JOHNSON v. DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY AS TRUSTEE FOR ARGENT SECURITIES INC ASSET BACKED PASS THROUGH CERTIFICATES SERIES 2006 M2 (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] In 2023, Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as Trustee for Argent Securities, Inc., Asset-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-M2 (Deutsche Bank), brought a mortgage foreclosure action against Mishael Johnson and several other defendants.¹ The trial court entered default judgment against Johnson and in favor of Deutsche Bank and awarded the bank a judgment of $175,306.57 (the Foreclosure Judgment). Johnson did not challenge the Foreclosure Judgment through an appeal.

[2] More than a year after the trial court issued the Foreclosure Judgment, Johnson filed several Trial Rule 60(B) motions to set aside the Foreclosure Judgment (Rule 60(B) Motions), which the trial court denied as untimely and as lacking a meritorious claim. Johnson, pro se, now appeals, but he does not present cogent argument challenging the trial court's denial of his Rule 60(B) Motions. Instead, he challenges the validity of the Foreclosure Judgment, contending that his appeal of the judgment is timely and properly before this Court and that several federal consumer protection acts were violated during the foreclosure process. We conclude that Johnson forfeited his right to appeal the Foreclosure Judgment by failing to file a notice of appeal within thirty days after the judgment was entered. We also conclude that Johnson has waived for our review any claims that the trial court erred by denying his Rule 60(B) Motions and any claims alleging violations of the federal consumer protection acts. We affirm the trial court's denial of Johnson's Rule 60(B) Motions.

Facts and Procedural History 2

[3] In June 2006, Johnson and Jamie Johnson (Jamie) became fee simple owners of a home in Indianapolis (the Property) after executing a mortgage and an adjustable-rate note (the Note) payable to Argent Mortgage Company, LLC (Argent), in the principal amount of $140,250.³ In 2010, Argent assigned the mortgage and the Note to Deutsche Bank. When Johnson and Jamie divorced in 2020, Jamie was awarded the Property, but Johnson's name was not removed from the mortgage documents.

[4] In March 2022, Jamie stopped making the mortgage payments. The Note and mortgage were considered in default as of April 2022. Approximately one year later, in May 2023, Jamie entered into a loan modification agreement to modify the terms of the mortgage. Jamie, however, did not tender the required monthly payments per the loan modification agreement.⁴ ,⁵

[5] In December 2023, Deutsche Bank filed a complaint on the Note and to foreclose the mortgage. In February 2024, Deutsche Bank served the complaint on Johnson by publication in a local newspaper that ran for three consecutive weeks. Johnson did not answer the complaint.

[6] On April 23, 2024, the trial court entered the Foreclosure Judgment. The trial court found, in relevant part, that Deutsche Bank had complied with applicable service requirements by serving notice of the complaint on Johnson by publication. The court ordered the Property sold by sheriff's sale and included an “in rem judgment” in favor of Deutsche Bank for $175,306.57. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 18.

[7] Two days later, on April 25, Deutsche Bank filed a praecipe for an order for a sheriff's sale. Notice of the sheriff's sale was posted at the Property on June 11, advising that the sale would occur on July 19. On July 16, Johnson, proceeding pro se, filed a request with the trial court, seeking to stay the sale, but he did not otherwise challenge the Foreclosure Judgment. That same day, the trial court denied Johnson's request to stay the sheriff's sale. The next day, July 17, Jamie filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. The July 19 sheriff's sale was subsequently canceled.

[8] Nearly a year later, in June 2025, Deutsche Bank notified the trial court that Jamie had received a discharge from bankruptcy. She had been relieved of personal liability for the mortgage loan. On June 10, Deutsche Bank filed a second praecipe for an order for a sheriff's sale. On June 22, Johnson filed a motion to stay the sale, indicating that he was attempting to gain “full title and sole ownership” of the Property and to obtain a modification of the mortgage loan. Appellee's App. Vol. 2 at 36. On June 25, Deutsche Bank filed its objection to the stay. On June 26, the trial court denied Johnson's motion to stay. That same day, Johnson filed a second motion to stay, raising issues substantially similar to those raised in this June 22 motion. The Court denied Johnson's second motion to stay on July 10.

[9] Meanwhile, on July 6, 2025, Johnson filed his first Rule 60(B) Motion to set aside the Foreclosure Judgment and stay the sheriff's sale. In his motion, Johnson cited Indiana Trial Rules 60(B)(1), (3), and (8). Relevant to this appeal, Indiana Trial Rule 60(B) provides as follows:

On motion and upon such terms as are just the court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a judgment, including a judgment by default, for the following reasons:

(1) mistake, surprise, or excusable neglect;

* * *

(3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party;

* * *

or

(8) any reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment, other than those reasons set forth in sub-paragraphs (1), (2), (3), and (4).

The motion shall be filed within a reasonable time for reasons (5), (6), (7), and (8), and not more than one year after the judgment, order or proceeding was entered or taken for reasons (1), (2), (3), and (4). A movant filing a motion for reasons (1), (2), (3), (4), and (8) must allege a meritorious claim or defense ․

(Emphasis added).

[10] In his first Rule 60(B) Motion, Johnson claimed: (1) the foreclosure judgment was entered without a contested hearing; (2) lack of notice of the foreclosure proceedings; (3) he had submitted requests to Deutsche Bank's loan servicer for certain information regarding the loan; (4) he submitted a notice of error to the loan servicer due to the servicer's failure to provide “a full response”; (5) he was seeking “clear title and ownership” of the Property in a separate legal action; and (6) he disputed the accuracy of the $175,306.57 judgment. Appellee's App. Vol. 2 at 43. On July 8, and again on July 10, Johnson filed additional Rule 60(B) motions, raising the same or substantially similar claims.

[11] On July 10, 2025, the trial court denied all of Johnson's Rule 60(B) Motions. On July 14, upon Johnson's request, the court issued findings of fact and conclusions thereon, providing in relevant part that Johnson's “requests for relief under Trial Rules 60(B)(1) and (3) are not timely made and are Denied as untimely”; the “request under 60(B)(8) was not made within a reasonable time”; “[r]equests for relief under Trial Rules 60(B)(1), (3), and (8) must also allege a meritorious claim or defense; and Johnson “has failed to assert a meritorious claim or defense.” Id. at 46. Johnson now appeals.⁶

Discussion and Decision

[12] At the outset, we reiterate that Johnson has chosen to proceed pro se on appeal. We do not owe Johnson any “ ‘inherent leniency simply by virtue of being self-represented.’ ” Auto. Fin. Corp. v. Liu, 250 N.E.3d 406, 410 (Ind. 2025) (quoting Zavodnik v. Harper, 17 N.E.3d 259, 266 (Ind. 2014)). To the contrary,

[i]t is well settled that pro se litigants are held to the same legal standards as licensed attorneys. This means that pro se litigants are bound to follow the established rules of procedure and must be prepared to accept the consequences of their failure to do so. These consequences include waiver for failure to present cogent argument on appeal. While we prefer to decide issues on the merits, where the appellant's noncompliance with appellate rules is so substantial as to impede our consideration of the issues, we may deem the alleged errors waived. We will not become an advocate for a party, or address arguments that are inappropriate or too poorly developed or expressed to be understood.

Basic v. Amouri, 58 N.E.3d 980, 983-84 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (citations and quotation marks omitted).

Section 1 – Johnson forfeited his right to appeal the Foreclosure Judgment by failing to file a timely notice of appeal.

[13] We first note that Johnson does not discuss in his briefing the trial court's order denying his Rule 60(B) Motions and the court's accompanying findings of fact and conclusions thereon, which are the final judgments in this case. See Ind. Appellate Rule 2(H). Instead, Johnson focuses on the Foreclosure Judgment. Johnson argues that, in this appeal, his challenges to the Foreclosure Judgment are properly before this Court because (1) the Foreclosure Judgment is void for lack of notice because, according to Johnson, the certificate of service for the judgment failed to include him; (2) the Foreclosure Judgment was “entered without competent evidence” of the mortgage debt; (3) the trial court issued contradictory rulings that created procedural irregularities; and (4) the loan servicer “admitted” that certain loan records were missing when the Foreclosure Judgment was issued, and the loan servicer “attempt[ed] to retroactively supply” certain evidence. Appellant's Br. at 7-8. However, Johnson's challenges to the Foreclosure Judgment, per se, are not properly before this Court.

[14] Indiana Rule of Appellate Procedure 9(A)(1) states in relevant part: “A party initiates an appeal by filing a Notice of Appeal with the Clerk (as defined in Rule 2(D)) within thirty (30) days after the entry of a Final Judgment is noted in the Chronological Case Summary.” In the case before us, the chronological case summary notes that the trial court entered the Foreclosure Judgment on April 23, 2024. Therefore, Johnson had thirty days, or until May 23, 2024, to timely file his notice of appeal. Johnson did not file a notice of appeal within thirty days after the entry of the Foreclosure Judgment. Therefore, he has forfeited his appeal of that judgment. See Ind. Appellate Rule 9(A)(5) (providing that “[u]nless the Notice of Appeal is timely filed, the right to appeal shall be forfeited except as provided by P.C.R. 2”). And a Trial Rule 60 motion does not toll the deadline for initiating an appeal of the underlying judgment. See In re Paternity of P.S.S., 934 N.E.2d 737, 740 (Ind. 2010) (providing, “a motion for relief from judgment under Indiana Trial Rule 60(B) is not a substitute for a direct appeal”). Accordingly, Johnson has forfeited his right to raise on appeal his challenges to the Foreclosure Judgment for failure to file a timely notice of appeal.

Section 2 – Johnson has waived for appellate review his challenges to the trial court's denial of his Rule 60(B) Motions and to any alleged violations of federal consumer protection acts.

[15] Next, we conclude that Johnson has waived any claims of error relating to the trial court's denial of his Rule 60(B) Motions by failing to include in his Appellant's Brief cogent argument in support of any such claims. See generally Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a) (requiring that each contention in the appellant's brief be supported by cogent argument and citations to applicable authority and to the record). Johnson makes only a very brief mention of the Rule 60(B) Motions in the section of his brief entitled “Timeliness of Appeal,” where he contends in two sentences that his appeal of the Foreclosure Judgment is timely based on “newly discovered evidence[.]” Appellant's Br. at 5. Johnson also has waived any claimed error related to alleged violations of certain federal consumer protection acts—namely, the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, the Truth in Lending Act, the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, and the Fair Credit Reporting Act—by raising the issue for the first time on appeal. It is the general rule that an argument or issue raised for the first time on appeal is waived for appellate review. First Chicago Ins. Co. v. Collins, 141 N.E.3d 54, 61 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020).

Section 3 – The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Johnson's Rule 60(B) Motions.

[16] Finally, in the interest of judicial economy, and despite waiver, we address whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying Johnson's Rule 60(B) Motions. We conclude that the trial court did not err.

[17] Trial Rule 60(B) provides “a mechanism by which a party may obtain relief from the entry of a final judgment.” McGhee v. Lamping, 198 N.E.3d 730, 736 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022). The burden is on the movant to establish grounds for relief under Trial Rule 60(B). McGhee, 198 N.E.3d at 737. We review the trial court's ruling on a Trial Rule 60(B) motion using an abuse of discretion standard. Speedway SuperAmerica, LLC v. Holmes, 885 N.E.2d 1265, 1270 (Ind. 2008). An abuse of discretion occurs “ ‘only when the trial court's action is clearly erroneous, that is, against the logic and effect of the facts before it and the inferences which may be drawn therefrom.’ ” Paternity of P.S.S., 934 N.E.2d at 741 (quoting Fairfield v. Fairfield, 538 N.E.2d 948, 950 (Ind. 1989)).

[18] Further, where, as here, the court enters findings of fact and conclusions thereon,

our standard of review is two-tiered: we determine whether the evidence supports the trial court's findings, and whether the findings support the judgment. We will not disturb the trial court's findings or judgment unless they are clearly erroneous. Findings of fact are clearly erroneous when the record lacks any reasonable inference from the evidence to support them. A judgment is clearly erroneous when a review of the record leaves us with a firm conviction that a mistake has been made. We will neither reweigh evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses, considering instead only the evidence favorable to the judgment and all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom.

Fields v. Safway Grp. Holdings, LLC, 118 N.E.3d 804, 809 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (internal citations omitted), trans. denied.

[19] Johnson filed his Rule 60(B) Motions pursuant to Trial Rules 60(B)(1), (3), and (8). As we noted previously, supra, ¶ [9], for Trial Rule 60(B) reasons (1) and (3), the moving party must file the motion within one year of the judgment; for reason (8), the motion must be filed “within a reasonable time.” Ind. Trial Rule 60(B). And for reasons (1), (3), and (8), the moving party must also “allege a meritorious claim or defense.” Id. The trial court ultimately determined that Johnson's “requests for relief under Trial Rules 60(B)(1) and (3) [we]re not timely made”; Johnson's “request under 60(B)(8) was not made within a reasonable time”; and Johnson “failed to assert a meritorious claim or defense.” Appellee's App. Vol. 2 at 46 (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law).

[20] Here, there is no dispute that Johnson filed his Rule 60(B) Motions more than one year after the Foreclosure Judgment was entered—the judgment was entered on April 23, 2024, and Johnson filed his Rule 60(B) Motions on July 6, 8, and 10, 2025. And the evidence of record established that Johnson was aware of the foreclosure proceedings at least as early as July 16, 2024, based on his filing a request with the trial court on that day, seeking to stay the July 19, 2024 sheriff's sale. In addition, and as discussed supra, ¶ [15], Johnson failed to present cogent argument in his Appellant's Brief to support any claims of error that related to the trial court's denial of his Rule 60(B) Motions. See Ind. Trial Rule 60(B); see generally Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a) (providing that appellant's brief “must contain the contentions of the appellant on the issues presented, supported by cogent reasoning”). Thus, Johnson has not carried his burden to establish grounds for relief under Trial Rule 60(B). Based on the record before us, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion by denying Johnson's Rule 60(B) Motions.

[21] To summarize, Johnson forfeited his right to appeal the Foreclosure Judgment by failing to file a timely notice of appeal; he waived for our review his challenges to the trial court's denial of this Rule 60(B) Motions by failing to present cogent argument; he waived for our review any alleged violations of federal consumer protection acts by raising the issue for the first time on appeal; and the trial court did not err by denying Johnson's Rule 60(B) Motions for relief from the Foreclosure Judgment. Accordingly, we affirm.

[22] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Deutsche Bank named the following as defendants in the foreclosure action: Mishael Johnson, Jamie Johnson (Mishael Johnson's ex-wife), Westridge Village Association, Inc. (a homeowner's association), the State of Indiana Department of Revenue, and the Town of Speedway. See Ind. Appellate Rule 17(A) (providing that “A party of record in the trial court ․ shall be a party on appeal.”). Only Mishael Johnson participates in this appeal.

3.   As noted supra, n.1, Jamie Johnson does not participate in this appeal. See App. R. 17(A). To the extent possible, we limit the facts to those pertinent to Johnson.

4.   Jamie entered into the loan modification agreement with PHH Mortgage Corporation, the then loan servicer for Deutsche Bank and the mortgage.

5.   We remind Johnson that “pleadings and other documents from the Clerk's Record ․ that are necessary for resolution of the issues raised on appeal” must be included in the Appendix. Ind. Appellate Rule 50(A)(2)(f). Johnson's failure to include in his Appendix documentation necessary for the resolution of this case hindered and delayed our review. Thus, to the extent necessary and pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 27, we have taken judicial notice of the Clerk's Record in this case.

6.   We note the following additional procedural history. On July 11, 2025, a “Decree of Foreclosure” was sent to the county sheriff for a sheriff's sale that was to take place on September 19. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 8. Johnson filed his Notice of Appeal, initiating the instant appeal, on July 16. That same day, he filed in the trial court a motion to stay the sale of the Property pending appeal, which the court denied on July 30. On August 8, a notice of sheriff's sale was posted at the Property, advising that the sale of the Property would occur on September 19. In August, Johnson tendered to this Court two motions to stay the sheriff's sale pending appeal. After review, our motions panel denied the motions on August 8 and September 2.On September 12, 2025, an entry was made to the trial court's chronological case summary that appeared to cancel the September 19 sale of the Property. On September 16, Deutsche Bank filed another praecipe, requesting that the Property be sold at sheriff's sale. As of the date of this appeal, no action has been taken on Deutsche Bank's request for the sale of the Property.

Crone, Senior Judge.

Altice, C.J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.