Randi L. Garcia, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Randi L. Garcia belatedly appeals the trial court's revocation of her probation and order that she serve the balance of her sentence in the Indiana Department of Correction (DOC). The State cross appeals, arguing that the appeal should be dismissed.

[2] We affirm.

Facts & Procedural History

[3] On May 2, 2023, the State charged Garcia with Level 5 felony neglect of a dependent, Level 6 felony possession of cocaine, Level 6 felony possession of a narcotic drug, and Class B misdemeanor possession of marijuana. On August 3, 2023, Garcia pled guilty to neglect of a dependent and possession of cocaine, and the State agreed to dismiss the remaining charges. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the trial court sentenced Garcia to concurrent terms of three years for neglect and one year for possession of cocaine, all suspended to probation. The trial court also issued an order prohibiting Garcia from contacting N.G., the victim of the neglect offense.

[4] On May 16, 2024, the State filed a petition to revoke Garcia's probation alleging Garcia had failed to report to probation and had tested positive for benzoylecgonine, a cocaine metabolite. At a hearing on August 1, 2024, Garcia admitted to the allegations, and the trial court took the matter under advisement to determine Garcia's eligibility for Allen County Community Corrections and Residential Services (ACCCRS). On August 16, 2024, the court issued an order revoking Garcia's probation and ordering her placed in ACCCRS with electronic monitoring.

[5] Probation filed a progress report with the court on November 22, 2024, which listed numerous violations by Garcia, including going to unauthorized locations and missed or positive drug screens. The report also noted medical concerns because Garcia had thirteen trips to an emergency room between September 1, 2024, and November 19, 2024, which made supervision difficult. On November 25, 2024, the trial court ordered Garcia released from ACCCRS to home detention upon obtaining suitable housing.

[6] On December 12, 2024, the State filed a petition to revoke Garcia's placement on home detention, citing four alleged violations. On January 14, 2025, the trial court held a contested revocation hearing. A home detention officer testified that on December 10, 2024, he received an alert that Garcia left the day reporting center, made an unauthorized stop in a “vulnerable victim zone,” and then returned to her residence. Transcript at 6. The detention officer went to Garcia's home to perform a home visit. N.G. was present in the home, and Garcia admitted that she had picked her up. The no contact order barring Garcia from having contact with N.G. was still in effect at that time, although Garcia claimed it had been dismissed. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court revoked Garcia's placement on home detention and ordered her to serve the remainder of her sentence at the DOC. Garcia was advised of her rights, and she stated that she did not wish to appeal. The order was signed and noted on the chronological case summary (CCS) on that date.

[7] Two days later, on January 16, 2025, Garcia sent a pro se “Motion for Appeal” to the trial court stating her desire to appeal the court's disposition. Appellant's Appendix Vol. II at 90. Garcia stated that her motion “demands [her] return to court for reassessment of said judgment in sentencing.” Id. Although Garcia did not request appointment of counsel, on January 27, 2025, the trial court found her to be indigent and ordered that a public defender be appointed to perfect an appeal on her behalf. On February 18, 2025, appellate counsel entered an appearance and filed a motion for leave to file a belated appeal, attaching a notice of appeal indicating it was a direct appeal. The trial court granted Garcia leave to file a belated appeal on May 15, 2025. Garcia filed a notice of appeal on May 20, 2025.

[8] On July 24, 2025, the State filed a motion to dismiss Garcia's appeal as untimely. The motions panel of this court denied the State's motion on August 15, 2025. Garcia now appeals the revocation of her placement on home detention. The State cross appeals, arguing that this appeal should be dismissed.¹

Discussion & Decision

Cross-Appeal

[9] The State argues that this appeal should be dismissed because Garcia was not permitted to seek relief under Post-Conviction Rule 2 (Rule 2). Ind. Appellate Rule 9(A)(1) requires a defendant initiating an appeal to file a notice of appeal within thirty days after entry of a final judgment is noted in the chronological case summary. In certain cases, a defendant who misses the appellate filing deadline may belatedly seek relief. See App. R. 9(A)(5) (“Unless the Notice of Appeal is timely filed, the right to appeal shall be forfeited except as provided by [Rule 2].”). Rule 2 provides, in relevant part:

Eligible Defendant Defined. An “eligible defendant” for purposes of this Rule is a defendant who, but for the defendant's failure to do so timely, would have the right to challenge on direct appeal a conviction or sentence after a trial or plea of guilty by filing a notice of appeal, filing a motion to correct error, or pursuing an appeal.

* * *

Section 1. Belated Notice of Appeal

(a) Required Showings. An eligible defendant convicted after a trial or plea of guilty may petition the trial court for permission to file a belated notice of appeal of the conviction or sentence if;

(1) the defendant failed to file a timely notice of appeal;

(2) the failure to file a timely notice of appeal was not due to the fault of the defendant; and

(3) the defendant has been diligent in requesting permission to file a belated notice of appeal under this rule.

[10] In Dawson v. State, 943 N.E.2d 1281, 1281 (Ind. 2011), the Indiana Supreme Court stated, “belated appeals from orders revoking probation are not presently available pursuant to Post-Conviction Rule 2.” In so holding, the Court adopted the reasoning set out by this court that because the sanction imposed when revoking probation does not qualify as a “sentence” under Rule 2, a defendant seeking to belatedly appeal such is not an “eligible defendant” thereunder. Id.

[11] Following a contested hearing, the trial court revoked Garcia's probation and ordered her to serve the balance of her sentence in the DOC.² The disposition was signed and noted on the CCS on January 14, 2025. At the conclusion of the hearing, Garcia was advised of her appellate rights and stated that she would not appeal. Two days later she changed her mind and sent a pro se “Motion for Appeal” to the trial court indicating her desire to appeal the court's disposition that she serve the remainder of her sentence in the DOC. Appellant's Appendix Vol. II at 90. On January 27, 2025, the trial court entered an order finding Garcia indigent and appointing the public defender to perfect an appeal on her behalf. Appellate counsel was appointed and filed an appearance on February 18, 2025, five days after the deadline to file her notice of appeal. Thus, technically speaking, Rule 2 does not permit Garcia to pursue a belated appeal of the revocation of her probation and the court's disposition. We nevertheless decline the State's request to dismiss the appeal for reasons stated below.

[12] Our Supreme Court has held that a procedurally forfeited right, such as a belated appeal from a probation revocation, can be restored when there are “extraordinarily compelling reasons” to do so. In re Adoption of O.R., 16 N.E.3d 965, 971 (Ind. 2014); see also Sevion v. State, 223 N.E.3d 1154, 1156 (Ind. Ct. App 2023) (noting that O.R. “acts as a fail-safe where procedural defaults would render forfeiture of an appeal shockingly unfair”). In O.R., father timely requested appointment of an attorney to appeal the adoption of his child, but counsel was not appointed until after the thirty-day deadline to appeal had elapsed. The Court acknowledged that procedurally, father forfeited his right to appeal by not timely filing a notice of appeal. The Court held, however, that because the delay in filing was due to no fault of father and because there was a fundamental liberty interest at stake, there were extraordinarily compelling reasons to restore father's forfeited right to appeal.

[13] Similarly, here, Garcia timely informed the court of her desire to appeal the disposition, and the trial court appointed the public defender to perfect an appeal on her behalf. That her public defender did not enter an appearance until after the thirty-day time period had passed was through no fault of Garcia. And, obviously, the court's order that Garcia serve the remainder of her sentence in the DOC implicates a fundamental liberty interest. We find that under these circumstances, Garcia's appellate rights should be restored. We deny the State's request to dismiss this appeal.

Sanction

[14] We now address the merits of Garcia's challenge to the trial court's revocation of her probation and order that she serve the balance of her sentence in the DOC. Probation “is a matter of grace left to trial court discretion, not a right to which a criminal defendant is entitled.” Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007). Probation revocation is within the discretion of the trial court, and we review only for abuse of discretion. Heaton v. State, 984 N.E.2d 614, 616 (Ind. 2013). Such an abuse occurs “where the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances, or when the trial court misinterprets the law.” Id.

[15] Probation revocation is a two-step process. Trammell v. State, 45 N.E.3d 1212, 1215 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). First, the State is required to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant violated the conditions of probation.³ Heaton, 984 N.E.2d at 615. Next, the trial court determines the sanction to impose for the violation. Trammell, 45 N.E.3d at 1215. The trial court may choose to continue probation with or without modification, extend probation, or order execution of all or part of the original sentence. Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(h).

[16] Garcia argues that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking her placement in community corrections and requiring her to serve the remainder of her sentence in the DOC. Garcia claims that the revocation was based on “technical violations” and that the trial court failed to take into account her well-documented history with substance abuse. Appellant's Brief at 13. Garcia suggests that the trial court should have “prioritize[d] rehabilitation instead of imposing a solely punitive sentence.” Id. at 14.

[17] In deciding what sanction to impose, the court considered Garcia's history of supervision in the instant case:

As far as her history of community supervision in this case, she originally had a completely suspended sentence to probation. A petition was filed back in May, 2024, indicating that she violated by stopping reporting for supervision, and also testing positive for a substance that is a cocaine metabolite, despite the record made at the beginning of this that the cocaine found in the home for this offense belonged to somebody else. It would seem interesting that it didn't belong to her or wasn't at least at some point used by her. Probation was revoked, she was placed on home detention – she was modified from [ACCCRS] then onto Home Detention. While on home detention she missed at least five (5) drug screens, got kicked out of Thinking for a Change, a couple positive drug screens for cocaine and suboxone without a prescription, and then she commits the new offense of invasion of privacy by having contact with a protected person in this case. We're done with community supervision.

Transcript at 11-12. Clearly, Garcia was offered chances in several different placements within community corrections before the trial court found it necessary to order her placed in the DOC. Garcia demonstrated time after time that she was not willing or able to abide by the rules of the various community corrections settings. She continued to use drugs, failed to follow the rules of ACCCRS and home detention, and was in the presence of an individual with whom she was ordered to have no contact. The trial court was not obligated to give her another chance by modifying her sentence to two years to be served through some sort of residential services as she requested. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking her probation and ordering her to serve the balance of her sentence in the DOC.

Judgment affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Although this court's motions panel denied the State's motion to dismiss the appeal, “[i]t is well-established that we may reconsider a ruling by the motions panel.” Core v. State, 122 N.E.3d 974, 976 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019).

2.   “A judgment revoking probation is a final appealable order.” Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(l)).

3.   Garcia does not challenge the court's finding that she violated the conditions of her probation

Altice, Chief Judge.

May, J. and Foley, J., concur.