ARIF v. AYOUBI (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Samimullah Arif (“Husband”) appeals the Hamilton Superior Court's order dissolving his marriage to Zahra Ayoubi (“Wife”). Husband raises four issues for our review, which we consolidate and restate as three issues:

1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it assessed the values of certain marital assets and included Wife's total student loan debt in the marital estate.

2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it divided the marital estate.

3. Whether the trial court erred when it adopted Wife's proposed findings and conclusions.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Husband and Wife married in 2015 and have two children. Prior to the marriage, Wife incurred student loans for college and a master's degree, and she enrolled in law school. During the marriage, Wife continued law school and incurred additional student loan debt, but she also worked. Wife paid approximately $25,000 per semester of law school.

[4] When Husband and Wife married, Wife and her mother were living in a home in Carmel owned by Wife's sister Manizha. Manizha and her husband lived in a house in Bloomington that they owned. In 2013, Manizha executed a quitclaim deed granting her interest in the Carmel home (“Fernwood Residence”) to her and Wife “so that Wife could apply for the homestead deduction for the Fernwood Residence.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 25. Wife did not pay taxes on the Fernwood Residence, and she did not pay any rent or other expenses related to the home. After the parties’ marriage, Husband also lived rent-free at the Fernwood Residence for more than one year.¹

[5] In late 2022, the parties bought a home in Westfield. The home was only in Wife's name, and she claimed the homestead deduction. In October, the Hamilton County Auditor wrote to Wife to explain that she could not have two homestead deductions. But neither Husband nor Wife saw the letter until November or December. After some discussion, Husband and Wife told Manizha that Wife could no longer claim the homestead deduction on the Fernwood Residence. Accordingly, in April 2023, Manizha and Wife attempted to execute a new quitclaim deed to remove Wife from the deed. Due to an error, Wife remained on the new quitclaim deed. Wife was finally successfully removed from the Fernwood Residence Deed on May 22. Husband and Wife also owned an investment property in Dubai worth $488,767, which was purchased with money gifted to Wife from her mother.

[6] On June 13, Wife filed a petition to dissolve her marriage to Husband. Following a hearing, the trial court divided the marital estate equally between Husband and Wife. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

Standard of Review

[7] Husband contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it valued certain marital assets, included certain marital debt in the marital estate, and divided the marital estate. The trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions thereon. Therefore, we apply a two-tiered standard of review: first, we consider whether the evidence supports the findings; and, second, we consider whether the findings of fact support the judgment. Hamilton v. Hamilton, 103 N.E.3d 690, 694 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied. We will set aside findings only if they are clearly erroneous, which occurs if the record contains no facts to support them either directly or by inference. Id. To determine that a trial court's findings or conclusions are clearly erroneous, this court's review of the evidence must leave it with the firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Campbell v. Campbell, 993 N.E.2d 205, 209 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied.

[8] Our review of family law matters is conducted with a preference for granting latitude and deference to our trial judges. Anselm v. Anselm, 146 N.E.3d 1042, 1046 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied.

Appellate deference to the determinations of our trial court judges, especially in domestic relations matters, is warranted because of their unique, direct interactions with the parties face-to-face, often over an extended period of time. Thus enabled to assess credibility and character through both factual testimony and intuitive discernment, our trial judges are in a superior position to ascertain information and apply common sense․

Best v. Best, 941 N.E.2d 499, 502 (Ind. 2011). “It is not enough on appeal that the evidence might support some other conclusion; rather, the evidence must positively require the result sought by the appellant.” Hamilton, 103 N.E.3d at 694. “Accordingly, we will not substitute our own judgment if any evidence or legitimate inferences support the trial court's judgment.” Id.

Issue One: Debts and Assets

[9] Husband argues that the trial court abused its discretion in: (1) excluding the Fernwood Residence from the marital estate; (2) including Wife's total student loan debt in the marital estate; and (3) undervaluing Wife's furniture and jewelry. We address each contention in turn.

Fernwood Residence

[10] Husband maintains that “Wife knew she was a 1/2 owner of the Fernwood property and divested herself of that property to avoid it being included in the marital estate just weeks before she filed the [Petition for] Dissolution.” Appellant's Br. at 17-18. In other words, Husband argues that Wife dissipated this marital asset and the trial court should have included its value in the marital estate.

“Fault is not relevant in dissolution proceedings except as related to the disposition or dissipation of marital assets.” Troyer v. Troyer, 987 N.E.2d 1130, 1139 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (quoting In re Marriage of Coyle, 671 N.E.2d 938, 942 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996)), trans. denied. We review findings of dissipation under an abuse of discretion standard. Hardebeck v. Hardebeck, 917 N.E.2d 694, 700 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).

“Dissipation generally involves the use or diminution of the marital estate for a purpose unrelated to the marriage and does not include the use of marital property to meet routine financial obligations.” Balicki v. Balicki, 837 N.E.2d 532, 540 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied. “The test for dissipation is whether the assets were actually wasted or misused.” Id. “Dissipation of marital assets includes the frivolous and unjustified spending of marital assets.” Grathwohl v. Garrity, 871 N.E.2d 297, 303 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).

To determine whether dissipation has occurred, we consider the following factors:

1. Whether the expenditure benefited the marriage or was made for a purpose entirely unrelated to the marriage;

2. The timing of the transaction;

3. Whether the expenditure was excessive or de minimis; and

4. Whether the dissipating party intended to hide, deplete, or divert the marital asset.

Kondamuri v. Kondamuri, 852 N.E.2d 939, 952 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (footnote omitted). “Dissolution courts may consider evidence of either pre- or post-separation dissipation.” Hardebeck, 917 N.E.2d at 700. “[T]ransactions which occur during the breakdown of the marriage, just prior to filing a petition or during the pendency of an action, may require heightened scrutiny.” Coyle, 671 N.E.2d at 943.

Johnson v. Johnson, 181 N.E.3d 364, 376-77 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021).

[11] Here, the trial court found that the “purpose of removing Wife's name from the deed of the Fernwood Residence was not to deprive Husband of the value (or to exclude it from the marital estate)[,] it was to allow Husband and Wife to claim the homestead deduction on the marital residence.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 27. Indeed, Wife received no money from her sister when she executed the quitclaim deed. The undisputed evidence showed that Wife's only reason for being included on the deed in the first instance was to help her sister by claiming the homestead deduction. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it rejected Husband's claim that Wife had dissipated a marital asset.²

Student Loan Debt

[12] Next, Husband argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it included Wife's student loan debt incurred before the marriage and when it made no provision for reimbursement if Wife's loans are eventually forgiven. First, with respect to the inclusion of the pre-marital loans, it is well settled that marital property includes both assets and liabilities, and “ ‘all marital property goes into the marital pot for division, whether it was owned by either spouse before the marriage, acquired by either spouse after the marriage and before final separation of the parties, or acquired by their joint efforts.’ ” Birkhimer v. Birkhimer, 981 N.E.2d 111, 120 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (quoting Smith v. Smith, 938 N.E.2d 857, 860 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010)). And the trial court “ ‘has no authority to exclude or set aside marital property but must divide all property.’ ” Id. (citing Smith, 938 N.E.2d at 860).

[13] Second, with respect to the possibility that Wife will eventually have her loans forgiven under a loan forgiveness program, Wife testified that she may not be able to continue working in the public sector, which is required to qualify. Moreover, there are no guarantees that the program will still be available in a few years when Wife would complete her payments. We cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion when it did not provide a remedy for Husband should Wife have her student loan debt forgiven in the future.

Furniture and Jewelry

[14] Finally, Husband argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it valued Wife's furniture and jewelry. The trial court awarded the parties their own “clothing, ․ jewelry, household goods, furnishings, and other personal property currently in their respective possession” without assessing values to those items. Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 29. And the trial court awarded a watch to Husband valued at $4,798 and jewelry to Wife valued at $5,000. Husband maintains that the court should have valued Wife's furniture at $10,000 and her jewelry at $20,000.

[15] In support of his argument on appeal, Husband cites his own testimony that he estimated the value of Wife's furniture at $10,000 and the value of her jewelry at $20,000. None of those items were appraised. In her amended financial declaration form, Wife did not include any value for either party's furniture. And she estimated the total value of her jewelry to be $2,700. We cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion when it assigned values to these items of personal property.

Issue Two: Division of the Marital Estate

[16] Next, Husband argues that the trial court “erred in deviating from an equal division of the marital estate.” Appellant's Br. at 26. But Husband is incorrect. The trial court divided the marital estate equally. Accordingly, Husband's argument on this issue is entirely without merit.³

Issue Three: Findings and Conclusions

[17] Finally, Husband argues that the trial court erred when it adopted Wife's proposed findings and conclusions verbatim. Our Supreme Court has observed that “[t]his practice weakens our confidence as an appellate court that the findings are the result of considered judgment by the trial court.” Cook v. Whitsell-Sherman, 796 N.E.2d 271, 274 n.1 (Ind. 2003). However, here, while the trial court adopted most of Wife's proposed findings and conclusions, it did not adopt them verbatim. Indeed, Wife sought an unequal division of the marital estate (sixty-forty), but the court divided the marital estate equally. In addition, many of the trial court's findings are not disputed by Husband.

[18] Husband's primary argument on appeal turns on his incorrect assertion that the trial court divided the marital estate unequally. While Husband has contested the inclusion, exclusion, and valuation of various property in the marital pot, he has not shown any reversible error.

[19] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Husband lived in Afghanistan from August 2018 through September 2021.

2.   Husband makes much of the fact that Wife allegedly committed fraud by engaging in this tax scheme. Whether she did so is a question for another day and another forum.

3.   Because the trial court divided the marital estate equally, we need not address Husband's argument that Wife violated her duty as an attorney to be “forthcoming” with the trial court. Appellant's Br. at 31. Husband maintains that Wife's violation of that duty resulted in the trial court's deviation from an equal division of the marital estate.

Mathias, Judge.

Vaidik, J., and Pyle, J., concur.