Jackie D. Hubbard, Jr., Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] After Jackie Hubbard, Jr., pled guilty to Level 6 felony possession of a narcotic drug and admitted that he is a habitual offender in February of 2023, the trial court ordered that the judgment of conviction and sentence would be deferred pending Hubbard's successful participation in a drug-court program. One of the conditions of Hubbard's drug-court placement was that he not be charged with additional crimes. In October of 2024, the State petitioned to revoke Hubbard's drug-court placement on the basis that he had been charged with three new crimes. The trial court found that the State had met its burden to show that Hubbard had violated the terms of his drug-court placement, terminated his participation, entered judgment of conviction for possession of a narcotic drug, found Hubbard to be a habitual offender, and sentenced him to two years of incarceration, enhanced by four years due to Hubbard's habitual-offender status. Hubbard contends that the State produced insufficient evidence to sustain the termination and, in the alternative, that the trial court abused its discretion in terminating his drug-court placement. Because we disagree, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On June 30, 2022, the State charged Hubbard with Level 6 felony possession of a narcotic drug, Level 6 felony possession of methamphetamine, Level 6 felony unlawful possession of a syringe, and Class C misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia and alleged that he is a habitual offender. On February 9, 2023, the parties filed plea and drug-court-participation agreements, pursuant to which Hubbard agreed to plead guilty to possession of a narcotic drug and admit that he is a habitual offender enhancement in exchange for dismissal of the other charges. Judgment of conviction and sentence would be deferred pending his successful participation in a drug-court program. The trial court accepted Hubbard's plea and ordered him to report to the drug court on March 17, 2023. One of the conditions of Hubbard's placement was that he “shall not be charged with a criminal offense, based upon probable cause, during the duration of this program.” Ex. Vol. p. 3.

[3] In July of 2023, August of 2023, January of 2024, March of 2024, and September of 2024, Hubbard admitted to having violated the terms of his drug-court placement; after each admission he was continued in the program with additional conditions. On October 17, 2024, the State petitioned to revoke Hubbard's participation in drug court on the basis that he had been charged with three new criminal offenses in cause number 85C01-2410-F3-1074 (“Cause No. 1074”), namely Level 3 felony criminal confinement, Level 5 felony intimidation, and Class A misdemeanor invasion of privacy. The trial court held a hearing on the petition, and, on January 6, 2025, found that the State had met its burden to show that Hubbard had violated the terms of his drug-court placement and terminated his participation. On May 22, 2025, the trial court entered judgment of conviction for possession of a narcotic drug, found Hubbard to be a habitual offender, and sentenced him to two years of incarceration, enhanced four years by virtue of Hubbard's habitual-offender status.

Discussion and Decision

[4] Hubbard contends that the State failed to produce sufficient evidence to sustain his removal from drug court and that, in the alternative, the trial court abused its discretion in removing him. Drug court is a forensic diversion program akin to community corrections and probation. Benitez v. State, 199 N.E.3d 811, 813 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (citing Withers v. State, 15 N.E.3d 660, 663 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014)). A trial court's decision on drug-court violations is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Withers, 15 N.E.3d at 665. “An abuse of discretion occurs where the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances[.]” Heaton v. State, 984 N.E.2d 614, 616 (Ind. 2013).

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

[5] When reviewing a trial court's decision to terminate participation in a drug-court program, the reviewing court will “consider only the evidence most favorable to the judgment without reweighing that evidence or reassessing the credibility of the witnesses.” Cain v. State, 30 N.E.3d 728, 732 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). The State must prove an alleged violation of a condition of a problem-solving court by a preponderance of the evidence. Ind. Code § 33-23-16-14.5(c)(1). “If a problem solving court finds that an individual participating in a program has violated a condition of the program, the problem solving court may ‘continue the individual's participation in the program’ or ‘terminate the individual's participation in the problem solving court program.’ ” Benitez, 199 N.E.3d at 814 (quoting Ind. Code § 33-23-16-14.5(e)) (footnote omitted).

[6] We conclude that the State provided more than sufficient evidence to establish that Hubbard had violated several conditions of the drug-court program, namely evidence that Hubbard had violated the terms of the placement by being charged with three new criminal offenses. At the revocation hearing, the State produced a charging information showing that the State had charged Hubbard with three new offenses in Cause No. 1074 and that the trial court in that case had found probable cause to support his arrest. This established by a preponderance of the evidence that Hubbard had violated the condition of the program that he not be charged with a new criminal offense.

[7] While Hubbard “concedes that he has been charged with multiple criminal offenses based upon probable cause[,]” he claims that the State failed to show that he had “committed the crimes” by a preponderance of the evidence and not by probable cause. Appellant's Br. pp. 19, 20. Even if we assume that this is true, Hubbard's argument is misplaced. Here, the State did not allege (nor was it required to) that Hubbard had committed a new crime but, rather, only that he had been “charged with a new criminal offense, upon probable cause, during the duration of this program.” Ex. Vol. p. 3. The State produced sufficient evidence to sustain a finding that Hubbard had violated the terms and conditions of the drug-court program.

II. Drug-Court Termination.

[8] Hubbard contends that the trial court abused its discretion in terminating his participation in the drug-court program. A trial court may terminate an individual from participating in a problem-solving court if it finds that the individual “has violated a condition of the program[.]” Ind. Code § 33-23-16-14.5(e). The trial court found that Hubbard had violated the terms of the placement and concluded that he was not entitled to another chance. As mentioned, Hubbard had already violated the terms of the placement several times, including violations ranging from not attending treatment, missing a drug screen, and testing positive for alcohol, to testing positive for a substance that he had not been prescribed. We would not characterize these, like Hubbard does, as a “few hiccups[.]” Appellant's Br. p. 21. We also cannot agree that the trial court was required to give him yet another chance when he was charged with new crimes, thereby violating the terms of his placement again. See Benitez, 199 N.E.3d at 814 (affirming termination of defendant's participation in drug-court program where defendant admitted that he had committed multiple violations, which had not even included committing a new offense). Hubbard has failed to establish that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking his drug-court placement.

[9] We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Bradford, Judge.

Weissmann, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.