IN RE: the Civil Commitment of D.T. (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] D.T. brings this expedited appeal challenging his involuntary temporary commitment to Community Fairbanks Behavioral Health (“Community”). D.T. claims the evidence is insufficient to show that he is dangerous or gravely disabled. Concluding that clear and convincing evidence supports D.T.’s involuntary temporary commitment, we affirm.

Issue

[2] D.T. presents one issue, which we restate as whether the evidence is sufficient to support his involuntary temporary commitment.

Facts

[3] Twenty-eight-year-old D.T. suffers from mental illnesses, including schizoaffective disorder. In May 2025, D.T. was released from a two-year incarceration. D.T. had stopped taking his medications while incarcerated because he believed he no longer needed them. After his release, D.T.’s psychological state deteriorated, and in September 2025, his mother, S.M., took D.T. to a hospital after D.T. blacked out after an incident in which D.T. smoked marijuana and “destroyed” his own apartment. Tr. p. 50. D.T. did not believe that he had any mental illness and, instead, claimed that the marijuana he smoked was laced. He also claimed that his water tasted like medicine. Although D.T. received an injection at the hospital, he refused to take any oral medications. The injection did not improve D.T.’s condition; he was unable to sleep, felt angry, and wanted to destroy things.

[4] On October 4, 2025, D.T. was outside his apartment complex when he saw a woman attempting to carry a table inside. According to D.T., he offered to help the woman but asked her if she knew the building entry code. Apparently offended by this, the woman called her boyfriend, and the boyfriend and several of his friends confronted D.T. The men were armed, so D.T. returned to his apartment, grabbed a steak knife, and went back outside to smoke a cigarette. The men then attacked D.T. by beating and pistol-whipping him. D.T. sustained a fractured nose, a lacerated ear that required stitches, and a busted lip.

[5] The next day, D.T.’s family observed his injuries. D.T. was acting erratically and unable to calm down. He was talking about things that did not exist, told S.M. that he was in the “mob,” and claimed that unknown people were trying to kill him. Id. at 14. D.T. also repeatedly went outside his apartment, even though the men who had attacked him were present. S.M. was concerned for her son's safety and wellbeing, so she took him to Community for mental health treatment. Initially, D.T. was willing to be treated, but he requested to be released on October 9, 2025. Community then filed a report requesting that D.T. be involuntarily temporarily committed for treatment.

[6] The trial court held a hearing on Community's request on October 14, 2025. At the hearing, Community presented testimony from psychiatrist Dr. Syed Hasan. Dr. Hasan had examined D.T. several times and described him as suffering from serious mental illnesses, including schizoaffective disorder, opioid-use disorder, and cannabis-use disorder. D.T. reported that he had auditory hallucinations in the form of voices telling him to do “bad things.” Id. at 35. D.T. also believed that other patients were touching his things and stealing his food, which made D.T. want to “hurt them.” Id. D.T. thought other people were trying to kill him.

[7] Dr. Hasan also testified that D.T. had a fixation on drugs. Indeed, D.T.’s prior incarceration was for selling drugs. Still, during his hospitalization, D.T. remained focused on being discharged and resuming his drug use. When Dr. Hasan testified that D.T. reported that he wanted to relapse on opioids, D.T. interjected and responded, “I said I might.” Id. at 44. Dr. Hasan explained that D.T.’s prognosis was poor if D.T. did not undergo treatment for his mental illness. D.T.’s condition impaired his judgment and made it difficult for him to manage his own affairs. Dr. Hasan opined that D.T. needed inpatient care to stabilize his medications and to begin addressing D.T.’s opioid addiction with naltrexone. Without such treatment, D.T.’s condition would deteriorate.

[8] D.T. had not slept for two weeks prior to his current hospitalization. And, although D.T.’s sleep had improved during his hospitalization and he could tend to his basic needs, Dr. Hasan explained that the improvement was due to the medication D.T. was receiving. Dr. Hasan testified that D.T. would have trouble functioning independently: although D.T. planned to live with S.M., they had an uneasy relationship; D.T. had no job; and, although he had applied for disability benefits, his application was denied. Dr. Hasan was also worried that D.T. would not keep his follow-up appointments or take his medication due to his lack of insight regarding his mental illness.

[9] S.M. testified about the circumstances surrounding D.T.’s current hospitalization. S.M. also testified that D.T. calls her several times a day from the hospital and is hostile and aggressive toward her. She explained that, when D.T. is symptomatic, he directs his anger toward her. S.M. stated that D.T. stopped taking his medication while incarcerated because he believed he did not need it, yet shortly thereafter, his condition worsened.

[10] D.T. also testified at the hearing and was anxious and distracted. D.T. repeatedly interrupted witnesses and counsel. His own testimony was confusing, and he often switched topics, demonstrating his disorganized thought processes. D.T. denied having schizoaffective disorder and instead insisted that his behavior was due to “laced” marijuana or his “anger issues.” Tr. pp. 29, 49, 52. When D.T. indicated that he financially supported his seven-year-old son, Community's counsel asked how he could do so without a job or other source of income. In response, D.T. “[p]lead the Fifth,” which suggested that his source of income was not legal. Id. at 64-65.

[11] After the hearing, the trial court entered an order granting Community's petition for D.T.’s temporary involuntary commitment. This order provides:

Upon evidence presented, the Court now finds by clear and convincing evidence:

1. Respondent is suffering from Schizoaffective disorder Bipolar type, Unspecified anxiety disorder, and Cannabis use disorder Moderate, which is a mental illness as defined in I.C. 12-7-2-130.

2. Respondent is (X) dangerous to self or (X) dangerous to others, as defined in I.C. 12-7-2-53. Respondent is (X) gravely disabled, as defined in I.C. 12-7-2-96.

3. Respondent is in need of custody, care, and treatment at Community Fairbanks Behavioral Health for a period of time not expected to exceed ninety (90) days.

4. Placement is determined to be the least restrictive environment suitable for treatment and stabilization as well as protecting Respondent while restricting Respondent's liberty to the least degree possible.

5. That the treatment plan for the Respondent has been fully evaluated, including alternate forms, and is believed to result in benefiting the Respondent while outweighing any risk of harm.

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the Respondent is accordingly committed to the designated facility until January 12, 2026, unless discharged prior.

* * * * *

Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 22-23 (emphasis in original). D.T. now brings this expedited appeal.¹

Discussion and Decision

A. Involuntary commitment statutes

[12] D.T. claims that there was insufficient evidence to support his temporary involuntary commitment. “ ‘[T]he purpose of civil commitment proceedings is dual: to protect the public and to ensure the rights of the person whose liberty is at stake.’ ” Civ. Commitment of T.K. v. Dep't of Veterans Affs., 27 N.E.3d 271, 273 (Ind. 2015) (quoting In re Commitment of Roberts, 723 N.E.2d 474, 476 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000)). “To satisfy the requirements of due process, the facts justifying an involuntary commitment must be shown ‘by clear and convincing evidence ․ [which] not only communicates the relative importance our legal system attaches to a decision ordering an involuntary commitment, but ․ also has the function of reducing the chance of inappropriate commitments.’ ” Id. (quoting Commitment of J.B. v. Midtown Mental Health Ctr., 581 N.E.2d 448, 450 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991), trans. denied).

[13] For involuntary temporary commitments of not more than ninety days, the petitioner must prove that the individual is “mentally ill and either dangerous or gravely disabled.” Ind. Code § 12-26-6-1, -8(a). The trial court can only order an involuntary temporary commitment if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that the person is mentally ill and either dangerous or gravely disabled and that committing them is appropriate. Ind. Code § 12-26-2-5(e), 6-8(a).

B. Standard of Review

[14] On appeal, we will affirm a civil commitment “if, ‘considering only the probative evidence and the reasonable inferences supporting it, without weighing evidence or assessing witness credibility, a reasonable trier of fact could find [the necessary elements] proven by clear and convincing evidence.’ ” J.W. v. Cmty. Fairbanks Behav. Health, 260 N.E.3d 946, 951 (Ind. 2025) (quoting T.K., 27 N.E.3d at 273). “Probative evidence is that which ‘tends to prove or disprove a point in issue.’ ” Id. (quoting Galloway v. State, 938 N.E.2d 699, 711 (Ind. 2010)). “And ‘[i]n order to be clear and convincing, the existence of a fact must be highly probable.’ ” Id. (quoting Commitment of B.J. v. Eskenazi Hosp./Midtown CMHC, 67 N.E.3d 1034, 1038 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016)).

C. Sufficient evidence supports the trial court's commitment order.

[15] Here, D.T. does not deny that there was sufficient evidence to support a finding that he suffers from a mental illness. Instead, he claims that no evidence supported the trial court's findings that he was dangerous to himself or others or that he is gravely disabled. We disagree.

[16] We first address D.T.’s argument that there is insufficient evidence to show that he was dangerous.² “Dangerous” is defined by statute as “a condition in which an individual as a result of mental illness, presents a substantial risk that the individual will harm the individual or others.” Ind. Code § 12-7-2-53(a). “ ‘Dangerousness must be shown by clear and convincing evidence indicating that the behavior used as an index of a person's dangerousness would not occur but for the person's mental illness.’ ” A.S. v. Cmty. Fairbanks Behavioral Health, 262 N.E.3d 853, 858 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (quoting M.M. v. Clarian Health Partners, 826 N.E.2d 90, 97 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied).

[17] Here, Community presented evidence from which the trial court could reasonably conclude by clear and convincing evidence that D.T. was a danger to himself. D.T had no insight into his mental illness and did not want to take his medication. Instead, D.T. was focused on relapsing on opioids when he was released from the hospital. Expressing a desire to use a dangerous class of controlled substances with a known risk of overdose—especially after a recent incarceration for dealing in a controlled substance—supports a finding that D.T. was a danger to himself. But this was not the only danger that D.T. posed to his own safety.

[18] The attack on D.T. at the apartment complex demonstrated how D.T.’s altered mental functioning impaired his judgment. Although D.T. testified that he was “jumped,” Tr. p. 51, this occurred only after he was first confronted by the men who attacked him. Rather than reporting the situation ³ or avoiding further confrontation, D.T. went back into his apartment, grabbed a steak knife, and returned outside. Only then was he attacked. We do not suggest that D.T. in any way deserved to be attacked. But the incident does demonstrate how his mental illness creates dangers to his safety. Indeed, D.T.’s mother explained that D.T. demonstrated paranoid behavior and stated that unknown people were “trying to kill [him],” and that “everyone was out to get [him],” while being very aggressive and angry. Tr. p. 14.

[19] D.T. nevertheless argues that his retrieval of the knife was merely an exercise of his right to self-defense. See Ind. Code § 35-41-3-2 (setting forth defense of the use of force to protect persons or property). But here, D.T. did not merely attempt to defend himself. He left the initial confrontation, retrieved a knife, and then voluntarily returned to the scene of the confrontation. Under these circumstances, the trial court could reasonably conclude that D.T. did not simply defend himself; rather, his impaired judgment led him to escalate an already dangerous situation. In fact, the day after the attack, D.T. repeatedly went outside his apartment, even though the men who had attacked him were present.

[20] In addition, Dr. Hasan's testimony established a link between D.T.’s impaired mental state and his dangerous behavior. Dr. Hasan explained that D.T. “gets very paranoid easily with the others” and “wants to hurt others.” Tr. p. 45. This not only poses a risk to other people, but, as demonstrated by the attack in which D.T. was seriously injured, also poses a risk to himself.⁴ See M.M., 826 N.E.2d at 97-98 (sufficient evidence supported a finding that the committed patient was dangerous to herself where the treating physician described the patient's erratic, impulsive, and angry behavior; the patient screamed at staff and other patients; and the patient refused medication). Accordingly, Community presented clear and convincing evidence that D.T. is a danger to himself.

[21] The trial court also concluded that D.T. was a danger to others, but D.T. notes that, in the Physician's Statement accompanying the report requesting his temporary commitment, the physician who completed the report checked the box indicating that D.T. presented “a substantial risk of harm to self,” but did not check the box indicating that D.T. presented a substantial risk to “others,” as indicated below:

Tabular or graphical material not displayable at this time.

Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 7.⁵

[22] Accordingly, D.T. argues that Community did not even allege that he was dangerous to others, much less prove that he was. See M.E. v. Dep't of Veterans Affs., 64 N.E.3d 855, 863 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (noting that physician “did not even check the box to indicate [the patient] was suffering from grave disability” and finding that there was insufficient evidence of grave disability), disapproved on other grounds by A.A. v. Eskenazi Health/Midtown CMHC, 97 N.E.3d 606 (Ind. 2018). We do not read M.E. to mean that a physician's statement limits what the trial court may find after an evidentiary hearing. Although such a statement, when attached to a report recommending temporary commitment, initiates the commitment process, the trial court must assess the evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing to determine whether commitment is appropriate. Regardless, here, there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding that D.T. was dangerous to himself, and we therefore need not address whether the evidence supported a finding that D.T. was dangerous to others.⁶

Conclusion

[23] Community presented sufficient evidence to prove by clear and convincing evidence that as a result of D.T.’s mental illness, he presented a substantial risk that he would harm himself or others. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

[24] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   This expedited appeal is part of the two-year Marion County Expedited Mental Health Appeals Pilot Project established by the Indiana Supreme Court. In re Marion Cnty. Expedited Mental Health Appeals Pilot Project, No. 24S-MS-190, slip op. at 1 (Ind. July 16, 2024).

2.   D.T. also challenges the trial court's finding that he was gravely disabled. The involuntary commitment statute, however, is written in the disjunctive, and the party seeking commitment is required only to prove that the patient is dangerous or gravely disabled, not both. M.Z. v. Clarian Health Partners, 829 N.E.2d 634, 637 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). Because we conclude below that Community presented evidence that D.T. was dangerous, we need not address his grave disability argument.

3.   We find D.T.’s citation to J.B. v. Midtown Health Center, 581 N.E.2d 448 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991), to be unavailing. In that case, we emphasized that courts “must exercise extreme caution that [they] not utterly strip a person suffering from mental illness of the power to make an informed decision concerning risk-taking.” Id. at 542. In J.B., the committed patient's risky behavior included one instance of hitchhiking and two instances of running away through a busy intersection. Id. This behavior reflected poor decision making, there was no showing that this conduct would not occur but for the patient's mental illness. Here, however, Dr. Hasan's testimony established that D.T.’s paranoid thinking was directly linked to the situation in which D.T. was attacked.

4.   D.T.’s attempt to frame this incident as a cultural issue by arguing that distrust of police is reasonable in his community is unpersuasive. We recognize that certain individuals may distrust the police, and we do not suggest that this alone constitutes evidence of mental illness or dangerousness. But the issue is not whether D.T.’s distrust of the police was reasonable; rather, it was whether D.T.’s behavior was driven by his mental illness and whether this created a danger to himself. The trial court could reasonably conclude that D.T.’s decision to go back outside and expose himself to an already dangerous situation, instead of seeking help from the police or others or even simply remaining inside his apartment, was a result of his mental illness and exposed D.T. to unnecessary danger.

5.   D.T. notes that no evidence was presented at the hearing that he threatened to commit suicide. The trial court, however, did not make such a finding and did not base its decision on this allegation.

6.   Moreover, unlike in M.E., where there was no substantial evidence that the patient was gravely disabled, here there was substantial evidence that D.T.’s mental illness posed a substantial risk to others. Specifically, D.T. demonstrated angry and paranoid behavior. He yelled and screamed at his mother. He claimed he was in the “mob” and that people were trying to kill him. Tr. p. 9. He also demonstrated significant paranoid behavior at the hospital by claiming that others were touching his belongings and stealing his food which made D.T. want to “hurt them.” Id. at 35. D.T. also heard voices telling him to do “bad things.” Id.

Tavitas, Judge.

Brown, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.