YOUNG v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Robert Lee Young, Sr., appeals his convictions for resisting law enforcement, a Level 6 felony, and operating a vehicle while intoxicated endangering a person, a Class A misdemeanor, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. Young argues that the convictions must be reversed because the State failed to show that he “voluntarily operated a motor vehicle.” Appellant's Brief at 11.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] While on routine patrol during the early morning hours of April 10, 2024, South Bend Police Officer Joshua Pennington observed a black Ford Fusion (the Ford) make a wide right turn from Humboldt Street onto Vassar Avenue. The vehicle struck a curb, moved back into the proper lane of traffic, and stopped at a stop sign. The Ford continued, straddled the two middle yellow lines on the road, and the driver—later identified as Young—eventually activated his turn signal and proceeded down another street.

[4] As Officer Pennington continued to follow the vehicle, he observed it swerve near a parked car. At that point, Officer Pennington activated his police cruiser's lights to initiate a traffic stop. The Ford did not stop and proceeded through a chain link fence and into a field before returning to the road. The vehicle then struck a curb and crashed into a tree.

[5] Young exited the vehicle with his hands in the air. After Young obeyed Officer Pennington's command to lie on the ground, other officers arrived, approached Young, and noticed that he smelled of alcohol. Young's speech was slurred, and he was unable to stand or sit upright on his own. Young was then transported to the hospital where he underwent a blood draw that showed a blood alcohol content “greater than .400 grams per 100 mil.” Transcript Vol. II at 86-87. The State charged Young with Level 6 felony resisting law enforcement and Class A misdemeanor operating a vehicle while intoxicated endangering a person.

[6] During a jury trial that commenced on March 7, 2025, two witnesses testified on Young's behalf that they had all been to a party and “somebody put [Young] in the car when he was unconscious.” Id. at 94, 107. One of the witnesses testified that another individual put the vehicle in drive and it “kinda rolled away” with Young in it. Id. at 107. Following the presentation of evidence, Young was found guilty as charged and was later sentenced.

[7] Young now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[8] Young challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, claiming that reversal is warranted because the State failed to establish that he was “voluntarily” driving the Ford when the incident occurred. In reviewing challenges to the evidence, it is the fact-finder's role, not that of appellate courts, to assess witness credibility and weigh the evidence to determine whether it is sufficient to support a conviction. Konkle v. State, 253 N.E.3d 1068, 1090 (Ind. 2025). A conviction is supported by sufficient evidence if there is substantial evidence of probative value supporting each element of the offense such that a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. We review only the evidence most favorable to the verdict and the reasonable inferences therefrom and will reverse “only where it is shown that no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 1090-91.

[9] To convict Young of operating a vehicle while intoxicated endangering another, a Class A misdemeanor, the State was required to prove that he operated the Ford while intoxicated “in a manner that endangers a person.” Ind. Code § 9-30-5-2(a) and (b). To convict Young of resisting law enforcement, a Level 6 felony, the State had to prove that he “knowingly or intentionally [used a vehicle] ․ [to flee] from a law enforcement officer after the officer ․ by visible or audible means, including operation of the law enforcement officer's siren or emergency lights, identified himself ․ and ordered [him] to stop ․” Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3-1(a)(3) and (c)(1).

[10] Relevant here is Ind. Code § 35-41-2-1(a) that provides “[a] person commits an offense only if he voluntarily engages in conduct in violation of the statute defining the offense.” (Emphasis added). Although voluntariness is not a statutory element of an offense, it is a “general element of criminal behavior.” Baker v. State, 208 N.E.3d 626, 638 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), trans. denied. Voluntariness is also an affirmative defense to criminal liability. Baird v. State, 604 N.E.2d 1170, 1176 (Ind. 1992). If, as here, a defendant's voluntariness is at issue, the State must prove that the defendant acted voluntarily beyond a reasonable doubt. See id.

[11] While Young contends that he was not driving the Ford “voluntarily,” the evidence demonstrated that while Officer Pennington was following the vehicle, Young stopped at a stop sign and activated his turn signal before turning at an intersection. Young continued driving erratically and ignored Officer Pennington's warning lights to stop. After crashing through a fence and into a tree, Young exited the Ford with his hands up and complied with Officer Pennington's commands to lie on the ground. From this evidence, the jury could reasonably conclude that Young's actions in driving while intoxicated endangering another and fleeing from police were voluntary.

[12] Young's arguments that he did not voluntarily drive the vehicle and flee from police because he was unconscious and someone pushed him into the Ford, turned the key, placed it in drive, and let it roll away, are requests to reweigh the evidence, which we do not do. See e.g., Thompson v. State, 804 N.E.2d 1146, 1149 (Ind. 2004) (holding that factfinders are not required to believe a witness's testimony even when it is uncontradicted). The evidence was sufficient to support Young's convictions.

[13] Judgment affirmed.

Altice, Chief Judge.

May, J. and Foley, J., concur.