IN RE: the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of I.L. and L.B. (Minor Children); (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] A.L. (“Father”) appeals the trial court's order terminating his parental rights to his minor children, I.L. and L.B. (“Children”). Father claims: (1) the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) failed to make reasonable efforts to reunify him with Children; (2) the trial court clearly erred by determining that the conditions resulting in Children's removal would not be remedied; and (3) the termination of Father's parental rights was not in Children's best interests. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm.

Issues

[2] Father raises three issues, which we restate as:

I. Whether DCS failed to make reasonable efforts to reunif Father with Children.

II. Whether the trial court clearly erred by determining that the conditions resulting in Children's removal would not be remedied.

III. Whether the trial court clearly erred in determining that the termination of Father's parental rights was in Children's best interest.

Facts

[3] Father and A.B. (“Mother”)¹ are the biological parents of I.L. (born in March 2015) and L.B. (born in January 2017). In May 2021, law enforcement searched Father's home in LaPorte as part of an investigation into methamphetamine distribution. At that time, Father lived with his mother (“Paternal Grandmother”), his girlfriend, and four of his minor children, including I.L. and L.B. Children were removed from the home on an emergency basis and taken into custody by DCS.

[4] The conditions of the home were deplorable at the time of the search. Police discovered syringes, baggies, and crystal methamphetamine within reach of Children. The roof was leaking and partially collapsed, several rooms contained standing water, and multiple windows were broken. Mold covered Children's bedding. I.L. was found sleeping on a bed surrounded by knives and drug paraphernalia, and L.B. was found sleeping in a plastic tote in the living room. Paternal Grandmother was arrested and charged with dealing in methamphetamine, a Level 2 felony. Although Father was not charged, he tested positive for methamphetamine. L.B. also tested positive for methamphetamine exposure. The home was subsequently condemned, and Father became homeless.

[5] On May 27, 2021, DCS filed a verified petition alleging that I.L. and L.B. were children in need of services (“CHINS”). On June 2, 2021, the trial court entered interim orders requiring Father to undergo clinical and substance abuse assessments and to follow any recommendations; submit to random drug screens; and participate in supervised visitation. The trial court also ordered that DCS make services available to Father.

[6] On July 23, 2021, the trial court held a CHINS fact-finding hearing. Father admitted that he lacked safe and stable housing. The trial court adjudicated Children as CHINS and issued a dispositional order directing Father to: (1) undergo clinical assessments addressing mental health, substance abuse, and parenting abilities; (2) submit to random drug screens; (3) participate in supervised visitation; (4) obtain and maintain stable housing and employment; (5) keep DCS informed of any changes in contact information; and (6) execute releases of information with service providers.

[7] Father, however, was noncompliant with the dispositional order. Father failed to participate in services until after a July 2023 order in which the trial court added a concurrent plan of adoption for Children. After that order, Father began partially complying with services and “completed a [c]linical [a]ssessment on August 2, 2023.” Ex. Vol. I pp. 98-99. Father submitted ten drug screens and failed to submit another nine. Of the ten submitted, six were positive for methamphetamine, and two were unable to be processed. Father testified that his improved compliance was due to his connection with “Mrs. K.,” a case manager at the Swanson Center. Tr. Vol. II pp. 170, 192.

[8] On August 7, 2023, DCS filed a petition to terminate Father's parental rights. Father later participated in a twenty-eight-day rehabilitation program from October 30 to November 27, 2023. After Father's release from the rehabilitation facility, however, he quickly relapsed. On December 14, 2023— less than three weeks after his release—Father participated in one random drug screen, which tested positive for methamphetamine and amphetamine.

[9] On October 21, 2024, the trial court held another permanency plan hearing and found that Father “ha[d] been more compliant with services since August 2024,” particularly regarding visitation and participation in recommended programs. Ex. Vol. I p. 113. Father, however, continued to test positive for illegal substances and failed to submit to multiple random drug screens. The trial court, therefore, approved adoption as Children's sole permanency plan. Father again tested positive for methamphetamine on December 3, 2024. On December 28, 2024, Father admitted himself to a rehabilitation facility for his second twenty-eight-day inpatient treatment program, which he completed by the end of January 2025.

[10] The fact-finding hearing on the termination of the parent-child relationship was held on April 21, 2025.² Father testified to the following. The last time Father used methamphetamine was December 28, 2024, and he had remained sober since that date. Father was unemployed at the time of the hearing, had been homeless until July 2024, and was then residing with Paternal Grandmother. Father had been consistently visiting Children even though he believed “doing visitation is harder than ․ being a ․ parent.” Tr. Vol. III p. 59. Father stated that he would “buy[ ] and prepare[ ] meals for them” during his visits. Id. And he stated that he “absolutely” loves Children and that their relationship “is growing.” Id; Tr. Vol. II p. 76.

[11] At the hearing, Father admitted that he faced eight criminal charges during the CHINS proceedings. Father was also incarcerated three times during the first review period of the CHINS proceeding and did not visit the Children during that time. In May 2024, Father entered into a plea agreement resolving seven of his pending criminal cases and was sentenced to six months in jail, two years on Community Corrections GPS monitoring, and one year suspended. At the time of the hearing, Father had pending charges for operating a vehicle as an habitual traffic violator, a Level 6 felony. Father was on an ankle monitor related to the pending charge and was scheduled to be released from monitoring on July 2, 2025.

[12] FCM Tara Shermak (“FCM Shermak”), who was assigned to the case in August 2024 after replacing a former family case manager, testified that Children were “progressing well” in Foster Mother's care. Tr. Vol. II p. 125. Both Children had individualized education programs (“IEPs”) and were participating in therapy and tutoring, as well as receiving services with Foster Mother. FCM Shermak confirmed that Father's visits had been fairly consistent but remained at the fully supervised level throughout the CHINS proceedings. FCM Shermak also explained that “the biggest concern was the continued meth[amphetamine] positive screens.” Tr. Vol. III pp. 5-9.

[13] Additionally, because Father's period of full compliance and sobriety was less than four months, his visitation had not progressed. FCM Shermak concluded that termination of the parent-child relationship was in Children's best interests, “largely due to the length of time that this case has been open, the length of time they've been with their current placement, the progress that's been made there, as well as the potential for that continued relationship with Father, even with [Foster Mother] adopting, if that's what happens.” Id. at 20.

[14] Angie Smith (“Smith”), Father's recovery coach, also testified. Smith had served as Father's recovery coach since May or June 2024. She described Father's progress over the past year and stated that she had seen him “grow a lot as a person.” Id. at 36. When asked about her opinion regarding Father's ability to maintain sobriety, Smith responded, “I don't think maintenance happens for at least a couple of years after you're in.” Id. at 48. Smith was critical of the services Father received from DCS before the case was assigned to FCM Shermak and stated that she was “always going to fight for reunification.” Id. at 52.

[15] Paternal Grandmother testified that Father had been living with her since July 2024 and that “he's doing really good,” particularly during “these last four months.” Id. at 80. She further testified that Father was “really trying this time” and that “she believes him.” Id. On cross-examination, however, Paternal Grandmother admitted that she did not know Father was using methamphetamine in August and December 2024.

[16] Foster Mother acknowledged Father's role in Children's lives and stated that Father “has been very consistent with his visits” since Children have been in her care. Tr. Vol. II p. 245. Foster Mother testified that she has “grown to love these little boys” and strives to “provide everything they need so they can have a good quality of life.” Id. at 132. She also expressed her strong willingness to adopt Children and stated, “I actually look forward to spending the rest of my life with them and raising them as my own.” Id. at 248. Foster Mother emphasized the importance of permanency, explaining that she wanted Children to “have someplace to call home.” Id. at 133. She further stated that, even if she adopted Children, she would still want Father to remain a part of their lives.

[17] On May 20, 2025, the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions thereon and granted DCS's petition to terminate Father's parental rights. The trial court found:

45. Mother and Father's habitual pattern of conduct for the nearly four (4) years of the CHINS case suggests that even Father's recent sobriety is unlikely to be maintained․ Therefore, there is substantial probability that the conditions will not be remedied.

46. In addition, it is contrary to the Children's best interest to keep the CHINS case open when Mother and Father had nearly four (4) years to stop using illegal substances and show period of maintaining sobriety.

* * * * *

14. Father admitted struggling with his addiction until he went to his second inpatient rehabilitation treatment on or about December 28, 2024.

15. Though Father was consistent with visiting the Children for the past two (2) years, he never progressed past fully supervised visitation.

16. Father admitted he was incarcerated approximately eight (8) times throughout the duration of the CHINS case. Father still has pending criminal charges to date.

17. Father admitted he is not employed and is unable to work due to injuries to his neck and wrists. He admitted applying for Social Security Disability in August of 2024. Prior to his injuries, he admitted to taking cash jobs. Father believes his family would take care of him and the Children if they were returned to his care.

18. Father does not have stable housing.

19. Father was noncompliant in his court ordered services in 2021, 2022, and most of 2023. At the end of 2023 and beyond, Father was found to be partially compliant related to his participation in his court ordered services. Father was never found fully compliant in the Children's case plan.

20. Termination of Parental Rights provides the Children with a clear path to permanency, in accordance with the Court's approved plan of Adoption, rather than prolonged uncertainty in their lives.

21. The Children have waited longer than the statutorily recommended time to achieve permanency, and Mother and Father have been afforded all services to remedy the reasons for involvement and have failed to do so.

Appellant's App. Vol. II. pp. 81, 82-83. Father now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

Standard of Review

[18] The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the traditional rights of parents to establish a home and raise their children. In re K.T.K. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., Dearborn Cnty. Off., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1230 (Ind. 2013). “[A] parent's interest in the upbringing of [his or her] child is ‘perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by th[e] [c]ourt[s].’ ” Id. (quoting Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000)). We recognize that parental rights are not absolute and must be subordinated to the child's best interests when determining the proper disposition of a petition to terminate parental rights. Id.; see also In re Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d 41, 45 (Ind. 2019) (“Parents have a fundamental right to raise their children—but this right is not absolute.”). “When parents are unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities, their parental rights may be terminated.” Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 45-46.

[19] Pursuant to Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-8(c), the trial court “shall enter findings of fact that support the entry of the conclusions required by subsections (a) and (b)” when granting a petition to terminate parental rights.³ Here, the trial court did enter findings of fact and conclusions thereon in granting DCS's petition to terminate Father's parental rights. We affirm a trial court's termination of parental rights decision unless it is clearly erroneous. Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 45. A termination of parental rights decision is clearly erroneous when the trial court's findings of fact do not support its legal conclusions, or when the legal conclusions do not support the ultimate decision. Id. We do not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility, and we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that support the trial court's judgment. Id.

[20] The requirements for the termination of parental rights are codified by statute. Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-8(a) provides that “if the court finds that the allegations in a petition described in [Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4] are true, the court shall terminate the parent-child relationship.” Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)⁴ provides that a petition to terminate a parent-child relationship involving a child in need of services must allege, in part:

(B) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the child.

(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been adjudicated a child in need of services;

(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and

(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the child.

DCS must establish these allegations by clear and convincing evidence. In re V.A., 51 N.E.3d 1140, 1144 (Ind. 2016).

I. DCS made reasonable efforts to reunify Father and Children

[21] Father argues that DCS failed to make reasonable efforts to reunify him with Children. Specifically, Father alleges that he did not receive the same level of support as Mother until FCM Shermak took over his case and that DCS “did not seem aware” of his needs related to illiteracy, including assistance with understanding court orders and other written correspondence. Appellant's Br. p. 18.

[22] During CHINS proceedings, DCS is generally required to make reasonable efforts to reunify a parent with Children unless certain statutory exceptions apply.⁵ Indiana Code Section 31-34-21-5.5. This CHINS provision, however, “is not a requisite element of our termination statute, and ‘failure to provide services does not serve as a basis on which to directly attack a termination order as contrary to law.’ ” S.K., 124 N.E.3d at 1232 n.1 (quoting In re H.L., 915 N.E.2d 145, 148 n.3 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009)). Further, there is no statutory or common-law authority requiring Father and Mother in the same case to receive the same or similar level of assistance or services.⁶ Indiana courts have never interpreted “reasonable” efforts to mean “identical” efforts or to mandate that both parents receive the same services under the circumstances of a particular case. In re T.W., 135 N.E.3d 607, 615 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (“What constitutes ‘reasonable efforts’ will vary by case, and as noted above, it does not necessarily always mean that services must be provided to the parents. In the end, we think that it does not ask too much of DCS to behave reasonably under such grave circumstances.”). Accordingly, Father's argument fails.

[23] Moreover, DCS made reasonable efforts to reunify Father with Children. We have long held that “[a] parent may not sit idly by without asserting a need or desire for services and then successfully argue that he was denied services to assist him with his parenting.” In re B.D.J., 728 N.E.2d 195, 201 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (citing Jackson v. Madison Cnty. Dep't of Fam. and Child., 690 N.E.2d 792, 793 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998)). At the initial hearing when DCS first filed the petition, the trial court explicitly asked Father whether he could “read, write, and understand the English language.” Tr. Vol. II p. 5. Father responded that he does not “read or write too well” but stated that he had no difficulty understanding the petition because he “had someone read it to [him].” Id. at 6. Next, the CASA's attorney asked Father at his termination hearing whether he sought to obtain his GED or requested “reading assistance, or overcoming [his] learning disability.” Tr. Vol. III p. 78. Father replied: “I didn't really[.]” Id. Further, Father repeatedly testified that he was aware of the court's order to submit to drug testing but “wouldn't even bother” because he knew he was addicted.⁷ Tr. Vol. II pp. 174-175, 184-185. Most significantly, Father was often noncompliant with the court's orders; when he did submit to drug screens, his results were positive for methamphetamine until a few months before the final termination hearing. Under these circumstances, Father's argument that DCS did not make reasonable efforts to reunify Father with Children is without merit.

II. The trial court did not clearly err in finding that the conditions resulting in Children's removal will not be remedied

[24] Father next challenges the trial court's conclusion that there was a “reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.” Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4 (2019). “In determining whether ‘the conditions that resulted in the [Children's] removal ․ will not be remedied, we ‘engage in a two-step analysis.’ ” In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 642-43 (Ind. 2014) (quoting K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1231). “First, we identify the conditions that led to removal; and second, we ‘determine whether there is a reasonable probability that those conditions will not be remedied.’ ” Id. at 643 (quoting K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1231). In analyzing this second step, the trial court judges the parent's fitness “ ‘as of the time of the termination proceeding, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions.’ ” Id. (quoting Bester v. Lake Cnty. Off. of Fam. and Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 152 (Ind. 2005)). “We entrust that delicate balance to the trial court, which has discretion to weigh a parent's prior history more heavily than efforts made only shortly before termination.” Id. “Requiring trial courts to give due regard to changed conditions does not preclude them from finding that parents’ past behavior is the best predictor of their future behavior.” Id.

[25] Here, Father argues that, by the time of the termination hearing, he had made progress in recovering from methamphetamine addiction and had obtained support to maintain his sobriety. Father also contends that his housing with Paternal Grandmother was stable. These arguments again ask us to reweigh the evidence and consider evidence that does not favor the trial court's decision, which we cannot do. Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 45.

[26] First, regarding Father's argument that he had overcome his addiction, the trial court noted that Father completed a twenty-eight-day inpatient rehabilitation program from December 2024 to January 2025 and claimed to have remained sober for the three months between completion of the program and the termination hearing. Father, however, did not submit to any drug screens after January 2025. Even accepting Father's claim of sobriety as true, the trial court had discretion to consider his long history of substance abuse. Over the four years since Children were placed in DCS custody, Father repeatedly tested positive for methamphetamine, missed numerous required drug screens, and quickly relapsed after completing his first treatment program.

[27] Moreover, FCM Shermak opined that Father's brief period of sobriety during the four-year case “could be influenced by the fact of having criminal charges and being on GPS.” Tr. Vol. III p. 18. Recent sobriety is not dispositive on the issue of addiction; the trial court must determine the reasonable probability of relapse by evaluating a parent's pattern of conduct over time rather than a thin slice of reality at the time of the hearing. It is within the trial court's discretion to “weigh a parent's prior history more heavily than efforts made only shortly before termination.” E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 643. The trial court, therefore, did not err in concluding that there was a reasonable probability that Father's addiction would not be remedied. See In re C.D., 141 N.E.3d 845, 853 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (affirming trial court's conclusion that conditions that resulted in child's removal and continued placement outside the parents’ home would not be remedied where mother failed to address her substance abuse problem, tested positive for marijuana, and missed multiple drug screens); see also In re J.L., 919 N.E.2d 561, 563-64 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (noting the twofold danger of parental drug use—the child seeing the parent using drugs and the parent “essentially abandon[ing]” the child “without any responsible supervision”) (citing White v. State, 547 N.E.2d 831, 836 (Ind. 1989)).

[28] Father next argues that his housing with Paternal Grandmother ⁸ is stable and comparable to Children's current placement with Foster Mother. This argument again requests that we reweigh the evidence. Father holds no ownership or rental interest in Paternal Grandmother's home, where he was living. Father was unemployed and had no employment history indicating an ability to earn income. Paternal Grandmother allowed Father to move back into her home in July 2024 based on his promise that he would stop using methamphetamine and “was going to be sober.” Tr. Vol. II p. 223. Paternal Grandmother, however, learned at the hearing that Father had tested positive for methamphetamine in August, October, and December 2024, thereby effectively breaching his promise to remain sober less than a month after returning to her home. Under these circumstances, the trial court did not clearly err in finding that the conditions resulting in Children's removal will not be remedied.

III. The trial court did not clearly err in deciding that termination of Father's parental rights is in Children's best interest

[29] Lastly, Father argues that the trial court clearly erred in concluding that termination of his parental rights was in Children's best interests. Specifically, Father emphasizes that he has a strong bond with Children and has been consistent in exercising visitation. In determining what is in the best interests of a child, the trial court is required to look at the totality of the evidence. Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 49. In doing so, the trial court must subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the child involved. Id. Termination of a parent-child relationship is proper where the child's emotional and physical development is threatened. K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1235. A trial court need not wait until a child is irreversibly harmed such that his or her physical, mental, and social development is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship. Id. Additionally, a child's need for permanency is a “central consideration” in determining the best interests of a child. Id.

[30] At the time of the hearing, Children had been out of Father's care for almost four years and in Foster Mother's care for nearly three years. Both Foster Mother and FCM Shermak testified that Children were adjusting and developing well in her home. Children each have IEPs, attend therapy, and receive tutoring. It is undisputed that Children are on the right track to recover from prior trauma and are thriving in an environment that meets their developmental needs. Relocating Children to Father's home, which would present a new environment, could exacerbate prior harm and require unnecessary readjustment, thereby disrupting the stability Children currently enjoy.

[31] Furthermore, Children's need for permanency is a “central consideration” in determining their best interests. K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1235. Foster Mother owns her home and has cared for Children for nearly three years. She expressed her unwavering willingness to adopt Children and to allow them to “have someplace to call home.” Tr. Vol. II p. 133. Both DCS and CASA recommended that termination of Father's parental rights and adoption by Foster Mother would serve Children's best interests. See K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1235 (holding that “termination of parental rights was in children's best interests based on [GAL's] concerns over the length of time that it took Mother to commit to a path of recovery and “the fact that the children just really need a permanent home.”). Under these circumstances, the trial court's conclusion regarding Children's best interests is not clearly erroneous.

Conclusion

[32] DCS made reasonable efforts to reunify Father with Children. The trial court did not clearly err in concluding that the conditions that resulted in Children's removal would not be remedied. Lastly, the trial court did not clearly err in concluding that termination of Father's parental rights was in Children's best interests. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

[33] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Mother does not challenge the termination of her parental rights and is not a party to this appeal.

2.   The first fact-finding hearing was held on January 3, 2025, during which Mother's portion of the case was concluded. Father's portion was continued and rescheduled for April 21, 2025, because his counsel moved to withdraw at the first hearing.

3.   Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-8, governing termination of a parent-child relationship involving a delinquent child or CHINS, provides as follows:(a) Except as provided in section 4.5(d) of this chapter, if the court finds that the allegations in a petition described in section 4 of this chapter are true, the court shall terminate the parent-child relationship.(b) If the court does not find that the allegations in the petition are true, the court shall dismiss the petition.

4.   This statute was amended effective March 11, 2024, and again effective July 1, 2025. DCS filed its petition on August 7, 2023, under the prior version of the statute. Accordingly, we apply the prior version of the statute here.

5.   The CHINS statutes do not require DCS to make reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify families under the circumstances enumerated in Indiana Code Section 31-34-21-5.6(b), which are inapplicable here.

6.   Father fails to direct us to any case law or statute to support his argument on this issue. Thus, Father's argument is waived for failure to support the claim with citation to the relevant authority.

7.   We need not address Father's argument that he “thrives when supported.” Appellant's Reply Br. p. 10. The evidence Father cites in support of this claim primarily demonstrates that DCS provided him with sufficient assistance in addressing his addiction, directly contradicting his claim that DCS failed to make reasonable efforts to reunify him with Children.

8.   Paternal Grandmother was charged with dealing in methamphetamine, a Level 2 felony, and later entered into a plea agreement on October 15, 2021, that allowed her to participate in drug court. Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 102-04. On January 2, 2024, all charges against Paternal Grandmother were dismissed following her completion of drug court. Id. at 114-15.

Tavitas, Judge.

Bailey, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.