Wayde M. Coleman, Appellant-Plaintiff v. LLC (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Wayde M. Coleman (“Coleman”) appeals, pro se, following the dismissal of his lawsuit under Trial Rule 12(B)(6) where the trial court determined that all claims were barred due to res judicata. Coleman presents ten issues for our review, which we consolidate and restate as the following three issues:

I. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in granting the motion to dismiss under Trial Rule 12(B)(6);

II. Whether the judgment involved procedural irregularities that Coleman claims were indicative of judicial bias; and

III. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in awarding attorney's fees to the defendants.

[2] Although we affirm the dismissal of the action, we remand for entry of findings in support of the trial court's award of attorney's fees under the General Recovery Rule.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Coleman owned a property on Nowland Avenue in Indianapolis (“the Property”). When Coleman became in arrears on property taxes, the Property was subject to a tax sale. During a 2019 tax sale, the Property was acquired by Covenant Community Housing, LLC (“CCH”), which is affiliated with Heart Change Ministries, Inc. (“Ministries”), a 501(c)(3) tax-exempt organization. Pursuant to Indiana Code section 6-1.1-24-6.7, which authorizes the sale of tax-delinquent properties to nonprofit entities, CCH purchased the Property and obtained the tax sale deed in May 2019.

[4] Coleman brought two federal lawsuits related to the tax sale. Coleman filed his first lawsuit with the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana on December 17, 2019. Coleman amended his complaint, and later filed a second amended complaint, which the District Court screened and determined was subject to dismissal for failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The District Court gave Coleman the opportunity to file a third amended complaint no later than April 9, 2021, and show cause why the case should not be dismissed for failing to state a claim. Coleman filed his third amended complaint on April 9, 2021, naming the following individuals, officials, and entities as defendants: the City of Indianapolis, Marion County, the Marion County Treasurer's Office, Josh A. Peters, Pamela G. Schneemann, Cindy Palmer, Dale Shaw, and CCH. He brought federal claims under 42 United States Code Sections 1983 and 1985. He also brought several state law claims, alleging the federal court had supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims because they arose “out of [the] same events as [the] federal claims.” Appellees’ App. Vol. III p. 97. Before delineating his claims, Coleman again indicated that the claims “all derive[d] from the same set of facts[.]” Id. at 107.

[5] First, Coleman claimed a violation of his right to procedural due process in connection with the 2019 tax sale. Coleman alleged that the tax sale deed should have been set aside for several reasons, including “falsified [o]wnership” records, and that, despite making “constant payment offers” regarding the Property, he lacked “the appropriate administrative process” to address his appeals, letters, complaints, forms, and other objections to the tax sale. Id. at 108. Coleman further alleged that the defendants “colluded, conspired with one another so that [CCH] could gain ownership of [the Property],” and that a “Bribery Check” was “offered to lock in the purchase several days before the Marion County Commissioners voted[.]” Id. at 108–09. Second, Coleman claimed a violation of his right to substantive due process, with Coleman focusing on alleged false testimony, bribery, and orchestration of a “game plan to take ownership of [the] Property and several others.” Id. at 111.

[6] Third, Coleman claimed negligent misrepresentation of facts due to the alleged falsification of ownership records and a failure to “correct [a] misrepresentation of fact in the Marion County Circuit Court.” Id. at 112. Fourth, Coleman alleged malicious abuse of process for the allegations outlined in the first three claims. Fifth, Coleman brought a federal claim under Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 695 (1978), for the failure to properly train and supervise employees. Sixth, Coleman claimed a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution for the collective events and circumstances alleged. Seventh, he claimed there was a conspiracy to interfere with his civil rights. Eighth, Coleman claimed intentional infliction of emotional distress. Ninth, he claimed actual fraud. Tenth—and finally—Coleman claimed constructive fraud.

[7] On April 23, 2021, the District Court dismissed the action under 28 United States Code section 1915(e)(2)(B) “for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” Appellees’ App. Vol. II p. 195. The Court determined that Coleman had not remedied the deficiencies identified in the Court's prior order, ultimately failing to comply with the pleading requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2). The Court separately issued a final judgment. Coleman filed a motion for clarification asking whether the dismissal was with prejudice, and the District Court clarified that the dismissal was with prejudice.

[8] On April 11, 2023, Coleman filed a second federal lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana. He filed an amended complaint on June 14, 2023, again naming as defendants the City of Indianapolis, Marion County, the Marion County Treasurer's Office, Josh A. Peters, CCH, and Cindy Palmer. Coleman alleged that he was bringing claims under 42 United States Code Sections 1981, 1983, 1985, 1986, and 1988, as well as “the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution of the United States of America.” Appellees’ App. Vol. III pp. 66–67. Coleman alleged that he was bringing related state law claims and that the District Court “ha[d] supplemental jurisdiction over the pendant state-law claims because the[y] ․ ar[o]se out of the same events as [the] [f]ederal claims.” Id. at 67.

[9] Omitting only the prior Equal Protection claim, Coleman delineated nine claims that paralleled claims brought in the first federal action. Those claims—which related to the 2019 tax sale—were: (1) violation of the right to procedural due process; (2) violation of the right to substantive due process; (3) negligent misrepresentation of facts; (4) malicious abuse of process; (5) municipal liability under Monell; (6) conspiracy to interfere with civil rights; (7) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (8) actual fraud; and (9) constructive fraud.

[10] On November 15, 2023, the District Court provided notice of its intent to “sua sponte enter summary judgment for the defendants under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f) on the grounds that th[e] suit is barred by res judicata.” Id. at 3. The District Court gave Coleman the opportunity to present argument and evidence that he believed created a genuine issue of material fact regarding the application of res judicata. Coleman responded on November 16, 2023. He also sought leave to amend his complaint, proffering an amended complaint.

[11] On November 28, 2023, the District Court granted summary judgment to the defendants and separately entered final judgment “on all of [Coleman's] claims.” Id. at 12. The Court concluded that “Coleman ha[d] not provided any argument or evidence that would indicate res judicata does not bar this suit.” Id. at 10. The Court explained that it was denying Coleman's motion for leave to amend because it had reviewed the proposed amended complaint and it “reveal[ed] the same problem as the current amended complaint: Coleman’[s] claims arise out of the same factual occurrences underpinning the prior lawsuit (i.e. his loss of title to the [P]roperty and the state and court procedural processes that led to that outcome).” Id. at 9.

[12] Coleman appealed the summary judgment decision to the Seventh Circuit, claiming “the [D]istrict [Court] erred in determining that his case was barred by res judicata, also known as claim preclusion.” Id. at 16. Meanwhile, on December 12, 2023—two weeks after the District Court's summary judgment ruling, but before the Seventh Circuit affirmed that judgment on appeal—Coleman filed the instant action in the Marion Superior Court. On February 9, 2024, certain defendants filed a motion to dismiss. On February 21, 2024, Coleman moved for leave to file an amended complaint. The trial court granted the motion on March 11, 2024, noting that, under the circumstances, Indiana Trial Rule 12(B) allowed Coleman to amend his complaint once as a matter of right.¹ In the amended complaint, Coleman named as defendants the City of Indianapolis, the Marion County Treasurer's Office, the Marion County Assessor's Office, Josh A. Peters, Cindy Palmer, CCH, and Ministries ² (collectively, “the Defendants”). He brought the following counts:

Count I – Gross negligence due to a lack of due process in the tax sale procedures resulting in, among other things, severe emotional distress.

Count II – Negligent misrepresentation of facts including “deceptive practices” that “undermin[ed] [Coleman's] equitable ownership of the [P]roperty[.]” Appellees’ App. Vol. II p. 34.

Count III – Malicious abuse of process, including “remain[ing] unresponsive” despite Coleman's “earnest effort in 2019 to discharge a $20,000.00” payment, and actions “in concert and collusion” that “deliberately inflict[ed] upon Coleman irreparable harm[.]” Id. at 35–36.

Count IV – Negligence in training and supervising employees, and in adopting a particular policy, resulting in liability under Monell.

Count V – Interference with Coleman's rights due to misrepresentation and acts of “bribery, conspiracy, and collaboration[.]” Id. at 39.

Count VI – Intentional infliction of emotional distress stemming from conspiracy and collusion in “attempting to unlawfully deprive [Coleman] of his Property[.]” Id. at 43.

Count VII – Actual and constructive fraud, including making “deceitful misrepresentations, hiding crucial information, or not disclosing imperative details,” and submitting “doctored evidence[.]” Id. at 44–45.

[13] On March 22, 2024, Coleman filed a motion asking the trial court to take judicial notice of District Court case 1:23-cv-617, which was the second federal action. Around this time, the Defendants filed a motion seeking a stay of the proceedings pending the federal appeal. On April 8, 2024, the trial court entered an order granting Coleman's motion to take judicial notice. The trial court also issued a stay of the state court proceedings, ordering as follows:

The matter is stayed pending the resolution of the appeal in front of the 7th Circuit in Case No. 23-3353. This matter is stayed until the 7th Circuit issues mandate 3 in that matter. The defendants will then have 30 days after the issuing of mandate to file a response to [Coleman's] first amended complaint. The parties are to file notice with this Court when the 7th Circuit issues its judgment in Case No. 23-3353 and the parties are to file notice with this Court when the 7th Circuit issues its mandate in Case No. 23-3353.

Id. at 76.

[14] On May 3, 2024, Coleman notified the trial court that the Seventh Circuit affirmed the District Court. In the written judgment, the Court applied “federal claim preclusion rules” and explained that “[c]laim preclusion applies when a court has rendered a final judgment on the merits, and a plaintiff later raises the same claims, or claims that could have been brought, against the same defendants or their privies.” Appellees’ App. Vol. III p. 16. The Court determined that “the first [District Court] judge adjudicated all Coleman's claims by dismissing them with prejudice,” id. at 17, and the claims brought in the second lawsuit “ha[d] the same factual basis as those in [Coleman's] first case—the County's acquisition of [the Property] and the transfer of that property to [CCH] in 2019,” id. at 16. The Court added that, “[t]o the extent [Coleman] raises new legal theories, he fails to show that he could not have raised them in the first lawsuit.” Id. The Court further noted that although Coleman cited “additional evidence” in the second lawsuit, “[t]he additional evidence he cites now does not transform this duplicative case into an original one.” Id. at 17.

[15] On May 6, 2024, Coleman filed a motion for leave to file a second amended complaint. On the same date, the trial court denied the motion. Noting that it previously granted a motion to amend the complaint, the trial court stated: “The issues in this case are not new. The Court will not entertain any other motions to amend the complaint.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 119. Coleman then moved for a change of judge. He also moved for an “Emergency Injunction” against CCH and Cindy Palmer due to alleged misrepresentations about CCH's nonprofit status. Id. at 183. On May 8, 2024, the motion for a change of judge was granted, and a special judge was soon appointed. With the special judge in place, the trial court held a status conference on May 28, 2024, noting in the CCS that the “matter [was] stayed” and it was “await[ing] a mandate/order from the [Seventh Circuit], which will provide guidance for this Court and will effectively lift the stay.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 13.

[16] The day of the status conference, May 28, 2024, the Seventh Circuit issued its mandate in Coleman's appeal. The next day, Coleman notified the trial court of the issuance of mandate. On June 27, 2024, the Defendants filed a motion to dismiss under Trial Rule 12(B)(6), arguing Coleman's claims were “barred by res judicata” and the complaint “otherwise fail[ed] to state a claim[.]” Appellees’ App. p. 92. They also sought an award of attorney's fees under Indiana Code section 34-52-1-1, alleging Coleman litigated “in bad faith.” Id. at 122. At one point, the Defendants also asserted attorney's fees were warranted because Coleman brought “frivolous litigation.” Id. at 123. Coleman did not file a response to the motion to dismiss. Rather, on July 1, 2024, Coleman again sought leave to file a second amended complaint, attaching to his motion a copy of his proposed amended complaint. Coleman asserted that the attached pleading would “simplif[y] and address[ ] the issues raised in the [motion to dismiss],” including res judicata, the statute of limitations, and “[s]pecific [d]ates of the [o]ngoing harm and damages[.]” Appellees’ App. Vol. III p. 130. The Defendants opposed the motion, arguing the proposed amendments were futile because the claims were barred by res judicata, and Coleman was trying to circumvent the prior order prohibiting further amendments. See id. at 162–73.

[17] On August 2, 2024, Coleman moved for leave to file and serve discovery “to substantiate the claims and gather relevant evidence,” arguing that discovery was “essential to uncover facts that are crucial for the fair adjudication of th[e] case.” Id. at 176. On August 6, 2024, the trial court denied Coleman's pending motions regarding (1) a preliminary injunction, (2) leave to file a second amended complaint, and (3) leave to file and serve discovery. See Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 14. In a separate order, the trial court granted the motion to dismiss “for the reasons stated in [the] Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint.” Appellees’ App. Vol. III p. 178. The trial court also summarily granted the request for attorney's fees and ordered the Defendants to submit documentation of their costs and fees, which they did. Thereafter, the trial court ordered Coleman to pay a total of $32,232.13 in attorney's fees. The Defendants moved for entry of final judgment. On October 10, 2024, the trial court issued an order denying all pending motions and entering final judgment in favor of the Defendants. Coleman now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[18] At the outset, we note that Coleman is representing himself on appeal. As our Supreme Court has explained, a pro se litigant is held to the same standards as a trained attorney and is afforded no inherent leniency simply by virtue of being self-represented. Zavodnik v. Harper, 17 N.E.3d 259, 266 (Ind. 2014).

[19] We review de novo a trial court's decision to dismiss a complaint under Trial Rule 12(B)(6). Bellwether Props., LLC v. Duke Energy Ind., Inc., 87 N.E.3d 462, 466 (Ind. 2017). On appeal, we take the alleged facts to be true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Id. However, we need not accept as true legal conclusions or conclusory allegations unsupported by factual assertions. Lei Shi v. Cecilia Yi, 921 N.E.2d 31, 37 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010).

I. Dismissal Due to Claim Preclusion

Here, the trial court determined that Coleman's claims were barred under the doctrine of res judicata, also known as claim preclusion. See Miller v. Patel, 212 N.E.3d 639, 646 (Ind. 2023). This doctrine serves as a “complete and categorical ‘bar to subsequent litigation on the same claim between identical parties.’ ” Id. (quoting Edwards v. Edwards, 132 N.E.3d 391, 396 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied). Res judicata bars claims when four requirements are met: (1) the former judgment was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) the former judgment was rendered on the merits; (3) the matter now in issue was, or could have been, determined in the prior action; and (4) the controversy adjudicated in the former action was between the parties to the present suit or their privies. Id. We address each requirement in turn.

A. Court of Competent Jurisdiction

[20] First, the prior judgments were rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction. Cf. Jones v. Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co., 489 N.E.2d 160, 164 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986) (recognizing that federal judgments can have preclusive effect in state courts), trans. denied. In both cases, the federal District Court had original jurisdiction over Coleman's federal claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Moreover, a federal District Court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims so long as the state law claims are so related to claims within the court's original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Here, Coleman included state law claims in both federal lawsuits, specifically asking the District Court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.

[21] Coleman suggests there was ambiguity as to whether the District Court in the first action actually exercised supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. We note that a District Court “may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim” if “the [D]istrict [C]ourt has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). Coleman argues that the Marion Superior Court erred “by excluding evidence or refusing to consider judicial notices” indicating that the District Court never exercised jurisdiction over his state law claims. Appellant's Br. p. 32; see also id. at 34 (arguing that the allegedly excluded evidence “directly impacted [his] ability to establish that the federal courts treated his claims solely as federal questions and failed to address his state law issues[.]”). We need not resolve this evidentiary issue. Indeed, it is immaterial whether the first District Court exercised supplemental jurisdiction over Coleman's claims. That is because, in the second federal case, the District Court entered summary judgment as to all claims in the operative pleading, which included both federal and state claims. See Appellees’ App. Vol. III p. 12 (entering final judgment “on all of [Coleman's] claims” (emphasis added)). Thus, the second District Court exercised supplemental jurisdiction over Coleman's state law claims. Moreover, as we explain herein, (1) the second federal action involved a determination that all claims—i.e., federal and state—were subject to claim preclusion, and (2) the second judgment has preclusive effect, barring any claim arising from the same core set of facts.

B. Prior Judgment on the Merits

[22] Turning to the second requirement, both federal judgments were rendered on the merits. The first federal case was dismissed with prejudice under 28 United States Code section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim. Dismissals under this section “are final decisions on the merits” with “res judicata effect.” Coleman v. Labor & Indus. Rev. Comm'n of Wisc., 860 F.3d 461, 469–70 (7th Cir. 2017). Moreover, in the second federal case, summary judgment was granted based upon res judicata. “[A] summary judgment is a decision on the merits of the case.” 10B Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 2735, Westlaw (database updated Sept. 2025). The Seventh Circuit affirmed, “agree[ing] ․ that Coleman's claims [were] barred by res judicata[.]” Appellees’ App. Vol. III p. 15. Both prior judgments constitute judgments on the merits for purposes of claim preclusion.

C. Nature of the Claims

[23] Third, Coleman brought state law claims that were, or could have been, determined in the prior federal litigation. “Claim preclusion prevents subsequent adjudication of every question which was within the issues and therefore might have been litigated in the previous action.” Jones, 489 N.E.2d at 165. “The question is not what was decided” in the prior action, “but what could have been decided.” Id. at 166. “Otherwise, a party could simultaneously try his case in any number of forums, so long as he carefully limited the issues to be decided by each.” Id. Thus, “[w]here at play, claim preclusion enacts a robust and ‘powerful prohibition against claim splitting[.]’ ” Miller, 212 N.E.3d at 646 (quoting Robbins v. MED-1 Solutions, LLC, 13 F.4th 652, 657 (7th Cir. 2021)).

[24] A comparison of Coleman's current state court claims with those brought in his second federal lawsuit demonstrates that the current claims arise from the same operative facts and seek the same relief. In Count I of the instant operative complaint, Coleman alleged gross negligence due to a lack of due process in the tax sale procedures resulting in, among other things, severe emotional distress. In his second federal lawsuit, Coleman similarly alleged that his “right to procedural due process ha[d] been violated in depriving him of possession and ownership of [the] Property by the [d]efendants who had been acting in conjunction with each other in this regard.” Appellees’ App. Vol. III p. 80.

[25] Count II asserted negligent misrepresentation of facts including “deceptive practices” that “undermined [Coleman's] equitable ownership of the [P]roperty[.]” Appellees’ App. Vol. II p. 34. The second federal lawsuit contained an identically titled claim for “Negligent Misrepresentation of Facts” based on the same alleged mishandling of a Tort Claim Notice and irregularities in documentation. Compare id. at 33–34 with Appellees’ App. Vol. III p. 83.

[26] Count III alleged malicious abuse of process, claiming the Defendants “acted in concert and collusion” so CCH could acquire the Property. Appellees’ App. Vol. II p. 36. This mirrors the claim titled “Right to Be Free from Malicious Abuse of Process” in the second federal lawsuit, where Coleman alleged the Defendants “collectively conspired ․ [and] colluded together” in “attempt[ing] to deprive [him] of ․ ownership of the Property.” Appellees’ App. Vol. III p. 85.

[27] Count IV presented a Monell claim alleging negligence in “training and supervising employees and the[ ] introduction and enforcement of a limiting policy” with regard to a particular case type. Appellees’ App. Vol. II p. 36. In the second federal lawsuit, Coleman brought a substantially similar Monell claim concerning the same policy. See Appellees’ App. Vol. III pp. 85–86.

[28] Count V alleged “conspiracy and collaboration” to deprive Coleman of his civil rights. Appellees’ App. Vol. II p. 39. The second federal lawsuit included a claim for “Conspiracy to Interfere with Civil Rights” containing parallel allegations. Appellees’ App. Vol. III pp. 86–87.

[29] Finally, Count VI was for intentional infliction of emotional distress stemming from conspiracy and collusion in “attempting to unlawfully deprive [Coleman] of his Property[.]” Appellees’ App. Vol. II p. 43. This was a different theory to obtain relief for the same alleged conspiracy and collusion as Count III. Moreover, the second federal lawsuit contained the same type of claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress related to the alleged “attempt[ ] to deprive [him] the ownership of the Property.” Appellees’ App. Vol. III p. 88.

[30] Because all claims brought in the instant case have equivalent claims brought in the second federal lawsuit, and because all claims in the second federal lawsuit were barred by res judicata due to the first federal lawsuit, the instant claims are likewise barred. Notably, the Seventh Circuit specifically found that Coleman's claims all arose from “the same factual basis as those in his first case—the County's acquisition of Coleman's property and the transfer of that property to [CCH] in 2019.” Id. at 16. In the second federal lawsuit—and in the instant case—Coleman alleged he has new evidence supporting relief and is able to prove “ongoing events and continuing harm.” Appellant's Br. p. 31. Yet, regardless of this alleged new evidence or the alleged continuing nature of the deprivation, Coleman's claims nevertheless distill to the same factual basis, with Coleman seeking a remedy for actions surrounding the acquisition of the Property and the transfer of the Property to CCH through tax sale procedures. Cf. Appellees’ App. Vol. III p. 9 (observing, in entering summary judgment in the second federal action, that “Coleman’[s] claims arise out of the same factual occurrences underpinning the prior lawsuit (i.e. his loss of title to the [P]roperty and the state and court procedural processes that led to that outcome).”). For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the third requirement is satisfied.

D. Parties Involved

[31] Fourth and finally, Coleman brought these claims against the same parties or those in privity with parties previously named as defendants. Parties are in privity if they have a “mutual or successive” relationship to the same property interest or “their interests are so identical as to represent the same legal right.” Isp.com LLC v. Theising, 805 N.E.2d 767, 774 (Ind. 2004) (quoting Mislenkov v. Accurate Metal Detinning, Inc., 743 N.E.2d 286, 289 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001)); see also Litton v. Baugh, 122 N.E.3d 1034, 1043 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). Here, the defendants named in the second federal lawsuit included the City of Indianapolis, the Marion County Treasurer's Office, Josh A. Peters, CCH, and Cindy Palmer. The instant lawsuit names these defendants plus the Marion County Assessor's Office and Ministries. The Marion County Assessor's Office has essentially the same interest in the action as the Marion County Treasurer's Office, just as Ministries—which is affiliated with CCH—has essentially the same interest in the action as CCH. Moreover, on appeal, Coleman makes no attempt to argue that the parties are different from or not in privity with those in prior litigation. See Appellant's Br. p. 32 (arguing the elements of res judicata were not satisfied “because the prior federal court dismissals were based on jurisdictional grounds and did not address the substantive state law claims, in addition to the continuous events and ongoing harm sustained by Coleman”). Thus, for the foregoing reasons, we conclude the fourth requirement is satisfied.

[32] In this case, all four requirements for claim preclusion are met. Coleman's claims arose from the same operative facts that were presented in two prior federal cases, both of which resulted in judgments on the merits. His attempt to relitigate these matters in state court constitutes the type of repetitive litigation the doctrine of res judicata is designed to prevent. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the dismissal of Coleman's complaint under Trial Rule 12(B)(6).

II. Other Alleged Defects

[33] Coleman alleges there were procedural irregularities that warrant reversal, including: (1) the failure to comply with the stay order; (2) the denial of his opportunity to respond to the motion to dismiss; (3) the denial of his motions to amend his complaint; (4) the denial of his request for leave to serve discovery; and (5) the denial of his request for an injunction. See Appellant's Br. pp. 24–31, 35–36. Coleman further suggests that the series of adverse rulings evinced judicial bias. We address these contentions in turn and identify no error.

A. Stay of Proceedings

[34] Coleman argues that the trial court violated its own stay order when it ruled on the Defendants’ motion to dismiss. Coleman claims the court was obligated to issue a separate, specific order lifting the stay, and because it did not do so, the stay order remained in effect. We disagree, finding that the stay order had self-executing provisions that lifted the stay upon the issuance of mandate.

[35] The proper interpretation of a judgment is a question of law subject to de novo review. See Firestone v. Am. Premier Underwriters, Inc., 891 N.E.2d 151, 154 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied. Moreover, we interpret clear and unambiguous legal text in a manner consistent with its plain meaning. See, e.g., Coleman v. Coleman, 539 N.E.2d 34, 35 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989).

[36] In this case, the trial court ordered the matter “stayed pending the resolution of the appeal in front of the 7th Circuit,” specifying that the matter was “stayed until the 7th Circuit issue[d] mandate in th[e] matter.” Appellees’ App. Vol. II p. 76. The court directed the parties to “file notice with th[e] Court” both “when the 7th Circuit issue[d] its judgment” and “when the 7th Circuit issue[d] its mandate.” Id. The trial court specified that the Defendants “w[ould] then have 30 days after the issuing of mandate to file a response to [Coleman's] first amended complaint.” Id. This language clearly and unambiguously provided that the stay would automatically lift upon the issuance of mandate, at which point the Defendants would have the opportunity to respond to the complaint.

[37] On May 28, 2024, the Seventh Circuit issued its mandate. The following day, Coleman alerted the trial court of the mandate. The Defendants filed their motion to dismiss on June 27, 2024, within thirty days of the issuance of mandate. Because the stay order had self-executing provisions to lift the stay, we disagree that any further action was necessary to resume proceedings.

[38] Coleman also contends that the Defendants failed to comply with the trial court's order by not filing notice of the mandate, and that the stay should have remained in place until both parties satisfied this procedural requirement. Coleman is correct that the trial court directed both parties to notify the court of the Seventh Circuit's actions in the appeal. However, the order was such that the matter was “stayed until the 7th Circuit issue[d] mandate in the matter,” thus, the pertinent triggering event was the issuance of the mandate, not notice of the mandate. Id. Furthermore, we note that Coleman filed multiple motions during the period he contends there was a stay. That is, on May 6, 2024—before the Seventh Circuit issued its mandate—Coleman moved for leave to file a second amended complaint. And after the Defendants filed their motion to dismiss, Coleman again moved for leave to amend the complaint. Coleman does not explain why, under his theory, the stay was lifted for purposes of amending his complaint but not lifted as to the Defendants.

B. Opportunity to Respond

[39] Coleman claims he was deprived of procedural due process in the proceedings on the motion to dismiss. In general, procedural due process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard. Trigg v. Al-Khazali, 881 N.E.2d 699, 702 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). Here, Coleman claims the trial court ruled on the Defendants’ motion to dismiss without giving him the opportunity to respond. We disagree.

[40] The Defendants filed their motion to dismiss on June 27, 2024. Instead of filing a response, on July 1, 2024, Coleman filed a repetitive motion for leave to amend his complaint. The court ultimately granted the Defendants’ motion to dismiss on August 6, 2024, which was more than thirty days after it was filed. Under the circumstances, Coleman had the opportunity to respond to the motion to dismiss. We therefore disagree that he was deprived of due process.

C. Motions to Amend

[41] Coleman claims the trial court erred in denying his motions for leave to amend his complaint. We review the denial of this type of motion for an abuse of discretion, reversing only if the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances or the trial court misinterpreted the law. E.g., CrossRoad Farms, LLC v. Whitlock, 157 N.E.3d 555, 560 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020).

[42] Under our trial rules, “[a] party may amend his pleading once as a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is served[.]” Ind. Trial Rule 15(A). “Otherwise a party may amend his pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be given when justice so requires.” Id. “In determining what justice requires, the trial court should consider factors such as ‘undue delay, bad faith, or dilatory motive on the part of the movant and undue prejudice to the opposing party.’ ” Pumphrey v. Jones, 172 N.E.3d 1256, 1260 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (quoting Gen. Motors Corp. v. Northrop Corp., 685 N.E.2d 127, 142 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997), trans. denied), trans. denied. In general, we have recognized that amendments to pleadings are to be liberally granted to allow all issues to be presented to the factfinder.” Id. However, “it is not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to deny a motion to amend a pleading where such an amendment would be futile.” Kelley v. Vigo Cnty. Sch. Corp., 806 N.E.2d 824, 830 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied.

[43] On March 11, 2024, Coleman amended his complaint once as a matter of course. On May 6, 2024—three days after the Seventh Circuit affirmed the summary judgment ruling in the second federal action—Coleman moved for leave to file a second amended complaint. The trial court denied this motion the same day. Noting that Coleman had already amended his complaint once, the trial court stated: “The issues in this case are not new. The Court will not entertain any other motions to amend the complaint.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 119. Despite the trial court's clear directive, Coleman moved for leave to file a second amended complaint on July 1, 2024, which was a few days after the Defendants filed their motion to dismiss. Coleman asserted that his proposed amendment would “simplif[y] and address[ ] the issues raised in the [motion to dismiss],” including res judicata, the statute of limitations, and “[s]pecific [d]ates of the [o]ngoing harm and damages[.]” Appellees’ App. Vol. III p. 130. The Defendants opposed the motion, arguing that, among other things, it violated the prior order prohibiting further amendments, and all claims in the proposed complaint would be barred by res judicata. See id. at 162–74.

[44] Here, the trial court faced circumstances where Coleman was litigating a third lawsuit related to the 2019 tax sale, his second lawsuit was already found barred by res judicata, and he was seeking leave to amend in yet another attempt to repackage his complaint to avoid the effects of claim preclusion. Under these circumstances, the trial court was within its discretion to conclude that justice did not require granting either motion to amend Coleman's pleading.

D. Discovery

[45] Coleman claims the trial court improperly denied his motion for leave to file and serve discovery. We review decisions regarding discovery for an abuse of discretion. E.g., Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Circle Centre Mall, LLC, 113 N.E.3d 1220, 1227 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied. Here, Coleman sought discovery to “substantiate the claims and gather relevant evidence” for his proposed second amended complaint. Appellees’ App. Vol. III pp. 176. Having concluded herein that the trial court properly denied Coleman's motion for leave to amend, it necessarily follows that no discovery was warranted related to that proposed amended pleading. Moreover, given the trial court's determination that Coleman's claims in the proposed amended complaint were not new claims, it is apparent that further discovery would have been futile.

E. Emergency Injunction

[46] Coleman also alleges the trial court erred in denying his motion for an emergency injunction. We review a trial court's decision on a preliminary injunction for an abuse of discretion. E.g., Crowe v. Drenter, 215 N.E.3d 1107, 1114 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), trans. denied.

[47] Coleman moved for an injunction on May 8, 2024, alleging that CCH and Cindy Palmer engaged in fraud by misrepresenting CCH's nonprofit status, which was part of a broader scheme. Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 183–89. We note, however, that Coleman's argument for an injunction related to the same core factual allegations involved in both federal cases. Based on our conclusion that the trial court properly granted the motion to dismiss because Coleman's claims were barred by res judicata, we conclude that Coleman has not identified procedural irregularity in the denial of his motion for an emergency injunction.

F. Adverse Rulings

[48] Furthermore, to the extent Coleman suggests the series of adverse rulings was indicative of judicial bias, we disagree. “A judge is presumed by law to be unbiased and unprejudiced.” Moore v. Liggins, 685 N.E.2d 57, 63 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997). Moreover, an adverse ruling alone is insufficient to show bias or prejudice. Id. In other words, a party cannot obtain a remedy based on “[a] mere allegation of bias, without a specific factual showing in support[.]” Id. Having concluded that Coleman did not demonstrate procedural error, we reject any bald suggestion that the trial court's rulings were indicative of bias.

[49] In sum, Coleman has not identified procedural error in the trial court's handling of this case. Nor can we conclude, as Coleman suggests, that the trial court's series of adverse decisions was indicative of judicial bias. We therefore reject Coleman's claims of procedural irregularities, ultimately identifying no error.

III. Attorney's Fees

[50] Coleman challenges the trial court's award of attorney's fees under Indiana Code section 34-52-1-1, which is known as the General Recovery Rule. We review an award of attorney's fees for an abuse of discretion. E.g., Nardi v. King, 253 N.E.3d 1098, 1103 (Ind. 2025). An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's decision was clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances or the court misinterpreted the law. Id. On appeal, we “review[ ] any findings of fact for clear error and any legal conclusions de novo.” Id. Moreover, to the extent the decision to award attorney's fees “involves an issue of statutory interpretation, the standard of review is de novo.” Id.

[51] In pertinent part, the General Recovery Rule provides as follows:

In any civil action, the court may award attorney's fees as part of the cost to the prevailing party, if the court finds that either party:

(1) brought the action or defense on a claim or defense that is frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless;

(2) continued to litigate the action or defense after the party's claim or defense clearly became frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless; or

(3) litigated the action in bad faith.

I.C. § 34-52-1-1(b). This rule “places an obligation on litigants to investigate the legal and factual basis of the claim when filing and to continuously evaluate the merits of claims and defenses asserted throughout litigation.” Staff Source, LLC v. Wallace, 143 N.E.3d 996, 1008 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (quoting Landmark Legacy, LP v. Runkle, 81 N.E.3d 1107, 1116 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017)).

[52] A claim is frivolous if it is made “primarily to harass or maliciously injure another; if counsel is unable to make a good faith and rational argument on the merits of the action; or if counsel is unable to support the action by a good faith and rational argument for extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.” Id. (quoting Kitchell v. Franklin, 26 N.E.3d 1050, 1057 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied). A claim is unreasonable if, “based on the totality of the circumstances, including the law and facts known at the time, no reasonable attorney would consider the claim justified or worthy of litigation.” Id. (quoting Kitchell, 26 N.E.3d at 1057). A claim is groundless if “no facts exist which support the legal claim relied on and presented by the losing party.” Id. (quoting Purcell v. Old Nat'l Bank, 972 N.E.2d 885, 843 (Ind. 2012)). “However, the law is settled that a claim is neither groundless nor frivolous merely because a party loses on the merits.” Id. at 1009 (quoting Kitchell, 26 N.E.3d at 1057). Finally, bad faith is demonstrated “where the party presenting the claim is affirmatively operating with furtive design or ill will.” Id. (quoting Kitchell, 26 N.E.3d at 1057).

[53] Here, the Defendants primarily sought attorney's fees on the basis that Coleman litigated the action in bad faith. See Appellees’ App. Vol. II pp. 121–23. Indeed, they presented arguments in a section titled as follows: “Coleman has brought these claims in bad faith and therefore [the] Defendants jointly request attorney's fees.” Id. at 121. However, in their prayer for relief, the Defendants characterized Coleman's claims as frivolous, stating they sought attorney's fees “due to [Coleman] bringing this frivolous litigation.” Id. at 123. Moreover, the Defendants’ specific arguments did not focus on demonstrating that Coleman affirmatively operated with furtive design and ill will. They instead focused on the fact that Coleman again brought claims related to the 2019 tax sale, which are arguments relating more to whether attorney's fees are warranted because Coleman brought claims that were frivolous or groundless.

[54] The trial court summarily granted the motion for attorney's fees. That is, although the trial court explained that it was granting the motion to dismiss “for the reasons stated” in the Defendants’ motion, the trial court did not include this language in ordering payment of “reasonable expenses and costs, including attorney's fees, incurred by [the] Defendants in responding to [Coleman's] lawsuit.” Appellees’ App. Vol. III p. 178.

[55] It is worth noting that a trial court may sua sponte order payment of attorney's fees under the General Recovery Rule. E.g., Smyth v. Hester, 901 N.E.2d 25, 35–36 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied. Thus, in this case, the trial court was not limited to the Defendants’ primary contention that Coleman acted in bad faith and could have awarded attorney's fees for other conduct. Nevertheless, this court has been reluctant to affirm an award of attorney's fees when “the order appealed does not provide us with any insight as to the trial court's reason for the award of attorney fees in th[e] case, i.e., what the trial court found to be frivolous, unreasonable, and bad faith conduct.” Id. at 36 (emphasis removed). Therefore, in Smyth, we “remand[ed] to the trial court for further consideration and explanation of its judgment in that regard.” Id. Consistent with Smyth, because it is unclear from the instant judgment whether the court found that Coleman acted in bad faith (i.e., with furtive design or ill will) or instead brought frivolous or unreasonable claims, we remand for the trial court to provide further findings with respect to the basis of the judgment awarding attorney's fees to the Defendants.⁴

Conclusion

[56] The trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the motion to dismiss under Trial Rule 12(B)(6) due to claim preclusion, nor are we persuaded of procedural irregularities affecting the judgment or otherwise evincing bias. However, we remand for entry of further findings in support of the judgment awarding attorney's fees to the Defendants under the General Recovery Rule.

[57] Affirmed and remanded with instructions.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The parties did not provide the March 2024 order on appeal. However, we were able to access the order through the Odyssey case-management system.

2.   Ministries does not participate on appeal.

3.   The issuance of mandate under the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure is akin to certification of an opinion under our appellate rules. Compare Fed. R. App. P. 41(B) with Ind. Appellate Rule 65(E).

4.   Resolving the issue on this basis, we do not address other alleged errors related to attorney's fees.

Foley, Judge.

Kenworthy, J. and Scheele, J., concur.