Javier de Jesus Aguilar, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] When Javier de Jesus Aguilar's girlfriend asked to exit his car during an argument, Aguilar refused to stop. He pulled his girlfriend's hair, hit her in the face, and continued to drive around Indianapolis for hours before she managed to contact 911. Police eventually located the vehicle and arrested Aguilar. He was later convicted of domestic battery and criminal confinement using a vehicle. Aguilar appeals, but his arguments are merely requests to reweigh the evidence and reassess witness credibility. We affirm.

Facts

[2] In April 2024, Aguilar and Candelaria Salazar-Perez were in a romantic relationship and living together in an Indianapolis hotel. Aguilar supported Salazar-Perez financially, though the couple argued frequently about her desire to find work and make money of her own. This dispute erupted again on the morning of April 1st, and it eventually moved from their hotel room to Aguilar's car. As Aguilar was driving with Salazar-Perez, the argument escalated and eventually “got out of control.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 116.

[3] Salazar-Perez said she wanted to end the relationship and asked to get out of the car, but Aguilar refused to let her exit and would not stop the car. He “pulled [her] hair really hard,” hit her in the face, and “drove like crazy.” Id. at 117, 123. He continued to drive her around Indianapolis for hours. Though Aguilar made a few brief stops during which he momentarily exited the car, he quickly returned. Salazar-Perez stayed in the car as she was “very fearful” and “didn't know what to do.” Id. at 119. At one point, Salazar-Perez called 911, but the call was disconnected after Aguilar attempted to grab the phone from her. Dispatch called back, and Salazar-Perez spoke with the operator through yes-or-no answers to questions. Through these responses, she explained that she could not speak because there was a man with her in a car threatening her, and he had a gun.

[4] Police eventually located the car near a house that Aguilar was remodeling. There, officers found Salazar-Perez frightened, with disheveled hair and an abrasion on her lip. No gun was recovered from the car or the house. Salazar-Perez reported having a “really bad headache” and went to the hospital for medical treatment. Id. at 127.

[5] Based on this incident, the State charged Aguilar with eight crimes, including kidnapping, confinement, pointing a firearm at another, and domestic battery. At his jury trial, Salazar-Perez testified through an interpreter as to the events of the day. She explained that she told Aguilar that she wanted to get out of the car, but he did not let her. She recalled that he threatened her, pulled her hair, and hit her. A recording of the 911 call was admitted into evidence. Aguilar then testified in his defense and told a very different story. He claimed that he had broken up with Salazar-Perez a few days before the incident but continued to let her live with him. He denied ever pulling her hair, hitting her, arguing with her, or threatening her.

[6] The jury found Aguilar guilty of Level 5 felony criminal confinement using a vehicle and Class A misdemeanor domestic battery.¹ He was acquitted of the other kidnapping and weapon-related charges. The trial court entered judgments of conviction accordingly and sentenced Aguilar to one year in the Indiana Department of Correction. He appeals his convictions.

Discussion and Decision

[7] On appeal, Aguilar disputes the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his two convictions. When reviewing such claims, we do not reweigh evidence but consider only the probative evidence and the reasonable inferences supporting the verdict. Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007). We affirm unless no reasonable factfinder could conclude the elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. The evidence need not “overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.” Id. at 147 (citation omitted). Finding sufficient evidence supports each of his two convictions, we affirm.

I. Criminal Confinement

[8] To convict Aguilar of Level 5 felony criminal confinement, the State was required to prove that he knowingly or intentionally confined Salazar-Perez without her consent by using a vehicle. See Ind. Code § 35-42-3-3(b)(1)(B). To “confine” means to “substantially interfere with the liberty of a person.” Ind. Code § 35-42-3-1. Aguilar claims the State failed to prove any of these elements. However, his arguments amount to an impermissible request to reweigh evidence and judge witness credibility. See Drane, 867 N.E.2d at 146.

[9] Aguilar first claims that Salazar-Perez voluntarily entered the car, never asked to be let out, and did not attempt to exit the vehicle. He therefore claims he did not knowingly confine her or act without her consent. However, Salazar-Perez was directly asked: “Did you tell [Aguilar] you wanted to get out of the car?” and she responded: “Yes.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 118. She explained that Aguilar “didn't allow [her] to get out of the car” and “was threatening the whole time.” Id. at 117. When she first tried to call 911, Aguilar snatched her phone away. This evidence shows that Aguilar was aware that Salazar-Perez no longer wanted to be in the vehicle and therefore supports his conviction for confinement. See Stephens v. State, 10 N.E.3d 599, 604 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (finding sufficient evidence of confinement where victim initially entered car voluntarily, but defendant refused her requests to be let out of the car and grabbed her phone when she tried to call 911).

[10] Though Aguilar did stop and exit the car at a few points, Salazar-Perez explained the stops were “very quick.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 119. She did not leave the car because she was still “very fearful” and “didn't know what to do.” Id. The jury could have reasonably determined that despite these brief moments away from the vehicle, Aguilar still interfered with the liberty of Salazar-Perez against her will. See Crabtree v. State, 470 N.E.2d 725, 727 (Ind. 1984) (“[T]he fact that a victim is able to break away from the confinement does not negate the determining factor that a jury could find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that a nonconsensual confinement took place.”).

[11] Aguilar also points to a single exchange on Salazar-Perez's redirect examination in which she was asked whether she “felt free to leave” and answered: “Yes.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 133. But because Salazar-Perez's testimony was interpreted from Spanish, the jury could reasonably have regarded that one response as a product of misunderstanding, especially considering that Salazar-Perez repeatedly stated that Aguilar “didn't allow [her] to get out of the car” and “was not letting” her leave. Id. at 117, 122. In any case, appellate review does not invite us to parse a cold transcript and reweigh contradictions in evidence that the jury already resolved. See Drane, 867 N.E.2d at 146.

[12] Next, Aguilar claims he did not use the vehicle to confine Salazar-Perez, as required for his conviction. However, Salazar-Perez testified that she repeatedly asked to get out of the car, but Aguilar instead “drove like crazy” and Salazar-Perez “didn't know where he was, where [they] were going.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 123. This demonstrates that Aguilar used the vehicle to confine her by continuing to drive erratically rather than stopping, making the vehicle's continued movement itself the mechanism that prevented her from leaving.

[13] Finally, Aguilar challenges the general credibility of Salazar-Perez's testimony. He notes that, despite her claims that Aguilar had a gun during some of the dispute, police never found a firearm and the jury acquitted him of all weapon-related charges. In his view, those acquittals prove that Salazar-Perez's account was not credible. But a jury is entitled to believe portions of a witness's testimony while rejecting others. See Keller v. State, 987 N.E.2d 1099, 1118 n.9 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (noting that jury could find parts of defendant's statement credible while rejecting other parts of it).

[14] The evidence most favorable to the verdict and the reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom demonstrate that Aguilar confined Salazar-Perez by using a vehicle. Although Aguilar offered a different account of the day through his testimony, “the jury is the trier of fact and is entitled to determine which version of the incident to credit.” Belser v. State, 727 N.E.2d 457, 464 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). We will not reweigh the evidence or revisit credibility determinations that the jury resolved against him. See Drane, 867 N.E.2d at 146.

II. Domestic Battery

[15] Aguilar next challenges his conviction for Class A misdemeanor domestic battery. This conviction required the State to prove that Aguilar knowingly or intentionally touched a family or household member in a rude, insolent, or angry manner. See Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1.3(a)(1). He claims the only evidence of a rude or angry touching came from Salazar-Perez's testimony, which he considers unreliable, and from photographs of her hair and lip following the incident, which he claims do not show injuries.

[16] Again, Aguilar's argument is an invitation to reweigh the evidence. Salazar-Perez testified that Aguilar pulled her hair “really hard” and hit her in the mouth, which hurt “a lot.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 117. She reported having a “really bad headache” after the incident. Id. at 127. The testimony of a victim alone may sustain a battery conviction. See Bailey v. State, 979 N.E.2d 133, 135 (Ind. 2012).

[17] Moreover, the two officers that testified at trial corroborated Salazar-Perez's account of the battery and her injuries. The first officer observed Salazar-Perez's “disheveled” hair and an abrasion on her lip—evidence consistent with Salazar-Perez's statements that her hair was pulled and she was hit in the mouth. Tr. Vol. II, p. 158. A second officer observed Salazar-Perez's lip abrasion at the hospital, and a picture of that lip abrasion was also admitted into evidence.

[18] From this evidence, a reasonable jury could conclude that Aguilar knowingly touched Salazar-Perez in a rude or angry manner. Aguilar's arguments to the contrary and potential alternate explanations for Salazar-Perez's physical appearance are unavailing. See Drane, 867 N.E.2d at 147 (explaining that the evidence supporting a conviction need not disprove every reasonable hypothesis of innocence).

Conclusion

[19] The State presented sufficient evidence to support Aguilar's convictions for Level 5 felony criminal confinement and Class A misdemeanor domestic battery. Each offense was proven through the victim's testimony and corroborated by the surrounding circumstances. We do not second-guess the jury's assessment of conflicting evidence and witness credibility on appeal. We therefore affirm.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Aguilar was also found guilty and convicted of battery resulting in bodily injury. However, the trial court vacated this conviction based on double jeopardy concerns.

Weissmann, Judge.

Bradford, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.