this case. And though he continued to use drugs, Harris explained that he was much more in control than he used to be. He also characterized his drug dealing simply as an unexpected opportunity to make some money. These statements show that his offenses were motivated by profit rather than addiction.

[27] Harris also notes that he took responsibility for his actions by turning himself in during the traffic stop. But the record strongly suggests that his forthcomingness was prompted by the imminent canine sniff rather than some altruistic motive. Ultimately, we are not persuaded that Harris's sentence is inappropriate in light of his character.

Conclusion

[28] For these reasons, we affirm Harris's convictions and 20-year total sentence for Level 2 felony dealing in cocaine, Level 2 felony dealing in methamphetamine, and Level 3 felony dealing in a narcotic drug.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Although the record contains evidence that Officer Rhoades initiated the traffic stop of Tulk's vehicle soon after it drove away from a Fort Wayne residence, this evidence was only offered and admitted at the hearing on Harris's motion to suppress, not at trial.

Weissmann, Judge.

Bradford, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.