Gerard M. Dierckman, Appellant-Respondent v. Sandra E. Dierckman, Appellee-Petitioner (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Gerard Dierckman appeals the trial court's grant of partial relief to Sandra Dierckman pursuant to Ind. Trial Rule 60(B) regarding the post-judgment interest provision included in the court's order dividing the parties’ marital property. Dierckman presents three arguments on appeal, which we consolidate and restate as: Did the trial court err in granting partial relief to Sandra regarding the post-judgment interest provision?

[2] Sandra cross appeals, claiming that the trial court abused its discretion by not granting her full relief from the post-judgment interest provision.

[3] We affirm.

Facts & Procedural History

[4] The parties were married on July 28, 1987. On December 20, 2019, Sandra filed a petition for dissolution. At the time of separation, the parties were equal owners and operators of a farming business consisting of approximately 1622 acres across two Indiana counties. To ensure that the bank would grant an operating loan on the business, the parties agreed to a provisional order that gave Sandra temporary control of the farming business.

[5] On October 26, 2022, following a hearing, the trial court entered a decree of dissolution (the Decree) in which the court dissolved the parties’ marriage and equally divided the marital property.¹ The trial court effectively awarded Sandra the entirety of the marital estate and ordered her to make a net equalization payment of $4,903,829.45 to Gerard.² The court ordered that “[s]tatutory interest shall accrue on this judgment as provided by law from the date of the filing of this Decree.” Appellant's Appendix Vol. II at 38. The court further ordered:

Each party shall, within 30 days from the filing of this Decree, execute any and all documents and perform any act which may be reasonable to carry out any of the purposes or provisions of this Decree. This includes, but is not limited to the signing of deeds transferring all real estate; the signing of titles to vehicles; and, the signing of titles or bills of sale to equipment. If titles are being held by secured creditors, said titles shall be signed upon request following refinancing.

Id. at 38-39. The court directed that a commissioner be appointed “upon motion of either party or by the Court to carry out the provisions” of the Decree. Id. at 39.

[6] Gerard appealed the Decree. Meanwhile, Sandra paid $3500 to secure a commitment letter to refinance the notes encumbering the real estate. At that time, interest rates on the loan Sandra planned to obtain were around 3.85%.³ On December 6, 2022, Sandra filed a motion requesting appointment of a commissioner, alleging “[Gerard] has not signed the deeds; refuses to sign the loan assumption agreement; and refuses to timely pay the loan encumbering his truck.” Id. at 41. On December 21, 2022, Sandra received an approval letter for a loan that she intended to use to pay the equalization payment.

[7] The trial court held a hearing on February 2, 2023, regarding appointment of a commissioner. Gerard objected to appointment, asserting that the motion was premature because Sandra had not made the equalization payment. Sandra testified that she could not obtain a loan to make the payment until she had a clean deed, which required Gerard to execute certain transfer documents. Gerard admitted that he would not sign the deeds over to Sandra until his appeal was completed. Thereafter, Sandra withdrew all of her outstanding motions pending the resolution of the appeal.

[8] On December 19, 2023, this court issued a memorandum decision affirming the trial court's division of marital property. Dierckman v. Dierckman, 2023 WL 8723399 (Ind. Ct. App. Dec. 19, 2023). Thereafter, on January 8, 2024, Sandra paid $2500 to secure a second loan commitment for which she received an approval letter on March 1, 2024. Due to his pending transfer request, Gerard still refused to execute the necessary documents, and Sandra's loan commitment expired. The decision of this court was certified on April 25, 2024, upon our Supreme Court's denial of transfer.

[9] Thereafter, Sandra again took steps to obtain financing. At then-current rates, Sandra was seeking to obtain a loan commitment at 6.75%, or nearly $735,750 per year in interest. On June 17, 2024, Sandra filed a motion to appoint a commissioner. The trial court scheduled a hearing on Sandra's motion for July 29, 2024. At the start of the hearing, the parties advised the court that they had agreed to execute all the necessary documents to transfer the property thereby making the appointment of a commissioner unnecessary. Gerard noted, however, that there was one contested issue regarding the post-judgment interest provision. The court heard testimony and received evidence and then considered arguments of counsel regarding enforcement of the statutory interest provision in the Decree. Gerard sought enforcement of the Decree regarding post-judgment interest and claimed that Sandra owed him interest on the equalization payment in an amount exceeding $700,000.

[10] Sandra responded that she had secured financing on two separate occasions but could not complete the transactions because Gerard refused to sign the documents necessary for her to close on the loans. Sandra also pointed out that interest rates were much lower when she first sought financing following entry of the Decree and that interest rates at the time of the current hearing were nearly double, thus the cost of a loan had risen from $381,500 to $735,750 a year. Sandra testified that she did not feel “it would be equitable to grant [Gerard] statutory interest based off of his actions.” Transcript at 27. Sandra also testified that Gerard had refused to make payments on his truck as ordered in the Decree, so she continued to make the payments to keep her credit status in good standing as both of their names were on the note for Gerard's truck.⁴ Sandra acknowledged that she never filed a request to stay execution of the Decree.

[11] On August 12, 2024, the court issued an “Order on Statutory Interest” wherein it concluded that “at this time, Post-Judgment Interest must be approved.” Appellant's Appendix Vol. II at 72. The court noted that “the only possible discretion in the matter” would be available through consideration of the circumstances pursuant to a motion for relief from judgment under T.R. 60(B)(8). Id. at 73. Because no such motion was pending, the court denied Sandra's argument “against application of statutory interest.” Id.

[12] On August 19, 2024, Sandra filed a T.R. 60(B)(8) motion and argued:

The award of statutory interest in this matter does not serve to promote a reasonable and equitable division of property between the parties, and the gap of inequity is widen[ed] by the acts by [Gerard], which (1) prevented [Sandra] from paying the judgment before the substantial amount of interest could accumulate, and (2) prevented [Sandra] from obtaining financing to facilitate paying the judgment at a lower rate than would now be necessary (which is roughly doubled what was available in 2022).

Id. at 75. Sandra requested that the court vacate that portion of the Decree awarding post-judgment interest on the equalization payment. Gerard filed an objection, and then the trial court held a hearing on Sandra's request for relief on September 13, 2024.⁵

[13] On October 10, 2024, the trial court issued its order granting Sandra's request in part. Specifically, the trial court ordered that “[s]tatutory interest shall accrue as provided by law, 30 days from the date that the Opinion of the Indiana Court of Appeals was certified on April 29, 2024.” Id. at 28. The court found that “the Decree contemplated that the provisions of the Decree would be addressed within the time periods indicated in the Decree,” but noted that the matter remained unsettled for eighteen months, which would result in Sandra having to pay an additional $714,000 in interest to Gerard. Id. at 27. This, the court found, amounted to a “significant and burdensome cost ․ not contemplated in the award of the original Decree.” Id.

[14] Gerard now appeals, and Sandra cross-appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.

Discussion & Decision

Motion for Relief from Judgment

[15] Gerard first argues that the trial court erred in granting Sandra relief because such was barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Gerard makes much of the fact that at the July 2024, hearing, which was scheduled to consider Sandra's request for appointment of a commissioner, the parties presented evidence and argument regarding enforcement of the post-judgment interest provision in the Decree. He claims that Sandra's T.R. 60(B) motion merely sought to relitigate that issue. We disagree.

[16] “Res judicata, whether in the form of claim preclusion or issue preclusion (also called collateral estoppel), aims to prevent repetitious litigation of disputes that are essentially the same, by holding a prior final judgment binding against both the original parties and their privies.” Becker v. State, 992 N.E.2d 697, 700 (Ind. 2013) (italicization removed). Res judicata “applies where there has been a final adjudication on the merits of the same issue between the same parties.” Ind. State Ethics Comm'n v. Sanchez, 18 N.E.3d 988, 993 (Ind. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

[17] Here, there was no final judgment on the merits of the parties’ arguments regarding post-judgment interest. The hearing was scheduled to consider Sandra's request for appointment of a commissioner, which turned out to be moot. At that hearing, however, Gerard mentioned a separate issue relating to the post-judgment interest provision in the Decree and the court permitted parties to present arguments about its enforcement. In its order following the hearing, the court reiterated what was set out in the Decree and found that the interest provision “must be approved,” but explained that such was because there was no motion asking the court to exercise its equitable discretion. Id. at 72. The court made clear that it was not deciding whether to exercise its equitable discretion and amend the interest provision in the Decree given the circumstances. The trial court's order following the July 2024 hearing was not a final judgment that was binding upon the parties as to the issue of whether the court would exercise its discretion and amend the post-judgment interest provision in the Decree. Res judicata does not operate to bar the court's consideration of Sandra's T.R. 60(B) motion.

[18] Gerard next argues that the trial court erred in granting Sandra equitable relief because such is “strictly prohibited” by Supreme Court precedent. Appellant's Brief at 17. In support of his argument, Gerard directs us to Ryan v. Ryan, 972 N.E.2d 359 (Ind. 2012).

[19] In Ryan, the parties entered into a property settlement agreement in which they agreed to sell two properties and pay off the mortgages. The parties also executed a “private agreement” in which either party could bind the other to accept a purchase of a property so long as a specified net proceed for each property would be obtained. Id. at 361. The parties’ agreement was incorporated into the divorce decree. When neither property had sold after more than eighteen months on the market, husband filed a T.R. 60(B)(8) motion for relief from judgment requesting the court order that the properties be sold at prevailing market value and that the parties’ private agreement be declared of no further force and effect. The trial court denied husband's motion and this court reversed. Our Supreme Court granted transfer and affirmed the trial court, holding that husband was not entitled to relief as T.R. 60(B)(8) is not available to challenge a property-division order.

[20] There are key distinctions that make the Court's decision in Ryan inapplicable to this case. First, in Ryan, the matter did not involve enforcement of a post-judgment interest provision. Second, the current matter does not involve a settlement agreement or a “private agreement” between the parties from which a party is seeking relief. Because we find Ryan to be distinguishable from the matter before us, Gerard's argument based thereon fails.⁶

[21] We agree with Gerard that Ind. Code § 31-15-7-9.1 unambiguously states that a “property disposition ․ may not be revoked or modified, except in case of fraud”. But post-judgment interest is not part of the property disposition.

[22] The statute on post-judgment interest reads: “Except as otherwise provided by statute, interest on judgments for money whenever rendered shall be from the date of the return of the verdict or finding of the court until satisfaction at: ․ eight percent.” Ind. Code § 24-4.6-1-101. In Rovai v. Rovai, 912 N.E.2d 374 (Ind. 2009), our Supreme Court directly addressed application of the post-judgment interest statute in the context of dissolution matters. The Court weighed the straightforward relationship of post-judgment interest and the time value of money in the context of a civil judgment with the more nuanced judicial decrees in dissolution matters. Given the allocation of economic values and social objectives in dissolution matters, the Court found “little reason for transporting the post-judgment interest statute into the equitable world of dissolutions.” Id. at 376. The Court therefore held that the post-judgment interest statute “does not compel that interest run on the various internal elements of dissolution decrees. Id. Rather, the dissolution statutes confer upon trial courts discretion whether to order interest when fashioning a just and reasonable division of property. In short, ordering post-judgment interest in a dissolution action is a matter of trial court discretion.

[23] Here, the trial court included the post-judgment interest provision in the Decree as a mechanism to encourage Sandra to timely satisfy her obligation to make the equalization payment. See Poehlman v. Feferman, 717 N.E.2d 578, 583 (Ind. 1999) (observing that the post-judgment interest statute serves as “an incentive on the part of judgment debtors to satisfy expeditiously their debt obligations to avoid this accrual of interest”). Such provision was not part of the property disposition. Thus, with her T.R. 60(B)(8) motion, Sandra did not seek modification of the trial court's property disposition; rather, Sandra sought relief from the discretionary interest provision in light of Gerard's conduct following entry of the Decree.

[24] Gerard finally argues that the trial court abused its discretion in granting relief pursuant to T.R. 60(B)(8) because Sandra failed to show “extraordinary or exceptional” circumstances that justified any relief. A motion under T.R. 60(B) is addressed to the equitable discretion of the trial court, and we will reverse only upon an abuse of that discretion. Brimhall v. Brewster, 864 N.E.2d 1148, 1152-53 (Ind. Ct App. 2007), trans. denied. T.R. 60(B)(8) allows the trial court to set aside a judgment within a reasonable time for any reason justifying relief “other than those reasons set forth in sub-paragraphs (1), (2), (3), and (4).” Id. at 1153. The trial court's residual powers under subsection (8) may only be invoked upon a showing of exceptional circumstances justifying extraordinary relief. Baker & Daniels, LLP v. Coachmen Indus., Inc., 924 N.E.2d 130, 140 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied. It is, of course, “the burden [of] the movant to demonstrate that relief is both necessary and just.” Id. In sum, to be granted relief, Sandra was required to show: (1) she brought her claim within a reasonable time; (2) she has alleged a meritorious claim; and (3) extraordinary or exceptional circumstances justify relief. Wilkerson v. Egan, 253 N.E.3d 1149 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025). Gerard only challenges the court's finding with respect to number 3.

[25] There is ample evidence in the record justifying the court's grant of partial relief to Sandra. Sandra submitted evidence showing that she timely secured loan commitments three different times in order to make the equalization payment and forestall the accumulation of interest, but her efforts were thwarted each time by Gerard's refusal to sign documents necessary for her to complete the loan process. She also incurred extra expenses in terms of the costs of securing the loan commitments, the first two of which expired because Gerard refused to cooperate. Sandra also pointed out that interest rates have nearly doubled since entry of the Decree, thus drastically increasing the cost to refinance the loans required to make the equalization payment.

[26] It is undisputed that Gerard refused to sign the documents Sandra needed to close on the loans for the equalization payment.⁷ At least eighteen months passed between entry of the Decree in October 2022 and when Gerard's appeals were final in April 2024. If interest accrued during this time, Sandra was responsible for nearly $714,000 in interest, which she notes is roughly 14% of the total equalization payment. As the trial court found, this amounted to a “significant and burdensome cost ․ not contemplated in the award of the original Decree” as the Court contemplated that provisions of the Decree would be addressed within the time periods indicated therein. Appellant's Appendix Vol. II at 27. We agree with the trial court that imposing interest on the equalization payment for the period of time that Gerard refused to cooperate while the appeals process played out would create a significant hardship to Sandra and that such rose to the level of extraordinary and exceptional circumstances. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting Sandra partial relief from the post-judgment interest provision.

Cross-Appeal

[27] Sandra argues that the extraordinary and exceptional circumstances that warranted partial relief from the post-judgment interest provision extend beyond the completion of the appellate process. Sandra notes that for three months after his appeal was final, Gerard still refused to execute the necessary documents. She maintains if his refusal to cooperate “justified a pause in the interest during the appeal, it also justified a pause after the appeals were complete.” Appellee's Brief at 23. Sandra maintains that the trial court should have granted her relief from the post-judgment interest provision until the day Gerard signed the necessary documents, i.e., July 29, 2024.

[28] In the Decree, the trial court ordered that interest would accrue from the date of the filing of the Decree. Thus, Sandra would have been obligated to pay interest until such time as she secured financing and made the equalization payment. In similar fashion, the trial court ordered that interest would accrue from the date Gerard's appeal was finalized until such time that Sandra made the equalization payment. Although Sandra points out that Gerard still refused to sign the documents needed to complete the loan process, Sandra did not secure a loan commitment letter until July 26, 2024. Thus, it was not Gerard's conduct that prevented her from making the equalization payment prior to that date. Given the circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in not granting Sandra total relief from the post-judgment interest provision.

[29] Judgment affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   In the Decree, the court noted that evidence had been presented that justified an unequal division of the marital estate in favor of Sandra but that it chose to accept Sandra's proposal for an equal division.

2.   The Decree awarded Gerard his truck. Gerard was directed to refinance or otherwise cause Sandra's name to be removed from the note encumbering his truck upon receipt of the equalization payment from Sandra.

3.   At that interest rate, Sandra would have accrued annual interest on her loan of approximately $381,500.

4.   By the time of this hearing, Sandra had paid off the note on the truck awarded to Gerard. The parties agreed to a set-off on Sandra's equalization payment for the monies she paid related to Grrard's truck.

5.   Sandra informed the court that she planned to close on a loan on September 20, 2024, and make payment to Gerard of $4,870,694.34 less the credits agreed to by the parties.

6.   Gerard has failed to direct us to any other case involving the issue of a post-judgment interest provision.

7.   Gerard takes the view that the accumulation of interest was not his problem. He suggests that Sandra could have forced him to sign the documents necessary to refinance the debt or she could have filed a motion to stay enforcement of the interest provision pending the outcome of the appeal. However, the record demonstrates that due to Gerard's refusal to cooperate, Sandra requested appointment of a commissioner. Gerard objected to this request and admitted that he would not sign any documents until his appeal was completed. There appears to have been some discussion between the parties, and perhaps the court, at a hearing on this matter. Shortly after the hearing, Sandra dismissed her request pending the outcome of the Gerard's appeal. It was within the trial court's discretion to consider the equities of these competing circumstances.

Altice, Chief Judge.

Pyle, J. and DeBoer, J., concur.