GILLEAND v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Following a jury trial, Timothy Gilleand appeals his conviction of neglect of a dependent, as a Level 6 felony, and his sentence. We affirm.

Issues

[2] Gilleand raises the following three issues on appeal:

I.  Whether the State provided sufficient evidence to support his conviction.

II.  Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it sentenced him.

III. Whether his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and his character.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] A.G. is Gilleand's niece, and she was born on April 20, 2012. When A.G. was nine months old, Gilleand and his wife, Marcella, (collectively, “Parents”) began caring for her; they adopted A.G. when she was four years old. A.G. was diagnosed with “high functioning” autism, Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (“ADHD”), and sensory integration disorder. Tr. v. III at 220. Gilleand was a licensed mental health professional with a master's degree in mental health counseling, and Marcella was a stay-at-home mother who homeschooled their children.

[4] A.G. lived on Poplar Street in Huntington with Gilleand, Marcella, and A.G.’s older adoptive siblings, Michael, M.G., and E.G. The house on Poplar Street had four bedrooms, and initially, A.G. shared a bedroom with her adopted sister, M.G. However, because A.G. frequently awoke late in the night and “was being destructive to all the things in the room,” A.G. was moved from M.G.’s bedroom to an upstairs hallway that divided the bedrooms. Tr. v. IV at 21. A.G. had a blanket and pillow while in the hallway and slept there for approximately one year.

[5] A.G. was then moved to an upstairs bathroom closet, known as the “gift closet,” that functioned as a storage room for gift boxes and wrapping paper. Tr. v. III at 152. The closet was approximately six feet by four feet and had no windows. Once A.G. began sleeping in the closet, Gilleand or Marcella made modifications: the working light was removed, and the functioning doorknob was replaced by a broken one so that it could not be opened from the inside. A.G. slept in this closet for six months even though Michael's bedroom was unoccupied for three months because Michael had begun sharing a bedroom with his brother, E.G.

[6] A.G. eventually moved into Michael's unoccupied bedroom. At that time, the bedroom had one functioning window, which A.G. opened on occasion to stick her head outside and look across the street at the employees of an auto parts shop. At that time, the bedroom also had a dresser, bed, clothes, books, and a nightstand. However, over time, Parents took away A.G.’s mattress, blanket, pillow, and most other items in the room. Parents also screwed the window shut and placed a covering on the bottom window to block the view.

[7] A.G. did not usually eat meals with the rest of family; rather, a family member took food to her room, where A.G. ate alone. For breakfast, A.G. was usually given four pieces of fruit, consisting of a banana, two apples, and an orange. For lunch and dinner, Parents gave A.G. one or two plain, microwaved potatoes, a green pepper, an apple or orange, and water. Gilleand claimed that this diet provided A.G. with 700 calories at each meal and that he was trying to heal her ADHD and autism with this strict diet.

[8] On rare occasions, A.G. was permitted to participate in birthdays and holidays. Likewise, when the family took part in church activities, movies, shopping, plays, and musicals, and visited friends, A.G. was permitted to participate only sometimes. When she did not participate, A.G. was in her bedroom. At times, she was left home alone, in her room, with the door shut and the door alarm on. Sometimes the family would “sneak” out of the house while leaving A.G. behind with no way to call for help in an emergency. Tr. v. III at 175.

[9] After she was moved into a bedroom, A.G. was frequently subjected to punishments that consisted of pushups, spankings, groundings, and having items taken away from her. Marcella kept a notebook in which she tallied the number of spankings and pushups that A.G. was “due” as punishment. Id. at 167. At one point, the tallies showed A.G. was due “a thousand spankings [and] pushups.” Id. Common offenses for which A.G. was punished were “stealing things and then lying about stealing things.” Id. at 165. Things A.G. “stole” included forks, pens, and her own toys that had been taken away and placed in the basement. Id. She also “stole” food such as dried oatmeal or a banana because she did not want to ask for food. She also sometimes took food off plates when she cleared the table and ate food from the kitchen trash can. Tr. v. II at 236.

[10] When confronted about “stealing” food and other items, A.G. denied stealing, which resulted in additional punishments. Tr. v. III at 166. If she lied about stealing, A.G. was confined to her room for the remainder of the day. Eventually the groundings became “longer and longer” until A.G. was grounded to her room five to six days a week and spent ninety percent of the time in her bedroom, essentially “from sunup to sundown.” Tr. v. IV at 8.

[11] An alarm was placed on the outside, top left corner of A.G.’s bedroom door, which was activated every night when A.G. was grounded. While A.G. initially tried to open the door, over the years she stopped trying because she did not want the alarm to go off. When she opened the door and the alarm sounded, she shut the door immediately because her sensory integration disorder made her particularly sensitive to loud noises. None of the other siblings had alarms on their doors or were confined to their bedrooms for lengthy periods of time.

[12] Because A.G. was unable to leave her room, she sometimes used the vents in her room to talk to her siblings and family friends who visited. Due to her alleged stealing, A.G. was eventually prohibited from leaving her room even to use the bathroom, and a “training potty” was placed in her room. Tr. v. III at 162-63. A.G. often did not have “toilet paper or any other means to clean herself when she used the training potty in her room,” id., and the training toilet was “caked with feces and urine,” Tr. v. II at 185.

[13] To occupy herself in the room in which she spent most of her time without possessions, A.G. tied her clothes into “mini figures.” Tr. v. II at 229-30. Parents then removed A.G.’s clothes from her room. A.G. also made “stuff” with toilet paper, and Parents then removed the toilet paper from her room. Id. at 234. A.G. peeled the fake wood off her dresser, used a penny to carve pictures into her dresser, and colored in her books; as a result, all of those items were eventually removed from A.G.’s room. A.G. tore a slit into the side of her mattress to store items such as forks, pens, and toys; when Parents discovered this, they removed A.G's mattress and bedframe from her room.

[14] Eventually, by the time A.G. was seven years old, her bedroom was completely empty except for a pillow, a blanket, a potty-training bowl, and a baby mattress that was eventually also removed. At times, A.G. had to “earn” her pillow and blanket by doing chores, completing schoolwork, or having no disciplinary issues, and sometimes she slept without either. Tr. v. III at 159. The walls of her room were dirty, and there were holes and chips out of the drywall. A.G.’s bedroom carpet was stained, and there was an “overwhelming” stench of urine. Tr. v. II at 180. To entertain herself in the empty room, A.G. played with the ants, gnats, and flies.

[15] When Michael moved out of the house in June 2022, he sent Marcella an email, which she shared with Gilleand, about Michael's concerns about their care of A.G., including Gilleand's past “jokes about putting [A.G.] back up for adoption.” Tr. v. III at 179-80. Afterwards, Michael and Parents spoke about Michael's concerns in person; however, after the discussion, neither Gilleand nor Marcella changed their treatment of A.G.

[16] Harley Zumbrun, who was best friends with M.G., had known Gilleand and his family from church for eight years. Over those years, Zumbrun visited Gilleand's house once or twice a week, including during 2022-2023. Zumbrun observed A.G. transition from residing in the hallway, to a bathroom closet, and eventually to an empty bedroom. After noticing A.G.’s skinny appearance and yellow skin, overhearing the family joking about forgetting to feed her, and seeing her small meals of a potato, pepper, and apple taken to her room where she primarily stayed all day, Zumbrun talked about A.G.’s treatment to her parents, who eventually contacted child protective services.

[17] On Thanksgiving Day of 2023, Heidi Strobel, a Family Case Manager (“FCM”) with the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”), and Detective Jordan Corral went to Gilleand's house after receiving a report of child neglect. They spoke with A.G. and Parents. When FCM Strobel and Detective Corral met A.G., she was very thin and underweight for her age—her khaki pants were cinched at the waist because they were oversized. A.G. wore a T-shirt and zip-up sweatshirt that was stained and dirty. She had dark circles under her eyes but had a pleasant disposition.

[18] Gilleand stated to FCM Strobel and Detective Corral that A.G. had been diagnosed with ADHD, oppositional defiant disorder, sensory issues, autism, and fetal alcohol syndrome. He described A.G. as “an impossible child” and described her as someone who lied, stole, and destroyed things. Tr. v. II at 175. Gilleand stated that A.G. received a vegetarian diet and that Parents were trying to “heal” her autism and ADHD through the diet. Id. at 177. Gilleand acknowledged that A.G.’s weight was a concern but advised that A.G. had had an unhealthy relationship with food since she was nine months old, based on the fact that she spit up milk, and he believed her to have an undiagnosed eating disorder based on her behavior of “hoard[ing] food.” Tr. v. IV at 6.

[19] When Detective Corral pointed out to Gilleand that A.G. was very thin and underweight, Gilleand said he had never really noticed a problem with A.G.’s appearance. When FCM Strobel asked Gilleand if he “would recommend to parents that [he was] counseling the same treatment that [he had] provided to [A.G.],” Gilleand responded, “Oh, God, no,” and “I don't even like it.” Id. at 102. DCS removed A.G. from the home later that same day, and A.G. was placed with her maternal grandparents.

[20] The State charged Gilleand ¹ with one count of Level 6 felony neglect of a dependent. Gilleand had a jury trial on May 14 through 16, 2025. At trial, the State presented evidence that, in September 2023, A.G. saw a clinical psychologist and was diagnosed with Level 1 autism. A.G. had never been diagnosed with reactive attachment disorder, bipolar, schizophrenia, or fetal alcohol syndrome, all disorders from which Gilleand claimed she suffered. Contrary to Gilleand's description of A.G. as an “impossible child,” the clinical psychologist found A.G. to be a “very pleasant child.” Tr. v. III at 215, 239. Because autism is a developmental disorder, the clinical psychologist believed that it requires stimulation and interaction. She further opined that, if A.G. was homeschooled and in her room eighty to ninety percent of the time with nothing except for a couple of blankets and a toddler potty, her psychological and emotional health would be stunted and she would not develop appropriately mentally, emotionally, or physically.

[21] Dr. Theppanya Keolasy was A.G.’s physician between 2017 and 2023. In approximately 2019, Dr. Keolasy became concerned about A.G.’s weight loss—she had gone from the thirtieth percentile in weight to the fifth percentile. Dr. Keolasy explained that a ten-to-twelve-year-old child needs approximately 1,600 calories per day to function correctly and develop normally. While it is acceptable for a child to be fed a vegetarian or vegan diet, a diet of solely fruits and vegetables would not be sufficient for a child's proper growth and development because it lacks the appropriate amounts of proteins and fats necessary for brain growth and development, as well as iron and minerals. A diet of a piece of fruit for breakfast, then a potato, pepper, and apple or orange for lunch and dinner would provide only a maximum of 1,000 calories per day and would not contain the necessary protein and fats for a ten-year-old girl to adequately grow and develop. A ten-to-twelve-year-old child with an adequate diet should grow one to two inches per year and gain about eight pounds each year.

[22] Dr. Keolasy ultimately diagnosed A.G. with “failure to thrive,” which means a child is not growing to their potential. Tr. v. III at 34. Additionally, A.G.’s skin had a yellowish tint, and Dr. Keolasy diagnosed her with carotenemia, which is caused by excess intake of foods high in carotene, such as squash, carrots, and sweet potatoes. A.G.’s lab results showed that she was also iron deficient. Dr. Keolsay referred A.G. to a dietician in 2019.

[23] A.G. and Marcella attended a dietician appointment with Dr. Megan Bobay on June 27, 2019. At that time, Dr. Bobay provided Marcella with information regarding a balanced healthy eating plan that could be adapted for plant-based eating, a plant-based nutritional supplement to fill in the gaps, and a vegan protein powder. However, Marcella was resistant to the recommendations to the point the dietician did not schedule a follow-up appointment. To Dr. Bobay's knowledge, no changes were made to A.G.’s diet.

[24] On December 6, 2023, after approximately a week in the care of her grandparents, A.G. was examined by pediatrician Dr. Thomas GiaQuinta. After reviewing A.G.’s medical documentation, the conditions of her living environment, her malnutrition, and weight, Dr. GiaQuinta's determined that A.G. was not growing as she should have been and, in fact, had had a decline in her growth from ages four to eleven. For example, A.G.’s medical records showed that on December 16, 2021, she weighed 56.4 pounds, and that nearly two years later, on October 11, 2023, she weighed 58.4 pounds. However, A.G.’s weight gain during just the brief time she had been in the care of her grandparents showed that, if given the right amount of calories, she would grow.

[25] Dr. GiaQuinta stated that, if a child did not receive enough calories every day, there would be physical and emotional consequences. The physical consequences included that the child would not grow to meet their potential and would suffer from bone thinning, poor vision, and an increased risk of infection. Children who are malnourished are also prone to behavioral problems and experience an ongoing state of stress if they are constantly hungry. This stress becomes toxic, raises cortisol levels, and can lead to very harmful consequences for a child that will last a lifetime and include increased risk of heart disease, diabetes, high blood pressure, and strokes.

[26] Dr. GiaQuinta's overall evaluation of A.G. disclosed that her physical and emotional health were in danger. He further noted that, if those conditions had continued, they would have had long-lasting impacts to A.G.’s overall social-emotional health, as well as her physical health. And if A.G.’s malnutrition had continued, it could have been fatal.

[27] Gilleand also testified at his trial. He admitted that he was an educated, licensed, practicing mental health professional who had taken classes in health, sociology, lifespan development, psychology, crisis intervention, human growth and development, cognitive personality, and physical and social development. Yet he contended that A.G.’s diet, punishments, and the removal of all items from her bedroom were either appropriate, beyond his control, or unknown to him because A.G. was mostly in Marcella's care. Gilleand stated that A.G. needed constant supervision. However, when he was asked about leaving A.G. home alone, Gilleand stated that, although he did not think it was appropriate, he “didn't know what else to do.” Tr. v. IV at 97. Gilleand stated that he “did not agree with much of” the way A.G. was treated but didn't “know what else [he] could've done.” Id. at 102. Gilleand agreed that A.G.’s “living conditions and the way she was living could've negatively impacted her mental health.” Id. at 102-03.

[28] The jury found Gilleand guilty as charged. At his sentencing hearing, Gilleand argued for the following alleged mitigating factors: he was employed; he is his family's sole source of income; because his wife is facing the possibility of incarceration, his family would experience undue hardship if Gilleand was also incarcerated; he had complied with all court orders so was likely to respond well to rehabilitation services; and he has no criminal history. The trial court sentenced Gilleand to two years in the Department of Correction. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

Sufficiency of the Evidence

[29] Gilleand challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction.

When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence needed to support a criminal conviction, we neither reweigh evidence nor judge witness credibility. We consider only the evidence supporting the judgment and any reasonable inferences that can be drawn from such evidence. We will affirm if there is substantial evidence of probative value such that a reasonable trier of fact could have concluded the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

Bailey v. State, 907 N.E.2d 1003, 1005 (Ind. 2009) (citation modified).

[30] To convict Gilleand of neglect of a dependent, as a Level 6 felony, the State was required to prove that (1) Gilleand, (2) who had the care of dependent, A.G., (3) knowingly (4) placed A.G. in a situation that endangered her life or health. See I.C. § 35-46-1-4(a)(1). “A person engages in conduct ‘knowingly’ if, when he engages in the conduct, he is aware of a high probability that he is doing so.” I.C. § 35-41-2-2(b). “Knowledge and intent are both mental states and, absent an admission by the defendant, the jury must resort to the reasonable inferences from both the direct and circumstantial evidence to determine whether the defendant has the requisite knowledge or intent to commit the offense in question.” Konkle v. State, 253 N.E.3d 1068, 1091 (Ind. 2025) (citation modified). “Under the child neglect statute a ‘knowing’ mens rea requires a subjective awareness of a ‘high probability’ that a dependent had been placed in a dangerous situation.” Pierson v. State, 73 N.E.3d 737, 741 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (citation modified), trans. denied.

[31] Gilleand does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence that he had the care of A.G. But he contends there was insufficient evidence that he was aware of a high probability that he had placed A.G. in a dangerous situation. However, the State presented more than sufficient evidence that Gilleand—a licensed, educated, practicing mental health professional with training in health, psychology, and human growth and development—restricted his autistic and sensory-disabled child, A.G., to an empty, dirty bedroom with no access to a fully functioning toilet for eighty to ninety percent of the time over a period of years; deprived A.G. of an adequate diet for years, despite medical warnings and obvious signs of A.G.’s malnutrition; and deprived A.G. of any possessions, including toys, and regular social interactions for a period of years. It was certainly reasonable for the jury to infer from Gilleand's professional background and training that he knew such actions endangered A.G.’s physical and psychological health. Moreover, Gilleand himself acknowledged “much of” the treatment of A.G. by Parents, including leaving A.G. alone in the house, was wrong, Tr. v. IV at 102, A.G.’s “living conditions and the way she was living could [have] negatively impacted her mental health,” id. at 102-03, and that he would not recommend similar treatment of children to parents he counseled in his professional life.

[32] The State presented more than sufficient evidence that Gilleand knowingly endangered his dependent, A.G.’s, life and/or health. Gilleand's assertions to the contrary are merely requests that we reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See Bailey, 907 N.E.2d at 1005.

Sentencing

[33] Gilleand maintains that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him. Sentencing decisions lie within the sound discretion of the trial court. Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1222 (Ind. 2008). An abuse of discretion occurs if the decision is “clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom.” Gross v. State, 22 N.E.3d 863, 869 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (citation omitted), trans. denied. A trial court abuses its discretion in sentencing if it does any of the following:

(1) fails “to enter a sentencing statement at all;” (2) enters “a sentencing statement that explains reasons for imposing a sentence—including a finding of aggravating and mitigating factors if any[ ]—but the record does not support the reasons;” (3) enters a sentencing statement that “omits reasons that are clearly supported by the record and advanced for consideration;” or (4) considers reasons that “are improper as a matter of law.”

Id. (quoting Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490-491 (Ind.), clarified on reh'g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007)).

[34] So long as a sentence is within the statutory range, the trial court may impose it without regard to the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors. Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 489. If the trial court does find the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors, it must give a statement of its reasons for selecting the sentence it imposes. Id. at 490. However, the relative weight or value assignable to reasons properly found, or those which should have been found, is not subject to review for abuse of discretion, Gross, 22 N.E.3d at 869, and a trial court is under no obligation to explain why a proposed mitigator does not exist or why the court found it to be insignificant, Sandleben v. State, 22 N.E.3d 782, 796 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied.

[35] The trial court sentenced Gilleand to two years executed to the DOC, which is six months less than the maximum sentence for a Level 6 felony. See I.C. § 35-50-2-7(b). Nevertheless, Gilleand asserts that his sentence should have been even less, given mitigating factors he contends the trial court did not consider. Specifically, Gilleand asserts that the trial court failed to adequately consider that: he was employed; he is his family's sole source of income; because his wife is facing the possibility of incarceration, his family would experience undue hardship if Gilleand was also incarcerated; he had complied with all court orders so was likely to respond well to rehabilitation services; and he has no criminal history. However, the trial court considered those factors and apparently concluded that most of them were not significant, and Gilleand has not established otherwise. See Tr. v. IV at 164. The trial court was under no obligation to explain its conclusion, see Sandleben, 22 N.E.3d at 796, and its decision regarding the weight to be given the mitigators is not subject to review, see Gross, 22 N.E.3d at 869.

[36] While the trial court acknowledged that Gilleand's lack of criminal history and status as the family's main source of income were significant mitigators, it found those mitigators were outweighed by the following serious aggravators: that, because of Gilleand's education and profession, he should be held to a higher standard in this type of situation; that he was in a position of trust with A.G.; that she was less than twelve years old when the offense was committed; that the neglect that occurred was more significant than what was required under the statute; and that Gilleand did not take responsibility for his actions. Those are all proper aggravators, and we may not reweigh them. See Gross, 22 N.E.3d at 869. The trial court was well within its discretion when it sentenced Gilleand to two years; in fact, the court would have been within its discretion had it given him the maximum sentence of two and one-half years, given its conclusion that “[t]his is one of the worst cases [the court had] seen of continued neglect.” Tr v. IV at 164.

Appellate Rule 7(B)

[37] Finally, Gilleand contends that his sentence is inappropriate considering the nature of the offense and his character. For Gilleand's Level 6 felony conviction, the sentencing range is between six months and two and one-half years, with an advisory sentence of one year. I.C. § 35-50-2-7(b). While Gilleand's two-year sentence is more than the advisory sentence, it is also less than the maximum sentence. Nevertheless, Gilleand contends that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and his character.

[38] Article 7, Sections 4 and 6 of the Indiana Constitution “authorize[ ] independent appellate review and revision of a sentence imposed by the trial court.” Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 491. This appellate authority is implemented through Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B). Id. As our Supreme Court recently explained,

Appellate Rule 7(B) serves “to leaven the outliers, rather than to achieve a perceived ‘correct’ sentence,” McCallister v. State, 91 N.E.3d 554, 566 (Ind. 2018), allowing revision of a sentence if the court finds the trial court's decision to be inappropriate in consideration of the nature of the offense and the offender's character, Inman v. State, 4 N.E.3d 190, 203 (Ind. 2014) (quoting App. R. 7(B)). “Ultimately, our constitutional authority to review and revise sentences boils down to our collective sense of what is appropriate,” Taylor v. State, 86 N.E.3d 157, 165 (Ind. 2017) (cleaned up), an act that is reserved for “exceptional” cases, Gibson v. State, 43 N.E.3d 231, 241 (Ind. 2015). It is up to the defendant to “persuade the appellate court that his or her sentence has met th[e] inappropriateness standard of review.” Childress [v. State], 848 N.E.2d [1073,] 1080 [(Ind. 2006)]. The trial court's sentence is afforded considerable deference and will stand unless [overcome by] “compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense (such as accompanied by restraint, regard, and lack of brutality) and the defendant's character (such as substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character).” Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015).

Cramer v. State, 240 N.E.3d 693, 698 (Ind. 2024).

[39] When considering the nature of an offense, we look at the defendant's actions in comparison to the elements of the offense. Cannon v. State, 99 N.E.3d 274, 280 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied. We focus “on the nature, extent and depravity of the offense ․ and what it reveals about the defendant's character.” Sorenson v. State, 133 N.E.3d 717, 729 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (internal quotation and citation omitted), trans. denied. Here, the details and circumstances comprising the nature of Gilleand's offense are egregious. For years, A.G. was treated not only less than her siblings, but less than human by Gilleand, who is her father and one of the only adults to whom she could look for care and support. Instead of fulfilling this role, Gilleand used his authority to deprive A.G. of basic food, care, and other items necessary to ensure her physical and mental health. See Hamilton v. State, 955 N.E.2d 723, 727 (Ind. 2011) (stating that harsher sentences are more appropriate where the defendant has violated a position of trust).

[40] Gilleand required A.G. to sleep in a hallway with only a pillow and blanket for upwards of a year, then required her to sleep in a bathroom closet with no window for nearly six months, even though a bedroom was available during a significant portion of that time. When he finally gave A.G. her own room, Gilleand continued the neglect by taking away her possessions one by one as punishments for A.G. attempting to take things that are necessary to basic human needs, like food. As a result, A.G. came to spend all her days and nights inside a dirty room with only a blanket and pillow which she had to “earn” through chores, and a training toilet that she was given because she was not allowed to leave her quarters to use the bathroom. Gilleand ensured his daughter's isolation by essentially locking her inside the room with an alarm that he knew she would not dare activate, due to the distress it would bring her because of her sensory integration disorder. In addition, Gilleand stunted A.G.’s physical growth by failing to provide the basic nutrition she needed to ensure proper growth and development. When A.G. attempted to augment her improper diet by taking food from other's plates when she cleared the table and from the trash, Gilleand punished A.G. And, despite knowing that A.G. required constant supervision, Gilleand left her home alone in her alarmed room with no way to call for help, if necessary. We agree with the trial court's conclusion that this is one of the worst, most extensive cases of continuing neglect.

[41] Nor does Gilleand's character warrant a sentence reduction. “The ‘character of the offender’ portion of the Rule 7(B) standard refers to general sentencing considerations and relevant aggravating and mitigating factors ․ and permits a broader consideration of the defendant's character.” Woodcock v. State, 163 N.E.3d 863, 878 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (internal quotations and citations omitted), trans. denied. Despite his mental health training, education, and career, Gilleand treated his young, autistic child worse than a prisoner. More, he took advantage of her known disabilities to essentially “lock” her in her room with an alarm that he knew her sensory integration disorder would not allow her to set off. Gilleand also joked about giving A.G. back up for adoption and forgetting to feed her. All of this shows a cruelty and callousness on Gilleand's part toward his own especially vulnerable young child who depended on him for care. In addition, Gilleand refused to accept responsibility for his neglect of A.G., which reflects poorly on his character. In short, there is no evidence that Gilleand has “substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character” that would support a sentence reduction; therefore, we affirm his sentence. Stephenson, 29 N.E.3d at 122.

Conclusion

[42] The State provided sufficient evidence to support Gilleand's conviction of neglect of a dependent, as a Level 6 felony. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Gilleand. And Gilleand has failed to demonstrate that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and his character.

[43] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Marcella was also charged separately.

Bailey, Judge.

Tavitas, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.