IN RE: The Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of E.J.R. and E.M.R. (Minor Children); (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] K.R. (“Mother”) appeals the termination of her parental relationships with her twin sons, E.J.R. (“E.J.R.”) and E.M.R. (“E.M.R.”) (collectively “the children”). She argues that the trial court's order terminating her parental relationships with the children is clearly erroneous. Concluding that the trial court's order is not clearly erroneous, we affirm the trial court's judgment.¹

[2] We affirm.

Issue

Whether the trial court's order terminating Mother's parental relationships with the children is clearly erroneous.

Facts

[3] In March 2023, twenty-five-year-old Mother, who has a history of mental health issues and who was pregnant with the children, was incarcerated in the Tippecanoe County Jail for a probation violation. In July 2023, Mother's mother (“maternal grandmother”), who was concerned that Mother was refusing medical and mental health services, bonded Mother out of jail and took her to an IU Hospital on a court-ordered involuntary emergency detention order (“EDO”). Staff at the IU Hospital transferred Mother to River Bend Hospital (“River Bend”) on the EDO.

[4] While Mother was at River Bend, she became involved in an altercation with nursing staff and another patient. The State subsequently charged Mother with one count of Class A misdemeanor battery and three counts of Class B misdemeanor battery (“the River Bend criminal case”).

[5] On August 7, 2023, Mother was transferred to St Vincent Hospital in Indianapolis, where she gave birth to the children three days later. The following day, DCS received a report alleging that the children were victims of neglect. The report specifically alleged that the children had been born prematurely at thirty-two weeks and were in the NICU. The report further alleged that Mother was hospitalized in the St. Vincent psychiatric unit because of “active psychosis and violent tendencies.” (Ex. Vol. 1 at 157). In addition, the report alleged that Mother had not been compliant with taking her mental health medications.

[6] Before a DCS assessment case manager had the opportunity to speak with Mother about the allegations, Mother was discharged from St. Vincent. However, a few days later, she was “EDO'd to Valley Oaks [(“Valley Oaks”)] for inability to care for self.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 93). Mother was then placed on an EDO at Sycamore Springs. The trial court issued another EDO on September 5, 2023, and Mother was placed at Options Behavioral Health (“Options”).

[7] Two days later, on September 7, 2023, DCS received a second report alleging that the children were victims of neglect. That report specifically alleged that Mother had been “diagnosed with schizophrenia with auditory hallucinations and paranoid delusions” and that there were “ongoing concerns for her mental health and ability to care for the twins.” (Ex. Vol. 1 at 77). In addition, the report alleged that maternal grandmother had guardianship over Mother and that neither Mother nor maternal grandmother had visited the children. Further, according to the petition, E.J.R, who was being fed through a feeding tube, was nearly ready for discharge, and no family member had completed the training required to care for him. In addition, E.M.R., who was also being fed through a feeding tube, was scheduled to be discharged from the hospital the following week.

[8] A DCS assessment case manager contacted Mother at Options. Mother asked the assessment case manager to place the children in foster care. In September 2023, while Mother was still at Options, DCS filed a petition alleging that the children were children in need of services (“CHINS”). Following a hearing, the trial court adjudicated the children to be CHINS in October 2023. DCS removed the children from Mother and placed them together in a foster home that specializes in medically complex children.

[9] That same month, the trial court issued a dispositional order that required Mother to: (1) complete a family functional assessment; (2) submit to oral, urine, and hair drug screens; (3) participate in supervised visits with the children; and (4) participate in therapy, case management services, and medication management services at Valley Oaks. The trial court also issued a parental participation decree that required Mother to: (1) obtain and maintain safe housing suitable for the children; (2) take prescribed medications; and (3) obtain and maintain a stable source of income adequate to support her household, including the children.

[10] While the children were in foster care, E.J.R. was diagnosed with epilepsy, cerebral palsy, cortical vision impairment, developmental delays, and plagiocephaly (flat-head syndrome). In addition, E.M.R. was diagnosed with developmental delays, a hole in his heart, vision impairment, and plagiocephaly.

[11] In October 2023, Mother attended one supervised visit with E.M.R. and two supervised visits with E.J.R. For one of Mother's supervised visits with E.J.R., foster mother (“foster mother”) had sent premeasured formula for Mother to mix in a bottle of water, which foster mother had also provided. However, during the visit, Mother refused to add the formula to the bottle of water and only fed E.J.R. water because she believed that he was dehydrated. By the time E.J.R. was returned to foster mother, the infant, who needed to be fed formula every two and one-half to three hours, had gone for more than three hours without formula. E.J.R. was very hungry and agitated, and he was up all night having seizures.

[12] In November 2023, Mother failed to attend scheduled visits with the children, and the visitation provider discharged Mother from its program. DCS referred Mother to three additional visitation providers. However, one of the providers refused the referral because Mother had verbally harassed one of its facilitators in the past. Another provider attempted to schedule visits with Mother, but Mother told the provider that her schedule conflicted with the provider's availability. DCS referred Mother to a third provider to accommodate Mother's schedule, but Mother told that provider that her schedule had changed and that she was unable to schedule visits. In February 2024, the trial court suspended Mother's visits with the children until Mother could show that she was consistently participating in services. Mother never made the required showing.

[13] Also, in February 2024, Mother pleaded guilty to Class A misdemeanor battery in the River Bend criminal case, and the State dismissed the remaining three charges. The trial court sentenced Mother to one year with ninety days in community corrections and 275 days on probation. One month later, in March 2024, the community corrections assistant coordinator (“the assistant coordinator”) filed a petition alleging that Mother had violated her community corrections placement by engaging in an altercation with another resident. The assistant coordinator asked the trial court to order Mother to serve her community corrections sentence in the county jail. The trial court ordered Mother to be held in the county jail pending further order of the court. Mother was released from the county jail and returned to probation in April 2024.

[14] During the pendency of the CHINS proceedings, Mother did not have stable housing. Specifically, in addition to serving time in community corrections and the county jail, Mother lived with a boyfriend for a few months, and she occasionally lived with maternal grandmother. Mother also stayed in a homeless shelter.

[15] In September 2024, DCS filed a petition to terminate Mother's parental relationships with the children. At the December 2024 termination hearing, the trial court heard the facts as set forth above.

[16] In addition, foster mother testified that she does not work outside the home because if she did, she would not have the time to take the children to their many medical appointments. Specifically, the children have physical therapy and vision therapy. They also have regular appointments with four specialists at Riley Hospital for Children (“Riley”). For example, E.J.R. has to see a Riley neurologist every three to six months for his epilepsy. As E.J.R. grows, his medication needs to be increased, and as he nears the need for a dosage increase, he becomes irritable and aggressive. In addition, foster mother testified that the children cannot miss their appointments at Riley because the appointments are “very hard to come by[,]” and it might take six to eight months to reschedule a missed appointment. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 21). Further, foster mother engages in therapy with the children in the home. For example, as a result of E.J.R.’s cortical vision impairment, he can see, but his brain does not process what he sees. Foster mother engages E.J.R. in daily activities to help build pathways to his brain so that he can understand what he sees.

[17] Mother also testified at the hearing. According to Mother, for the past year, she had been receiving, at Valley Oaks, bi-weekly Haldol injections to treat her mental health issues. Mother further testified that she saw a psychiatric nurse practitioner at Valley Oaks once a month to monitor the Haldol. In addition, Mother testified that she took the Haldol injections because DCS required them. According to Mother, she would stop taking the injections if DCS did not require them. Mother also testified that her mental health was stable when the children were born and that even though she had not seen the children in more than one year, she believed that she was in a position to take the children home that day. Mother acknowledged that she had not participated in the other services set forth in the CHINS dispositional order, including submitting to drug screens, completing a family functional assessment, and visiting with the children.

[18] Mother also testified that for the previous three months, she had been working part-time at the At Home Store. When asked how she would support the children, Mother responded that she would seek public assistance. Mother acknowledged that it might take up to two years for her to receive public assistance and testified that while waiting, she could work full-time and place the children in daycare. Further, when asked how she would get the children from Lafayette to their appointments at Riley in Indianapolis, Mother responded that she would take an Uber or a Lyft. Lastly, Mother testified that she and the children would live with maternal grandmother, who lived in a two-bedroom residence. According to Mother, the children could share a bed with her.

[19] A psychiatric nurse practitioner (“the nurse practitioner”) at Valley Oaks confirmed that Mother had been receiving bi-weekly Haldol injections. However, the nurse practitioner further testified that Mother had missed five medication monitoring appointments in the past year. According to the nurse practitioner, Mother's cessation of the Haldol injections would lead Mother to experience psychosis.

[20] In addition, a DCS family case manager (“the FCM”) testified that Mother had not been compliant with the CHINS dispositional order because she had failed to submit to drug screens and participate in individual therapy and home-based case management services. According to the FCM, the children needed consistency and structure, and DCS had “not seen much progress from Mother throughout this case.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 117). The FCM testified that termination was in the children's best interests.

[21] Further, the CASA (“the CASA”) testified that the permanency plan for the children was adoption by the foster parents and that adoption was in the children's best interests. According to the CASA, the children had “created some really wonderful bonds” in their foster home and were thriving. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 142). Further, according to the CASA, the children had exceeded expectations for their health. The CASA also testified that Mother, who had rarely asked about the children's well-being, lacked stability.

[22] In April 2025, the trial court issued a detailed order terminating Mother's parental relationships with the children. In its order, the trial court concluded that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions that had resulted in the children's removal or the reasons for continued placement outside the home would not be remedied and that termination of Mother's parental relationships with the children was in the children's best interests.

[23] Mother now appeals.

Decision

[24] The traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In re J.W., Jr., 27 N.E.3d 1185, 1187-88 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied. However, a trial court must subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the children when evaluating the circumstances surrounding a termination. Id. at 1188. Termination of the parent-child relationship is proper where a child's emotional and physical development is threatened. Id. Although the right to raise one's own child should not be terminated solely because there is a better home available for the child, parental rights may be terminated when a parent is unable or unwilling to meet his or her parental responsibilities. Id.

[25] Indiana Code § 31-35-2-4 provides, in relevant part, that DCS must allege, in its petition to terminate the parent-child relationship, as follows:

(c) A petition filed under subsection (a) must allege:

(1) the existence of one (1) or more of the circumstances described in subsection (d);

(2) that there is a satisfactory plan for care and treatment of the child; and

(3) that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests.

(d) A petition filed under subsection (a) must allege the existence of one (1) or more of the following circumstances:

* * * * *

(3) That there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4.² DCS must prove these alleged circumstances by clear and convincing evidence. K.T.K. v. Indiana Department of Child Services, Dearborn County Office, 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1230 (Ind. 2013).

[26] When reviewing a termination of parental rights, this Court will not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. In re Involuntary Termination of Parent-Child Relationship of R.S., 56 N.E.3d 625, 628 (Ind. 2016). We consider only the evidence and any reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom that support the judgment and give due regard to the trial court's opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses firsthand. K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1229.

[27] Mother argues that the trial court's order terminating her parental relationships with the children is clearly erroneous. Specifically, her sole contention is that DCS failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the termination was in the children's best interests.

[28] In determining whether a termination of parental rights is in the best interests of a child, the trial court is required to look at the totality of the evidence. In re Termination of Parent-Child Relationship of D.D., 804 N.E.2d 258, 267 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. In so doing, the court must subordinate the interests of the parent to those of the child involved. Id. Termination of the parent-child relationship is proper where the child's emotional and physical development is threatened. In re R.S., 774 N.E.2d 927, 930 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied. The trial court need not wait until the child is irreversibly harmed such that his or her physical, mental, and social development is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship. K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1235. A child's need for permanency is a central consideration in determining the child's best interests. In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1265 (Ind. 2009), reh'g denied.

[29] In addition, a parent's historical inability to provide a suitable environment coupled with a current inability to provide the same will support a finding that termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the children. Lang v. Starke County Office of Family and Children, 861 N.E.2d 366, 373 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied. Also, a parent's failure to exercise the right to visit her children demonstrates a “lack of commitment to complete the actions necessary to preserve [the] parent-child relationship[.]” In re A.L.H., 774 N.E.2d 896, 900 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). Moreover, this Court has previously held that the recommendations of the service providers, in addition to evidence that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions that had resulted in the children's removal would not be remedied, is sufficient to show clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child's best interests. In re J.S., 906 N.E.2d 226, 236 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).

[30] Here, our review of the evidence reveals that Mother's mental health issues have historically rendered her unable to provide the children with a suitable environment and her inability or unwillingness to accept her mental health issues rendered her unable to provide the same at the time of the termination hearing. Specifically, despite the many EODs that were issued immediately before and after the children's births, Mother testified at the hearing that she did not have mental health issues when the children were born. Further, Mother testified that she would stop taking the Haldol injections if DCS did not require them, and the psychiatric nurse practitioner testified that a cessation of the injections would lead Mother to experience psychosis. We further note that, during the pendency of the CHINS proceedings, Mother did not obtain or maintain safe housing suitable for the children or a stable source of income adequate to support her household, including the children.

[31] In addition, during the first year of their lives, Mother visited with E.M.R. one time and E.J.R. two times. Thereafter, Mother either failed to attend visits or was unable to fit the visits into her schedule. In February 2024, the trial court suspended Mother's visits with the children until Mother could show that she was consistently participating in services. Mother never made the required showing, and at the time of the termination hearing, Mother had not visited with the children in nearly one year.

[32] Moreover, the FCM testified that termination was in the children's best interests, and the CASA testified that adoption was in the children's best interests. Further, the trial court concluded that DCS had proved by clear and convincing evidence that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions that had resulted in the children's removal would not be remedied, and Mother does not challenge this conclusion. Lastly, we note that at the time of the termination hearing, the children, who both suffer from complex medical issues and developmental delays, were thriving in foster care and had exceeded expectations for their health. The totality of this evidence supports the trial court's conclusion that the termination of Mother's parent-child relationships with the children was in the children's best interests, and the trial court's order is not clearly erroneous.

[33] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The children's Father is unknown.

2.   The General Assembly amended Indiana Code § 31-35-2-4 effective March 11, 2024. Because DCS filed the termination petition in this case in September 2024, the amended version of the statute applies here. Additionally, we note that the General Assembly further amended INDIANA CODE § 31-35-2-4 during the 2025 legislative session, and that amendment became effective July 1, 2025. The 2025 amendment does not apply to this case.

Pyle, Judge.

[34] Vaidik, J., and Mathias, J., concur.