Justin Keith Miller, Appellant-Defendant v. Dubois County Government, Appellee-Defendant (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] In May of 2025, the Dubois County Government (“the County”) filed suit against Justin Miller, and Miller was successfully served with the complaint on June 12. On July 9, 2025, the trial court entered default judgment in favor of the County after Miller had failed to appear. Miller ultimately moved to set aside the judgment and various post-judgment orders and for Judge Anthony Quinn to recuse himself, which he did. Miller contends that the judgment should be set aside for lack of service and because it was the result of judicial bias. Miller also contends that he has been denied his due-process rights. Because Miller has failed to establish that any of his claims have merit, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On May 27, 2025, the County filed a claim of an unknown nature against Miller. The trial court issued a summons to Miller the same day, and it was served on Miller on June 12, 2025. On July 9, the trial court entered default judgment in favor of the County and issued an order that provided, in part, as follows:

[T]he Court, [a]fter hearing evidence and taking notice that the Defendant was served a copy of the Plaintiffs complaint, including the date and time of this hearing, by certified mail/Sheriff endorsed summons, and further that the Plaintiff has presented at least a prima facie case, does hereby enter a default judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant in the sum of $5,198.47 plus court costs in the amount of $125.00, for a total judgment of $5,323.47, said judgment to bear interest at the rate of eight percent (8%) per annum.

Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 2. The chronological case summary (“CCS”) indicates that service of the judgment was returned, not served.

[3] On August 4, 2025, Miller moved to set aside/vacate the default judgment and stay enforcement proceedings, which motions the trial court denied the following day. On August 6, 2025, Miller filed a notice of appeal and moved Judge Quinn to recuse, which motion the trial court granted; Senior Judge Nathan Vercamp accepted his appointment the same day. On August 11, 2025, Miller moved again to set aside the default judgment.

Discussion and Decision

[4] We first note that Miller is proceeding pro se.

It is well settled that pro se litigants are held to the same legal standards as licensed attorneys. Twin Lakes Reg'l Sewer Dist. v. Teumer, 992 N.E.2d 744, 747 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). This means that pro se litigants are bound to follow the established rules of procedure and must be prepared to accept the consequences of their failure to do so. Shepherd v. Truex, 819 N.E.2d 457, 463 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). These consequences include waiver for failure to present cogent argument on appeal. Id. While we prefer to decide issues on the merits, where the appellant's noncompliance with appellate rules is so substantial as to impede our consideration of the issues, we may deem the alleged errors waived. Perry v. Anonymous Physician 1, 25 N.E.3d 103, 105 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied (2015), cert. denied (2015). We will not become an “advocate for a party, or address arguments that are inappropriate or too poorly developed or expressed to be understood.” Id.

Basic v. Amouri, 58 N.E.3d 980, 983–84 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016).

[5] We further note that the County has not filed a brief. When an appellee has not filed a brief, “we need not undertake the burden of developing an argument on the appellee's behalf.” Trinity Homes, LLC v. Fang, 848 N.E.2d 1065, 1068 (Ind. 2006). “[W]e will reverse the trial court's judgment if the appellant's brief presents a case of prima facie error.” Id. Prima facie error is error “at first sight, on first appearance, or on the face of it.” Id. (citation omitted). With this in mind, we turn to Miller's claims.

[6] Miller contends that the default judgment against him must be set aside because he was not properly served. Indiana Rule of Trial Procedure 4(A) provides, in part, that “[t]he court acquires jurisdiction over a party or person who [․] is served with summons[.]” Contrary to Miller's factual assertion that he was not served prior to the entry of default judgment, the CCS indicates that he was, in fact, served on June 12, 2025, almost one month before the entry of default judgment on July 9. The subsequent failure of service of the judgment on Miller did not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction over Miller, which it had already acquired through completed service of the summons.

[7] Miller also contends that the judgment against him must be vacated due to alleged judicial bias and a conflict of interest by Judge Quinn, citing Judge Quinn's employment with the County and that he had previously prosecuted a criminal case against Miller. Finally, Miller contends that the trial court's denials of his post-judgment motions to vacate judgment, conduct discovery, and stay enforcement constitute abuses of discretion and violations of his right to due process. These two arguments, however, are devoid of citations to the record and lack cogent reasoning. Indiana Rule of Appellate Procedure 46(A)(8)(a) requires that an appellate argument contain “the contentions of the appellant on the issues presented, supported by cogent reasoning. Each contention must be supported by citations to the authorities, statutes, and the Appendix or parts of the Record on Appeal relied on[.]” “Failure to present a cogent argument results in waiver of the issue on appeal.” Martin v. Hunt, 130 N.E.3d 135, 137 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019).

[8] As for cogent argument, while Miller does cite to general authority regarding judicial bias and notes Judge Quinn's entry of orders adverse to him, he does not explain how any of them qualify as an exception to the rule that “judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion.” Liteky v. U.S., 114 S. Ct. 1147, 1157 (1994). Moreover, Miller does not explain how the denials of his various post-judgment motions constitute violations of the “[t]he fundamental requirement of due process [that is] the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’ ” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965). To the extent that Miller's due-process claim relies on his contention that the trial court never properly acquired jurisdiction over him, we have already rejected that claim. Miller has failed to establish that he is entitled to relief from the default judgment entered against him.

[9] We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Bradford, Judge.

Weissmann, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.